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SOCRATES.

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# SOCRATES

## AND THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OF


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## PREFACE.



THE following pages on Socrates and the Socratic Schools are intended to offer to the English reader that part of Dr. Zeller's work, entitled 'Die Philosophie der Griechen,' which treats of Socrates and the imperfect Socratic Schools. This part has been chosen, in preference to any other, in the hope of supplying an introductory volume to the real philosophy of Greece, as it found expression in the complete systems of Plato and Aristotle. The person of Socrates, too, is so much the Sphinx of philosophy that any contribution from foreign sources which throws light on his life and his surroundings is likely to excite general interest.

The aim of the translator has been to adhere to the substance of Dr. Zeller's work, without necessarily adopting his language. In some parts the idea of a close translation has been followed, whilst in other parts considerable freedom of expression has been allowed; the invariable design being to reproduce the substance of Dr. Zeller's teaching in an

intelligible form, avoiding as far as possible all technicalities and unnecessary abstractions. The writer is aware how imperfectly he has been able to realise his own standard of excellence; but he believes that there is a large class of students who find it difficult to understand the work of Dr. Zeller in the original, and who will therefore accept with gentle criticism even an imperfect attempt.

The thanks of the writer are due to the Rev. Walter Mooney Hatch, of New College, and to the Rev. Henry J. Graham of Garsington, for assistance in preparing the manuscript for the press.]

OXHEY RISE, NEAR WATFORD:

*January, 1868.*

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## PART I.

### *THE GENERAL STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.*

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#### CHAPTER I.

##### THE INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT OF GREECE IN THE FIFTH CENTURY.

THE intellectual life of Greece had reached a point towards the close of the fifth century, in which the only alternatives open to it were either to give up science altogether, or to attempt a thorough transformation of it on a new basis. The older schools were not indeed wholly extinct; but all belief in the systems taught had been practically undermined, and a general disposition to doubt had set in. Following the practice of the Sophists, men had begun to call everything into question—to attack or defend with equal readiness every opinion. Faith in the aim of human ideas, or in the validity of moral laws, had wholly disappeared. Natural philosophy, on which the attention of thinkers had been engrossed for upwards of a century and a half, had now become distasteful; and, in fine, scientific enquiry had been supplanted by a merely superficial culture

CHAP.  
I.

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CHAP.  
I.

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of thought and language, and by the acquisition of such accomplishments only as were likely to serve the purposes of social life.

*Problem  
proposed to  
philosophy  
in the fifth  
century.*

This state of things was, however, naturally calculated to lead men to search after a new method of knowledge—one which would avoid the defects and one-sidedness of previous systems, by a more rigorous treatment of the questions raised. The possibility of a new method had been indirectly pointed out by the logical inconsistencies of previous speculation, and the instruments for scientific enquiry had been sharpened by eristic quibbles and subtleties, and ample material for the erection of a new structure might now be gained from the ruins of those that had preceded it. Moreover, the practical effect of the Sophistic tendencies had been, to open up a new field of enquiry, which gave promise of a rich harvest for speculative enquiry. The question now proposed to Greek philosophy was, whether a creative genius would arise to make use of the material prepared, and to direct thought into a new channel. It was at this crisis that Socrates appeared.

*A. The  
problem  
solved by  
political  
events.  
(1) Po-  
litical un-  
settledness.*

The question depended greatly on the course which political circumstances, moral life, and general culture had taken. The connection between philosophy and the conditions of social life, at all times intrinsic, had been brought out by the Sophists with striking clearness. In its political character, too, Greece had undergone changes of the most startling kind. Never has a nation had a more rapid or more brilliant career of military glory in

union with high culture than had the Greeks. Yet never has national decay been more rapid or more complete. The achievements of the Persian war, the rich profusion of brilliant art of the time of Pericles, were followed immediately by an internal conflict, which wasted the strength and prosperity of the free cities of Greece in unhallowed domestic quarrels. In the course of this conflict, the independence which Greece had so hardly won, was hopelessly lost, her freedom undermined, her moral instincts corrupted, and her reputation irretrievably ruined. A progress which elsewhere it would have required centuries to make, had been worked out within a few generations. When the pulse of national life beat so fast, the general spirit was sure to be exposed to rapid and marked changes; and where so much that was great had happened in so short a time, a rich growth of ideas was sure to spring up, awaiting only the magic touch of skill to form themselves into scientific systems.

The position assumed by Athens since the close of the Persian war, was of the greatest importance for the future of Philosophy. During their recent struggles the consciousness of their common connection had dawned upon the Hellenes with a force hitherto unparalleled. The representations in myth and legend of a Grecian expedition against Troy, might seem to be realised in the domain of actual history, in Greece standing as a united nation opposed to the East. The general headship of this body had fallen to the lot of Athens, which in conse-

(2) *Athens  
a centre of  
union and  
stability.*

CHAP.  
I.

quence became the centre also of the intellectual movement, 'the Prytaneum of the wisdom of Greece.'<sup>1</sup> This circumstance in itself had a most beneficial effect on the subsequent development of philosophy. Already in the previous schools, an impulse might have been noticed prompting them to come forth from isolation; an active interchange of thought was carried on between the East and the West of Greece, through the cosmical philosophers of the fifth century; and now that the Sophists were travelling from one end to the other of the Grecian world, and were carrying to Thessaly the eloquence of Sicily, to Sicily the doctrines of Heraclitus, these various sources of culture could not fail gradually to flow together into one mighty stream. Still it was of great importance, that a solid bed should be hollowed out for this stream, and that its course should be directed towards a fixed end, a result which was brought about by the rise of the Attic philosophy. When once the various tendencies of pre-Socratic enquiry had met and crossed in Athens, as the common centre of the Grecian world, it was possible for Socrates to set up a more comprehensive view of science; and henceforth Greek philosophy continued to be so firmly bound up with Athens, that till the time of the New Academy that wonderful city continued to be the birthplace of all schools historically important, as it was the last refuge to which they retreated before they were finally suppressed by Justinian.

In attempting, by means of the literary remains

<sup>1</sup> So called by Hippias in Plato, Prot. 337, D.

we possess, to realise to ourselves the change which took place in the Greek mode of thought during the fifth century, and in trying to estimate the worth and extent of the contributions yielded to philosophy by the general culture of the time, we must, in the first place, look to the great Athenian tragedians, as they will be found admirably to depict the character of the respective epochs to which they successively belong. In the first of them, Æschylus, there is an earnestness of purpose, a depth of religious feeling, a surpassing power and grandeur, worthy of a man of ancient virtue, who had himself taken part in the great battles with the Persians. At the same time there is something harsh and violent in his poetry, a quality which in a time of heroic deeds and sacrifices, of mighty chances and inspiring results, cannot either be softened down or dispensed with. The spirit of his tragedies is that of a manly nature, undaunted and giant-like, rarely moved by tenderness of feeling, but spell-bound by reverence for the gods, the recognition of an unbending moral order, and resignation to a destiny from which there is no escape. The Titan-like daring of unbridled strength, the wild fury of the passions and of madness, the crushing might of fate, the dread of divine vengeance, no poet ever painted more thrillingly than Æschylus. Reverence for the power of the Gods is the source of all his convictions, but in that power his eye at a glance sees, as it were, the monotheism of one almighty power. What Zeus says comes to pass; his will is always carried out,

CHAP.  
I.

B. *The  
problem  
solved by  
literature.*

(1) *The  
tragedians.*

(a) *Æs-  
chylus.*

CHAP.  
I.

even though it escape the notice of men; <sup>1</sup> no mortal can do anything against his will, <sup>2</sup> none can escape the decision of heaven, or rather destiny, <sup>3</sup> over which Zeus himself is powerless. <sup>4</sup> Man in the face of this divine power feels himself weak and frail; his thoughts are fleeting as the shadow of smoke; his life is like a picture which a sponge washes out. <sup>5</sup> Man must not ignore his position, he must learn not to overrate what is human, <sup>6</sup> let him not be indignant with the Gods when in affliction, <sup>7</sup> let his feelings not rise too high; let him remember that the grain of guilt, planted by pride, grows to a harvest of tears, <sup>8</sup>—such is the teaching which, with glowing words, flashes on us in every page of the poet.

Not even Æschylus, however, was able to grasp this idea in its purity, or to rise above the contradiction which runs not only through Greek tragedy, but through the whole of the Greek view of life. On the one hand he gives utterance to the ancient belief in the envy of the Gods, which is so closely connected with the peculiarity of natural religion; sickness lurks under the rudest health—the wave of fortune, when it bears man highest on its crest, breaks on a hidden reef—the man on whom fortune smiles, must voluntarily renounce a part of what he has, <sup>9</sup> if he will escape ruin; even heaven itself brings guilt on

<sup>1</sup> Suppl. 598; Agamemnon, 1485.

<sup>2</sup> Prometh. 550.

<sup>3</sup> Pers. 93; Fragm. 299 (Dindorf).

<sup>4</sup> Prometh. 511.

<sup>5</sup> Fragm. 295; Agam. 1327.

<sup>6</sup> Niobe, Fr. 155.

<sup>7</sup> Frag. 369 (Dindorf).

<sup>8</sup> Pers. 820.

<sup>9</sup> Agamem. 1001; compare Herodotus, iii. 40.



men, when it will utterly destroy a family.<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, Æschylus never tires of insisting on the connection between guilt and punishment. He not only paints with telling touches the unavoidable nature of divine vengeance, the mischief which follows in the wake of pride, the never-dying curse of crime, in the old stories of Niobe and Ixion, of Laius and the house of Atreus, but in the unexpected result of the Persian expedition he sees a higher hand, visiting with punishment the self-exaltation of the great king, and the insults offered to the gods of Greece. Man must suffer<sup>2</sup> according to his deeds. God blesses him who lives in piety without guile and pride, but vengeance,<sup>3</sup> though slow at first, suddenly comes upon the transgressor of right. Diké strikes some down with a sudden blow,<sup>4</sup> and slowly crushes others. The curse of crime gathers strength from generation to generation, just as virtue and happiness<sup>5</sup> descend on children and children's children. The Furies are at work in the concerns of men, avenging the fathers' sins on the sons,<sup>6</sup> sucking the criminal's life-blood, stealthily clinging to his feet, throwing round him the snares of madness, pursuing him with punishment down to the shades.<sup>7</sup> Thus the thought of divine justice and of implacable destiny runs firmly and steadily through all the plays of Æschylus. But all the more remarkable on that account is the vigour with which he breaks through

<sup>1</sup> Niobe, Fr. 160; blamed by Plato, Rep. 380, A.

<sup>3</sup> Eumen. 530; Fr. 283.

<sup>4</sup> Choeph. 61.

<sup>2</sup> Agam. 1563; Choeph. 309; Fr. 282.

<sup>5</sup> Agam. 750.

<sup>6</sup> Eum. 830.

<sup>7</sup> Eum. 264, 312.

CHAP.  
I.

the fetters of this view of the world. In the *Eumenides*, these moral collisions, the play of which *Æschylus* can so well pourtray,<sup>1</sup> are brought to a satisfactory issue when the Olympic Goddess of light appeases the avenging spirits of Night, and the severity of the ancient blood-exacting Justice gives way to human kindness. In the *Prometheus*, natural religion as a whole celebrates its moral transfiguration; the zeal of the gods against men is seen to resolve itself into mercy; Zeus himself requires the aid of the Wise One, who has felt the whole weight of divine wrath because of his kindness to men; but, on the other hand, the unbending disposition of the Titan is relaxed, and Zeus' rule of might is changed into a moral government of willing subordination. But in reality the history which the poet places in the mythical past is that of his own time and of his own mind. He was standing on the boundary line between two periods of culture, and the story he tells of the mitigation of ancient justice, and of the new rule of the Gods, was acted over again in another way when the sternness of the race which fought at Marathon softened down into the genial beauty which characterised the time of Pericles.

(b) *Sophocles.*

This new spirit finds its fullest expression in the plays of *Sophocles*. Although in principle he agrees with his predecessor, his tragedies create a very different impression. The keynote of his poetry is equally reverence for the Gods, whose hand and law encompass human life. All things, even mis-

<sup>1</sup> *Choeph.* 896; *Eum.* 198, 566.

fortune,<sup>1</sup> come from the Gods; no mortal can withstand their never decaying power; nothing can escape their decree;<sup>2</sup> no deed and no thought can be hid from their eyes;<sup>3</sup> no one may transgress their eternal laws,<sup>4</sup> created as they are by a superhuman power. Men, however, are weak and frail, mere shadows or dreams, non-existent, and only capable of a passing semblance of happiness.<sup>5</sup> No mortal's life is free from misfortune,<sup>6</sup> and even the happiest man cannot be called happy before his death;<sup>7</sup> and taking all things into account, which the changing day brings with it, the number of woes, the rarity of good-fortune, the end to which all must come, it would be well to repeat the old saying, 'Not to have been born is the best lot, and the next best is to die as soon as may be.'<sup>8</sup> The highest wisdom of life is, therefore, to control our wishes, to moderate our desires, to love justice, to fear God, to be resigned to fate. Sophocles makes use of the example of men who have been hurled from the summit of fortune, or who have been ruined by recklessness and overbearing, to show that man should not exalt himself above what is human, for only the modest man is acceptable to the Gods;<sup>9</sup> arrogance hurries on to sudden destruction; Zeus hates the vaunts of a boasting tongue.<sup>10</sup> Like

<sup>1</sup> Ajax. 1036; Trach. 1278.<sup>2</sup> Antig. 604, 951; Fr. 615.<sup>3</sup> Electra, 657.<sup>4</sup> Œd. Rex, 864; Antig. 450.<sup>5</sup> Ajax, 125; Œd. R. 1186; Fr. 12, 616, 860.<sup>6</sup> Antig. 611; Fr. 530.<sup>7</sup> Œd. R. Trach. 1, 943; Fr. 532, 583.<sup>8</sup> Œd. Col. 1215.<sup>9</sup> Ajax, 127, 758; Œd. Col. 1211; Fr. 320, 528.<sup>10</sup> Œd. R. 873; Antig. 127.

CHAP.  
I.

Æschylus, Sophocles is full of the thought of divine retribution and of the worth of virtue. He knows that uprightness is better than riches, that loss is better than unjust gain, that heavy guilt entails heavy punishment, but that piety and virtue are worth more than all things else, and are rewarded not only in this world but in the next.<sup>1</sup> He even declares that it is more important to please those in the next world than those in this.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, he is convinced that all wisdom comes from the Gods, and that they are always leading to what is right,<sup>3</sup> though at the same time men may not cease from learning and striving.<sup>4</sup> He bids them to commit their griefs to Zeus, who looks down from heaven and arranges all things, and to bear what the Gods send with resignation:<sup>5</sup> and in this belief he remains unshaken, despite the misfortunes of many good men, and the good fortune of many bad ones.<sup>6</sup>

The same thoughts had inspired the poetry of Æschylus, and yet the spirit of the drama of Sophocles is very different from his. There is in Sophocles a higher artistic perfection, a richer dramatic movement, a finer painting of the inner life, a more careful development of actions from character and of character from actions, a softer beauty, a clearer and more pleasing language, without at all rivalling the stormy power, the wild exultation, and the

<sup>1</sup> Fr. 18, 210, 196; Philoc. 1440. bably there is a *θεία μοῖρα*.

<sup>2</sup> Ant. 71.

<sup>4</sup> Fr. 731, 736.

<sup>5</sup> Elec. 174; Fr. 523, 862.

<sup>3</sup> Fr. 834, 227, 809, 865; in the unintelligible *θεία ἡμέρα* pro-

<sup>6</sup> Fr. 104.

grand view of history taken by Æschylus. But the moral ground of the two tragedians is not the same. Both are penetrated with reverence for the Gods; but, in the case of Æschylus, this reverence is combined with a dread which has first to be set aside, and with a contradiction, which has to be overcome before it can come up to the trustful resignation and the blissful grace of the piety of Sophocles. The power of fate seems with Æschylus much harsher, because it is less called for by the character of those whom it reaches; the reign of Zeus is a reign of terror, mitigated only by degrees, and the individual must perish if the Deity establish too close a relation with him.<sup>1</sup> Both celebrate the victory of moral order over human self-will; but in Æschylus the victory is preceded by severer and more dreadful struggles. Moral order is, with him, a tremendous power, crushing the refractory; whereas, with Sophocles, its work is completed with the quiet certainty of a law of nature, and awakens pity for human weakness rather than terror. That conflict of the old stern blood-exacting justice with the new, which is the subject of the Eumenides, forms the background of the plays of Sophocles, with whom justice is, from the very beginning, united with mercy, and in the 'Œdipus Coloneus' the most accursed of all mortals finds an end in expiation. His heroes too are of a different kind to those of his predecessor. In Æschylus moral opposites are so hard, that human

<sup>1</sup> Compare the character of Io in the Prometheus, especially v. 887, &c.



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representatives of them are not adequate to express them; and thus he brings into the battle-field Zeus and the Titans, the daughters of Night and of Olympus; but the tragedy of Sophocles takes place entirely in the world of men. The former prefers to introduce mighty natures and uncontrolled passions. The latter loves to depict what is noble, self-contained, tender; strength is generally placed side by side with dignity, and pain with resignation, for which reason his female characters are exquisitely true to life. Æschylus describes the demoniacal side of woman's nature with all its repulsiveness in his Clytæmnestra; Sophocles in his Antigone displays the true woman who knows 'how to love but not to hate,'<sup>1</sup> and who by the heroism of her love puts hatred to shame. In short the poetry of Sophocles sets before us an epoch and a people which has risen to fame and power by successful attempts at a happy use of its capacities, and which, enjoying its own existence, has learned to look on human nature and all that belongs to it in a cheerful spirit, to prize its greatness, to mitigate its sufferings by timely recognition, to bear its weakness, to control its excesses by custom and law. From him the idea may be gathered, as it may from no other poet, of a beautiful natural agreement between duty and inclination, between freedom and order, which constitutes the moral ideal of the Greek world.

(c) *Euripides.*

Euripides is only about four or five Olympiads later than Sophocles; but his writings present a

<sup>1</sup> Ant. 523.

remarkable change in ethical tone and view of life. Even as an artist Euripides constantly uses calculation to supply the place of an immediate poetic inspiration, and discriminating reflection in the place of a harmonising admiration. By means of particular scenes of an exciting and terrifying character, by choruses which have often little to do with the action of the play, and by rhetorical declamations and sayings, he endeavours to produce an effect, which might be gained in greater purity and depth from the connection of the whole. So too the agreement of moral and religious life, which commended itself so strongly to us in Sophocles, may be seen in a state of dissolution in the plays of the younger poet. He must not, however, be supposed to be deficient in moral maxims and religious thoughts. He knows full well that piety and the virtue of moderation are the best things for man; that he who is mortal must not grow proud in success or despairing in misfortune; that he can do nothing without the Gods; that in the long run the good man succeeds and the bad fails; that a moderate good-fortune is preferable to the vicissitudes of greatness;<sup>1</sup> that the poor man's fear of the Gods is worth more than the pompous sacrifices of many a rich one; that virtue and understanding are better than wealth and noble birth.<sup>2</sup> He discourses at length of the benefits conferred by the Gods on men,<sup>3</sup> he speaks well of their righteous and almighty rule,<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bacch. 1139; Fr. 77, 80, 257, 305, &c.

<sup>3</sup> Suppl. 197.

<sup>4</sup> Troad. 880; Hel. 1442.

<sup>2</sup> Fr. 329, 53, 254.

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and he even traces back human guilt to their will.<sup>1</sup> But all such expressions, however numerous, do not contain the whole of his view of the world, and the ethical peculiarity of his poetry is not to be found in them.

Euripides has sufficient appreciation of what is great and morally beautiful, to be able to paint it when it occurs in a true and telling manner. But as he is a student of philosophy,<sup>2</sup> and is related in spirit to the better Sophists, he deviates too far from the older method of thought, to be able to devote himself absolutely and with real conviction to the traditional faith and morality. He has sober understanding enough to recognise that many myths are improbable and unseemly; but he has not sufficient artistic power to rise above this for the sake of the ideas they embody, and for their poetic worth. The fortunes of men do not seem to him to be the immediate revelation of a higher power, but rather the result of natural cause, of calculation, of caprice, and of chance. Even moral principles appear wavering, and though on the whole they are looked upon as binding, still the poet cannot conceal from himself that much may be said for an immoral course of conduct. The sublime poetic view of the world, the half-moral, half-religious way of looking at human life, has been succeeded by a sceptical tone, a

<sup>1</sup> Hippol. 1427.

<sup>2</sup> Compare with reference to the views of Anaxagoras, which are especially to be found in the Fragments, Hartung's Euripides

Restit. i. 109, 118. Anaxagoras, however, does not, like Euripides, make Earth and Ether, but Air and Ether come first after the original mixing of all things.

critical reflection, and a kind of natural positivism. Æschylus brought the Eumenides, in the uncouth guise of antiquity, yet with a startling effect on to the stage; whereas the Electra of Euripides says to her brother, or rather the poet himself says, that the Furies are mere offsprings of the imagination.<sup>1</sup> While Iphigeneia is preparing to sacrifice the captives, she reflects that the goddess herself cannot possibly require this sacrifice, and that the story of the feast of Tantalus is a fable.<sup>2</sup> Similarly in the Electra<sup>3</sup> the chorus raises doubts as to the miracle of the change in the course of the sun. In the Troades,<sup>4</sup> Hecuba calls in question the story of the judgment of Paris, and explains the assistance of Aphrodite in carrying off Helen to mean the attractive beauty of Paris. In the Bacchæ,<sup>5</sup> Teiresias gives an insipid, half-natural explanation of the birth of Bacchus.<sup>6</sup> The Gods, says Euripides,<sup>7</sup> have no needs, and therefore the stories which impute to them human passions cannot possibly be true. Even the general notions of divine punishment give him offence. Punishment must not be looked upon as a visitation for particular acts, but as a general law.<sup>8</sup> In other cases he throws blame on the actions and commands of the Gods—a blame too which, for the most part, is not called for by the development of the characters, and entails no punishment in the sequel; and it must, therefore, necessarily appear as the poet's own con-

<sup>1</sup> Orest. 248, 387.<sup>2</sup> Iphi. Taur. 372.<sup>3</sup> 734.<sup>4</sup> 963.<sup>5</sup> 265.<sup>6</sup> Frag. 209.<sup>7</sup> Herc. Fur. 1328.<sup>8</sup> Fr. 508.

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viction;<sup>1</sup> and from this he at one time concludes, that man need not disturb himself because of his faults, since the Gods commit the same; at another time, that the stories about the Gods cannot be true.<sup>2</sup>

He attaches an equally slight importance to prophetic art, and makes use of an opportunity in the Helen,<sup>3</sup> to prove, on highly rationalistic grounds, that it is lying and deceit.<sup>4</sup> Belief in the Gods is, however, thoroughly interwoven with these myths and rites. No wonder, then, that the poet often makes his heroes utter statements about the existence of the Gods, which would sound much better from the mouth of Protagoras, than from men and women of the mythical past: as, for instance, when Talthybius raises the question and asks whether there are Gods, or whether Chance guides all things;<sup>5</sup> or when another is made to doubt the existence of the Gods,<sup>6</sup> because of the unjust distribution of good and bad fortune. Hecuba in her prayer wonders what the deity really is, whether Zeus, or natural necessity, or the spirit of mortal beings;<sup>7</sup> Hercules and Clytæmnestra leave it an open question, whether there are Gods, and who Zeus is;<sup>8</sup> and even the Ether is explained to be God.<sup>9</sup> These utterances prove at least

<sup>1</sup> Io, 448, 1315; Elect. 1298; with Euripides. Orest. 277.

<sup>2</sup> Herc. Fur. 1301.

<sup>3</sup> 743.

<sup>4</sup> Sophocles, Antig. 1033, makes Cleon attack the prophet, but his accusations are refuted by the sequel. But not so

<sup>5</sup> Hel. 484.

<sup>6</sup> Fr. 288; compare Fr. 892.

<sup>7</sup> Troad. 877.

<sup>8</sup> Herc. Fur. 1250; Iph. Aul. 1034; Orestes, 410.

<sup>9</sup> Fr. 935, 869.



that Euripides had wandered far away from the ancient faith, but though we allow that he utters his own belief when he asserts, that only a fool can deny the deity and believe the false pretensions of philosophy about what is hidden,<sup>1</sup> still in general he appears to assume a sceptical and critical attitude towards the popular faith. Probably he allowed that there was a God, but he certainly attributed no value to the mythical notions about the Gods; he believed that the essence of God could not be known, and he presupposed the oneness of the divine nature either by glossing over or by plainly denying the ruling Pantheism.<sup>2</sup>

In a similar way he expresses himself about the popular ideas on the future state. Naturally enough, he makes use of them when it is in his power, but then he also says, that we know not how it is with another life, we only follow an unfounded opinion. In several places he gives utterance to an opinion<sup>3</sup> which refers partly to Orphic and Pythagorean traditions, and partly to the teaching of Anaxagoras and Archilaus, that the spirit returns at death to the ether from which it came;<sup>4</sup> and apparently leaves it an undecided question, whether at all, or to what extent, consciousness belongs to this soul when united with the ether.<sup>5</sup> Nor is the sphere

<sup>1</sup> Fr. 905, 981.

<sup>2</sup> Fr. 804.

<sup>3</sup> Hippolyt. 192.

<sup>4</sup> Suppl. 532; Hel. 1012; Fr. 836.

<sup>5</sup> He says in the *Helen*: The

soul of the dead does not survive, but yet it has an eternal consciousness after it has united with the immortal Ether. From this he deduces the belief in retribution after death, and he asks (Fr.

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of morals untouched by these doubts; a fact which may be gathered from the general character of his tragedies rather than from particular statements, though the latter sufficed to give offence to his contemporaries.<sup>1</sup> The tragic motives of Euripides, like those which Æschylus and Sophocles had so deeply sounded, are not to be sought in the collision of moral forces, but in personal passions, complications and experiences. His heroes have not that ideal character which makes them types of a whole class, and therefore, the highest necessity which we admired before is not active in the development of the Euripidean drama, but the solution of the plot is visibly brought about by the appearance of Gods, or by some human device. Thus a tragedian, so rich in poetic beauties, so successful in painting individual characters, so experienced in knowledge of human life and human frailty, so telling in many of his speeches and acts, must yet be said to have come down from the moral and artistic height of his two great predecessors, in order to introduce into tragedy a method of inward reflection, of studied effect, and of artificial language, like that which was followed by the delicate neatness of Agatho, and the didactic pretensions of Critias.

(2) *Didactic poetry.*

Cotemporary with Æschylus, or even a little before him, lived the poets Epicharmus, Simonides, and Pindar, and soon after him Bacchylides. It

639), whether on the whole life is not death and death life. On the other hand in the Troades, 638, he says, the dead man is like an unborn child, feelingless; and in

the Heraclid. 591, he leaves it an open question whether the dead have any feelings.

<sup>1</sup> As for instance: ἡ γλῶσσ' ὀμῶμοκε, &c. Hippol. 607.

belongs to a former period to shew what a rational view of the world is taken by Epicharmus, and how pure are his moral and theological notions, thanks to his connection with philosophy. Simonides, too, seems on the whole, so far as his views can be gathered from scattered fragments, to uphold the cause of moderation and self-restraint; the result, however, of recognising human weakness and frailty. Our life is full of sorrows<sup>1</sup> and troubles; its fortune is uncertain; it is quickly gone; even prudence<sup>2</sup> is too readily lost by men, and their hardly-won virtue is imperfect and unreliable, and changes with circumstances. He fares best on whom the Gods bestow prosperity. A faultless man must not be looked for; it must be enough to find one righteously disposed.<sup>3</sup> The art of Simonides is inherited by Bacchylides, who gives utterance to the same feelings. He knows that no one is altogether happy, and that few are preserved from heavy changes of fortune, and breaks out into complaints of others: 'Not to have been born were the happiest lot;'<sup>4</sup> and hence he places the highest wisdom of life in equanimity, that is, content with the present, and takes no thought for the future.<sup>5</sup> At the same time he is convinced that man can discover what is right, and that Zeus, the almighty ruler of the world, is not to blame for the misfortunes of mortals.<sup>6</sup>

Exactly the same sentiments may be observed (c) *Pindar*

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(a) *Simonides*.

(b) *Bacchylides*.

<sup>1</sup> Fr. 32, 36, 38, 39.

<sup>2</sup> Fr. 42.

<sup>3</sup> Fr. 5.

<sup>4</sup> Fr. 1, 2, 3, 21.

<sup>5</sup> Fr. 19.

<sup>6</sup> Fr. 29.

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here as were expressed by the earlier didactic poets, without, however, any noticeable difference in a moral point of view. A more peculiar and more powerful spirit, and one nearly akin to Æschylus, finds utterance in Pindar. The secret of Pindar's view of the world, like that of Æschylus, is an exalted notion of the Deity, 'God is the all;'<sup>1</sup> nothing is impossible for Him. Zeus governs all things according to His will. It is He that bestows success or failure.<sup>2</sup> In Him the law, to which both Gods and men must bow, realises itself with a mighty power.<sup>3</sup> Even the deeds of men are not hid from His all-seeing eyes.<sup>4</sup> Only what is beautiful and noble can be attributed to the Gods. He who accuses them of human vices cannot escape their punishment.<sup>5</sup> In contrast with this divine exaltation, man occupies a twofold attitude. On the one hand his nature is related to that of the Gods—the two races come from a single stock; on the other hand his power is infinitely different, and neither in body nor in mind can we creatures of the day be compared with the immortals;<sup>6</sup> our lot is changeful, and joy and sorrow lie near together.<sup>7</sup> True wisdom, therefore, consists in not going beyond the bounds of

<sup>1</sup> Clemens Stromat. v. 610 : Πίνδαρος . . . ἀντικρὺς εἰπὼν, τί θεός; ὅτι τὸ πᾶν. It may have been that Pindar used the words θεὸς τὸ πᾶν in the same sense that Sophocles said (Trach. 1278) οὐδὲν τοῦτων ὅτι μὴ Ζεὺς, to express, All depends upon God.

<sup>2</sup> Fr. 119; Pyth. ii. 49, 88; Nem. x. 29.

<sup>3</sup> Fr. 146.

<sup>4</sup> Ol. i. 64; Pyth. iii. 28.

<sup>5</sup> Ol. i. 28.

<sup>6</sup> Nem. vi. 1. According to Frag. 108, the soul, the εἰδωλον αἰῶνος, comes from God alone, and proves its higher nature in dreams.

<sup>7</sup> Ol. ii. 30.

what is human, in looking to the Gods for all that is good, and in being content with what they bestow. 'Seek not to be a God,' exclaims the poet; 'what is mortal becomes mortals, and he who soars to heaven will, like Bellerophon, have a precipitate fall.'<sup>1</sup> Blessing and success is only to be had when God points the way;<sup>2</sup> the result of our labour is in His hand, according as he is determined by destiny.<sup>3</sup> From God comes all virtue and knowledge;<sup>4</sup> and for the very reason that it is a gift of God, natural talent is placed by Pindar far above all acquirements, and the creative spirit, to which Deity has imparted Himself, above all other spirits, as the eagle of Zeus is above the croaking rooks.<sup>5</sup> We must resign ourselves to what God disposes, and be content with our lot, whatever it be. Strive not against God; bear his yoke without kicking against the pricks; adapt yourself to circumstances; seek not what is impossible; in all things observe moderation; beware of envy, which strikes the highest most severely. These are the counsels of the poet.<sup>6</sup> To give greater weight to his moral counsels he not unfrequently appeals to a future retribution, of the wicked as well as of the good, in doing which he sometimes follows the ordinary notions of Tartarus, of Elysium, and the islands<sup>7</sup> of the blest, whilst at other times he con-

<sup>1</sup> Ol. v. 24; Isthm. v. 14; vii. 25, iii. 40.

<sup>2</sup> Fr. 85. <sup>3</sup> Pyth. ii. 34, 88; iii. 21, 59, 103; xi. 50; Fr. 201.

<sup>4</sup> Pyth. xii. 28.

<sup>5</sup> Ol. ix. 28, 103; Pyth. i. 41; Fr. 118. <sup>6</sup> Ol. ii. 56; Fr. 106, 120.

<sup>7</sup> Fr. 108 seems only to presuppose the current notions, with this difference, that a more intense



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nects with them a belief in the migration of souls.<sup>1</sup> On the whole, the religious and moral point of view in Pindar is not different from that of Æschylus, although the thought of divine justice is not brought out by him with such tragic force.

(3) *Historians.*

(a) *Herodotus.*

If we would see this view of life as it appears in its transitions to a later form, no better example can be selected than Herodotus, the friend of Sophocles. In writing his history, Herodotus sometimes allows himself to be guided by the notions of olden times. He recognises the rule of divine providence in the order of nature,<sup>2</sup> and equally clearly in the fortunes of men, and especially in punishment, which overtakes the guilty, even if he has only indulged a guiltless passion to excess.<sup>3</sup> The popular forms of worship are honoured by him,<sup>4</sup> because he knew that every nation clings most closely to its own usages, and that only a madman can treat them with disdain.<sup>5</sup> He has sufficient credulity to relate in good faith several miracles and prophecies,<sup>6</sup> and among them some of the most extraordinary kind. His piety bears the impress of antiquity, in being connected with that

life is given to souls in Hades than was the view of Homer and the mass of people. Fr. 109 is probably spurious.

<sup>1</sup> Fr. 110, Ol. ii. 68. According to the latter passage, in which Pindar is most explicit, reward or punishment follows in Hades. Only a few distinguished men are able to return to life, and allowed to enjoy the higher bliss on the islands of the blessed by a threefold life of innocence.

<sup>2</sup> Her. iii. 108.

<sup>3</sup> ii. 120; iv. 205; vi. 84; viii. 129; vii. 133.

<sup>4</sup> For instance, he hesitates to utter the names of Egyptian Gods in a context which might desecrate them, ii. 86, or to speak of Egyptian mysteries.

<sup>5</sup> iii. 38.

<sup>6</sup> vii. 12, 57; viii. 37, 65; ix. 100. Here belong the prophecies of Bakis and Musæus, viii. 77; ix. 43.

fear of divine powers so peculiarly adapted to natural religion, because there the exaltation of the Gods above men is not conceived of in all its intensity, but regarded in a physical rather than in a moral light. Man is not destined to enjoy perfect good fortune; his life is exposed to changes innumerable; before his death no one can be called happy, and in general it is a matter for doubt whether death is not better for a man than life.<sup>1</sup> He who by prosperity or self-satisfaction rises above the lot of men, is invariably the victim of the envy of the Deity, which, jealous of its privileges, will not brook a mortal rival.<sup>2</sup>

This is altogether in agreement with the spirit, which breathes through the older poetry of Greece. But for all that, Herodotus is unable to conceal from us the fact that he is a product of an epoch, in which thought has already begun to shake the foundations of a simple faith. With whatever naïveté he may tell a number of wonderful stories, there are times when he declares a belief in the appearance of Gods<sup>3</sup> (which, be it said, pointed to a plain act of deception) to be extremely simple, and when he refers to an earthquake as the cause of a result attributed to Poseidon by the Thessalian legend.<sup>4</sup> But a rationalistic tendency clearly comes to light when he, by preference, receives mythical explanations in the taste of a later Euemerism, and even carries them further himself.<sup>5</sup> Add to this that he occasionally

<sup>1</sup> ii. 31.<sup>4</sup> vii. 129.<sup>2</sup> On the *θεῶν φόβον*, conf. i. 32, 34; iii. 40; vii. 10, 5, 46.<sup>2</sup> See the legends of Io and Europa, i. 1; of Gyges, i. 8; of the doves of Dodona, ii. 56; of<sup>3</sup> i. 60.

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expresses the opinion that all men know equally little about the Gods,<sup>1</sup> and it will be patent, how much doubt was already encroaching on the ancient faith.

(b) *Thucydides.*

In Thucydides, the next great historian, faith had already changed into a natural way of treating history. No one will deny the high moral earnestness of his writings. His history of the Peloponnesian war in its unfinished form has all the effect of a stern tragedy. But this effect is brought about purely by historical positivism, without introducing the interposition of the gods to explain events. Thucydides knew how indispensable religion was for the public good; his very descriptions show how deeply he deplored that his country, not only morally but religiously, suffered decay;<sup>2</sup> yet in his pages the rule of the deity and of moral order in the world is only allowed to be seen by the light of history. Convinced that human nature is always the same, he insists on moral laws by showing in a given case, that ruin naturally results from the weakness and the passions of men, all of which he knows well and can judge impartially.<sup>3</sup> But he nowhere betrays a belief in those extraordinary occurrences, in which Herodotus saw the hand of God. Where his contemporaries fancied they saw the fulfilment of a prophecy, he contented himself with sober criticism.<sup>4</sup> To depend on oracles instead of taking active steps, he calls the folly

Helen, ii. 113-120; of Hercules, ii. 43, 146.

<sup>1</sup> ii. 3.

<sup>2</sup> See the well-known passages ii. 53; iii. 82.

<sup>3</sup> iii. 82, 84; and in the description of the Sicilian expedition, its motives and results, vi. 15, 24, 30; vii. 75, 87.

<sup>4</sup> For instance, ii. 17, 54.

of the masses,<sup>1</sup> and openly expresses his disapproval of the disastrous superstition of Nicias.<sup>2</sup> In the panegyric of the dead,<sup>3</sup> which is a memorial of his own spirit quite as much as of the spirit of the age of Pericles, he does not deign to bestow a single word on the mythical history of Athens, the hackneyed theme of ancient panegyrists; but instead of it, with a statesmanlike disposition, he clings to what is actual, and to practical questions. His history is a brilliant evidence of manly vigour and high intellectual culture, of a many-sided experience of life, of a calm, unimpassioned, penetrating, and morally correct view of the world. It is a work which fills us with the highest respect not only for the writer, but for the whole period, which could bring to maturity a genius like that of Thucydides.

At the same time, however, this work contains the darker sides of the period concealed within. We have only to read the descriptions it gives<sup>4</sup> of the confusion of all moral notions in the factious struggles of the Peloponnesian war, of the desolation of Athens by the plague, of the decline of piety and self-sacrifice, of reckless indulgence in selfish passions, to be convinced how in that period of might and culture, moral worth had altogether degenerated. To prove beyond all question, that along with those outward relations all general convictions had been shaken, Thucydides puts in the mouth of several of his speakers, and particularly of those who represented

<sup>1</sup> v. 103.<sup>2</sup> vii. 50.<sup>3</sup> ii. 35.<sup>4</sup> ii. 53; iii. 82.

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Athens, naked avowals of the most selfish principles, which could come only from the lips of some of the younger sophists. Popular Athenian speakers and ambassadors<sup>1</sup> are made to express themselves on every occasion unblushingly, to the effect that all who have the power seek to rule, that no one is restrained by considerations of justice from pursuing his advantage by every means in his power, that the rule of the stronger is the universal law of nature, that at bottom every one estimates justice and honour by his own interests and tastes, and that even the best regulated states act on this idea, at least in their relations with others. Even those who have to suffer from the selfishness of the Athenians, are in the end hardly able to blame it.<sup>2</sup> It is thus seen that moral and political conditions invariably keep pace with the sophistic character of scientific culture.

(4) *The Comedians.**Aristophanes.*

How little other prudent men were deceived about the dangers which this course of things was bringing upon them, and how little they were able to control it, or to stand aloof from the spirit of their times, may be seen by the example of Aristophanes. This poet is an enthusiastic admirer of the good old time, with its steady morality, its strict education, its military prowess, its orderly and prudent administration.<sup>3</sup> He grows warm and sublime whenever he speaks of the days of Marathon;<sup>4</sup> lashes with implacable satire, now in the form of bantering jest,

<sup>1</sup> i. 76; iii. 40; v. 89, 105,  
111; vi. 85.

<sup>2</sup> iv. 61.

<sup>3</sup> *Clouds*, 882; *Knights*, 1316.

<sup>4</sup> *Wasps*, 1071; the *Acharnians*, 676.



now in that of bitter earnestness, these new-fangled notions which have forced themselves into the place of time-honoured institutions—the unbridled democracy with its demagogues and sycophants<sup>1</sup>—the empty, effeminate, free-thinking poetry, so faithless to its moral idea, so fallen from its artistic height<sup>2</sup>—the sophistic culture with its unfruitful speculations, dangerous alike to faith and morals, which instead of steady citizens and sober-minded men, can only bring up shameless quibblers, atheistic reasoners,<sup>3</sup> or unconscionable perverters of justice. Zeal for what is ancient is with him undeniably an affair of individual conviction. This is what may be gathered from the earnestness, the warmth, and the classic beauty of those passages, which set forth the praise of the olden time and its customs; but it is more undeniably manifested in the general tendency of his comedies: and if he justly commends his own courage to us in discharging his duty to his city against Cleon,<sup>4</sup> the claim to be a noble man fighting for a principle, cannot be fairly denied him.

But Aristophanes, while warmly taking the field against the spirit of innovation, at the same time not only presupposes this very spirit, but actually furthers and, to a certain extent, promotes it in his hearers. He lashes the demagogues and sycophants; but whilst lashing them he tells us that every place is full of them, that democracy has a hundred heads,

<sup>1</sup> Wasps; Clouds, 568.

Frogs, 1491.

<sup>2</sup> Frogs; Achar. 393.<sup>4</sup> Wasps, 1029, 1284; Peace,<sup>3</sup> Clouds; Birds, 1282, 1553; 951; Achar. 959.

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ever full of vitality; that the Athenian people, like a childish old man, was always the victim of the most impudent of his flatterers; that the steady men of the older generation were just as punctilious about judicial proprieties as the estimable citizens were about their legal forms; and that the Spartan-aping young gentlemen were no less slovenly than the demagogues;<sup>1</sup> that the sovereign people, after Solon's constitution had been re-established, continued to manage house as wildly as before, and only wanted female government to complete the folly.<sup>2</sup> In his plays he even indulges in the arts of the demagogues and sycophants; he slanders Socrates and many others quite as much as any rhetorician could have done, and to outbid the statesmen who squandered the public property in order to bribe the the people, he tells the citizens of Athens that if the distribution were fairly made<sup>3</sup> they ought to receive far more than they did. Even in religious and moral reforms he has only bad prospects to shew. He praises the ancient moral training, but he says at the same time with derision, that little morality is to be found amongst his hearers,<sup>4</sup> and the vices from which his people suffered appear to him on the whole very natural.<sup>5</sup> He brings women on the stage to lash their licentiousness; but he depicts this licentiousness as so deep and so general, that there could be no hope of improvement. He attacks

<sup>1</sup> Wasps; Birds, 38.<sup>4</sup> Clouds, 1055.<sup>2</sup> Eccles. v. 456; conf. Plato, Rep. viii. 563, B.<sup>5</sup> Compare Birds, 137; Frogs, 148.<sup>3</sup> Wasps, 655.

the philosophers who deny the Gods, but in one of his first comedies he gives us to understand, that belief rested in his time on trembling foundations,<sup>1</sup> and he exposes the Gods, together with their priests, with surpassing recklessness, not only in individual expressions,<sup>2</sup> but in whole acts and plays.<sup>3</sup> He brings them down with rough scorn, not only into the region of humanity, but into what is lowest and most common; he holds up the moral weaknesses in which they resemble men nakedly and minutely to view; he makes the world of Gods, like that of men, turn in such a wild whirlpool, that the spectator no less than the poet must lose all respect for the beings who are so readily and recklessly at the disposal of the imagination. We may attribute much of this to the license of comedy; but still more than enough remains to convince us that the poet himself, as well as his audience, had gone far from the ancient morality, the loss of which he regrets; and we see, on the whole, the period and the circumstances out of which philosophy came forth, wherever we come in contact with them, penetrated by that spirit of novelty which made it impossible for the most decided lovers of antiquity to adhere to their ancestral mode of life and thought.

Amongst other indications of this change, one more circumstance deserves to be noticed, which appeared about the time of the Peloponnesian war—the increasing spread of the mysteries, and of

*C. The problem solved by the new forms of religious worship.*

<sup>1</sup> Knights, 32.

<sup>3</sup> In the Frogs, Peace, and the

<sup>2</sup> Clouds, 369, 396, 900, 1075; Birds. Birds, 556, 1608.

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prophecies in connection with them. The reputed predictions of the older prophets had been already appealed to in exceptional cases, as is the wont of men; but the mischief and abuse which was kept up in this way appears now to have reached an incredible pitch. The Orphic and Corybantic mysteries would seem also to have been more widely diffused, and to have gained supporters about the same time, if we may judge by the numerous allusions to them in the writers of this and the following generation. In more than one aspect, however, an innovation was at the root of this. To a merely outward spectator, it was a very different thing, whether advice was sought from the public oracles and use was made of the ancient rites naturalised from time immemorial in fixed spots, or whether recourse was had to the professed utterances of individual prophets and to a private worship—a worship too without a fixed locality, carried about by vagrant priests, practised in particular confraternities, and claiming to elevate all who took part in it as the special elect above the mass of mankind. The predominance of this kind of private worship and irregular prophecy was partly a proof that the public religion was not altogether satisfactory, but in part it contributed to produce that very result. Such mystical piety was in itself very different from the customary forms of faith and life. The notions of the gods, by flowing into each other, began to lose their distinctness; and perhaps the harmonising and pantheistic tendency already noticed in individuals in the fifth century may be

connected with it. The conceptions of human life and of human nature had assumed an altered character, owing to a clearer belief in immortality, which the dogmas of the migration of souls and of future retribution had introduced; and traces of this change may be seen in the poetry of the time of Euripides. Connected too with it was an ascetic code of morals which came into vogue, enjoining abstinence from animal food, celibacy, the avoidance of certain defilements, and the wearing of white clothing. Philosophy, it is true, could only appropriate what was most general in this asceticism—the renunciation of the senses in a spiritual sense. It was not till a later time that the Neopythagoreans embraced the whole of it, with all its external belongings. But before that time arrived the spiritual life and the intellectual growth of Greece had another and a more brilliant career marked out for it.



## CHAPTER II.

CHARACTER AND PROGRESS OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY IN  
THE FIFTH CENTURY.CHAP.  
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THE age of Socrates inherited a rich treasure of religious ideas, of moral principles, and scientific conceptions, but at the same time it was inferior to the age that had preceded it, in its modes of thought and in its moral practice. Traditional opinions seemed now to be all too narrow; there were new lines of thought to be opened out, new problems to be solved. Mythical notions about the Gods and about the state after death, had lost all meaning for the great majority of the educated;<sup>1</sup> ancient customs had fallen into disuse; the regularity of civil life, the simplicity and purity of domestic life, had been supplanted by an utter recklessness of conduct, and by an unscrupulous pursuit of pleasure and profit. Principles subversive of all law and of all right, were being unhesitatingly avowed, and were willingly acquiesced in by the younger generation. The strictness and grandeur of the early art, the lucid beauty, the classic softness, the self-contained dignity of the later art, was degenerating into the study of mere effect; while under the influence of sophistry,

<sup>1</sup> Conf. Plato, Rep. i. 330, D.

science had been brought into an utter disbelief, not only of individual systems, but of the very end assumed in previous enquiry, the possibility of knowledge at all.

So far, however, from being exhausted, the spirit of Greece was only the more emerging into life amid these throes and struggles. Its mental horizon was being extended; its powers of thought were being braced; its views and conceptions were being enriched; its whole consciousness was gaining a new object, now that the nation had succeeded in glorious undertakings, and had distinguished itself by its military exploits. Even if the meridian of classic art and of free political life was past towards the close of the period, still the newly-awakened culture of the understanding was full of promise for the future; since as yet sophistry had been destructive, not constructive, and instead of having completed, was only commencing its task. Some new and thorough change might surely be worked out, and was seemingly required, both in the interest of morals and of science. When ordinary propriety of conduct and the traditional views of science had once been overthrown by the altered spirit of the times, a return to the old point of view became impossible. But that men should despair on this account of all knowledge, and of all principles of morality, was an over-hasty conclusion. For granting that the current view of science and morality was inadequate, it by no means followed, that all science, and all morality was impossible. On the contrary, the more the pernicious

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consequences of such a view were brought to light, the more it was felt to be a duty to avoid them by a thorough transformation of the whole tone of feeling and thought, instead of making a useless attempt blindly to recall the past.

A. *Distinction of Socratic from pre-Socratic philosophy.*  
(1) *The pre-Socratic traditional; the Socratic resting on knowledge.*

To a far-sighted eye the particular line to be taken for the re-establishment of science was pointed out with special clearness by the experience of the past. Traditional propriety of conduct had succumbed before the spirit of innovation, because it rested upon instinct and custom, and not on any clear knowledge of its necessity. To be replaced on a permanent basis, propriety of conduct must rest upon knowledge. Earlier philosophy had been unable to satisfy the wants of the times because it had been directed exclusively to a study of nature; because it did not give an elementary education sufficient for practical life to the mass of men, nor to the thinking spirit any clue to the problem of its being and destiny. To supply this want a new philosophy was required—one which would direct its attention to the sphere of mind and morals, and work into shape the ample supply of ethical ideas stored up in poetry and underlying custom. The earlier systems had been exposed to sophistic doubts, because they were too one-sided in their foundations, and too materialistic in their conclusions to be able to stand against a searching criticism—such a criticism as that which destroyed their various one-sided aspects by means of each other, and argued from the change and uncertainty of all sensible appearances, that know-

ledge was impossible. A lasting structure could not be established, unless the foundations were laid deeper, unless too some means could be found of supplementing these various views by each other, of harmonising them when contradictory in some higher point of union, and of detecting the unchangeable essence of things amidst changing appearances. What was wanted was supplied by dialectic, or the art of forming conceptions, and the result of it was philosophical idealism. Thus the knowledge of the faults and deficiencies of the previous age naturally produced the turn taken by philosophy after Socrates. Scientific ethics became necessary because moral convictions had been shaken; a wider enquiry became necessary, because of the onesidedness of the philosophy of nature; a searching criticism was necessary, because dogmatic systems contradicted one another; a philosophy of conception was necessary, because observations of the senses could not be relied on; idealism was necessary, because a materialistic view of the world proved unsatisfactory.

It is precisely in these traits that the Socratic philosophy differs from that of the previous period. The pre-Socratic philosophy was simply and solely a philosophy of nature; it was not until it reached its period of transition in the sophists that it left nature for ethical and dialectical questions. In Socrates the dialectical tendency is supreme. He occupied himself almost exclusively in determining conceptions logically, and in enquiring into the nature of virtue. The imperfect Socratic schools

(2) *The pre-Socratic philosophy a study of nature; the Socratic of conceptions.*

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were, with few exceptions, confined to a similar ground, and even in Plato's system this foundation of dialectic, and this structure of ethics formed a marked contrast to the previous study of nature. So, too, when Aristotle discusses physics in great detail and with unmistakeable predilection, they are, in point of value, only a single branch of a system subordinate to metaphysics.

The increase of territory thus gained is in itself enough to show that the whole domain of philosophy was altered; why else should thought have searched for other and more extended materials, were it not that it had been changed in itself, and become no longer content with those which had sufficed before? For the same reason the philosophic method was a different one. In previous philosophy thought had been directed immediately to the object, as such. In the Socratic and post-Socratic systems it was directed immediately to the conception, and to the object only mediately, through the conception. The older systems enquired, without further examination, what predicates belonged to things; for instance, whether being admitted of motion or not—how and out of what the world was made. The Socratic philosophy ever asks, in the first place, what things are in themselves, according to the conception belonging to them, and thinks to explain their states and properties best when it has thoroughly mastered these conceptions.<sup>1</sup> The conception of a thing is only obtained, by observing its various aspects and qualities, by uniting

B. Characteristic of this period is its doctrine of conceptions.

<sup>1</sup> Compare the clear statement he had busied himself in vain in the *Phædo*, 99, D. After with the enquiries of the physi-



them, by harmonising apparent contradictions, by distinguishing what is lasting from what is changing, in a word, by that constructive criticism, which was introduced by Socrates, and which was enlarged by Plato and Aristotle. Former philosophers, starting from single prominent features, endeavoured by a one-sided view of things to determine what they were. Now all the properties of an object were taken into account and weighed from every side, before a judgment could be formed. Thus reflection, which substituted sophistry in place of the older philosophy, was welcomed by the new philosophy as a moving power; the various aspects under which things might be regarded, were brought together and referred to each other; but instead of stopping at the negative result, and allowing that our notions cannot be true because they contain opposite determinations, the aim of the new philosophy was to unite these opposites in one, and to show that true science is not affected by contradiction, because it only refers to that which unites opposites in itself, and is superior to all contradiction. This connection of knowledge and conceptions is the common peculiarity of the Socratic, the Platonic, and the Aristotelian philosophy, nor do the lesser Socratic schools form any exception to it, as will be seen hereafter.

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(1) *Definition of a conception.*

cal philosophies, he declares himself convinced, that he is only involved in greater darkness by directing his enquiries into things in themselves. (τὰ ὄντα σκοπῶν . . . βλέπων πρὸς τὰ πράγματα τοῖς ὅμμασι καὶ ἐκάστη τῶν αἰσθή-

σεων ἐπιχειρῶν ἀπτεσθαι αὐτῶν). ἔδοξε δὲ μοι χρῆναι εἰς τοὺς λόγους καταφυγόντα ἐν ἐκείνοις σκοπεῖν τῶν ὄντων τὴν ἀλήθειαν (the true being of things), i. e. instead of πράγματα, λόγοι, instead of ὄντα, ἀλήθεια τῶν ὄντων.

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If conceptions, and conceptions alone, can give true knowledge, it follows that true being belongs only to that which is known by means of conceptions; that is, to the essence of things, in so far as this essence is conceived in thought. This essential being must not, however, be sought for in matter. That matter could only be made into a world by means of spirit, had been shown by Anaxagoras; and the old materialistic physics had been generally brought into discredit by the sophists. Nothing remained but to examine the form and purpose of things, to determine the conceptions belonging to them by making the immaterial part the most important, and to assign to it a true reality underlying the appearance. In this way the Socratic philosophy led logically to idealism.

(2) *Theory  
of concep-  
tions  
expanded  
by  
Socrates,  
Plato, and  
Aristotle.*

Even in Socrates himself traces of this idealism may be seen. His indifference to physical enquiries and his preference for ethical ones prove satisfactorily that he estimated the inner at a much higher value than the outer world. We need only analyse the theory of final causes, which he applied to nature, into the metaphysical elements out of which it is composed, to see that according to his view it is not the material of which a thing is made, but the conception which gives it shape, that makes everything what it is, and which accordingly represents its true nature. In the school of Megara this idealism comes out more plainly; and in Plato it runs through all parts of his philosophy side by side with a current of pre-Socratic doctrines. Even Aristotle does not give

up his adherence to this view. Although he denies the independent existence of the Platonic ideas, he still asserts that it is form and not matter that constitutes what is real, and that the highest reality belongs to spirit free from matter. On this ground his physics agree with those of his predecessors in making final higher than material causes, so that in comparison with the natural philosophers of the pre-Socratic period, Aristotle must really be called an Idealist.

Thus, before the time of Socrates, philosophy started from the consideration of nature, and was chiefly occupied in enquiring into the nature and causes of external things, dealing mainly with their material properties. An entirely different character is displayed in the philosophy founded by Socrates. Instead of beginning by observing nature, it begins with observing 'self'—with ethics instead of physics. It aims at explaining appearances by conceptions first of all, and only in the second place by physics. It substitutes an attitude of enquiry for dogmatic statements, and idealism in the place of materialism. Spirit contrasted with nature, and the conception or the form contrasted with matter, are now seen to be of chief importance—the philosophy of nature has given way to a philosophy of conceptions.

In making philosophy deal exclusively with conceptions, it is, however, by no means granted that the human mind is the measure of truth and the goal of science. Far from having arrived at the subjective idealism of Fichte—an idealism which was only possible in modern times—the philosophy of this period

*C. Distinction of Socratic from post-Aristotelian philosophy.*

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is not even nearly so subjective as that of the post-Aristotelian schools, in which the interests of speculation were subordinated to those of morals. In those later schools knowledge was regarded only as a means to virtue and happiness, whereas the great philosophers of the present period fully recognised the independent value of science. To them knowledge was an end in itself, the life of speculation was the highest and most blessed life, action was made to depend upon knowledge, not knowledge upon the aims of active life. The only exceptions to the rule are a few one-sided followers of Socrates, who, however, prove nothing as to the general tendency.

(1) *It still believes the attainment of knowledge to be possible.*

Here, then, was a simple belief in the possibility of knowledge, wanting in the post-Aristotelian school. The general doubts of the sophists were refuted, but there was no need of grappling with them in the mind of the philosopher. The subject for enquiry was, how could true knowledge be obtained, in what kind of notions must it be sought, how must the conception of it be determined. There was no doubt that knowledge was really possible. The question as to a standard—the fundamental question of the later schools—was altogether alien<sup>1</sup> from the feelings of men at this time. They did not, as did the Epicureans and Stoics, cut short the question by saying a standard *was* possible; they did not, as did the

<sup>1</sup> Take for instance the question raised in the Theætetus, as to the conception of knowledge, ἐπιστήμη ὅ, τί ποτε τυγχάνει ὄν; (Theætet. 145, E.); it is quite

different to the doubt entertained in the enquiry after a standard, or as to whether knowledge is really possible at all.

Sceptics despair of knowledge; they did not, as did the Neoplatonists, resort to higher revelations; but they were content to place the source of truth in rigid thought. Even physical science, the independent pursuit of which was very much neglected by later writers, was studied in this period with success. Socrates and the great bulk of his followers may have neglected it, but Plato could not dispense with it, and Aristotle's labours in this branch of study set the subject at rest for nearly two thousand years. When the post-Aristotelian Ethics had, from various causes, at length broken loose from the old Greek morality, partly by a world-wide extension, partly by being separated from politics, partly, too, by the withdrawal of the moral consciousness from the outer world, and partly by a dumb resignation and a sour asceticism, then the difference between the past and the present might easily have been seen by recalling the many-sided sympathies of Socrates, with his cheerful enjoyment of life, and his devoted attachment to his country, or the teaching of Plato concerning the state, or that of Aristotle concerning virtue and society, or the relation of the Cyrenaic to the Epicurean view of happiness.

It is true, attempts were made even in ethics, to get beyond the bounds of custom. The propriety of custom was supplemented by a theory of ethics, and a theory of conscious action. The difference between the outward deed and the intention, was made clearer than in the ordinary view. Men were required to rise above the life of the senses to what is

(2) *Distinction in Ethics.*



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ideal. Light was thrown on the meaning and motives of moral consciousness. A universal human virtue was taught, which is not lost in activity on behalf of the state; and accordingly the state was regarded as a means for realising virtue and happiness, nor was its welfare considered to be the ultimate end of moral action. But yet this period was far removed from the luxurious apathy of the Stoics, from the indifference of the Sceptics, from the asceticism of the Neoplatonists. It severed the moral activity of man from nature, but yet with Aristotle it rather looked upon virtue as the perfection of a natural gift, or with Plato it advanced to the love of what is morally beautiful from the love of what is sensibly beautiful. It required the philosopher to work for his fellowmen. It did not as yet embrace a world-wide society, nor did it shew indifference to nationality and political life. Even in this respect, it steered a middle course between a slavish surrender to the outer world, and a narrow withdrawal from it.

(3) *Its greater comprehensive-ness.*

Compared with the pre-Socratic era, the age of Socrates is characterised by the diversion of philosophy from external nature to thought or to ideas. In the same way, compared with the following age, it is marked by the objective character of its thought, and by the fact that the thinker has not to do with himself and the certainty of his own knowing, but with attaining to the knowledge of what is in itself real and true. Its theory of a knowledge of conceptions gives it a scientific character:—a theory from which its comprehensive view (reaching alike beyond the

physical one-sidedness of the pre-Socratic, and the moral one-sidedness of the post-Aristotelian schools), its constructive criticism in opposition to the earlier and later dogmatism, and its idealism, transfiguring the whole aspect of the outer world, without, however, destroying it—all follow as necessary consequences.

This theory was developed in a simple and natural order by three philosophic schools, the founders of which belong to three successive generations, and are personally connected as teachers and pupils. The first, who asserted that the standard of human thought and action lay in a knowledge of conceptions was Socrates, and he taught his followers to acquire this knowledge by dealing with notions critically. Plato concluded at once that objective conceptions were alone real, in any true sense, and that consequently only a derivative reality belonged to other things. This view he upheld by a more searching analysis, and developed to a system. Lastly, Aristotle arrived at the conclusion that conceptions are *in* things, constituting their real essence and cause of motion. By an exhaustive analysis of the scientific method, he showed how conceptions were to be formed and applied to things, and by a most comprehensive enquiry into the several parts of the universe, he examined the laws and connection of conceptions, and the thoughts which determine all that really is. Socrates had as yet no system. He had not even any theory concerning matter. He was convinced that in acquiring conceptions true knowledge was alone to be found, that true virtue consisted in acting according to concep-

*D. Development of the Socratic philosophy.*

(1) *Socrates.*

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tions, that even the world was framed in accordance with definite conceptions, and therefore showed design. In any given case he tried by a critical testing of former notions to gain a conception of the object with which he had to deal, and to this he devoted all his powers, setting aside every other interest. But he never went beyond this methodical treatment. His teaching was confined to general requirements and conditions. His importance does not arise from his new view of things, but from his new view of knowledge. It consists in the way in which he put forward this view, in the way in which he understood the business and method of science, in the strength of his philosophical bent, and in the simplicity of his philosophical life.

- (2) *Plato.* The Socratic search for conceptions, has grown in Plato to a discovery of them, to a certainty of possessing them, and gazing upon them. Objective thoughts or ideas are with him the only real things. Objects of sense and matter, as such, are simply non-existent; and since all things are made up partly of what is and partly of what is not, they therefore are real only in proportion to the part they have in the idea. However much this may be in advance of the Socratic view, it follows logically from that view. The Platonic ideas, as Aristotle rightly understood them,<sup>1</sup> are the general conceptions, which Socrates was searching for, separated from the world of appearance. They are also the central point of the speculations of Aristotle, according to whom

<sup>1</sup> Met. i. 6.

the conception or the form alone constitutes what is essential and actual, and is as it were the soul of things; form without matter, simple spirit thinking of itself, is absolutely real, and thought is to man the most intense reality, and therefore also the most intense pleasure in life. The only difference is, that whereas Plato separated the conception from the appearance, and regarded it as independent—as an *ἰδέα*—Aristotle places it in things themselves. But even this statement does not imply, that form stands in need of matter to become actual, since it is in itself actual. The reason why Aristotle will not remove the idea out of the world of appearances, is because it could not in a state of separation serve as a connecting link between individual things, nor could it be the cause and substance of things. The theory then is one and the same in all, but it was taken up by Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle at different stages of its growth. In Socrates it is undeveloped, but full of vitality, pushing itself forward through the husk of earlier philosophy; in Plato it has grown to a pure and independent existence; and in Aristotle it has overspread the whole world of being and consciousness, exhausting itself with the effort, and awaiting a perfect transformation from later systems. Socrates, so to speak, is the pregnant germ, Plato the rich bloom, Aristotle the ripe fruit of Greek philosophy, standing on the summit of its historical growth.

There is only one circumstance, which will not altogether fall in with this historical connection, but threatens to break the continuity of Greek thought

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(3) *Aristotle.*

(4) *Difficulty caused by Socratic Schools.*



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II.

—the imperfect attempts to expand the Socratic principle which are seen in the Megarian, the Cynic, and the Cyrenaic schools. There is, however, a real and essential advancement of the philosophic consciousness to be found in these schools, restricting philosophy as they did to the form of subjective thought and training of the character; although even in the time of Socrates the aim of philosophy began to be directed to objective knowledge, which could only be gained by a systematic course. And on other grounds also, they cannot be said to be wholly unimportant, since they were not only, at a later period, starting points for Stoicism, Epicureanism and Scepticism, but they also promoted independently many scientific enquiries, by means of which they exercised an undeniable influence on Plato and Aristotle. The same state of things is met with frequently in other instances, and occurred only a very short time afterwards in the older Academy, and in the Peripatetic school, both of which had no independent influence on the growth of philosophy, but yet cannot be overlooked in its history. One and the same thing must be said of all these instances. It is that they are important, not for having inwardly expanded a principle, but for having been outwardly helpful in advancing it, by preserving for others the older forms of culture, by improving and widening them here and there, and by thus keeping the philosopher's mind in sight of a many-sidedness, without which later systems would never have included the earlier ones.



There were accordingly no philosophic schools to be met with, which had a permanent influence in Greece, until philosophy as a whole took up a more general position. They first appear with Socrates and Plato. By summing up all the pre-Socratic schools, Plato put an end to their existence; and since his time there has been no principle put forward, which has not propagated itself in a school until the time that Neoplatonism put the coping-stone on Greek philosophy, and extinguished by including all previous systems. However many philosophical tendencies exist side by side in later times, only a few of them possess a life of their own. The rest keep up former views with a sort of traditional adherence, and cannot be taken further into account, in considering the peculiar philosophical character of the time. They need therefore only to be mentioned by the historian in a passing way. This treatment applies to the imperfect followers of Socrates. Since their teachings were not advancements in principle, but only incomplete and partial ways of representing the Socratic philosophy, they can only be treated cursorily, and in connection with the doctrines of Socrates.

## PART II.

### *S O C R A T E S.*

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## CHAPTER III.

### THE LIFE OF SOCRATES.

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THERE is no instance on record of a philosopher whose importance as a thinker is so closely bound up with the personality of the man as it was in the case of Socrates. Every system, it is true, as the work of a definite person, may best be viewed in the light of his peculiarities, culture, misfortunes and circumstances; but yet in many cases it is well to separate the fruits of genius from the actual stock on which they grew. The doctrines of schools can indeed generally be received and handed down by men of very different characters; but in the case of Socrates this is not nearly so feasible. He had far less to do with definite doctrines, which might be equally well embraced by different men, than with giving a peculiar turn to life and thought, a peculiar character to philosophy, and a new method to scientific enquiry. In short, his teaching was not of a kind to be directly imparted and faithfully handed

down, but could only be left to propagate itself freely by stirring up others to a similar self-culture. This fact should make us all the more anxious for detailed information as to the training of a character which has had so powerful an influence on history. But here a very common difficulty meets us. It is known what Socrates was, and what he did in his riper years; but only the roughest sketches are preserved of his outward life. A dark cloud rests on the earlier part of it, and excepting a few scanty, and for the most part untrustworthy, notices of earlier writers, we are left entirely to conjecture for the history of his intellectual and moral training.

The youth and early manhood of Socrates fall in the most brilliant period of Grecian history. Born during the last years of the Persian war,<sup>1</sup> he was a

<sup>1</sup> The most certain chronological date in the life of Socrates is his death. According to Demetrius Phalerius and Apollodorus (in Diog. ii. 44), it happened in Olympiad 95, 1 (Diod. xiv. 37), and probably in the second half of the month Thargelion. For we must place the return of the Delian *θεωπύς* at this time, and according to Plato (Phædo, 59, D.), it arrived the day before the execution of Socrates. About a month earlier (Xenophon, Mem. iv. 8, 2, says definitely thirty days), i.e. in the month Munychion, the judicial enquiry took place. Accordingly Socrates must have been condemned in April 399 B.C., and have suffered death in May the same year. Now since at the time of his death he had passed

his seventieth year according to Plato (Apol. 17, D.), but not long (Crito, 52, E. calls him in round numbers seventy), his birth must have fallen not later than 469 B.C., and since his birthday is rightly fixed for the 6th Thargelion (Apoll. in Diog. ii. 44, Ælian, V. H. ii. 25), but was not past at the time of the judicial inquiry, we should have to go back for it to 470 or even 471 B.C.

The question then arises whether these notices about the time of his birth are historical, or whether they are a mere fiction, and whether the birthday of Socrates, the *μαίευτικός*, was not placed on the 6th of Thargelion to make it agree with that of Artemis, as Plato's was made to agree with Apollo's. In this case it is possible that he was born in

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near contemporary of all those great men who adorned the age of Pericles. As a citizen of Athens he could enjoy the opportunities afforded by a city, which united every means of culture by its unrivalled fertility of thought. Poverty and low birth were but slender obstacles<sup>1</sup> in the Athens of Pericles, where the lowest of the city roll were not debarred

469 B.C. (Olym. 77, 3). The calculation of Apollodorus, which places it in 468 B.C. (Ol. 77, 4), is anyhow wrong. In the same way the assertion noticed by Diogenes that he was only sixty years of age, carries no weight against the clear statement of Plato, and probably rests upon a transcriber's mistake. Neither will Hermann's remark hold that Socrates could not have been born in the third or fourth year of an Olympiad, since he was twenty-five at the time of his interview with Protagoras, which interview happened (Plato, Parm.) at the time of the Panathenæa, and consequently in the third year of an Olympiad. For, supposing the interview to be an historical fact, the remark of Synesius (Calv. Enc. c. 17) about the age of Socrates was a pure guess, which the expressions in the Theætet. 183 F., and the Parmen. 127, C., *πάνυ νέος, σφόδρα νέος*, refute altogether.

<sup>1</sup> That his father Sophroniscus (how Epiphanius, Exp. Fid. 1087, comes to call him Elbaglus, is difficult to say) was a sculptor, may be gathered from Diog. ii. 18, and the services of his mother Phænarete as a midwife are known from Plato's Theætetus, 149, A. As regards his circumstances, it is stated by Demetrius

Phaler. in Plutarch's Life of Aristides, c. 1, that he not only possessed land, but had seventy minæ—a considerable sum—at interest, but this is at variance with the testimony of the most trustworthy witnesses. The historical grounds for it are without doubt weaker than those on which a similar statement about Aristides rests, and arose seemingly out of a Peripatetic's wish to find authorities for his view of the worth of riches. Plato (Apol. 23, B. 38, A.; Rep. i. 337, D.) and Xenophon (Œc. ii. 2; xi. 3; Mem. i. 2, 1) represent him not only as very poor, *πάνυ μικρὰ κεκτημένος* and *ἐν πενία μυρία*, but they establish this by explicit references. Plato makes him say, perhaps he could pay a fine of a mina, and Xenophon depicts him as estimating his whole property, inclusive of his cottage, at five minæ. The story of Libanius (Apol. Socr. t. iii. p. 7), according to which Socrates inherited eighty minæ from his father, and then lost them by lending, bearing his loss with extreme composure, looks like a fiction intended to shew the indifference of a philosopher to wealth. It can, however, scarcely come from Libanius. If Plato and Xenophon had known the story, we may be sure they would not have omitted it.

from enjoying the rich profusion of art, which was for the most part devoted to the purposes of the state, nor yet from associating with men in the highest ranks of life. By this free personal intercourse science was at that time advanced far more than by teaching in schools, and Socrates had reached manhood before the Sophists introduced a systematic course of education. Although it can in this way be easily understood how a man in the position of Socrates could find enough to stimulate and to educate his mind, and how he could be carried away by the wonderful current of the intellectual movement at Athens, nothing further is known about the means by which he advanced to his subsequent greatness.<sup>1</sup> We may suppose that he enjoyed the usual education in gymnastics and music,<sup>2</sup> although the accounts which are given of his teachers in music<sup>3</sup> deserve no credit.

<sup>1</sup> See the work of H. F. Hermann, *De Socratis magistris et disciplina juvenili*, Marb. 1837.

<sup>2</sup> Plato asserts this expressly in the *Crito*, 50, D.; but apart from this testimony there could be no doubt of it. Porphyry's statement (in *Theod. Cur. Gr. Aff.* i. 29, p. 8)—a statement which he undoubtedly got from Aristoxenus—that Socrates was too uneducated to be able to read, need scarcely be refuted by authorities such as *Xen. Mem.* i. 6, 14. It is clearly an exaggeration of the well-known ἀπαιδευσία (Plato, *Symp.* 221, E., 199, A., *Apol.* 17, B.), which only belongs to the satirical outside of the philosopher, but was readily taken hold of and exaggerated by jealousy in later times.

<sup>3</sup> According to *Max. Tyr.* xxxviii. 4, Connus was his teacher in music, and Euenus in the art of poetry. Alexander (in *Diog.* ii. 19) makes him a pupil of Damon, whereas Sextus (*Matth.* vi. 13), makes Lampo his teacher. All these notices have undoubtedly come from passages in Plato, which are irrelevant. Socrates calls Connus his teacher (*Menex.* 235, E., and *Euthyd.* 272, C.), but according to the latter passage, he was a man at the time, so that he must have gone to Connus simply with a view to revive a skill long since acquired. It is more probable, (however often such notices are given as historical, and with further details: *Cic. ad Fam.* ix. 22; *Quint.* i. 10; *Val. Max.* viii. 7; *Diog.* ii.



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We are further told that he learnt enough of geometry to be able to solve difficult problems, and that he was not ignorant of astronomy;<sup>1</sup> but whether he acquired this knowledge in his youth, or only in later years, and who was his teacher, we cannot tell.<sup>2</sup> And lastly, in his riper years he may be seen in contact more or less close with a number of characters who must have exerted a most varied and stirring influence on his mind.<sup>3</sup> It is beyond doubt that he was much indebted to this personal intercourse; but these friends cannot strictly be pointed to as his teachers, although we may often find them called so,<sup>4</sup> nor do they throw any light on the history

32; Stob. Flor. 29, 68), that the passages in Plato refer to the Connus of the comic poet Ameipsias, from whom the whole fabrication comes. Damon's name comes from the Laches, 180, D., 197, D.; Rep. iii. 400, B., 424, C., in which however this musician appears as the friend rather than as the instructor of Socrates, and as an important political character from his connection with Pericles. The Phædo, 60, C., and the Apology, 20, A., mention Euenus, but not as a teacher, and hardly even as an acquaintance of Socrates. And lastly, the Lampo of Sextus probably owes his existence to a mistake. Sextus may have written Damon instead of Connus (Stobæus, Flor. 29, 68, has Connus in the same connection)—or else Lamprus, (a name which occurs in the Menexenus, though not as that of a teacher of Socrates), and transcribers made it Lampo. The celebrated prophet of this name

cannot of course have been intended.

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Mem. iv. 7, 3, 5.

<sup>2</sup> Maximus says Theodore of Cyrene, but this is only an inference drawn from Plato's Thætetus, and not warranted by it.

<sup>3</sup> For instance the Sophists Protagoras, Gorgias, Polus, Hippias, Thrasymachus, but especially Prodicus. Cf. Plato, Prot., Gorg., Hip., Rep. i. Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 21, iv. 4, 5, &c. Also Euripides, who was on such intimate terms with him that the comic poets charged him with borrowing his tragedies from Socrates. Cf. Diog. ii. 18; Ælian, V. H. ii. 13. Also Aspasia; cf. Xen. Œc. 3, 14; Mem. ii. 6, 36; Æschines in Cic. de Invent. i. 31; and Diotima, Plato, Symp. About several of them we do not know whether Plato was true to facts in bringing them into connection with Socrates.

<sup>4</sup> Socrates calls himself in Plato a pupil of Prodicus, of Aspasia (Menex. 235, E.), and of

of his early training. The statement that he received instruction in his younger years from Anaxagoras and Archelaus, can neither be supported by satisfactory evidence, nor is probable in itself.<sup>1</sup> The same

Diotima (Symp. 201, D.), all of which statements have been repeated in past and later times. But not only must we refer the instruction of the two ladies to a free personal intercourse, on the supposition that Diotima is an historical person, and the Menexenus a genuine dialogue, but the same applies equally to Prodicus. Maximus makes Ischomachus his teacher in agriculture, but he probably arrived at this by a perversion of Xen. Œc. 6, 17. The story that he was a pupil of Diagoras of Melos (the Scholiast on Aristoph. Nubes, v. 828), is an obvious fiction.

<sup>1</sup> The authorities are: for Anaxagoras, Aristid. Or. xlv., and the nameless sources referred to by Diog. ii. 19 and 45, whom Suidas according to his custom follows; for Archelaus, Diog. ii. 16, 19, 23, x. 12, and those mentioned by him, Io, Aristoxenus, and Diocles. Besides these Cicero, Sextus, Porphyry, Clement of Alexandria (Strom. i. 301). Simplicius, Eusebius (pr. ev. x. 14, 13, xiv. 15, 11, xv. 61, 11), the spurious Origen, and a few others. The evidence in favour of Anaxagoras is very insufficient, and the expressions about him which Plato (Phædo, 97, B.) and Xenophon (Mem. iv. 7, 6) put in the mouth of Socrates, make it improbable that he knew him personally, or was acquainted with his views, except from books and hearsay, which of course

does not exclude any casual or accidental intercourse. The traditions about his relations to Archelaus go a great deal further, not however without much that is suspicious. Of the two most ancient authorities, Io and Aristoxenus, the former, who was a near contemporary of Socrates, does not seemingly make Archelaus his instructor. All that is stated by Diog. ii. 23, on his authority, is that Socrates, when a young man, travelled with Archelaus to Samos. But this assertion is in direct contradiction to what Plato says (Crito, 52, B.), that Socrates never left Athens, except once to go to the Isthmian games, or when on military duty. Müller, however, gets over the difficulty (Frag. Hist. Gr. ii. 49), by understanding Plato only to refer to Socrates as a man.

It may be asked whether there is not some mistake here, and whether Io does not mean by the journey to Samos, his taking part in the expedition to Samos of 441 B. C., which, strange to say, is not mentioned in the Apology, 28, E.—or whether the Archelaus, with whom Socrates was then brought into contact, was the follower of Anaxagoras or another—or, lastly, whether the error does not lie with Diogenes, who applied to Socrates what Io had said of some one else. Certain it is, that Io's testimony does not prove Socrates to have been a pupil of Archelaus, and even

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must be said of his supposed relations to Zeno and Parmenides; and of the philosophical writings with which he was acquainted, still less is recorded.<sup>1</sup>

Socrates, no doubt, began life by learning his father's trade,<sup>2</sup> a trade which he probably never practised, and certainly soon gave up.<sup>3</sup> He con-

if the association were proved to have existed in Socrates' younger days, it would still be a question, whether his philosophy was due to this connection.

Aristoxenus goes further. According to his account in Diog. ii. 16, Socrates was the favourite of Archelaus, or as Porphyry represents it, he became acquainted with Archelaus in his seventeenth year, lived with him many years, and was by him initiated into philosophy. But we shall have occasion to notice hereafter how little dependence can be placed on the statements of Aristoxenus about Socrates. Were the other assertion of Diogenes established, which is closely connected with this one, that Socrates did not become a pupil of Archelaus till after the condemnation of Anaxagoras, its untrustworthiness would be thoroughly shown; for Socrates was seventeen when Anaxagoras left Athens, and had long passed his years of pupillage. But the assertions of Aristoxenus are in themselves improbable. For supposing Socrates to have been on intimate terms with Archelaus, when young, twenty years before Anaxagoras was banished, how is it conceivable that he should not have known Anaxagoras?—and if he was instructed by him in philosophy, how is it that neither Xenophon nor Plato nor Ari-

stotle ever mention Archelaus? Later statements about the relation of the two philosophers appear to rest on the authority of Aristoxenus. As there is nothing in the teaching of Archelaus, with which the Socratic teaching can be connected, it seems probable that he has little to do with the philosophy of Socrates, even though Socrates may have known him and his teaching. Besides, Socrates (in Xen. Sym.) calls himself an *αὐτομαθὴς τῆς φιλοσοφίας*, a self-taught philosopher.

<sup>1</sup> He seems to have known those of Anaxagoras. A supposed allusion to the writings of Heraclitus (in Diog. ii. 22), is uncertain, nor is it established that he ever studied the Pythagorean doctrine (Plut. Curios. 2). The very general remarks about the Atomists and Heraclitus (Xen. Mem. i. 1, 14) by no means prove that he was acquainted with their writings or systems.

<sup>2</sup> Timon and Duris in Diog. ii. 19. Timæus, according to Porphyry in Cyril c. Jul. 208, A. Plato (Rep. vi. 496, B.) seems to have had the case of Socrates in view.

<sup>3</sup> Porphyry leaves it an open question whether Socrates or his father practised sculpture. That the Graces on the Acropolis were declared to be his work (Diog. Paus. i. 22) will not go for much. No allusions are found in Ari-

sidered it to be his special calling to labour for the moral and intellectual improvement of himself and others—a conviction which he felt so strongly that it appeared to him in the light of a divine revelation.<sup>1</sup> Moreover he was confirmed in it by a Delphic oracle, which, of course, must not be regarded as the cause of, but rather as an additional support to his reforming zeal.<sup>2</sup> How and when this

stophanes, Plato, and Xenophon to the sculptor's art, from which we may conclude, that if Socrates ever practised it, he gave it up long before the play of the Clouds was acted. Duris and Demetrius of Byzantium in Diog. ii. 19, in stating that he was a slave, and that Crito removed him from a workshop and cared for his education, appear to confound him with Phædo.

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Apol. 33, C.: *ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτο . . . προστέτακται ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πράττειν ἐκ μαντείων καὶ ἐξ ἐνυπνίων καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ, ᾧ περ τίς ποτε καὶ ἄλλη θεία μοῖρα ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ὁτιοῦν προσέταξε ποιεῖν.*

<sup>2</sup> According to the well-known story in the Apol. 20, E., which has been repeated countless times by succeeding writers, the matter stands thus: Chærephon had asked at Delphi if there was a wiser man than Socrates, and the priestess had answered in the negative. Upon this, Socrates goes on to say, he had thought over the sense of the oracle, and in the hope of finding it, he had conversed with all who made pretensions to knowledge as to what they knew. The result was that he discovered, that neither he himself nor any other man was

wise, but that others believed themselves to be wise, whilst he was conscious of his want of wisdom. He considered himself therefore pledged in the service of Apollo to a similar sifting of men, to save the honour of the oracle, which declared him, who was so wanting in wisdom, to be the wisest of men. Allowing that Socrates really said this—and there is no doubt that he uttered it in substance, it by no means follows from the story, that his philosophical activity dated from the Pythian oracle. Else how should Chærephon have come to put the question or the oracle to give its answer? If then he speaks in the Apology, as though the Delphic oracle had first aroused him to sift men, this must be an oratorical figure. Without being obliged to follow Colotes (in Plut. adv. Col. 17, 1), and Athenæus (v. 218) and many modern writers (Brucker, Hist. Phil. i. 534, Van Dalen and Heumann), in denying the historical character of the oracle altogether—which certainly cannot be very rigidly proved—we can attach no great importance to it. It may have done as good service to Socrates as his doctor's degree



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conviction first dawned on him, cannot be determined. Meanwhile it is most probable that this conviction grew gradually, as he gained more knowledge of his moral and intellectual position, and soon after the beginning of the Peloponnesian war he had found in the main his philosophical centre of gravity.<sup>1</sup>

Henceforth he gave himself up to the mission he had assumed with perfect devotion. His means of support were extremely limited, and his domestic life, in company with Xanthippe, was by no means happy.<sup>2</sup> But he allowed himself to be disturbed in

did to Luther, by assuring him of his inward call, but it made him just as little a philosophical reformer as the doctor's degree made Luther a religious reformer. The story of the oracle, given to his father when he was a boy (Plut. Gen. Soc. c. 20), is a fiction.

<sup>1</sup> This is supported by the part which Aristophanes assigns to Socrates in the *Clouds*. If at that time, 424 B.C., he could be described as the chief of the new learning, this supposes, that he must have worked for years according to a definite method, and have gathered about him a circle of friends. In the *Connus* of Ameipsias, which seems to have been acted at the same time as the *Clouds*, he likewise appears as a well-known person, and Io in his travelling memorials had previously alluded to him, but Io died before 421 B.C. since Aristophanes (Peace, 835) mentions him as dead.

<sup>2</sup> The name of Xanthippe is

not only proverbial with us, but the later writers of antiquity—Seneca (De Const. 18, 5, Epist. 104, 17), Porphyry (in Theod. Cur. Gr. Aff. xii. 65) Diogenes (ii. 36), Plutarch (Coh. Ira, 13), who however tells the same of the wife of Pittacus, Ælian (V. H. xi. 12), Athenæus (v. 219), Synesius, &c., tell so many little stories and disgraceful traits of her that one feels inclined to take up the cudgels in her behalf, as Heumann has actually done (Acta Phil. i. 103). What Xenophon (Mem. ii. 2; Sym. 2, 10) and Plato (Phædo, 60, A.) say of her, shows that she must have been not altogether badly disposed, but really solicitous about her family, though at the same time she was extremely violent, over-bearing, and hard to deal with. It is remarkable that Aristophanes in the *Clouds* says nothing of the married life of Socrates, which might have afforded him material for many a joke. Probably he was not then married. His



the work which he recognised to be the business of his life just as little by domestic cares, as he suffered

eldest son is called twenty-five years later (Plato, *Apol.* 34, D., *Phædo*, 60, A.) *μειράκιον ἤδη*, and there are two other young children. Besides Xanthippe, Socrates is said to have had another wife, Myrto, a daughter or granddaughter of Aristides, *after* Xanthippe according to Aristotle (in *Diog.* ii. 26; less accurate is Plutarch's *Aristid.* 27), *before* her according to another view (also in *Diog.*), and at the same time with her according to Aristoxenus, Demetrius Phaler., Hieronymus Rhod., Satyrus, and Porphyry, so that he had two wives at once. The fallacy of the last view has been already exposed by Panætius, (according to Plut.) and in modern times has been refuted by Luzac (*Lectiones Atticæ*, Leyden, 1809), in a conclusive manner. For not only is such a thing incompatible with the character of Socrates, but amongst his contemporaries, foes and friends, Xenophon, Plato, Aristophanes, and other comic poets, including Timon, there is no allusion to a relation, which would most undoubtedly have caused a great sensation had it existed, and have provoked attack and defence, and derision in the highest degree. The laws of Athens never allowed bigamy, and the decree purporting to be in favour of it, by which Hieronymus attempts to give probability to his story, either never was passed, or must bear a different meaning. The only question is, whether there can be any foundation for the story, and how its rise can

be explained. Luzac supposes that Myrto was his first wife, and that he married Xanthippe after her death. But this is not probable. For, in the first place, neither Xenophon nor Plato know anything about two wives of Socrates, although the *Symposium* would have invited some mention of them. In the second place, all the biographers (a few unknown ones in Diogenes excepted) assert that he married Myrto after Xanthippe, and that Sophroniscus and Menexenus were her children. Thirdly, Socrates cannot possibly have married the sister or the niece of Lysimachus, the son of Aristides, before the battle of Delium, since at the time of the battle (*Lach.* 180, D.) he did not know Lysimachus personally. Nor can his first marriage have been contracted after that date, since Xanthippe's eldest son was grown up at the time of his death. And lastly, in Plato's *Theætet.* 150, E., shortly before his death, Socrates mentions this Aristides, as one of those who had withdrawn from his intellectual influence without detriment to his relationship as a kinsman.

Thus the connection between Socrates and Myrto seems to belong altogether to the region of fable. The most probable account of the origin of the story is the following. We gather from the remains of the treatise *περὶ εὐγενείας*, (*Stob. Flor.* 76, 24, 25; 77, 13) the genuineness of which was doubted by Plutarch, and certainly cannot be allowed, that

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his composure to be ruffled by his wife's fretfulness.<sup>1</sup> His own concerns were neglected lest he should omit anything in the service of God.<sup>2</sup> To be independent, he tried, like the Gods, to rise superior to his wants;<sup>3</sup> and by carefully practising self-denial and abstemiousness,<sup>4</sup> he was really able to boast that his life was more pleasant and more free from troubles than that of the rest of mankind.<sup>5</sup> Thus he was able to devote

this dialogue was concerned with the question, whether nobility belonged to those whose parents were rich, or to those whose parents were virtuous. Now none were more celebrated for their spotless virtue and their voluntary poverty than Aristides and Socrates. Accordingly the writer brought the two into connection. Socrates was made to marry a daughter of Aristides, and since Xanthippe was known to be his wife, Myrto was made to be his second wife and the mother of his younger children. Others, however, remembered, that Xanthippe survived her husband. They thought it unlikely that Socrates should be the son-in-law of a man dead before he was born, and they tried to surmount these difficulties in various ways. As regards the first difficulty, either it was maintained that Myrto was his second wife and that the younger children were hers, in which case it was necessary to place her side by side with Xanthippe, as Hieronymus actually did, and invented a decree of the people to make it probable; or to avoid romance, this supposition was given up, and Myrto was made to be his first wife, who then

can have borne him no children, since Lamprocles, his eldest son, according to Xenophon, was a child of Xanthippe. The second difficulty might be got over either by making Myrto a grand-daughter instead of a daughter of Aristides, or by making her father to be Aristides, the grandson of Aristides the Just. Plato, *Lach.* 179, A.; *Theæt.*, &c. The former is the usual one. The latter is the view of Athenæus.

<sup>1</sup> See Xenophon.

<sup>2</sup> Plato, *Apol.* 23, B.; 31, B.

<sup>3</sup> Conf. Xen. *Mem.* i. 6, 1-10, where he tells Antiphon, that he is thoroughly happy in his mode of life, ending with the celebrated words: τὸ μὲν μηδενὸς δέεσθαι θεῶν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ὡς ἐλαχίστων ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ θείου.

<sup>4</sup> The contentment of Socrates, the simplicity of his life, his abstinence from sensual pleasures of every kind, his scanty clothing, his walking bare-foot, his endurance of hunger and thirst, of heat and cold, of deprivations and hardships, is well known. Conf. Xen. *Mem.* i. 2, 1; i. 3, 5; i. 6, 2; Plato, *Symp.* 174, A., 219, B.; *Phædrus*, 229, A.; *Aristoph.* *Nubes*, 103, 361, 409, 828.

<sup>5</sup> Xen. *Mem.* i. 6, 4; iv. 8, 6.

his whole powers to the service of others, without asking or taking reward;<sup>1</sup> and thus he became so engrossed by his labours for his native city, that he rarely passed its boundaries or even went outside its gates.<sup>2</sup>

He did not, however, feel himself called upon to take part in the affairs of the state.<sup>3</sup> On the one hand he felt it to be impossible to maintain a character for statesmanship<sup>4</sup> in Athens, as it then was, without violating his principles; besides which, submission to the demands of a pampered mob was odious to him.<sup>5</sup> On the other hand, his own duty called him in another direction—that of influencing individuals.<sup>6</sup> Any one convinced as he was, that care for one's own culture must precede care for public business, and that a thorough knowledge of

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Mem. i. 2, 5; i. 5, 6; i. 6, 3; Plato, Apol. 19, D. 31; B.; 33, A.; Euthypro, 3, D.; Symp. 219, E. In the face of these distinct testimonies, the statement of Aristoxenus (Diog. ii. 20) that from time to time he collected money from his pupils, can only be regarded as a slander. It is possible that he did not always refuse the presents of well-disposed friends—(Diog. ii. 74, 121, 34; Sen. de Benef. i. 8; vii. 24; Quintil. Inst. xii. 7, 9). Questionable anecdotes (Diog. ii. 24, 31, 65; Stob. Flor. 3, 61; 17, 17) prove nothing against it, but the authorities cannot be depended on. He is said to have refused the splendid offers of the Macedonian Archelaus and the Thessalian Scopas (Diog. ii. 25;

Sen. Benef. v. 6; Dio Chrys. Or. xiii. 30), and this is confirmed as far as the first-named individual is concerned by Aristotle, Rhet. ii. 23.

<sup>2</sup> In the Crito, 52, B., he says, that except on military duty he has only once left Athens, going as a deputy to the Isthmian games; and from the Phædrus, 230, C., we gather that he rarely went outside the gates.

<sup>3</sup> Plato, Apol. 31, C.

<sup>4</sup> Plato, Apol. 31, D.; Rep. vi. 496, C.

<sup>5</sup> Plato, Apol. 33, A., or as the Gorgias (473, E.) ironically expresses it: because he was too plain for a statesman.

<sup>6</sup> Plato, Apol. 29, D.; 30, D.; 33, C.

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self, together with a deep and many-sided experience, was a necessary condition of public activity,<sup>1</sup> must have thought that, to educate individuals by influence, was the more pressing need,<sup>2</sup> and have held that he was doing his country a better service by educating able statesmen for it, than by actually discharging a statesman's duties.<sup>3</sup> Accordingly, Socrates never aimed at being anything but a private citizen. His duties to his country he discharged by serving in several campaigns with the greatest bravery and endurance.<sup>4</sup> As a citizen he boldly and fearlessly met the unrighteous demands alike of an infuriated populace and of tyrannical oligarchs, in every case of danger,<sup>5</sup> without ever being anxious to take part in the government of the commonwealth.

Just as little was he desirous of being a public teacher like the Sophists. He not only took no pay, but he gave no methodical course.<sup>6</sup> He did not

<sup>1</sup> Plato, *Symp.* 216, A.; Xen. *Mem.* iv. 2, 6; iii. 6.

<sup>2</sup> Conf. *Gorg.* 513, E.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. *Mem.* i. 6, 15.

<sup>4</sup> See the stories in Plato, *Symp.* 219, E.; *Apol.* 28, E.; *Charm.* i.; *Lach.* 181, A. Of the three expeditions mentioned in the *Apology*, that to Potidæa between 432 and 429 B.C., that to Delium, 424 B.C., and that to Amphipolis, 422 B.C., the two first are described with details. At Potidæa Socrates rescued Alcibiades, but gave up in his favour his claim to the prize for valour. His fearless retreat from the battle of Delium is mentioned with praise. Antisthenes (in *Athen.* v. 216) refers the affair of the prize to the time after the

battle of Delium, but probably Plato is right, who shews himself in general well informed on these matters. The doubts which Athenæus raises about Plato's account are of no importance. Of course other accounts which have been taken from it cannot be alleged in support of it. The story that Socrates rescued Xenophon at Delium (*Strabo*, ix. 2, 7; *Diog.*) seems to confound Xenophon with Alcibiades.

<sup>5</sup> Xen. *Mem.* i. 1, 18, and 2, 31; iv. 4, 2; *Hellen.* i. 7, 15; Plato, *Apol.* 32, A.; *Gorg.* 473, E.; *epist. Plat.* vii. 324, D; *Grote's Hist. of Greece*, viii. 238-285.

<sup>6</sup> Plato, *Apol.* 33, A: ἐγὼ δὲ διδάσκαλος μὲν οὐδενὸς πάποτε



profess to teach, but to learn in common with others, not to force his convictions upon them, but to examine theirs; not to pass the truth that came to hand like a coin fresh from the mint, but to stir up a desire for truth and virtue, to point out the way to it, to overthrow what was spurious, and to seek out real knowledge.<sup>1</sup> Never weary of talking, he was on the look out for every opportunity of giving an instructive and moral turn to the conversation. Day by day he was about in the market and public promenades, in schools and workshops, ever ready to converse with friends or strangers, with citizens and foreigners, but always prepared to lead them to higher subjects;<sup>2</sup> and whilst thus in his higher calling serving God, he was persuaded that he was also serving his country in a way that no one else could do.<sup>3</sup> Deeply as he deplored the decline of discipline and education in his native city,<sup>4</sup> he felt that he could depend but little on the Sophists,<sup>5</sup> the moral teachers of his day. The attractive powers of his discourse won for him a circle of admirers, for the most part consisting of young men of family,<sup>6</sup> drawn to him by the most

ἐγενόμην· εἰ δέ τις μου λέγοντος καὶ τὰ ἑμαυτοῦ πράττοντος ἐπιθυμεῖ ἀκοῦειν . . . οὐδενὶ πάποτ' ἐφθόνησα. Xen. Mem. i. 2, 3 and 31. The assertion of the Epicurean Idomeneus, and of Favorin. in Diog. ii. 20, that he gave instruction in rhetoric, needs no further refutation.

<sup>1</sup> Proofs in all the dialogues. See particularly Plato, Apol. 21, B.; 23, B.; Rep. i. 336, B. The Socratic method will be discussed later.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Mem. i. 1, 10; iii. 10; Plato, Symp., Lysis., Apol. 23, B. The *μαστροπεία* which Socrates boasts of, Xen. Symp. 3, 10; 4, 56, is nothing else. For this art, as it is there explained, consists in making his friends loveable, by virtue and prudence.

<sup>3</sup> Plato, Apol. 30, A.; Gorg. 521, D.

<sup>4</sup> Xen. Mem. iii. 5, 13.

<sup>5</sup> Mem. iv. 4, 5.

<sup>6</sup> Plato, Apol. 23, C.



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varied motives, standing to him in various relations, and coming to him, some for a longer, others for a shorter time.<sup>1</sup> For his own part, he made it his business not only to educate these friends, but to advise them in everything, even in worldly matters.<sup>2</sup> But out of this changing, and in part loosely connected, society, a nucleus was gradually formed of decided admirers,—a Socratic school, which we must consider united far less by a common set of doctrines, than by a common love for the person of Socrates. With more intimate friends he frequently had meals<sup>3</sup> in common, which, however, can scarcely have been a fixed institution. Some few who appeared to him to need other instruction, or who did not seem to profit by his conversation, he urged to go to other teachers, either in addition to, or instead of himself.<sup>4</sup> He continued to pursue this course with his powers of mind unimpaired<sup>5</sup> till his seventieth year. The blow which then put an end to his life and his activity, will be mentioned hereafter.

<sup>1</sup> Conf. Xen. Mem. i. 2, 14; iv. 2, 40; Plato, Theæt. 150, D.

<sup>2</sup> Conf. examples, Mem. ii. 3, 7, 8, 9; iii. 6, 7.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Mem. iii. 14.

<sup>4</sup> Plato, Theætet. 151, B.; Xen. Mem. iii. 1.

<sup>5</sup> Xenophon and Plato mostly

represent Socrates as an old man, (as he was when they knew him) without showing any trace of weakness in his mental powers up to the last moment. See also the definite statement in Mem. iv. 8, 8.

## CHAPTER IV.

## THE CHARACTER OF SOCRATES.

ANTIQUITY speaks of the character of Socrates with the greatest esteem. There are, however, a few exceptions, and the prejudices occasioned by his condemnation, no doubt survived some time after his death. The followers of Epicurus indulged their love of slander even at his expense,<sup>1</sup> and one voice from the Peripatetic School utters scandalous tales about his life. As a boy he was said to have been disobedient and refractory; as a youth, profligate; as a man, coarse, importunate, given to sudden bursts of anger, and of fiery passions.<sup>2</sup> But the statements we have of this kind are so improbable, and the

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A. *The  
greatness  
of the cha-  
racter of  
Socrates.*

<sup>1</sup> Cicero de N. D. i. 34, says that his teacher, the Epicurean Zeno, called him an Attic buffoon. Epicurus, however, according to Diog. x. 8, appears to have spared him, although he depreciated every other philosopher.

<sup>2</sup> The source from which these unfavourable reports come is Aristoxenus. From this writer come the following statements; that mentioned in Porphyry: *ὡς φύσει γεγόνος τραχὺς εἰς ὀργήν, καὶ ὁπότε κρατηθείη τῷ πάθει διὰ πάσης ἀσχημοσύνης ἐβάδιζεν*—Synesius

(Enc. Calv. 81) will have this limited to his younger years; that of Cyril. c. Jul. vi. 185, C.: *ὅτε δὲ φλεχθείη ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους τοῦτον δεινὴν εἶναι τὴν ἀσχημοσύνην· οὐδενὸς γὰρ οὔτε ὀνόματος ἀποσχέσθαι οὔτε πράγματος*; and another of Cyril. (180, C.) that Socrates was in other ways temperate, *πρὸς δὲ τὴν τῶν ἀφροδισίων χρῆσιν σφοδρότερον μὲν εἶναι, ἀδικίαν δὲ μὴ προσεῖναι, ἥ γὰρ ταῖς γαμιταῖς ἢ ταῖς κοιναῖς χρῆσθαι μόναις*, and then after the history of his bigamy he concludes: *εἶναι*

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chief witness is so untrustworthy,<sup>1</sup> that we cannot even infer with certainty,<sup>2</sup> that it cost Socrates a severe struggle to become what he was in after life.<sup>3</sup>

δέ φησιν αὐτὸν ἐν ταῖς ὀμυλίαις αἰνῶς τε φιλαπεχθήμονα καὶ λοιδόρον καὶ ὕβριστικόν. From the same source comes the charge εἶναι δὲ αὐτὸν πρὸς οὐδέν μὲν ἐφυῆ, ἀπαίδευτον δὲ περὶ πάντα. Probably the story of the physiognomist Zopyrus is connected with these statements, (Cic. Tusc. vi. 37, 80; De Fat. iv. 10; Alex. Aph. De Fato, vi.; Max. Tyr. xxxi. 3), who declared Socrates to be stupid and profligate, and received from him the answer, that by nature he had been so, but had been changed by reason. This account can hardly be historical. It looks as if it had been devised to illustrate the power of reason over a defective natural disposition, as illustrated in Plato, Symp. 215, 221, B. If the story was current in the time of Aristoxenus, he may have used it for his picture; but it is also possible that his description produced the story, which in this case would have an apologetic meaning. The name of Zopyrus would lead us to think of the Syrian magician, who, according to Aristotle in Diog. ii. 45, had foretold the violent death of Socrates.

<sup>1</sup> As may be already seen from the stories about the bigamy, the gross ignorance, the violent temper, and the sensual indulgences of Socrates.

<sup>2</sup> As Hermann does, De Socr.

<sup>3</sup> Though this is in itself possible, we have no certain authority for such an assertion. The anecdote of Zopyrus is, as already remarked, very uncertain, and

where is the warrant that Aristoxenus followed a really credible tradition? He refers, it is true, to his father, Spintharus, an actual acquaintance of Socrates. But the question arises whether this statement is more trustworthy than the rest. The chronology is against it, and still more so is the substance of what Spintharus says. It may also be asked whether Spintharus spoke the truth, when he professed to have witnessed outbursts of anger in Socrates, although he can only have known him in his later years, and certainly we have no reason to place more confidence in him than in his son. Lastly, Aristoxenus does not confine his remarks to the youth of Socrates, but they are of a most general character, or refer distinctly to his later years. Luzac would appear to have hit the truth when he makes Aristoxenus responsible for all these statements. For Aristoxenus appears not only to have carried his warfare with the Socratic Schools against the person of Socrates, but to have indulged in the most capricious and unfounded inferences. His overdrawn imagination makes Socrates as a boy dissatisfied with his father's business, and makes him afterwards pass his life about the streets. In the same way he finds that Socrates must have been a man without culture, because of expressions such as that in the Apology, 17, B., or that in the Symp. 221, E.; violent in temper, in support of which he

Our most reliable authorities only know of him as a perfect man, to whom they look up with respect, and whom they regard as the exemplar of humanity and morality. ‘No one,’ says Xenophon, ‘ever heard or saw anything wicked in Socrates; he was so pious, that he did nothing without consulting the Gods, so just that he never injured any one in the slightest degree, so self-controlled that he never preferred pleasure to goodness, so sensible that he never made a mistake in deciding between what was better and what was worse. In a word, he was the best and happiest of men.’<sup>1</sup>

This description represents Socrates as a pattern of abstemiousness, of self-denial, and of self-mastery, as a man of religious feeling and love for his country, and of unbending fidelity to his convictions, as a sensible and trustworthy adviser both for the bodies and souls of his friends, as an agreeable and affable companion, with a happy combination of cheerfulness and seriousness; and more than all, as an unwearied trainer of character, using every opportunity of bringing all with whom he came into contact to virtue and self-knowledge, and endeavouring especially to counteract the self-esteem and lightmindedness of youth. Plato repeats the same of him. He too calls his teacher the best, the most sensible, and the most just man of his age,<sup>2</sup> and he never tires of praising his simplicity, his moderation, and his control over the desires and wants of the

refers to Symp. 214, D.; and dissolute because of his supposed bigamy, and the words in Xen.

Mem. ii. 2, 4.

<sup>1</sup> Mem. i. 1, 11; iv. 8, 11.

<sup>2</sup> See the end of the Phædo.

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senses. He represents him as imbued with the deepest religious feeling in all his doings, as devoting his whole life to the service of the Gods, and dying a martyr's death because of his obedience to the divine voice; and, like Xenophon, he describes this service as the exercise of a universal moral influence on others, and particularly on youth. His picture too brings before us the real kindness, the Athenian polish, the sparkling cheerfulness and pleasing humour which light up the more serious side in the character of Socrates. Of his social virtues and his political courage Plato speaks in the same terms as Xenophon, and adds moreover an admirable description of his military services.<sup>1</sup> Every touch from his pen serves to increase the lustre of that picture of moral greatness, which appears all the more wonderful from its very originality, and from the absence of all that is studied and affected, owing, as it does, its charm to a perfectly unadorned simplicity.<sup>2</sup>

B. *His character influenced by Grecian peculiarities.*

But besides being an original growth, the Socratic type of virtue bears, throughout, the peculiar impress of the Greek mind. Socrates is not the insipid ideal

<sup>1</sup> See page 60, note 4.

<sup>2</sup> Most of the further traits and anecdotes recorded by later writers are in harmony with this view of Socrates. Some of them are certainly fictions. Others may be taken from writings of pupils of Socrates, which have been since lost, or from other trustworthy sources. They may be found in the following places. Cic. Tusc. iii. 15, 31; Off. i. 26 and 90; Seneca, De Const. 18, 5; De

Ira, i. 15, 3; iii. 11, 2; ii. 7, 1; Tranqu. An. 5, 2; 17, 4; Epist. 104, 27; Plin. H. Nat. vii. 18; Plut. Educ. Pu. 14; De Adulat. 32; Coh. Ira, 4; Tranqu. An. 10; Garrulit. 20; Diog. ii. 21, 24, 27, 30; vi. 8; Gell. N. A. ii. 1; xix. 9, 9; Val. Max. viii. 8; Ælian, V. H. i. 16; ii. 11, 13, 36; iii. 28; ix. 7, 29; xii. 15; xiii. 27, 32; Athen. iv. 157; Stob. Flor. 17, 17 and 22.



of virtue, which a sentimental hero-worship would make him, but he is a thorough Greek, the very marrow, as it were, of his nation, possessed of flesh and blood, and not merely the universal moral standard for all time. The moderation so much lauded in him is free from the ascetic element, which always seems to be suggested by it in modern times. Socrates enjoys good company, although he avoids noisy carousals;<sup>1</sup> and if he does not make the pleasures of the senses an object in life, no more does he avoid them, when they are offered to him, nay, not even when in excess. Thus there is a call for small cups in Xenophon's banquet, not for fear of indulging too largely, but that exhilaration may not be too rapid.<sup>2</sup> In Plato he boasts that he is equally well able to take much or little, that he can surpass all in drinking, without ever being intoxicated himself,<sup>3</sup> and he is represented at the close of the banquet, after a night spent over the bowl, as pursuing his daily work as if nothing had happened, when all his boon companions were suffering from ill consequences. Moderation appears with him to consist, not in total abstinence from pleasure, but in perfect mental freedom,—a freedom which neither requires pleasure, nor is ever overtaken by its seductive influence. His abstemiousness in other points is also recorded with admiration,<sup>4</sup> but nume-

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Symp. 220, A.

θόμενοι, πρὸς τὸ παιγνιδέστερον ἀφιζόμεθα.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Mem. 2, 26: ἦν δὲ ἡμῖν οἱ παῖδες μικραῖς κύλιξι πυκνὰ ἐπιψεκάζουσιν, οὕτως οὐ βιαζόμενοι ὑπὸ τοῦ οἴνου μεθύειν, ἀλλ' ἀναπει-<sup>3</sup> Symp. 176, C.; 220, A.; 213, E.<sup>4</sup> Xen. Mem. i. 2, 1; 3, 14.

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rous passages in Xenophon's 'Memorabilia'<sup>1</sup> prove that his morality was far below our standard of rigid adherence to principles. The Grecian peculiarity of a love for boys marks his relations to youth, but his character is above all suspicion of actual vice,<sup>2</sup> as is shown by the irony with which he treats a supposed love-affair of his own.<sup>3</sup> At the same time, what Greek in the presence of youthful beauty was proof against a certain element of æsthetic pleasure, which if it was the ground and origin, was at any rate an innocent one in his case, of deeper affection?<sup>4</sup> The odious excrescences of Greek morality called forth his severest censure, but at the same time, according to Xenophon,<sup>5</sup> and Æschines,<sup>6</sup> and Plato,<sup>7</sup> Socrates designated his own relations to his younger friends

We have already seen that Aristoxenus and his followers cannot make the contrary probable.

<sup>1</sup> i. 3, 14; ii. 1, 5; 2, 4; iii. 11; iv. 5, 9.

<sup>2</sup> The cotemporaries of Socrates seem to have found nothing to object to in his love of boys. Not only is there no allusion to it in the judicial charge, but not even in Aristophanes, who would undoubtedly have magnified the smallest suspicion into the gravest charge. The other comic poets, according to Athen., v. 219, seem to have known nothing of it. Just as little does Xenophon think it necessary to refute this calumny, and therefore the well-known story of Plato's banquet has for its object far more the glorification than the justification of his teacher. On the other hand, the relations of Socrates to

Alcibiades, in the verses purporting to be written by Aspasia, which Athenæus communicates on the authority of Herodæus, have a very suspicious look, and Juvenal (Sat. ii. 10) does not hesitate to charge Socrates with the reigning dissoluteness of manners.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Mem. iv. 1, 2; Symp. 4, 27; Plato, Symp. 213, C.; 216, D.; 222, B.

<sup>4</sup> Xen. Mem. i. 2, 29; 3, 8; Sym. 8, 19.

<sup>5</sup> Symp. 8, 2 and 24; Mem. iv. 1, 2.

<sup>6</sup> In his Alcibiades he speaks of the love of Socrates for Alcibiades. See Arist. Or. xlv. *περὶ ῥητορικῆς*.

<sup>7</sup> Prot. beginning; Symp. 177, D.; 218, B.; 222, A.; not to mention other expressions for which Plato is answerable.

by the name of Eros, or a passionate attachment grounded on æsthetic feeling. Not otherwise may Grecian peculiarities be observed in his ethical or political views, while his theology is confined by the trammels of the popular belief. How deeply these peculiarities had influenced his character, may be seen not only in his simple obedience<sup>1</sup> to the laws of his country throughout life, and his genuine respect for the state religion,<sup>2</sup> but far more also in the trials of his last days, when for fear of violating the laws, he scorned the ordinary practices of defence, and after his condemnation refused to escape from prison.<sup>3</sup> Truly the epitaph which Simonides inscribed on the tomb of Leonidas might be inscribed on that of Socrates: He died to obey the state.<sup>4</sup>

But fully as Socrates was imbued with all the peculiarities of a Greek, there is a something in

*C. Prominent  
traits in*

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Apol. 28, E.

<sup>2</sup> Xenophon, Mem. i. 1, 2, assures us not only that Socrates took part in the public sacrifices, but that he was frequently in the habit of sacrificing at home. In Plato he invokes Helios, Symp. 220, D.; and his last words, according to the Phædo, 118, A., were an earnest commission to Crito to offer a cock to Æsculapius. A belief in oracles is also very frequently mentioned, which he always obeyed conscientiously (Mem. i. 3, 4; Plato, Apol. 21, B.) and the use of which he recommended to his friends (Xen. Mem. ii. 6, 8; iv. 7, 10; Anab. iii. 1, 5). He was himself fully persuaded that he possessed an oracle in the truest sense, in the

inward voice of his *δαίμονιον*, and he also believed in dreams and similar prognostications. (Plato, Crito, 44, A.; Phædo, 60, D.; Apol. 33, C.)

<sup>3</sup> This motive is represented by Xenophon (Mem. iv. 4, 4), and Plato (Apol. 34, D.; Phædo, 98, C.) as the decisive one, although the Crito makes it appear that a flight from Athens would have done no good to himself, and much harm to his friends and dependants. The Apology speaks as if entreating the judges were unworthy of the speaker and his country.

<sup>4</sup> Xen. says: *προείλετο μᾶλλον τοῖς νόμοις ἐμμένων ἀποθανεῖν ἢ παρανομῶν ζῆν.*

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his appearance which is decidedly unlike a Greek, nay, which has even a foreign and almost modern aspect. This it was which made him appear to his cotemporaries a thoroughly eccentric and singular person. This something, which they described by one word as his singularity,<sup>1</sup> consisted, according to Plato's account,<sup>2</sup> in what any Greek would have found difficulty in understanding—a want of agreement between his outward appearance and his inward and real nature. In this respect he presents a striking contrast to the usual classic type, which consists in a harmonious union of the outer and the inner world. On the one hand we behold Socrates indifferent to the outer world, and thus entirely unlike his countrymen; on the other hand, deeply sunk in meditation—a feature unknown before—sometimes even so deeply as to lose the consciousness of his own personality. Owing to the former, there is a something stiff and awkward about him, sharply contrasting with the graceful sweetness and the artistic beauty of life in Greece—we might almost call him a Philistine—and the other shows itself in a way that looks like the working of a higher revelation, having its seat within in the recesses of the soul, in which light it was regarded by Socrates himself. In their account of these two peculiarities both Plato and Xenophon are agreed.

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Symp. 221, C.: Πολλὰ μὲν οὖν ἂν τις καὶ ἄλλα ἔχοι Σωκράτη ἐπαινέσαι καὶ θαυμάσια . . . τὸ δὲ μηδεὶν ἀνθρώπων ὅμοιον εἶναι, μήτε τῶν παλαιῶν μήτε τῶν νῦν ὄντων, τοῦτο ἄξιον παντὸς θαυ-

μάτος . . . οἷος δὲ οὔτοσι γέγονε τὴν ἀτοπίαν ἀνθρώπου καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ οἱ λόγοι αὐτοῦ οὐδ' ἐγγὺς ἂν εὔροι τις ζητῶν, οὔτε τῶν νῦν οὔτε τῶν παλαιῶν.

<sup>2</sup> Symp. 215, A.; 221, E.

Even the outward appearance of Socrates, which Alcibiades in Plato,<sup>1</sup> and Socrates himself in Xenophon<sup>2</sup> compares with so much humour to Silenus, must to the eye of the Greek have seemed rather like a veil to conceal, than an instrument to express the presence of genius. A certain amount of intellectual stiffness, and an indifference to what was sensibly beautiful also expressed itself in his conduct and conversation. Take for instance the process of catechising given in the 'Memorabilia,'<sup>3</sup> by which Hipparchus is brought to a knowledge of his duties, or the formality with which things,<sup>4</sup> long familiar to his hearers, are proved, or again the way in which the idea of the beautiful is reduced to that of the useful.<sup>5</sup> Or hear him advising conduct, which to us seems simply abominable,<sup>6</sup> on grounds of expediency, or in the Phædrus<sup>7</sup> refusing to walk out because he can learn nothing from trees and the country. Or see him according to Xenophon's account of the banquet,<sup>8</sup> in opposition to the universal custom of the ancients, dancing alone and at home,<sup>9</sup> in order to gain health-

<sup>1</sup> Symp. 215; Conf. Theæt. 14, 3, E.

<sup>2</sup> Symp. 4, 19; 2, 19; Epictetus (Diss. iv. 11, 19) gives Socrates a pleasing appearance, but this is of course quite untenable.

<sup>3</sup> iii. 3.

<sup>4</sup> iii. 10, 9; iii. 11.

<sup>5</sup> iii. 8, 4.

<sup>6</sup> i. 3, 14.

<sup>7</sup> 230, D.

<sup>8</sup> 2, 17.

<sup>9</sup> Compare Menexenus, 236, C.:

ἀλλὰ μέντοι σοί γε δεῖ χαρίζεσθαι, ὥστε κἂν ὀλίγον εἴ με κελεύοις ἀποδύντα ὀρχήσασθαι, χαρισαίμην ἄν; and Cicero pro Mur. 6: Nemo fere saltat sobrius, nisi forte insanit; De Offic. iii. 19: Dares hanc vim M. Crasso, in foro, mihi crede, saltaret; also the expressions in Xenophon: Ὀρχήσομαι νῆ Δία. Ἐνταῦθα δὴ ἐγέλασαν ἅπαντες. And when Charmides found Socrates dancing: τὸ μέν γε πρῶτον ἐξεπλάγην καὶ ἔδεισα, μὴ μαίνοιο, κ. τ. λ.



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ful exercise, and justifying his conduct by curious reflections; even at table<sup>1</sup> unable to forget considerations of utility. Taking these and similar traits into account, there appears in the conduct of Socrates a certain want of imagination, a one-sided prominence of the critical and intellectual faculties, in short a want of taste which clashes with the poetry of Grecian life, and the delicate refinement of an Athenian. Even Alcibiades<sup>2</sup> allows, in Plato, that the discourses of Socrates appear ridiculous and rude at first sight, since they always concern beasts of burden, smiths, tailors, and tanners. Was not this the very objection raised by Xenophon?<sup>3</sup> How strange that plain unadorned common sense must have appeared to his cotemporaries with its shrinking from all set modes of speech, forms, and its simple use of plain and intelligible expressions!

D. *His  
peculiar  
mental  
pheno-  
mena.*

It was not however produced by any lack of taste. On the contrary, it resulted from the profound originality of his ideas, for which customary expressions were insufficient. The soul of the philosopher diving into its own recesses was sometimes so far absent as to be insensible to external impressions, and at other times poured forth enigmatical utterances, which appeared strange to it in a wakeful state. It not

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Symp. 3, 2.

<sup>2</sup> Symp. 221, E.

<sup>3</sup> Mem. i. 2, 37: 'Ο δὲ Κριτίας· ἀλλὰ τῶν δέ τοί σε ἀπέχεσθαι, ἔφη, δεήσει, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῶν σκυτέων καὶ τῶν τεκτόνων καὶ τῶν χαλκέων, καὶ γὰρ οἶμαι αὐτοὺς ἤδη κατα-τετρίφθαι διαθρυλούμενους ὑπὸ σοῦ.

Again in iv. 4, 6: καὶ ὁ μὲν Ἰππίας· ἔτι γὰρ σύ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκεῖνα τὰ αὐτὰ λέγεις, ἃ ἐγὼ πάλαι ποτέ σου ἤκουσα. The same complaint and the same answer is met with in Plato's Gorgias, 490, E.

unfrequently happened to Socrates with his seriousness and love of meditation,<sup>1</sup> that his thoughts wandered and remained for a longer or shorter time absent and indifferent to the outer world.<sup>2</sup> But as he watched with careful eye all that transpired within, endeavouring to let nothing escape him, he discovered a residuum of feelings and impulses, which could not be explained from what he knew of his own inner life. This he regarded in the light of a divine revelation, and believed that he enjoyed it in that particular form which goes by the name of the Dæmonium. He was, therefore, not only convinced that he stood and acted in the service of God in general, but he also held that special supernatural suggestions were communicated to him.

It was a common thing even among the ancients to regard these suggestions as the revelations of a special and personal genius,<sup>3</sup> and in modern times

(a) *False news about the δαίμόνιον.*

<sup>1</sup> Accordingly in the Aristotelian problems, xxx. 1, he is reckoned amongst the melancholy, which is not at variance with the gentle obstinacy (τὸ σπράσμιον) which Aristotle (Rhet. ii. 15) assigns to him.

<sup>2</sup> Plato, Symp. 174, D.; 220, C. According to the latter passage, Socrates was once twenty-four hours in this state, and remained the whole time in one spot.

<sup>3</sup> The bill of accusation against Socrates seems to have understood the δαίμόνιον in this sense, since it charges him with introducing ἑτέρα καὶ δαίμόνια in the place of the gods of the state. Afterwards this view appears to have been dropped, thanks to the de-

scriptions of Xenophon and Plato, since it does not recur for some time, even in spurious works attributed to them. Even Cicero, Divin. i. 54, 122, does not translate δαίμόνιον by genius, but by 'divinum quoddam,' and doubtless Antipater, whose work he was quoting, took it in the same sense. But in Christian times the belief in a genius became universal, because it fell in with the current belief in dæmons. For instance, Plut. De Genio Socratis, c. 20; Max. Tyr. xiv. 3; Apuleius, De Deo Socratis, the Neoplatonists, and the Fathers, who are however not agreed whether his genius was a good one or a bad one. Plutarch, however, and after him

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this view for a long time continued to hold its ground.<sup>1</sup> No doubt it was a sad thing in the eyes of enlightened admirers, that a man so sensible as Socrates, should have laboured under a fanatical delusion; nor were attempts wanting to excuse him, either on the ground of the universal superstition of his age and nation, or because he was believed to have a physical tendency to fanaticism.<sup>2</sup> Some even ventured to assert that his claim to supernatural revelations was a piece of shrewd calculation,<sup>3</sup> or that it was one form of his celebrated irony.<sup>4</sup> But how can the last-named view be reconciled with the language which, on the testimony of both Plato and Xenophon, he used of the suggestions of the Dæmonium, or with the value which he attaches to these suggestions on the most important occasions?<sup>5</sup> And to refer the Dæmonium to the irritability of a sickly body, cannot fall far short of asserting that it is

Apuleius, mention the view that by the *δαίμόνιον* must be understood the power of vague apprehension, by means of which he could guess the future from prognostications or natural signs.

<sup>1</sup> Compare Tiedemann, *Geist der spekulat. Philosophie*, ii. 16; Meiners, *Ueber den Genius des Sokr.* (*Verm. Schriften*, iii. 1); Buhle, Krug, &c.

<sup>2</sup> The first-named excuse is a very common one. Marsilius Ficinus (*Theol. Platon.* xiii. 2) assumed in Socrates, as well as in other philosophers, a peculiar bodily disposition for ecstacy, when he refers their susceptibility for supernatural revelations to

their melancholy temperament. The personality of the dæmon is not however called in question by him or by his supporters. Modern writers took refuge in the same hypothesis in order to explain in Socrates the possibility of a superstitious belief in a *δαίμόνιον*. For instance, Tiedemann, Meiners, Schwarze, Krug.  
<sup>3</sup> Plessing, *Osiris and Socrates*, 185.

<sup>4</sup> Fraguier, *Sur l'ironie de Socrate*, in the *Mémoires de l'Académie des Inscriptions*, iv. 368. Also Rollin in his *Histoire ancienne*, ix. 4, 2; and Barthélemy, *Voyage du jeune Anacharsis*.

<sup>5</sup> *Xen. Mem.* iv. 8, 4.

identical with the monomania of a diseased mind, and reduces the great reformer of philosophy to the level of a madman.<sup>1</sup> But all these explanations can be dispensed with, now that Schleiermacher,<sup>2</sup> with the general approbation of the most competent judges,<sup>3</sup> has established it as a fact, that by the *Dæmonium* in the sense of Socrates, no genius, no separate and distinct person, can be understood, but only some supernatural voice or divine revelation in general. No passage in Plato or Xenophon speaks of Socrates holding intercourse with a genius.<sup>4</sup> We only hear of divine or supernatural signs,<sup>5</sup> of a voice heard by Socrates,<sup>6</sup> of some supernatural guidance, by which many warnings were vouchsafed to him.<sup>7</sup> All that

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(b) *Schleiermacher's.*

<sup>1</sup> Many have spoken of the superstition and fanaticism of Socrates in a more modest way, but comparatively recently Lélut has boldly asserted, 'que Socrate était un fou'—a category, in which he places amongst others not only Cardan and Swedenborg, but Luther, Pascal and Rousseau. His chief argument is the statement that Socrates not only believed in a real and personal genius, but believed that in his hallucinations he audibly heard its voice. Those who rightly understand Plato, and can distinguish what is genuine from what is false, will not need a refutation of these untruths.

<sup>2</sup> Platon's Werke, i. 2, 432.

<sup>3</sup> Brandis, Ritter, Hermann, Socher, Cousin, Kresche. Compare Hegel and Ast.

<sup>4</sup> The passage Mem. i. 4, 14: ὅταν οἱ θεοὶ πέμπωσιν, ὥσπερ σοὶ φῆς πέμπειν αὐτοὺς συμβούλους,

proves nothing, as συμβούλους is used as a metonym for συμβουλὰς.

<sup>5</sup> Plato, Phædr. 242, B.: τὸ δαιμόνιον τε καὶ τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον μοι γίγνεσθαι ἐγένετο, καὶ τινα φωνὴν ἔδοξα αὐτόδε ἀκοῦσαι. Rep. iv. 496, C.: τὸ δαιμόνιον σημεῖον. Euthy. 272, E.: ἐγένετο τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον, τὸ δαιμόνιον. Apol. 40: τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον.

<sup>6</sup> Plato, Apol. 31, D.: ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον, φωνὴ τις γιγνομένη.

<sup>7</sup> Plato passim: ὅτι μοι θεῶν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίγνεται. Also 40, A.: ἡ εἰωθυῖά μοι μαντικὴ ἢ τοῦ δαιμονίου. Theæt. 151, A.: τὸ γιγνόμενον μοι δαιμόνιον.—Euthyphro 3, B.: ὅτι δὴ σὺ τὸ δαιμόνιον φῆς σαντῶ ἐκάστοτε γίγνεσθαι.—Xen. Mem. i. 1, 4: τὸ δαιμόνιον ἔφη σημαίνειν. iv. 1, 5: ἡναντιώθη τὸ δαιμόνιον. Symp. 8, 5. Even the spurious writings do not go further, and whatever the romance of the



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these expressions imply is, that Socrates was conscious to himself of a divine revelation, but of the source whence it came they say absolutely nothing, nay their very indefiniteness proves clearly enough, that neither Socrates nor his pupils had any very clear notion on the subject.<sup>1</sup> They generally refer to the fitness or unfitness of certain actions to attain their ends.<sup>2</sup> Sometimes a sign from the Dæmonium stops him from carrying out his own intentions; at other times, it urges him to warn friends of ill-success awaiting them, and to dissuade them from their plans. It imparts neither philosophical principles nor moral maxims. Indeed the whole province of morals is expressly exempted from the sphere of divine revelation, and referred to that of human reason.<sup>3</sup> The *δαιμόνιον* is therefore an internal oracle,

Theages. 128, D., about the prophetic character of the *δαιμόνιον* may mean, the expressions used are very indefinite.

<sup>1</sup> It is very much the same whether τὸ δαιμόνιον be taken as a substantive, or as an adjective. The probable rights of the case are that Xenophon uses it as a substantive = τὸ θεῖον or ὁ θεός, whereas Plato uses it as an adjective, and says δαιμόνιον μοι γίγνεται. The very difference between Xenophon and Plato proves how loosely it was used by Socrates.

<sup>2</sup> On this point our authorities are not agreed. Xen. Mem. i. 4, says: πολλοῖς τῶν ξυνόντων προσηγόρευε τὰ μὲν ποιεῖν, τὰ δὲ μὴ ποιεῖν, ὡς τοῦ δαιμονίου προσημαίνοντος. Likewise in Mem. iv. 3, 12, the Gods announce to Socrates ἃ τε χρὴ ποιεῖν καὶ ἃ μὴ. In Plato

however, Socrates assures us that the *δαιμόνιον* only restrained him from carrying out his intentions, but never urged him on, and in all the other passages in which the *δαιμόνιον* is mentioned, even Mem. iv. 8, 5, it appears only as restraining and never as prompting. The apparent contradiction has been done away with by the statement, that Plato is here more accurate, and that the *δαιμόνιον* worked directly as a restraining power, and only indirectly as an incentive, in as far as not to forbid is to allow, and to forbid one thing is to advise its opposite.

<sup>3</sup> Compare besides the passages already quoted, Xen. Mem. i. 1, 6: τὰ μὲν ἀναγκαῖα συνεβούλευε καὶ πράττειν ὡς ἐνόμιζεν ἄριστ' ἂν πραχθῆναι. περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀδήλων ὕπως ἂν ἀποβήσοιτο μαντευσόμε-



and as such it is by Xenophon<sup>1</sup> and Plato<sup>2</sup> included under the more general notion of divination, and placed on a par with divination by sacrifice and the flight of birds.

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In attempting to bring this inward revelation of Socrates into harmony with the facts of psychology, it may be laid down in the first place that the Dæmonium must not be confounded with the voice of conscience, as many ancient and modern critics have done.<sup>3</sup> Conscience always refers to the moral character of an action, partly by laying down a law and thus determining the universal moral standard, and partly by sitting in judgment and acting as a regulating power, when past or possible actions are arraigned before its tribunal. The δαιμόνιον has nothing to do with the universal moral standard—which, according to Socrates, is a matter for pure intelligence to determine—still less has it to do with the moral quality of an action already past. Even actions in prospect, which alone are the subject of its warnings, it does not

(c) *It is  
not con-  
science.*

vous ἔπεμπεν εἰ ποιητέα—τεκτονικὸν μὲν γὰρ ἢ χαλκευτικὸν ἢ γεωργικὸν ἢ ἀνθρώπων ἀρχικὸν ἢ τῶν τοιούτων ἔργων ἐξεταστικὸν ἢ λογιστικὸν ἢ οἰκονομικὸν ἢ στρατηγικὸν γενέσθαι, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα μαθήματα καὶ ἀνθρώπου γνώμη αἰρετέα ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι. τὰ δὲ μέγιστα τῶν ἐν τούτοις ἔφη τοὺς θεοὺς ἑαυτοῖς καταλείπεσθαι. The future outward result of an action is however what is greatest. And then he continues: δαιμονῶν δὲ τοὺς μαντευομένους, ἃ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἔδωκαν οἱ θεοὶ μαθοῦσι διακρίνειν, &c. What is here said of μαντικὴ in general applies also

to the Socratic μαντικὴ or the δαιμόνιον. Conf. Mem. iv. 3, 12, where the remark that the Gods announce to Socrates beforehand what he ought to do, is satisfactorily explained by the words that precede: διὰ μαντικῆς τοῖς πυνθανομένοις φράζοντας τὰ ἀποβησόμενα, καὶ διδάσκοντας ἢ ἀν' ἀριστα γίγνοιτο. Ἄριστον here is what is most useful.

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Mem. i. 1, 3; iv. 3, 12; i. 4, 14.

<sup>2</sup> Apol. 40, A.; Phæd. 242, C.: Euthyphro 3, B.

<sup>3</sup> Stapfer, Brandis, Röscher, Marbach.

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deal with according to their moral worth, but solely according to their results—results concealed from us and locked up in the divine foreknowledge—and for these Socrates either has recourse to *μαντική* in general, or to his *δαιμόνιον*, leaving moral conduct to be determined by clear knowledge. In Xenophon he is heard to say that it is absurd to consult the Gods about things which may be known by deliberation; and we might have inferred that deliberation would be the condition of morality in his system, even if there were less explicit statements to guide us, from the fact that he makes virtue consist in knowledge.<sup>1</sup>

(d) *Not a  
general  
conviction  
of his  
divine  
mission.*

Just as little must the divine voice of Socrates be confounded with a general belief in his own divine mission;<sup>2</sup> for it is only occasionally that actions are referred to the former. Thus in particular cases it dissuades Socrates from receiving back into his society<sup>3</sup> friends who have once deserted him; but when the general question is asked: What led Socrates to the study of philosophy, the answer is not given by reference to the Dæmonium, but to the leading of providence,<sup>4</sup> which in various ways has impressed on him this duty.<sup>5</sup> The Dæmonium only influenced the mission of his life in one, and that a very indirect way, by restraining him from intermeddling with politics, and thus proving faithless to his philosophic bent.<sup>6</sup> In addition to this, Plato's

<sup>1</sup> Socrates enumerates among the things which are in the power of man, ἀνθρώπων ἀρχικὸν γενέσθαι.—Mem. i. 1, 7; iii. 9, 14.

<sup>2</sup> As both Meiners and Lélut have done.

<sup>3</sup> Theætet. 151, A.

<sup>4</sup> Plato, Apol. 23, B.; 28 B.; Theætet. 150, C.

<sup>5</sup> Plato, Apol. 33, C.

<sup>6</sup> Plato, Rep. vi. 496, B.; Apol. 31, C.

remark that the Dæmonium never urged him on, but only kept him back, refutes the notion of a general guiding influence. On the whole then the psychological explanation of the phenomenon will be found to be the same as that given by most modern writers. The Dæmonium is a vague apprehension of some good or ill result following on certain actions. It is, as it were, an inward voice coming from his own individual tact,<sup>1</sup> which as a boy Socrates had carefully cultivated.<sup>2</sup> It attained an unusual degree of accuracy in his case<sup>3</sup>—partly owing to subsequent experience and a keen susceptibility, partly from a knowledge of himself and his own needs; and in default of a better psychological knowledge which could explain it, it presented itself to him in a form agreeing with the spirit of his times,<sup>4</sup> that of an immediate divine revelation.

But common as is the notion of a supernatural revelation, the particular form in which it was held by Socrates is thoroughly characteristic. Hegel

<sup>1</sup> Hermann, *Platonismus*, i. 236.

<sup>2</sup> We are compelled to include this amongst the peculiarities of the δαιμόνιον, partly because of the remark already quoted from the Theætet. 151, A., and partly because of the notices (Xen. Mem. iv. 8, 5; Apol. 4), that Socrates was prevented by the δαιμόνιον from defending himself before the court. The real reason which deterred him was that to busy himself with his own fate was opposed to his philosophical character, and that it was against his nature, to defend himself

except by a plain statement of the truth. To him it appeared as if God had revealed to him that it was better not to make any preparation.

<sup>3</sup> All the more accurate statements given by Xenophon (Mem. iv. 8, 5) and Plato (Apol. 31, D.; 40, A.; Theætet. 151, A.; Phædrus, 242, B.) about the suggestions of the δαιμόνιον agree with this. The later love of the marvellous led to all sorts of romantic stories about it, as even Cicero, *Divin.* i. 54, proves.

<sup>4</sup> Krische, *Forschung*. 231.

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appropriately remarks<sup>1</sup> that in the *Dæmonium* of Socrates may be seen the beginnings of that gradual change of opinion from the time when external agencies were regarded as determining the will—as was the case in the Greek oracles—to the time when the power of origination is felt solely to belong to ourselves. Thus, by substituting the immediate utterances of his inner life in place of the usual signs and oracular appeals, Socrates brought within the province of the mind, what had hitherto ruled it from without. At the same time this forward step was not altogether without a compensating drawback. The mind when first disenthralled and placed in a position to exercise its own freedom, could not at once trust its own decisions in every case, but allowed any indefinite impulses which claimed to be divine revelations to prevail against the dictates of its own intelligence. The *Dæmonium* of Socrates was not therefore Socrates himself, but a kind of oracle; his mind, but his mind only half conscious of itself.<sup>2</sup>

This brings out the importance of the phenomenon. It reveals the inner life of Socrates down to its inmost depths, but it proves also that it was as yet impossible for the whole of life to be regulated according to the dictates of an intelligent will. Illustrations of this have been already noticed in those instances of absence of mind in Socrates, and they may also be observed in the stiffness and awkwardness of his demeanour. It can thus be

<sup>1</sup> *Rechts philosophie*, § 279.

<sup>2</sup> Hegel, *Gesch. d. Phil.* ii. 77.

understood, that features apparently so different, as the sober sense of the man of intellect and the fanaticism of the man of feeling could be combined in one and the same person, for both were due to one and the same cause. Depth of inward concentration distinguished Socrates from his contemporaries, and made him appear so singular to his countrymen.

It also made an irreparable breach in the artistic unity of Greek life. The gradual widening of that breach, and the shape it assumed in the philosophy of Socrates, will occupy our attention hereafter, when we come to consider his philosophical system.



## CHAPTER V.

THE SOURCES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PHILOSOPHY  
OF SOCRATES.CHAP.  
V.A. *Xenophon and Plato.*

THERE is considerable difficulty in arriving at an accurate view of the philosophy of Socrates, owing to the discrepancies in the accounts of the original authorities. Socrates himself committed nothing to writing,<sup>1</sup> and there are only the works of two of his pupils, Xenophon and Plato, preserved, in which he is made to speak in his own person.<sup>2</sup> But the accounts of these two writers are so little alike, that we gather from the one quite a different view of the teaching of Socrates to what the other gives us. It was the fashion among early historians of philosophy to construct a picture of the Athenian philosopher, without any principles of criticism to guide them, from the writings of Xenophon and Plato indiscriminately, as well as from later, and for the

<sup>1</sup> The unimportant poetical attempts of his last days (Plato, *Phædo*, 60, C.) could hardly be taken into account, even if they were extant. They appear, however, to have been very soon lost. See *Diog.* ii. 42. The genuineness of the Socratic letters need not occupy us for a moment, and

that Socrates committed nothing to writing is clear from the silence of Xenophon, Plato, and all antiquity on the point, not to mention the positive testimony of *Cic. de Orat.* iii. 16, 60; *Diog.* i. 16; *Plut. De Alex. Virt.* i. 4.

<sup>2</sup> For instance, those of *Æschines*, *Antisthenes*, *Phædo*.

most part untrustworthy authorities. Since the time of Brucker, however, it became the custom to look to Xenophon as the only authority to be perfectly trusted on the philosophy of Socrates, and to allow to others, Plato included, at most only a supplementary value. Quite recently, however, Schleiermacher has lodged a protest against the preference shown for Xenophon.<sup>1</sup> Xenophon, he argues, not being a philosopher himself, was scarcely capable of understanding a philosopher like Socrates; the object, moreover, of the *Memorabilia* was only a limited one, to defend his teacher from definite charges; we are therefore justified in assuming *à priori* that there must have been more in Socrates than Xenophon allows, or else he could not have played so important a part in the history of philosophy, nor have exerted so marvellous a power of attraction on the most intellectual and cultivated men of his time. The character too which is given him by Plato, would have otherwise been a manifest contradiction of the picture presented by him to the mind of his reader. Besides, Xenophon's dialogues create the impression, that philosophic matter has been put into the unphilosophic language of every-day life, with detriment to its full and proper meaning; and there are gaps left in his account which we must look to Plato to fill up. We can hardly, however, adopt the view of Meiners,<sup>2</sup> that only those parts of the

<sup>1</sup> On the philosophical merits of Socrates, Schleiermacher, Works, iii. 2, 293.

<sup>2</sup> *Geschichte der Wissenschaften in Griechenland und Rom*, ii. 420.

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dialogues of Plato may be considered historical, which are either to be found in Xenophon, or immediately follow from what Xenophon says, or which are opposed to Plato's own views. This hypothesis would only give us the Socrates of Xenophon slightly modified, whilst the deeper spring of Socratic thought would still be wanting. The only safe course is adopted by Schleiermacher, who asks: What *may* Socrates have been, in addition to what Xenophon says he was, without denying the character and maxims which Xenophon distinctly assigns to him? and what *must* he have been to call for and to justify such a description as is given of him in the dialogues of Plato? Several other writers have since acquiesced in Schleiermacher's estimate of Xenophon,<sup>1</sup> and even before Schleiermacher, Dissen<sup>2</sup> had expressed his inability to see in the pages of Xenophon anything but a description of the outward appearance of Socrates. The same approval has been bestowed on Schleiermacher's canon for finding out the real Socrates, and only when it failed has an addition been made,<sup>3</sup> that the expressions of Aristotle may be used as a touchstone to discover the teaching of Socrates. On the other hand Xenophon's authority has been warmly supported by several critics.<sup>4</sup>

In deciding between these two views a difficulty, however, presents itself. The authority of the one or the other of our accounts can only be ascertained by

<sup>1</sup> Brandis, Ritter, Van Heusde.<sup>2</sup> De philosophia morali.<sup>3</sup> By Brandis.<sup>4</sup> Hegel, Gesch. d. Phil. ii. 69;

Rötscher, Herrman, &amp;c.

a comparison with the true historical picture, and the true historical picture can only be known from these conflicting accounts. This difficulty would be insurmountable, if the two narratives had the same claim to be considered historical in points which they state varyingly; nor would Aristotle's scanty notices of the Socratic philosophy have been sufficient to settle the question. Fortunately one thing is clear, that Plato only claims to be true to facts in those points on which he agrees with Xenophon, as for instance, in the *Apology* and the *Symposium*. On other points no one could well assert that he wished all to be taken as historical which he puts into the mouth of Socrates. Of Xenophon, on the contrary, it may be asserted, that in the *Memorabilia* he intended to unfold a lifelike picture of the views and the conduct of his teacher, although he did not feel himself bound to reproduce his discourses verbatim, and may have thus expanded in his own way many a conversation, of which he only knew the general substance. The objections to his account are only based on an indirect argument, that the historical importance of Socrates can hardly be explained from the picture he gives, and that if it were true, it is impossible to conceive how Socrates could have said what Plato makes him say, without violating the strongest probabilities. And supposing this objection to be established, it would be necessary in order to gain an idea of his philosophy, to look to the very questionable picture of Plato, and to the few expressions of Aristotle. But before these can be received, an examination of

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them must be made in a more careful manner than the opponents of Xenophon have generally cared to do. The enquiry is closely bound up with an exposition of the teaching of Socrates, and can only be distinguished from it in theory. It will not, therefore, be separated from it here. Socrates must be drawn after the three accounts of Xenophon, Plato, and Aristotle. If the attempt to form a harmonious picture from them all succeeds, Xenophon will be justified. Should it not succeed, it will then be necessary to ask, which of the traditional accounts is the true one.

B. *Philosophical point of view. Supposed popular philosophy.*

We will begin with enquiring into the general point of view and the fundamental conception of Socrates. But, on the very threshold of the enquiry, different lines seem to be taken by our main authorities. According to Plato, Socrates appears as a perfect thinker—at home in all branches of knowledge; whereas, in Xenophon he is represented far less as a philosopher than as an innocent and excellent man, full of piety and common sense. It is from Xenophon's account that the ordinary view of Socrates has arisen, that he was only a popular teacher holding aloof from speculative questions, and that he was far less a philosopher than a teacher of morality and instructor of youth.<sup>1</sup> It cannot, indeed, be

<sup>1</sup> How common this view was in past times, needs not to be proved by authorities which abound from Cicero down to Wiggers and Reinhold. That it is not yet altogether exploded may be gathered not only from

writers like Van Heusde, but even Marbach, a disciple of the Hegelian philosophy, asserts that Socrates 'regarded the speculative philosophy which aimed at general knowledge, as useless, vain, and foolish,' and that he



denied, nor have we attempted to do so, that he *was* full of the most lively enthusiasm for morality, and made it the business of his life to exercise a moral influence upon others. But if he had only discharged this duty in the superficial way of a popular teacher, and had only imparted and inculcated the ordinary notions of duty and virtue, it would be a mystery how he could have exerted the influence he did, not only on weak-minded and thoughtless young men, but on the most talented and cultivated of his contemporaries. It would be inexplicable what induced Plato to connect the deepest philosophical enquiries with his person, or what induced all later philosophers, from Aristotle down to the Stoics and Neoplatonists to regard him as having inaugurated a new epoch in philosophy, and to trace their own peculiar systems to the stimulus imparted by him.

There is also more than one feature in the personal habits of Socrates to refute the idea that he thought knowledge only of value in as far as it was instrumental for action. So far is this view even from being the true one, that we shall find that he considered actions to have a value only when they proceeded from correct knowledge, the conception of knowledge being the higher one to which he referred that of moral action or virtue, and perfection of knowledge being the measure for perfection of action. Again, the ordinary view represents him as aiming

‘took the field not only against the Sophists as pretenders to knowledge, but against all philosophy;’ in short that ‘he was no philosopher.’

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in his intercourse with others at moral training alone; but it would appear<sup>1</sup> from his own words, that love of knowledge was the original motive for his activity; and accordingly we observe him in his dialogues pursuing enquiries, which not only have no moral end,<sup>2</sup> but which, in their practical application, could only serve immoral purposes.<sup>3</sup> These traits are not met with exclusively in one or other of our authorities, but they appear equally through the accounts given by the three main sources. This fact would be wholly inexplicable if Socrates had been

<sup>1</sup> Plato, *Apol.* 21, where Socrates deduces his whole activity from the fact that he pursued a real knowledge.

<sup>2</sup> Examples are to be found in the conversation (*Mem.* iii. 10), in which Socrates conducts the painter Parrhasius, the sculptor Clito, and Pistias, the forger of armour, to the conceptions of their respective arts. It is true Xenophon introduces this conversation with the remark that Socrates knew how to make himself useful to artisans. But the desire to make himself useful can only have been a very subordinate one; he was no doubt really actuated by the motive mentioned in the *Apology*, a praiseworthy curiosity to learn from intercourse with all classes, whether they were clearly conscious of what their arts were for. Xenophon himself attests this, *Mem.* iv. 6, 1: *σκοπῶν σὺν τοῖς συνοῦσι, τί ἕκαστον εἴη τῶν ὄντων οὐδὲ πώποτ' ἔληγεν.* This pursuit of the conceptions of things, aiming not at the application of knowledge, but at

knowledge itself, is quite enough to prove that Socrates was not only a preacher of virtue, but a philosopher. Even Xenophon found some difficulty in subordinating it to his practical view of things, as his words shew: from which it may be seen that Socrates made his friends more critical. But criticism is the organ of knowledge.

<sup>3</sup> *Mem.* iii. 11 contains a paragraph adapted more than any other to refute the idea that Socrates was only a popular teacher. Socrates hears one of his companions commending the beauty of Theodota, and at once goes with his company to see her. He finds her acting as a painter's model, and he thereupon enters into a conversation with her, in which he endeavours to lead her to a conception of her trade, and shows her how she will best be able to win lovers. Now although such a step would not give that offence to the Greeks which it would to us, still there is not the least trace of a moral purpose in it.

only the moralist for which he was formerly taken. The key which explains it will be found in the assumption that, in all his investigations, even when he appears specially as a moral teacher, a deeper philosophic interest was concealed below.

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Our authorities do not leave us any room to doubt in what his purpose consisted. He sought for true knowledge in the service of the Delphic God. He busied himself unweariedly with his friends to gain a knowledge of the essence of things. He referred all the claims of morality to the claims of knowledge. In a word, the idea of knowledge forms the centre of the Socratic philosophy.<sup>1</sup> Now, as all philosophy aims at knowledge, a further determination must be added to this definition:—that the pursuit of true knowledge, which had been hitherto an immediate and instinctive activity, became with Socrates a conscious and methodical pursuit. He became conscious of the idea of knowledge as knowledge, and when once conscious of it, he raised it to be his leading idea.<sup>2</sup> This, again, requires further explanation. If the love of knowledge was in existence before, it may be asked why did it not develope into a conscious and critical pursuit? The answer can only be found

*C. His theory that knowledge consists in conceptions.*

<sup>1</sup> Schleiermacher, Works, iii. 2, 300: 'The awakening of the idea of knowledge, and its first utterances, must have been the substance of the philosophy of Socrates.' Ritter agrees with this, Gesch. d. Philosophie, ii. 50. Brandis only differs in unessential points. To him the origin of the doctrine of Socrates appears to be his desire

to establish against the Sophists the absolute worth of moral determinations, and then he adds: to secure this purpose the first aim of Socrates was to gain a deeper insight into his inner life, in order to be able to distinguish false and true knowledge with certainty. Similarly Braniss.

<sup>2</sup> Schleiermacher. Brandis.

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in the fact, that the knowledge which earlier philosophers pursued, was, in itself, different from the knowledge which Socrates required, and therefore they were not led on as Socrates was by this idea of knowledge to direct their attention to the intellectual processes and conditions, by which it was truly to be acquired. Such a necessity was, however, imposed on Socrates by the theory which he held, according to the most trustworthy accounts, as the soul of all his teaching—that all true knowledge must be based on correct conceptions, and that nothing can be known, unless it can be referred to a general conception, and judged of by that.<sup>1</sup> With this funda-

<sup>1</sup> Xenoph. Mem. iv. 6, 1: *Σωκράτης γὰρ τοὺς μὲν εἰδότας, τί ἕκαστον εἴη τῶν ὄντων, ἐνόμιζε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἂν ἐξηγεῖσθαι δύνασθαι· τοὺς δὲ μὴ εἰδότας οὐδὲν ἔφη θαυμαστὸν εἶναι αὐτοὺς τε σφάλλῃσθαι καὶ ἄλλους σφάλλῃν· ὧν ἕνεκα σκοπῶν σὺν τοῖς συνοῦσι τί ἕκαστον εἴη τῶν ὄντων, οὐδεπώποτ' ἔληγε . . . ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἐπάνηγε πάντα τὸν λόγον, &c.* As is explained by the context, he referred all doubtful points to the universal conceptions, in order to decide by them; iv. 5, 12: *ἔφη δὲ καὶ τὸ διαλέγεσθαι ὀνομασθῆναι ἐκ τοῦ συνιόντος κοινῇ βουλευέσθαι, διαλέγοντας κατὰ γένη τὰ πράγματα. δεῖν οὖν πειρᾶσθαι ὅτι μάλιστα πρὸς τοῦτο ἑαυτὸν ἔτοιμον παρασκευάζειν.* Comp. i. 1-16, and the many instances in the Memorabilia. Aristotle (Met. xiii. 4, 1078, b, 17, 27): *Σωκράτους δὲ περὶ τὰς ἠθικὰς ἀρετὰς πραγματευομένου καὶ περὶ τούτων ὀρίζεσθαι καθόλου ζητοῦντος πρώτου . . . ἐκείνος*

*εὐλόγως ἐζήτει τὸ τί ἐστίν . . . δύο γὰρ ἐστίν ἃ τις ἂν ἀποδοίη Σωκράτει δικαίως, τοὺς τ' ἐπακτικοὺς λόγους καὶ τὸ ὀρίζεσθαι καθόλου.* Both are, however, at bottom the same. The *λόγοι ἐπακτικοί* are only the means for finding universal conceptions, and therefore Aristotle elsewhere (Met. i. 6, 987, b, 1; xiii. 9, 1086, b, 3; De Part. Anim., i. 1, 642, a, 28) justly observes that the seeking for universal conceptions or for the essence of things is the only philosophical merit of Socrates. Accordingly in the dialogue which Xenophon has preserved, we also see him making straight at the general conception, the *τί ἐστίν*, and even Plato's Apology, 22. B., describes his investigation of men as *διερωτᾶν τί λέγοιεν*. Socrates, that is to say, asks for the conception of the deeds of the practical man, or the poetry of the poet. Conf. Meno, 70, A.; Phædr. 262, B.; 265, D. It can however hardly be proved



mental theory, however simple it may appear, an entire change in the intellectual process was demanded. The ordinary view regards things as being what they appear to be to the senses; or if contradictory experiences forbid this, it clings to those appearances which make the strongest impression on the observer, declares these to constitute the essence, and thence draws further conclusions. This was exactly what philosophers had hitherto done. Even those who decried the senses as not to be depended upon had started from one-sided observations, without being conscious of the necessity of grounding every judgment on an exhaustive enquiry into the object. This dogmatism had been overthrown by the Sophists, and it was recognised that all impressions derived from the senses were relative and personal, that they do not represent things as they are, but as they appear; and, that, consequently, whatever assertion we may take, its opposite may be advanced with equal justice. For, if for one person at this moment *this* is true, for another person at another moment *that* is true.

Socrates expresses the same sentiment relative to the value of common opinions. He is aware that they cannot furnish us with knowledge, but only

from Plato that Socrates really distinguished *ἐπιστήμη* from *δόξα*, as Brandis would have it; for we cannot decide whether passages like Meno, 98, B. represent the view of Socrates or that of Plato. And Antisthenes, who, according to Diogenes vi. 17, wrote a treatise *περὶ δόξης καὶ ἐπιστήμης*, may have

derived this distinction from the Eleatics. It can hardly be found in Xen. Mem. iv. 2, 33. In reality, however, the distinction was implied in the whole conduct of Socrates, and in passages such as Xen. Mem. iv. 6, 1; Plato, Apol. 21, B.



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involve us in contradictions. But he does not draw the inference, which the Sophists did, that real knowledge is impossible, but only that it is impossible in that way. The majority of mankind have no true knowledge, because they confine themselves to suppositions, the accuracy of which they have never examined, and they only take into consideration one property or another, but not the essence. Amend this fault; consider every object in all its bearings, and endeavour from such many-sided observation to determine its essence; we shall then have conceptions instead of vague notions—a regular examination, instead of an unmethodical procedure without reflection—a true, instead of a supposed knowledge. By requiring knowledge to be made of conceptions, Socrates not only broke away from the current view, but, generally speaking, from all previous philosophy. A thorough observation from every side, a critical examination, a methodical enquiry conscious of its own basis, was demanded; all that had hitherto been regarded as knowledge was rejected, because it fell short of these conditions; and at the same time the conviction was expressed that, by observing these rules, real knowledge could be secured.

D. *Moral  
importance  
of this  
theory.*

This theory had not only an intellectual, but more immediately a moral value for Socrates. It is in fact one of the most striking traits in his character that he was unable to divide the intellectual from the moral, and neither admitted knowledge without virtue, nor virtue without knowledge. In this

respect he is the man of his age, and herein consists his greatness, that he made its needs and lawful desires felt with great penetration and keenness. When advancing civilisation had created the demand for a higher education amongst the Greeks, and the course of their intellectual development had diverted their attention from nature, and fixed it on mind, a closer connection became necessary between philosophy and life. Philosophy could only find its highest object in man, and man could only find in philosophy the help and support which he needed for life. The Sophists endeavoured to meet this want with great skill and vigour, and hence their extraordinary success. But the sophistic philosophy of life suffered too much from the want of a tenable ground. It had by universal doubting loosened its intellectual roots too effectually to save itself from degenerating with terrific speed, and serving to foster every wicked and selfish impulse. Instead of the moral life being raised by the influence of the Sophists, both life and philosophy were taking the same downward course.

The sad tendencies of the age were fully understood by Socrates, and while his contemporaries, struck blind with admiration, were either insensible to the dangers of the sophistic education, or else through fear and singular indifference to the wants of the times and the march of history, confined themselves, as did Aristophanes, to denouncing the innovators, he was able with penetrating look to discern, what was right and what was wrong in the

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spirit of his time. The unsatisfactory nature of the older culture, the untenableness of the ordinary virtue, the obscurity of the prevailing notions so full of contradictions, the necessity for intellectual education, were all recognised by him as much as by any other of the Sophists. But he held out other and higher ends to education. He sought not to destroy the belief in truth, but rather to show how truth might be acquired, by a new intellectual process. His aim was not to minister to the selfishness of the age, but rather to rescue the age from selfishness and apathy, by teaching it what was truly good and useful: not to undermine morality and piety, but to rear them up on a new foundation of knowledge. Thus Socrates was at once a moral and an intellectual reformer. His one great thought was to transform and restore moral conduct by means of knowledge, and these two elements were so intimately united by him, that he could find no other subject of knowledge but human conduct, and could discover no security for conduct but knowledge. The service which he rendered to both morality and science by his labours, and the standard which he set up for the intellectual condition of his people and of mankind generally, were felt in after times. If in the sequel, the distinction between moral and intellectual activity in addition to their unity, was fully brought out, yet the knot by which he connected them, has never been untied; and if in the last centuries of the old world, philosophy took the place of the waning religion, and gave a new ground

to morality, purifying and exalting the inner moral life, this great and beneficial result was due to Socrates in as far as it can be assigned to any one individual.

The interest of philosophy was now turned away from the outer world, and directed to man and his moral nature. But, inasmuch as man can only regard a thing as true and connected when he has been convinced of its truth by personal research, great attention was bestowed by Socrates on the culture of his own personality. In this some modern writers have thought that they discerned the peculiar character of his philosophy.<sup>1</sup> But the life and personality of Socrates is a very different thing from the caprice of the Sophists, nor must it be confounded with the extreme individualism of the post-Aristotelian schools. Socrates was aware, that each individual must seek the grounds of his own conviction, that truth is not something given from without, but must be found by the exercise of a man's own thought. He required all assumptions to be examined anew, no matter how old or how current they were, and that dependence should only be placed on proof and not on authority. But he was far from making man, as Protagoras did, the measure of all things. He did not even as the Stoics and Epicureans did, declare personal conviction and practical need to be the ultimate standard of truth, nor yet as the Sceptics, resolve all truth into probability; but as knowledge was to him an end in itself, he

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*E. The  
subjective  
character  
of the  
theory of  
Socrates.*

<sup>1</sup> Hegel, *Gesch. d. Phil.* ii. 40; Röscher, *Aristoph.*, p. 245.

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was convinced that true knowledge could be obtained by a thoughtful consideration of things. Moreover he saw in man the proper object of philosophy, but instead of making personal caprice the law, as the Sophists did, he subordinated it to the general law residing in nature and in abstract moral relations.<sup>1</sup> Instead too of making, with later philosophers, the self-contentment of the wise man his highest end, he confined himself to the old Greek morality, which could not conceive of the individual independent of the state,<sup>2</sup> and which accordingly made the first duty of a citizen to consist in living for the state,<sup>3</sup> and regarded the law of the state as his natural rule of conduct.<sup>4</sup> Hence the political indifference or the universal patriotism of the Stoa and its contemporary rivals were entirely alien to Socrates. If it can be truly said 'that in him commences an unbounded reference to the person, to the freedom of the inner life,'<sup>5</sup> it must also be added that this statement by no means exhausts the theory of Socrates; and thus the disputes about the purely personal, or the really general character of the Socratic doctrine,<sup>6</sup> will have to be decided in such a way, that it is allowed that his theory exhibits an inward personal bent, in comparison with former systems, but is not by any means purely relative. Its object is to gain a knowledge which does more

<sup>1</sup> Proofs may be found Xen. Mem. ii. 2; ii. 6, 1-7; iii. 8, 1-3; Plato, Apol. 30, A. iv, 4, 20.

<sup>3</sup> See Xen. Mem. i. 6, 15;

<sup>4</sup> Mem. iv. 4, 12, and 3, 15.

<sup>5</sup> Hegel.

<sup>2</sup> Compare the conversation with Aristippus, Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 13; and Plato's Crito, 53, A.

<sup>6</sup> Compare the views of Röt-scher and Brandis.



than serve a personal want, and which is true and desirable for more than the person who seeks it, but the ground on which it is sought is only the personal thought<sup>1</sup> of the individual.

It is true that this theory is not further expanded by Socrates. He has established the principle, that only the knowledge which has to do with conceptions is true knowledge; that true being only belongs to conceptions, and that therefore conceptions are alone true; but he never reached to a systematic exposition of what conceptions are true in themselves. Knowledge is here laid down as a postulate, and set as a problem for individuals to solve. Philosophy is rather philosophic impulse, and philosophic method, a seeking for truth, but not yet a possessing it; and this incompleteness has countenanced the view that the theory of Socrates was a theory of a personal and one-sided knowledge. It should, however, never be forgotten, that the aim of Socrates was always to find out and describe what was really true and good. Mankind is to be intellectually and morally framed, but the one only means for the purpose is the acquisition of knowledge.

As the great aim of Socrates was to train men to

<sup>1</sup> Hegel says nothing very different, when in distinguishing (*Gesch. d. Phil.* ii. 40) Socrates from the Sophists he says: 'in Socrates the creation of thought is at once clad with an independent existence of its own,' and what is purely personal is 'externalised and made universal by him as the good.'

Socrates is said to have substituted 'thinking man is the measure of all things,' in place of the Sophistic doctrine 'man is the measure of all things.' In a word, his leading thought is not the individual as he knows himself experimentally, but the universal element which is found running through all individuals.

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think, rather than to construct a system for them, it seemed to be his main business to determine the way which would lead them to truth, or in other words to find out the true method of philosophy. The substance of his teaching appears to have been confined on the one hand to questions having an immediate bearing on human conduct; and it does not, on the other hand, go beyond the general and theoretical demand, that all action should be determined by a knowledge of conceptions. There is no systematic tracing of the development of morality in the individual; no attempt to ground it upon other than external reasons.

## CHAPTER VI.

## THE PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD OF SOCRATES.

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THE peculiarity of the method pursued by Socrates,<sup>r</sup> consists generally speaking in deducing conceptions from the common opinions of men. Beyond the formation of conceptions, however, his method leads to nothing further: so far from being a systematic treatment of the conceptions gained, it is merely an intellectual discipline of the individual mind. Now for the first time it was instinctively felt, that knowledge could only belong to conceptions, and it became the object of science to gain an insight into the essence of things. At the same time, thought does not advance further than this. It has not the power to develope to a system of absolute knowledge, nor has it a method sufficiently matured to form a system. For the same reason, the process of induction is not reduced within clearly defined rules. All that Socrates has clearly expressed is the general postulate, that every thing must be reduced to its conception. Further details about the mode and manner of this reduction, and its strict logical forms, were not yet moulded into a theory, but were applied by him as the result of individual skill. The only thing which

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at all resembles a logical rule, is his maxim that the process of constructive criticism must always confine itself to what is universally admitted;<sup>1</sup> but this sounds far too indefinite to invalidate our assertion.

A. *The Socratic knowledge of self, resulting in a knowledge of his own ignorance.*

This process involves three particular points. The first is the Socratic knowledge of self. Since the knowledge of conceptions was in the opinion of Socrates alone true knowledge, he was obliged to enquire in the case of all supposed knowledge, whether it agreed with his idea of knowledge, or not. Nothing appeared to him more mistaken, nothing more obstructive to true knowledge from the very outset, than the belief that we know what we do not know.<sup>2</sup> Nothing was so necessary as self-examination, to discover what we really know, and what we only seem to know.<sup>3</sup> Nothing was more indispens-

<sup>1</sup> Mem. iv. 6, 15: *ὅποτε δὲ αὐτός τι πῶ λόγῳ διεξίει, διὰ τῶν μάλιστα ὁμολογουμένων ἐπορεύετο, νομίζων ταύτην τὴν ἀσφάλειαν εἶναι λόγου.*

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Mem. iii. 9, 6: *μανίαν γὰρ μὴν ἐναντίον μὲν ἔφη εἶναι σοφία, οὐ μέντοι γὰρ τὴν ἀνεπιστημοσύνην μανίαν ἐνόμιζεν. τὸ δὲ ἀγνοεῖν ἐαυτὸν καὶ ἂ μὴ οἶδε δοξάζειν τε καὶ οἶεσθαι γιγνώσκειν, ἐγγυτάτω μανίας ἐλογίζετο εἶναι.* Generally speaking, those are called mad who are mistaken about what is commonly known, but not those who are mistaken about things of which most men are ignorant. Also Plato, Apol. 29, B.: *καὶ τοῦτο πῶς οὐκ ἀμαθία ἐστὶν αὕτη ἢ ἐπονείδιστος, ἢ τοῦ οἶεσθαι εἰδένααι ἢ οὐκ οἶδεν;*

<sup>3</sup> In the sense Socrates speaks

of it in Plato, Apol. 21, B., and says that according to the oracle he had interrogated all with whom he was brought into contact, to discover whether they had any kind of knowledge; and that in all cases he had found along with some kind of knowledge an ignorance, which he would not take in exchange for any kind of knowledge—a belief that they knew what they did not know. On the other hand, he considered it to be his vocation, *φιλοσοφοῦντα ζῆν καὶ ἐξετάζοντα ἑμαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους* (28, E.); and he says elsewhere (38, A.) that there could be no higher good, than to converse every day as he did: *ὁ δὲ ἀνεξέταστος βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ.*

able for the practical duties of life, than to become acquainted with the state of our inner self, with the extent of our knowledge and capacities, with our defects and with our needs.<sup>1</sup> Now, inasmuch as one result of this self-examination is the discovery that the actual knowledge of the philosopher does not correspond with his idea of knowledge, the immediate conclusion is, that we know that we know nothing, a conclusion at which Socrates declared he had arrived. Any thing else he denied that he knew,<sup>2</sup> and therefore refused to be the teacher of his friends, only wishing to learn and enquire with them.<sup>3</sup> This confession of his ignorance was cer-

<sup>1</sup> Xenophon, Mem. iv. 2, 24, speaking of an enquiry into the Delphic γνῶθι σεαυτόν, says that self-knowledge is attended with the greatest advantages, want of it with the greatest disadvantages: οἱ μὲν γὰρ εἰδότες ἑαυτοὺς τὰ τε ἐπιτήδεια ἑαυτοῖς ἴσασι καὶ διαγιγνώσκουσιν ἅ τε δύνανται καὶ ἅ μὴ· καὶ ἅ μὲν ἐπίστανται πράττοντες πορίζονται τε ὧν δέονται καὶ εὖ πράττουσιν. See also Plato, Phædrus, 229, E.; Symp. 216, A.

<sup>2</sup> Plato, Apol. 21, B.: ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ, οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν σύνοιδα ἑμαντῶ σόφως ὦν.—21, D.: τούτου μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐγὼ σοφώτερός εἰμι· κινδυνεύει μὲν γὰρ ἡμῶν οὐδέτερος οὐδὲν καλὸν καγαθὸν εἰδέναι, ἀλλ' οὗτος μὲν οἶεται τι εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδώς, ἐγὼ δὲ ὥσπερ οὖν οὐκ οἶδα, οὐδὲ οἶομαι.—23, B.: οὗτος ὑμῶν, ὃ ἀνθρώποι, σοφώτατός ἐστιν, ὅστις ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ἔγνωκεν, ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἁξίός ἐστι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πρὸς σοφίαν. And a little before: τὸ δὲ κινδυνεύει, ὃ ἀνδρες Ἀθη-

ναῖοι, τῷ ὄντι ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς εἶναι, καὶ ἐν τῷ χρησμῷ τούτῳ τοῦτο λέγειν, ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία ὀλίγου τινὸς ἁξία ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδενός.—Symp. 216, D.: ἀγνοεῖ πάντα καὶ οὐδὲν οἶδεν, ὥς τὸ σχῆμα αὐτοῦ.—Theætet. 150, C.: ἀγονός εἰμι σοφίας, καὶ ὅπερ ἤδη πολλοὶ μοι ὠνειδισαν, ὥς τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἔρωτῶ, αὐτὸς δὲ οὐδὲν ἀποκρίνομαι περὶ οὐδενός διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν σοφόν, ἀληθὲς ὠνειδίζουσι· τὸ δὲ αἴτιον τούτου τόδε· μαριεύεσθαι με ὁ θεὸς ἀναγκάζει, γεννᾶν δὲ ἀπεκάλυπεν. Comp. Rep. i. 337, E.; Men. 98, B. That this trait has been taken by Plato from the Socrates of history, may be gathered from his dialogues, in which his teacher by no means appears so ignorant.

<sup>3</sup> κοινῇ βουλευέσθαι, κοινῇ σκέπτεσθαι, κοινῇ ζητεῖν, συζητεῖν, &c. Xen., Mem. iv. 5, 12; 6, 1; Plato, Theæt. 151, E.; Prot. 330, B.; Gorg. 505, E.; Crat. 384, B.; Meno, 89, E.



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tainly not meant to be a sceptical denial of all knowledge<sup>1</sup>—the whole of the philosophy of Socrates would be irreconcilable with such a view—but it contains a simple avowal about his own personal state, and about the state of those, whose knowledge he had had the opportunity of testing.<sup>2</sup> Nor again must it be taken for mere irony, or exaggerated modesty. Socrates really did not know anything, or to express it otherwise, he had no developed theory, and no positive and dogmatic teaching. But ever since the demand for a knowledge of conceptions had dawned upon him in all its fulness, he missed the marks of true knowledge in all that hitherto passed for wisdom and knowledge. Since, however, he was also the first to require such a knowledge, he could as yet assign no definite subject to knowledge. The idea of knowledge was to him a boundless field, in the face of which he could not but be conscious of his ignorance.<sup>3</sup> A certain affinity between his view and the sophistic way of doubting every thing, may be here observed. Socrates was however opposed to this doubting, in as far as it denied the possibility of all knowledge, although he agreed with it in as far as it referred to previous philosophy. Natural philosophers, he believed, transcended the limits of human knowledge in their enquiries, as might be seen from the fact that they were at variance

<sup>1</sup> As the New Academicians wanted, Cic. Acad. i. 12, 14; iv. 23, 74.

<sup>2</sup> The expression in the Apology, 23, A., does not contradict this: for the possibility of know-

ledge is not denied, but it is only asserted that human knowledge in comparison with the divine is limited.

<sup>3</sup> Compare Hegel, *Gesch. d. Phil.* ii. 54; Hermann, *Plato*, 326.

with one another. Some held the All to be one, others made of it a boundless variety; some thought that everything, others that nothing was moved; some that all things, others that nothing comes into being or perishes.<sup>1</sup> Just as the Sophists destroyed by each other the contending statements of the natural philosophers, so Socrates gathered from the contest of systems, that not one of them was in possession of the truth. But herein lay the difference between them, that whereas the Sophists made ignorance their leading thought, and considered the highest wisdom to consist in doubting everything, Socrates adhered to his demand for knowledge, and to the belief in its possibility, and therefore regarded ignorance as the greatest evil.

This being the import of ignorance according to Socrates, it involves in itself a demand for enlightenment. The knowledge of ignorance leads to a search for true knowledge—and this is his second point. Since, however, the consciousness of our own ignorance continues, and since the philosopher has an idea of knowledge, which he does not find realised in himself, the search for knowledge naturally assumes the form of an application to others, with a view of seeing whether the required knowledge is to be found with them.<sup>2</sup> Hence the necessity of carrying on the

B. *The search for knowledge. Sifting of his fellow-men. Eros and irony.*

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Men. i. 1, 11, says that Socrates did not busy himself with natural science, but on the contrary he held those who did to be foolish: ἐθαύμαζε δὲ ἐ? μὴ φανερόν αὐτοῖς ἔστιν, ὅτι ταῦτα οὐ δυνατόν ἔστιν ἀνθρώποις εἰρεῖν.

ἐπεὶ καὶ τοὺς μέγιστον φρονούντας ἐπὶ τῷ περὶ τούτων λέγειν οὐ ταῦτ' αὖ δοξάζειν ἀλλήλοις, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μαινομένοις ὁμοίως διακείσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

<sup>2</sup> This connection is very apparent in the Apol. 21, B., if only

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enquiry by means of the dialogue. For Socrates, this mode of intercourse has not merely an educational value by opening a more extensive field for his ideas, but it is an indispensable condition for the development of thought, and one from which the Socrates of history never departs.<sup>1</sup> To determine it more accurately, the nature of this method consists in a sifting of men, as it is described in the *Apology*,<sup>2</sup> — or in a bringing to the birth, as it is called in the *Theætetus*; in other words, the philosopher obliges others by his questions, to open out their minds to him, he enquires into their real opinions, into the reasons of their beliefs and actions, and in this way attempts to analyse their notions by interrogation and to bring out the latent thought of which they are unconscious. In as far, then, as this process of interrogation assumes that the knowledge needed by the philosopher may be found elsewhere, it resembles an impulse to supply one's own defects by the help of others; and since theory and practice are here united, and what is more, since philosophy cannot be separated from the personal life of the philosopher, this intercourse with others became for him not only an intellectual, but at the same time also a moral and personal need. To enquire in common is at once to

the inner thought of the philosophy of Socrates, is put in the place of the oracular response.

<sup>1</sup> Compare, besides the *Memorabilia*, Plato, *Apol.* 24, C.; *Protag.* 335, B., 336, B.

<sup>2</sup> Similarly Xen. *Mem.* iv. 7, 1: πάντων μὲν γὰρ ὧν ἐγὼ οἶδα μάλιστα ἔμελεν αὐτῷ εἰδέναι, ὅτου

τις ἐπιστήμων εἶη τῶν συνόντων αὐτῷ. Xenophon only took it to prove ὅτι αὐτάρκεις ἐν ταῖς προσηκούσαις πράξεσιν αὐτοὺς εἶναι ἐπεμελείτο: and the enquiry into human nature has this meaning in *Mem.* iii. 6; iv. 2; but clearly this is not its original object.

live in common. Love of knowledge is at once love of friendship, and the peculiar character of the Socratic Eros<sup>1</sup> consists in the blending together of philosophy and friendship. The process bears also the character of irony; for in as far as others do not possess the knowledge sought for, the questions of Socrates only serve to expose their ignorance. Irony, however, must not be understood to be merely a conversational trick;<sup>2</sup> still less is it that derisive condescension or affected simplicity, which as it were lures others on to the ice in order to laugh at their falls; and it is equally removed from the intensely individualising tendency of the romantic school, which bears the same name, but is entirely destructive of all general truth. Properly speaking, it consists in this, that Socrates, without any positive knowledge, and only prompted by a desire for knowledge, addresses himself to others, in the hope of learning from them what they know, but that in the attempt to discover it, by a critical analysis of their notions<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Brandis ii. a, 64, reminds us with justice that besides Plato and Xenophon, Euclid, Crito, Simmias, and Antisthenes mention writings about *ἔρως*, which shew the importance of it for the Socratic schools. The main passage in Xenophon is Symp. c. 8, in which the advantages of a spiritual and the disadvantages of a sensual love are insisted upon by Xenophon, speaking for himself, as a careful survey of the Platonic Symposium will shew, but undoubtedly following in the train of Socrates. Even Æschines

and Cebes had treated of *ἔρως* in the Socratic sense.

<sup>2</sup> Hegel, *Gesch. d. Phil.* ii. 53, 57; Conf. Arist. *Eth.* iv. 13.

<sup>3</sup> Plato at least gives this deeper meaning to the irony of Socrates. See Rep. i. 337, A.: *αὐτὴ ἐκείνη ἡ εἰωθὺς εἰρωνεία Σωκράτους, καὶ ταῦτ' ἐγὼ ἤδη τε καὶ τοῦτοις προὔλεγον, ὅτι σὺ ἀποκρίνασθαι μὲν οὐκ ἐθέλῃσιν, εἰρωνεύσειο δὲ καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον ποιήσεις ἢ ἀποκρίνοιο εἴ τίς τί σε ἐρωτᾷ.* And again, 337, E.: *ἵνα Σωκράτης τὸ εἰωθὸς διαπράξῃται, αὐτὸς μὲν μὴ ἀποκρίνηται, ἄλλον δὲ ἀποκρινόμε-*

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C. *The formation of conceptions and the method of proof by conceptions.*

their supposed knowledge itself vanishes. In its widest acceptation, irony is the dialectical or the critical side of the Socratic method, and it assumes its peculiar form, owing to the presupposed ignorance of him who uses it for his instrument.

But however conscious Socrates might be of possessing no real knowledge, he must at least have believed that he possessed a notion of what knowledge was and of its method, since, without this conviction, he would neither have been able to confess his own ignorance, nor to expose that of others, both being only rendered possible by comparing current knowledge with the idea of knowledge residing somewhere. The fact that this idea was nowhere to be found realised, appeared to him to call for an attempt to make it actual, and hence resulted

νον λαμβάνη λόγον καὶ ἐλέγχῃ· to which Socrates replies: πῶς γὰρ ἂν . . . τις ἀποκρίναιτο πρῶτον μὲν μὴ εἰδὼς μηδὲ φάσκων εἰδέναι, &c. Symp. 216, E.: εἰρωνεύομενος δὲ καὶ παίζων πάντα τὸν βίον πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους διατελεῖ, which, as the context shews, refers partly to the fact that Socrates pretended to be in love, without being so in the Greek sense of the term, and partly to the words ἀγνοεῖ πάντα καὶ οὐδὲν οἶδεν. The same, omitting the word εἰρωνεῖα, is said in the passage of the Theætetus already mentioned, and in the Meno, 80, A.: οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ αὐτός τε ἀπορεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιεῖς ἀπορεῖν, and also in the Apol. 23, E., in which, after the Socratic sifting of others has been described, it goes on to

say: ἐκ ταυτησὶ δὴ τῆς ἐξετάσεως πολλοὶ μὲν ἀπέχθοντο μοι γεγονόσιναι . . . ὄνομα δὲ τοῦτο . . . σοφὸς εἶναι. οἴονται γάρ με ἐκάστοτε οἱ παρόντες ταῦτα αὐτὸν εἶναι σοφὸν ἢ ἂν ἄλλον ἐξελέγξω. Likewise Xenophon, Mem. iv. 4, 10: ὅτι τῶν ἄλλων καταγέλας, ἐρωτῶν μὲν καὶ ἐλέγχων πάντας, αὐτὸς δὲ οὐδενὶ θέλων ὑπέχειν λόγον οὐδὲ γνώμην ἀποφαίνεσθαι περὶ οὐδενός. And therefore Quintilian ix. 2, 46, observes that the whole life of Socrates seemed an irony, because he always played the part of an admirer of the wisdom of others. Connected with this is the use which Socrates made of irony as a figure of speech. Conf. Plat. Gorg. 489, E.; Symp. 218, D.; Xen., Mem. iv. 2. Only its meaning must not be limited to this.



the third point in his scientific course, the attempt to create real knowledge. Now, since he could only hold that knowledge to be true which was concerned with the conception of things, the formation of conceptions or induction<sup>1</sup> became for him a preliminary necessity. Even if formal definitions were not always forthcoming, some universal quality applicable to the conception and to the essence of the object, was always required, in order that any particular case which was brought before his notice might be solved by a reference to a universal category.<sup>2</sup> The class-quality therefore became of the greatest importance to him.

This induction takes, as a starting point, the commonest opinions of men: it begins with examples taken from daily life, with well known and generally admitted maxims. On every disputed point Socrates refers to such instances, and hopes in this way to attain a universal agreement.<sup>3</sup> As all previous science had been called in question, nothing remained but to begin anew with the most simple matters of experience. But induction does not as yet derive its value from the exhaustive and critically tested series of observations on which its conceptions are based. This is a later requirement due partly to Aristotle, and partly to more modern philosophy. The wider basis of positive knowledge based on an exhaustive

<sup>1</sup> Compare the remarks of Aristotle already mentioned, p. 90.

<sup>2</sup> ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἐπανῆγε πάντα τὸν λόγον. See p. 90.

<sup>3</sup> Plato gives instances of this procedure. Compare the Me-

morabilia passim, and Xen. (Ec. 19, 15: ἡ ἐρώτησις διδασκαλία ἐστὶν . . . ἄγων γάρ με δι' ὧν ἐγὼ ἐπίσταμαι, ὅμοια τοῦτοις ἐπιδεικνὺς ἃ οὐκ ἐνόμιζον ἐπίστασθαι, ἀναπέθεισ, οἶμαι ὥς καὶ ταῦτα ἐπίσταμαι.

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experience is as yet wanting, and its very possibility denied ; and so in expanding his thoughts in personal conversation, Socrates has distinct reference to the case before him, and to the capacity and needs of his audience. Confined to the assumptions which the circumstances and his own limited experience supply, he has to connect the thread of isolated notions and admissions, and can only go as far as others can follow. In most cases he relies more on particular instances than on an exhaustive analysis of experience.<sup>1</sup> He endeavours, however, to improve the chance element in his fundamental principles, by collecting opposite instances, with the view of correcting and supplementing different experiences by one another. For instance, the question is raised as to the conception of injustice. He is unjust, says Euthydemus, who lies, deceives, robs, &c. But, rejoins Socrates, it is right to lie, to deceive, and to rob, in the case of enemies. Accordingly, the conception must be more accurately limited, and becomes: He is unjust who does such things to his friends. But in certain cases it is allowable to do such things to one's friends. A general is not unjust when he inspirits his army by a falsehood, nor a father, who gives his son medicine by an artifice, nor a friend, who gets a weapon out of his friend's hand, with which he would have committed suicide. We must, therefore, introduce a further limitation, and say: He is unjust who deceives his friends in order

<sup>1</sup> As for example in the comparison of the politician with the physician, pilot, &c.

to do them harm.<sup>1</sup> Or supposing the conception of a ruler has to be discovered. General opinion regards a ruler as one who has the power to give orders. But this power, Socrates shows, is conceded to a pilot on board ship, to a physician in sickness, and in every other case, to those only who are at home in their special subject. He, therefore, alone is a ruler who possesses the necessary knowledge to rule.<sup>2</sup> Or we have to determine what belongs to a good suit of armour. The smith says, it must have a proper measure. But suppose the man who has to wear it has a misshapen body? Why then, the answer is, the misshapen body must be the proper measure. And thus the armour has the proper measure, when it fits. But now, supposing a man wishes to move, must the armour fit exactly? Certainly not, or it would impede the movements of the wearer. We must, therefore, understand by fitting what is comfortable for use.<sup>3</sup> In a similar way we see him analysing other common notions for the benefit of his friends. He reminds them of the various sides to every question; he brings out the opposition which every notion contains either within itself or in relation to some other: and he aims at correcting, by additional observations, ideas resting on a one-sided experience, at completing them, and at giving to them more careful and accurate definitions.

By this procedure will be discovered what belongs to the essence of every object, and what does not, and thus conceptions are formed from ordinary no-

<sup>1</sup> Mem. iv. 2, 11.<sup>2</sup> Ibid. iii. 9, 10.<sup>3</sup> Ibid. iii. 10, 9.

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tions. But the class-qualities of conceptions are also the most important things for the purpose of proof. In order to discover whether a particular quality really belongs to a thing, or whether a particular course of action is necessary, Socrates goes back to the conception of the thing to which it refers; and from it deduces what applies to the given case.<sup>1</sup> But since his aim in so doing is rather to decide a particular case than to construct an intellectual system, this part of his method has not the same importance as the formation of conceptions. The remarkable feature about his method of proof is that everything is measured and decided by conceptions. Otherwise, the theory of proof has, with Socrates, very little that is peculiar. When Aristotle, then, makes the chief merit of Socrates consist in the formation of conceptions and in induction, is he not on the whole right?

If we proceed to ask on what objects did Socrates practise his method, we meet with a motley array of materials in the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon—enquiries into the essence of virtue, the duties of man, the existence of Gods, contests with Sophists, counsels of the most varied kinds for friends and acquaintances, conversations with generals about the responsibilities

<sup>1</sup> For instance, in order to reprove Lamprocles for his conduct to Xanthippe, he first (Mem. ii. 1) lets him give a definition of ingratitude, and then he shews that his conduct falls under this conception; in order to put his duties before a commander of

cavalry, he begins (Mem. iii. 3, 2), by stating what is his employment, and enumerating its different parts; in order to prove the being of the gods, he begins with the general principle that all that serves an end must have an intelligent cause.

of their office, with artificers and tradesmen about their arts, even with loose women about their mode of life. Nothing is too small to arouse his curiosity, and to be thoroughly and methodically examined by him. As Plato at a later time found essential conceptions in all things without exception, so Socrates, purely in the interest of knowledge, referred everything to the corresponding conception, even where no good seemed to result from so doing, either for education or for any other purpose. The life and pursuits of man were what he considered to be the proper object for his enquiries, and other things only in as far as they influenced the conditions and the occupations of that life. Hence his philosophy, which in a general and scientific point of view was a criticism of what *is* (*διαλεκτική*), became in its actual application a science of human actions (*ἠθική*).



## CHAPTER VII.

## THE SUBSTANCE OF THE TEACHING OF SOCRATES : ETHICS.

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VII.*A. Fundamental restriction of the subject-matter to Ethics.*

SOCRATES, says Xenophon,<sup>1</sup> did not, like most other philosophers before him, discourse concerning the nature of the All; he did not enquire into the essence of the world and the laws of natural phenomena, but, on the contrary, he declared it folly to search into such subjects: for how could it be anything else but unreasonable to perplex the mind with divine things, before fully understanding human affairs? The discordant opinions of natural philosophers proved that the object of their research transcended the powers of human knowledge, and after all, of what practical use could their enquiries be? It is quite in keeping with this view, that the Socrates of Xenophon reduces geometry and astronomy<sup>2</sup> to the standard of our absolute wants—the knowledge requisite for surveying and navigation. Anything beyond this he considers to be unnecessary, or even impious, for how can men ever understand all the mysterious works of the Gods, while it is obvious that the Gods do not desire them to possess such

<sup>1</sup> Mem. i. 1, 11.<sup>2</sup> Ibid. iv. 7.

knowledge. Hence all such attempts, those of Anaxagoras for instance, necessarily involve men in extravagance.<sup>1</sup>

The accuracy of this description of Socrates has, however, not passed unchallenged by modern writers.<sup>2</sup> Granting, they say, that Socrates really made use of these and similar expressions, can he in any way be understood to deprecate all speculative enquiry into nature? Would this not be too manifestly at variance with his own fundamental notion of the oneness of all knowledge? and would it not lead, if propounded as Xenophon has done, to consequences too manifestly untenable? Even Plato<sup>3</sup> bears testimony to the fact that Socrates did not attack natural science altogether, but only the ordinary treatment of it, and Xenophon himself cannot ignore the fact that on the whole his master did study nature,<sup>4</sup> hoping by considering the relations of means to ends to gain an

<sup>1</sup> Mem. iv. 7, 6: ὅλως δὲ τῶν οὐρανίων, ᾧ ἕκαστα ὁ θεὸς μηχανᾶται, φροντιστὴν γίγνεσθαι ἀπέτρεπεν· οὔτε γὰρ εὐρετὰ ἀνθρώποις αὐτὰ ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι, οὔτε χαρίζεσθαι θεοῖς ἂν ἡγεῖτο τὸν ζητοῦντα ἃ ἐκείνοι σαφηνίσαι οὐκ ἐβουλήθησαν. Such subtleties only led to absurdities, οὐδὲν ἦττον ἢ Ἀναξαγόρας παρεπρόνησεν ὁ μέγιστος φρονήσας ἐπὶ τῷ τὰς τῶν θεῶν μηχανὰς ἐξηγεῖσθαι—which is then supported by all kinds of remarks to prove the extravagance of the notion that the sun is a fiery stone.

<sup>2</sup> Schleiermacher, Werke, iii. 2, 305–307; Gesch. d. Phil. p. 83; Brandis, R. ter, Krische, &c.

<sup>3</sup> Phædo, 96, A.; 97, B.; Rep. vii. 529, A.; Phileb. 28, D.

<sup>4</sup> Mem. i. 4; iv. 3. No argument can be drawn from Mem. i. 6, 14: τοὺς θησαυροὺς τῶν πάλαι σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν, οὓς ἐκείνοι κατέλιπον ἐν βιβλίοις γράψαντες, ἀνελίστων κοινῇ σὺν τοῖς φίλοις διερχομαι, for these σοφοὶ need not necessarily be the earlier natural philosophers. Σοφοὶ is also used of poets, chroniclers, &c., and it is expressly stated that Socrates perused the works of the natural philosophers in order to find in them what was morally useful for himself and his friends.

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insight into its reasonable arrangement. Socrates may have had no special talent for natural science, and hence not have pursued it as a separate branch of study; but at least the germ of a new form of this science may be discovered in his philosophy. In his conception of the relations of means to ends, must have lain 'the thought of a universal diffusion of intelligence through the whole of nature,' the theory of an absolute harmony of man and nature, and of man's occupying such a position in nature as to be a microcosm of the world.<sup>1</sup> If he stopped with the microcosm, and confined his study of nature within the limits of man's practical needs, he must on his own showing have done this only as a preliminary step. He must have meant that we ought not to go beyond the limits of self until the foundation of a constructive criticism (*διαλεκτική*) has been securely laid in the depths of our inner life; or else he must be alluding to a popular and not to a philosophical method of study.<sup>2</sup>

Unfortunately this view of modern writers rests on assumptions which cannot be maintained. In the first place not only Xenophon, but even Aristotle,<sup>3</sup> not to mention later writers,<sup>4</sup> assert that Socrates

<sup>1</sup> Schleiermacher and Ritter.

<sup>2</sup> Krische, 208, but Socrates made no distinction between training for a philosopher and training for a good man.

<sup>3</sup> Met. i. 6, (987, b, 1): Σωκράτους δὲ περὶ μὲν τὰ ἠθικὰ πραγματευομένου, περὶ δὲ τῆς ὅλης φύσεως οὐθέν. xiii. 4; De Part.

Anim. i. 1, (642, a, 28): ἐπὶ Σωκράτους δὲ τοῦτο μὲν [τὸ ὁρισθαι τὴν οὐσίαν] ἠὺξήθη, τὸ δὲ ζητεῖν τὰ περὶ φύσεως ἔληξε.

<sup>4</sup> Cic. Tus. v. 4, 10; Acad. i. 4, 15; iv. 29, 123; De Fin. v. 29, 87; Rep. i. 10. Sext. Math. vii. 8. Gell. N. A. xiv. 6, 5. Diog. ii. 21.

never pursued the study of nature. Aristotle is, however, the authority who must be called in to arbitrate when Xenophon and Plato differ; and what could justify us in rejecting his testimony on all occasions when it is given against that of Plato? Plato, however, admits indirectly in the *Timæus* that natural science was foreign to Socrates; and the few maxims about nature which he attributes to him in his other writings, cannot be taken as conclusive evidence of an opposite tendency. The only passage (that in the *Phædo*) which seems to lay claim to historical accuracy, at least as far as the substance of it is concerned, does not say anything more than Xenophon had done before, namely, that Socrates demanded an investigation of the relations of means to ends in nature. Supposing this to be accepted, and at the same time a demand to be made that means and ends should not be understood in the lower sense in which they were understood by a subsequent age and also by Xenophon, but that higher speculative ideas should be taken to be latent in them, where, we ask, is the historical justification of this view to be found? Or, again, if an appeal is made to the logical consequences which would follow from the theory of Socrates, do they not prove that Socrates must have been quite serious in disparaging a speculative study of nature, and in his popular notion of means and ends? No doubt if he had placed his theory of the mutual dependence of all knowledge in an explicit form at the head of his system, it would be impossible to account for his low

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estimate of physics. But if his object was not knowledge in general, but the education and training of men by means of knowledge, is it not very natural that his enquiry should take a one-sided turn and consider the powers and activities of man himself,<sup>1</sup> nature being only considered in as far as it is of use to man? The idea of the relation of means to ends was, for natural and scientific enquiries, like a seed sown broadcast, which sprang up and bore fruit in the systems of Plato and Aristotle; but to Socrates himself this new theory of natural science appeared only to be a subsidiary branch of his ethical enquiries, whilst he was unconscious of all that it involved. Ethics only he pursued consciously. Even the study of the relation of means to ends in nature was, according to his view, subservient to a moral purpose—that of urging his friends to piety.<sup>2</sup> Like all subordinate branches of knowledge, it cannot, however, be altogether neglected in considering his teaching; but it does not follow that it can be allowed to have an independent value, taking it in the sense in which it was used by Socrates, or be separated and brought into prominence apart from the ethics with which it is entirely bound up.

<sup>1</sup> In this respect Socrates is like Kant, and Kant's position in history is also not unlike his. As Kant, after doing away with the older Metaphysics, only retained Ethics, so Socrates, after putting natural science out of sight, turned his attention exclusively to Ethics. In the one

case, as in the other, the one-sidedness with which the founders began has been supplemented by their disciples, and the treatment adopted for Ethics extended to the whole of philosophy.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Mem. i. 4, 1, and 18; iv. 3, 2 and 17.



The same may be said of his theology, resting, as it does in this respect on the same footing with natural science. The motives which deterred him from studying the one, must have deterred him from studying<sup>1</sup> the other. His definite views about the Gods and the worship of the Gods were the offspring of a practical love of piety, and his theology can therefore be only considered in the light of an appendix to ethics.

Bearing this in mind and confining ourselves to ethics, we shall find that even on this subject very few definite opinions can be brought home to Socrates with certainty. Indeed how could anything else have been possible, or how could a systematic treatment be given to ethics without a basis of facts either without or within for it to rest upon? All that Socrates did was however of a vague and speculative character. Moral action was referred to knowledge, but no sooner was it necessary to deduce particular moral acts and relations from knowledge, than he was content to fall back upon prevailing custom, or else to substitute the expediency of accident in place of the obligation which philosophy requires.

The fundamental thought of the ethics of Socrates may be expressed in the sentence—All virtue is

B. *The leading thought of*

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Mem. i. 1, 11; nothing impious was ever heard from Socrates; οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τῆς τῶν πάντων φύσεως . . . διελέγετο . . . ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς φροντίζοντας τὰ τοιαῦτα μωραίνοντας ἀπεδείκνυε. He asked, whether they fully understood human things, before

they advanced to such enquiries, ἢ τὰ μὲν ἀνθρωπινὰ παρόντες τὰ δαιμόνια δὲ σκοποῦντες ἡγούνται τὰ προσήκοντα πράττειν. and 12: αὐτὸς δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων αἰεὶ διελέγετο, σκοπῶν τί εὖσεβὲς ἢ ἀσεβές, &c.

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knowledge.<sup>1</sup> This assertion was most closely connected with his whole view of things. His endeavours from the first aimed at re-establishing morality and rooting it more deeply by means of knowledge. By the experience of his time he was convinced that the conventional mode of treating moral questions as matters of custom and authority could not hold its ground. His sifting of men discovered a pretended rather than a genuine form of virtue, even in the most celebrated of his contemporaries.<sup>2</sup> If true morality was to be attained, it was necessary to make clear and certain knowledge the standard of action. The idea which had thus dawned upon him was, however, as yet understood by him in a narrow and exclusive spirit. Knowledge was to be not only an indispensable condition and an aid to true morality, but it was to be the whole of morality. Where knowledge was wanting, there not only was virtue imperfect, but there was absolutely no virtue at all. The first who placed the Socratic doctrine of virtue on a broader footing, was Plato; and he was afterwards followed by Aristotle.

The position thus occupied Socrates established

<sup>1</sup> Arist. Eth. N. vi. 13: Σωκράτης . . φρονήσεις φέτο εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς . . . Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν λόγους τὰς ἀρετὰς φέτο εἶναι, ἐπιστήμας γὰρ εἶναι πάσας, Ibid. iii. 11: Eth. End. i. 5: ἐπιστήμας φέτ' εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς, ὥσθ' ἅμα συμβαίνειν εἶδεναι τε τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ εἶναι δίκαιον. Xen. Mem. iii. 9, 5: ἔφη δὲ καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν ἄλλην πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν σοφίαν εἶναι· τὰ τε

γὰρ δίκαια καὶ πάντα ὅσα ἀρετῇ πράττεται καλὰ τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι· καὶ οὐτ' ἂν τοὺς ταῦτα εἰδότας ἄλλο ἀντὶ τούτων οὐδὲν προελέσθαι, οὔτε τοὺς μὴ ἐπιστάμενους δύνασθαι πράττειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐὰν ἐγχειρῶσιν ἁμαρτάνειν. Plato, Lach. 194, D.: πολλάκις ἀκήκοά σου λέγοντος ὅτι ταῦτα ἀγαθὸς ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ἅπερ σοφός, ὃ δὲ ἀμαθὴς ταῦτα δὲ κακός.

<sup>2</sup> Plato, Apol. 21, C.; 29, E.

by maintaining that proper action was impossible without proper knowledge, and conversely, that where knowledge existed, right action followed as a matter of course. In support of the first of these assertions, he argued that no action or possession was of any use, unless it was directed by intelligence to a proper object;<sup>1</sup> and, in favour of the latter, that everyone only did what he believed would be of use to himself,<sup>2</sup> in proof of which he reasoned, that knowledge was always the strongest power in man, and could not be overcome by passion,<sup>3</sup> and that no one intentionally did wrong.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> It is only in Plato (Euth. 280, B.; Meno, 87, C.), that Socrates is made to take this view so expressly, and hence the *Moralia Magna* (i. 35) appear to have derived a corresponding view, but the statement is not only very like a Socratic statement, but it is also hinted at by Xenophon, Mem. iii. 9, 14; and more definitely expressed Xen. Œc. i. 1, 7. Æschines too in Demetrius de Elocu. 297, Rhet. Gr. ix. 122, puts the question into the mouth of Socrates when speaking of the rich inheritance of Alcibiades: Did he inherit the knowledge how to make use of it?

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Mem. iii. 9, 4; iv. 6, 6: *εἰδότες δὲ ἃ δεῖ ποιεῖν οἷεν τινὰς οἶσθαι δεῖν μὴ ποιεῖν ταῦτα*; *Οὐκ οἶομαι, ἔφη. Οἷδας δὲ τινὰς ἄλλα ποιοῦντας ἢ ἃ οἶονται δεῖν*; *Οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἔφη. Conf. Plato, Prot. 358, C.*

<sup>3</sup> Plato, Prot. 352, C.: *ἄρ' οὖν καὶ σοὶ τοιοῦτόν τι περὶ αὐτῆς [τῆς ἐπιστήμης] δοκεῖ ἢ καλόν τι*

*εἶναι ἢ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ οἷον ἄρχειν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἐάνπερ γινώσκῃ τις τὰ γαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ μὴ ἂν κρατηθῆναι ὑπὸ μηδενός, ὥστε ἅλλ' ἅττα πράττειν, ἢ ἃ ἂν ἢ ἐπιστήμη κελεύῃ, ἅλλ' ἱκανὴν εἶναι τὴν φρόνησιν βοηθεῖν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ*; The latter is then asserted with the consent of Socrates. Arist. Eth. Nic. vii. 3: *ἐπιστάμενον μὲν οὖν οὐ φασι τινες οἷον τε εἶναι [ἀκρατεῦσθαι] δεινὸν γὰρ, ἐπιστήμης ἐνούσης, ὡς ᾤετο Σωκράτης, ἄλλο τι κρατεῖν. Eth. Eud. vii. 13: ὁρθῶς τὸ Σωκρατικόν, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἰσχυρότερον φρονήσεως· ἅλλ' ὅτι ἐπιστήμην ἔφη, οὐκ ὁρθόν, ἀρετὴ γάρ ἐστι καὶ οὐκ ἐπιστήμη.*

<sup>4</sup> Arist. M. Mor. i. 9: *Σωκράτης ἔφη οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῶν γενέσθαι τὸ σπουδαῖος εἶναι ἢ φαύλους· εἰ γάρ τις, φησὶν, ἐρωτήσῃεν ὄντιναον, πότερον ἂν βούλοιτο δίκαιος εἶναι ἢ ἄδικος, οὐθεὶς ἂν ἔλοιτο τὴν ἀδικίαν.* More indefinite are the remarks in Eth. Nic. iii. 7, on the statement *ὡς οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν πονηρὸς οὐδ' ἄκων*

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With reference to the virtue of bravery, he more especially insisted upon it, that in all cases, he who knows the true nature of an apparent danger and the means of avoiding it, is braver than he who has not such knowledge.<sup>1</sup> Hence he concluded that virtue was entirely dependent upon knowledge; and accordingly he defined all the particular virtues in such a way, as to make them consist in knowledge of some kind, their difference being determined by the difference of their objects. He is pious, who knows what is right towards God; he is just, who knows what is right towards men.<sup>2</sup> He is brave who knows how to treat dangers properly;<sup>3</sup> he is prudent and wise who knows how to use what is good and noble, and how to avoid what is evil.<sup>4</sup> In short all virtues are referred to wisdom or knowledge, which, as far as he is concerned, are one and

μάκαρ. Brandis remarks with justice (Gr. röm. Phil. ii. 39) that this refers to the arguments of the Platonic Socrates, (see Meno, 77, B.), but that the same is asserted by Xenophon, Mem. iii. 9, 4 iv. 6, 6 and 11; and by Plato, Apol. 25, E.: ἐγὼ δὲ . . . τοῦτο τὸ τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἐκὼν ποιῶ, ὡς φῆς σύ; ταῦτα ἐγὼ σοὶ οὐ πείθομαι, ὦ Μέλητε . . . εἰ δὲ ἄκων διαφθείρω . . . δῆλον ὅτι ἐὰν μάθω παύσσομαι ὃ γὰρ ἄκων ποιῶ.

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Mem. iii. 9, 2; Symp. 2, 12: Socrates remarks in reference to a dancing girl, who is tumbling among swords, οὗτοι τοὺς γὰρ θεωμένους τάδε ἀντιλέγειν ἔτι οἶμαι, ὡς οὐχὶ καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία διδασκόν. Arist. Eth. Nic. iii. 11:

δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐμπειρία ἡ περὶ ἕκαστα ἀνδρεία τις εἶναι· ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ᾤθη ἐπιστήμην εἶναι τὴν ἀνδρείαν.

<sup>2</sup> εὐσεβῆς = ὁ τὰ περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς νόμιμα εἰδώς· δίκαιος = ὁ εἰδὼς τὰ περὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους νόμιμα. Mem. iv. 6, 4 and 6.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Mem. iv. 6, 11: οἱ μὲν ἄρα ἐπιστάμενοι τοῖς δεινοῖς τε καὶ ἐπικινδύνοις καλῶς χρῆσθαι ἀνδρείοι εἰσιν, οἱ δὲ διαμαρτάνοντες τούτου δειλοί. Plato, Prot. 360, D.: ἡ σοφία ἄρα τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν ἀνδρεία ἐστίν.

<sup>4</sup> Mem. iii. 9, 4: σοφίαν δὲ καὶ σωφροσύνην οὐ διώριζεν, ἀλλὰ τὸν τὰ μὲν καλὰ τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ γιγνώσκοντα χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς καὶ τὸν τὰ αἰσχυρὰ εἰδὼτα εὐλαβεῖσθαι σοφόν τε καὶ σφρόνα ἔκρινε.



the same.<sup>1</sup> The ordinary notion that there are many kinds of virtue is incorrect. Virtue is in truth but one.<sup>2</sup> Even the difference between one person and another, one time of life and another, one sex and another, is no proof of the contrary. For in all cases it is one and the same thing, which makes the conduct virtuous,<sup>3</sup> and in all persons the same disposition for virtue must be assumed to exist.<sup>4</sup> The main point therefore is to cultivate this disposition by education. Some may bring with them more, and others fewer talents for any particular activity, but all alike require exercise and education, and those who have the most talents, require it most, or else they will be lost in ruinous errors.<sup>5</sup> Now, since there is no greater obstacle to

<sup>1</sup> Mem. iv. 6, 7: ἐπιστήμη ἅρα σοφία ἐστίν; Ἐμοίγε δοκεῖ. No man can know everything, ὅ ἅρα ἐπίσταται ἕκαστος τοῦτο καὶ σοφός ἐστιν.

<sup>2</sup> In addition to Xenophon, Plato also develops this in his earlier writings, Prot. 329, B.; 349, B.; 360, E.; which confined themselves much more closely to the opinions of Socrates. From this doctrine of Socrates the Cynic and Megarian notions of the oneness of virtue arose.

<sup>3</sup> Plato (Meno, 71, D.), and Aristotle, according to the following passage (Pol. i. 13,) which he must in some way have harmonised with the Socratic teaching: ὥστε φανερόν, ὅτι ἐστὶν ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ τῶν εἰρημένων πάντων, καὶ οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ σωφροσύνη γυναικὸς καὶ ἀνδρός, οὐδ' ἀνδρία καὶ δικαιοσύνη, καθάπερ ᾤετο Σωκράτης . . . πολλὸν

γὰρ ἄμεινον λέγουσιν οἱ ἑξαριθμοῦντες τὰς ἀρετάς.

<sup>4</sup> Xen. Sym. 2, 9: καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης εἶπεν· ἐν πολλοῖς μὲν, ὧ ἀνδρες, καὶ ἄλλοις δῆλον, καὶ ἐν οἷς δ' ἡ παῖς ποιεῖ, ὅτι ἡ γυναικεῖα φύσις οὐδὲν χείρων τῆς τοῦ ἀνδρός οὔσα τυγχάνει, βώμης δὲ καὶ ἰσχύος δεῖται. Conf. Plato, Rep. v. 452, E.

<sup>5</sup> Mem. iii. 9, 1; iv. 1, 3; iv. 2, 2. The question, which is raised in the first of these passages with special reference to bravery: Whether virtue is a natural or an acquired result; the identical question, to which Plato devoted a thorough enquiry in the Meno and Protagoras, appears to have become a favourite topic of discussion owing to the appearance of the Sophistic teachers of virtue; at least it seems so in Xenophon iii. 9, 1,



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true knowledge than imaginary knowledge, it follows that in a moral point of view nothing can be more necessary than self-knowledge, so that the dark semblance of knowledge may be dispelled, and human wants and human needs may be brought to light. It seems to be assumed by him that right action will follow from knowledge, just as bad conduct follows from want of knowledge, and that he who knows himself will, without fail, do what is right, just as he who is ignorant of himself will, without fail, do what is wrong.<sup>1</sup> The man of knowledge can alone do anything that can last; he alone is useful and deserves esteem.<sup>2</sup> In short, knowledge is the root of all moral action; want of knowledge the cause of every vice: indeed, if it were possible wittingly to do evil, it would be better to do so than to commit it unwittingly; for in the latter case the first condition of all right action—a moral state of mind—would be found wanting, whilst in the former case it would be there, the doer being only faithless to it for the moment.<sup>3</sup>

and in the *Meno*. Pindar had previously contrasted natural and acquired gifts. See above, p. 19.

<sup>1</sup> *Mem.* iv. 2, 24. For examples of conversations, in which Socrates endeavoured to bring his friends to a knowledge of themselves, see *Mem.* iii. 6; iv. 2.

<sup>2</sup> *Mem.* i. 2, 52: the accuser charged Socrates with inducing his followers to despise their friends and relations; for he had declared, those only ought to be honoured, who were able to make themselves useful by means of

their knowledge. Xenophon allows, that he showed how little useless and ignorant people were esteemed by their own friends and relatives; but he says that Socrates did not intend thereby to lead them to despise their dependants, but only to shew that they must aim at understanding *ὅτι τὸ ἄφρον ἡτιμὸν ἐστι*.

<sup>3</sup> *Mem.* iv. 2, 19: *τῶν δὲ δὴ τοὺς φίλους ἐξαπατώντων ἐπὶ βλάβῃ πότερος ἀδικιώτερός ἐστιν, ὁ ἐκὼν, ἢ ὁ ἄκων*; which is thus

As yet, however, all that has been established is very vague and speculative. All virtue is knowledge, but of what is it the knowledge? To this Socrates gives the general answer, when he says that it is the knowledge of the good. He is virtuous, just, brave, and so forth, who knows what is good and right. But this addition still leaves his criterion as wide and indefinite as it was before. Knowledge which makes virtue, is knowledge about the good, but what is the good? The good is the conception of a thing viewed as an end. Doing what is good, is acting up to the conception of the corresponding action, in short, knowledge in its practical application. Thus the essence of moral action is not explained by the vague definition, that it is a knowledge about the good, the right, and so forth. Beyond this, however, Socrates did not advance in his philosophy. Just as his speculative philosophy stopped with the general requirement that knowledge belonged to conceptions only, so his practical philosophy stopped with the indefinite postulate that actions must correspond

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C. *The  
Good and  
Eudæ-  
monism.*

(a) *Virtue  
is know-  
ledge about  
the Good.*

decided in the sequel: τὰ δίκαια πότερον ὁ ἐκὼν ψευδόμενος καὶ ἐξαπατῶν οἶδεν, ἢ ὁ ἄκων; Δῆλον ὅτι ὁ ἐκὼν. Δικαιότερον δὲ [φῆς εἶναι] τὸν ἐπιστάμενον τὰ δίκαια τοῦ μὴ ἐπιστάμενον; Φαίνομαι. Conf. Plato, Rep. ii. 382; iii. 389, B.; iv. 459, C.; vii. 535, E.; Hipp. Min. 371, E. It can only be an imaginary case to suppose that any one can knowingly and intentionally do what is wrong: for according to the principles of Socrates, it is impossible to conceive that the man who possesses

knowledge as such, should by virtue of his knowledge do anything but what is right, or that any one spontaneously should choose what is wrong. If, therefore, an untruth is told knowingly and intentionally, it can only be an apparent and seeming untruth, which Plato allows as a means to higher ends (Rep. ii. 382; iii. 389, B.; iv. 459, C.), whereas want of knowledge is the only proper lie, a proper lie being always unintentional, Rep. ii. 382; v. 535, E.

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with their conceptions. But how with so vague a principle can it be determined what actions are moral? To answer this question it either becomes necessary to adopt a standard without further thought, from the customs prevailing around us, or, in as far as the morality of an action is to be brought into harmony with the theory of knowledge, the standard of morals must be decided by the special aims and interests of the doer, that is, by external and utilitarian considerations.

(b) *Practically the Good is determined either by custom or utility.*

Both courses were attempted by Socrates. On the one hand he explained the conception of the right by that of the lawful.<sup>1</sup> The best service of God, he says, is that which agrees with customary forms;<sup>2</sup> and he will not even withdraw himself from an unjust sentence, lest he should violate the laws.<sup>3</sup> On the other hand, as a necessary consequence of this view of things, he could not be content with existing moral sanctions, but felt obliged to look about him for an intelligible standard of morality.

<sup>1</sup> Mem. iv. 6, 6 : Δίκαια δὲ οἶσθα, ἔφη, ὅποια καλεῖται ;—Ἄ οἱ νόμοι κελεύουσιν, ἔφη.—Οἱ ἄρα ποιοῦντες ἃ οἱ νόμοι κελεύουσιν δίκαιά τε ποιοῦσι καὶ ἃ δεῖ ; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ ; In Mem. iv. 4, 12, Socrates says : φημί γὰρ ἐγὼ τὸ νόμιμον δίκαιον εἶναι, and when Hippias asks for further information about what is meant by νόμιμον : νόμους δὲ πόλεως, ἔφη, γιγνώσκεις ;—Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, νόμιμος μὲν ἂν εἴη ὁ κατὰ ταῦτα [ἃ οἱ πολῖται ἐγράψαντο] πολιτευόμενος, ἄνομος δὲ ὁ ταῦτα παραβαίνων ; Πάν μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.—Οὐκοῦν καὶ δίκαια μὲν ἂν πράττοι ὁ τούτοις

πειθόμενος, ἄδिका δὲ ὁ τούτοις ἀπειθῶν ;—Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

<sup>2</sup> Mem. iv. 3, 16 : Euthydemus suggests that no one can worthily honour the gods. Socrates tries to refute it : ὁρᾷς γὰρ, ὅτι ὁ ἐν Δελφοῖς θεὸς ὅταν τις αὐτὸν ἐπερωτᾷ πῶς ἂν τοῖς θεοῖς χαρίζοιτο ἀποκρίνεται νόμῳ πόλεως. The same principle is attributed to Socrates, i. 3, 1.

<sup>3</sup> As Dissen has already shewn, Compare Wiggers, Socrates, p. 187 ; Hurndall, De Philosophia Mor. Socr. ; Grote (Hist. of Greece viii. 605) agrees with this expression, excepting that he refuses

This could not fail to bring him, occupying the ground he did, to a utilitarian standard; and thus, his ethical principles are derived by a line of argument, which differs in results more than in principles, from the moral philosophy of the Sophists. When asked whether there could be a good, which did not refer to a definite end, he distinctly stated that he neither knew, nor desired to know of such a one:<sup>1</sup> everything is good and beautiful in relation to the special needs which it supplies. He declared in a most emphatic way, that the good is nothing else but what is advantageous, the beautiful nothing else but what is useful, and that everything is accordingly good and beautiful in relation to the objects for which it is best fitted.<sup>2</sup> The doctrine of the involuntary nature of evil he confirmed by remarking, that everyone does that which he thinks advantageous for himself,<sup>3</sup> and thus he would practically seem to hold that there is no absolute, but only a relative good, no standard but advantage and disadvantage, by which good and evil may be tested.<sup>4</sup> In the dialogues of Xenophon he almost always grounded his moral precepts on the motive of utility: we should aim at being continent, because the continent man has a more pleasant life than the incontinent:<sup>5</sup>

to speak of Sophistic morality as a unity.

<sup>1</sup> Mem. iii. 8, 1-7.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Mem. iv. 6, 8; conf. iv. 5, 6; Symp. 5, 3; Plato, Prot. 333, D.; 353, C.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Mem. iii. 9, 4: something similar is found in Plato's Protagoras, 358, B.

<sup>4</sup> On the other hand little stress can be laid upon the treatment of happiness as the highest end of life in Mem. iii. 2, 4. All Greek philosophers do the same, including Plato, Aristotle, and even the Stoics.

<sup>5</sup> Mem. i. 5, 6; ii. 1, 1; conf. iv. 5, 9.



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we should inure ourselves to hardships, because the hardy man is more healthy, and because he can more easily avoid dangers, and gain honour and glory:<sup>1</sup> we should be modest, because boasting does harm and brings disgrace.<sup>2</sup> We should be on good terms with our relatives, because it is absurd to harm ourselves by those who have been given us for our good;<sup>3</sup> we should try to secure good friends, since a good friend is the most useful possession.<sup>4</sup> We should not withdraw from public affairs, since the well-being of the community is the well-being of the individual;<sup>5</sup> we should obey the laws, since obedience is productive of the greatest good to ourselves and to the state; and we should abstain from wrong, since wrong is always punished in the end.<sup>6</sup> In short, we should live virtuously, because virtue carries off the greatest rewards both with God and man.<sup>7</sup> Allowing even that the advantages which belong to the virtuous man consist in the feeling of contentment with his own perfection,<sup>8</sup> yet the groundwork of morals is as yet intellectually defective: for actions are only considered as means for producing moral pleasure.

(c) *The superficial character of this mode of treatment*

It is true that in the Socrates of Plato, the superficial character of this mode of treatment is concealed from view by the further thought, that the use of virtue is a consequence of its agreeing with a healthy

<sup>1</sup> Mem. iii. 12; ii. 1, 18; conf. i. 6.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. i. 7.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. ii. 3, 19.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid. ii. 4, 5; ii. 6, 4.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid. iii. 7, 9; ii. 1, 14.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid. iv. 4, 16; iii. 9, 12.

<sup>7</sup> Mem. ii. 1, 27, gives an extract from a writing of Prodicus, the contents of which Socrates appropriates. Conf. i. 4, 18; iv. 3, 17.

<sup>8</sup> Mem. i. 6, 9; iv. 8, 6.



state of the soul.<sup>1</sup> But far from our being justified in attributing this further thought to the Socrates of history, it must be observed that even Plato in the Protagoras puts language in the mouth of Socrates which is substantially the same as that found in Xenophon. Still less can it be maintained,<sup>2</sup> that the moral teaching of the above-quoted expressions being at variance with other essential parts of the system called after the name of Socrates, cannot be his: for it is very questionable whether this variation is the fault of his biographers. On the contrary, it would seem rather to belong to Socrates himself; and it is certainly a contradiction<sup>3</sup> to call virtue the highest end of life, and at the same time to recommend it because of the advantages it brings.<sup>4</sup> The existence of this contradiction may

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*concealed  
in Plato.*

<sup>1</sup> Gorg. 467, C.; 474, C.; 495, D.; 499, C.; Rep. iv. 444, E.; x. 612, A.

<sup>2</sup> As Brandis and Ritter maintain in opposition to the view of Xenophon.

<sup>3</sup> As Plato has already remarked, Rep. ii. 362, E.; Phædo, 68, D.

<sup>4</sup> What Brandis has elsewhere asserted appears to be less open to objection, viz. that Socrates distinguishes mere good fortune from really faring well, and that he only allows happiness in its ordinary sense a place among things relatively good. The former is in Mem. iii. 9, 14; the latter in iv. 2, 34. It is there stated, that he declared *εὐπραξία* to be *κράτιστον ἀνδρὶ ἐπιτήδευμα*, but that in answer to the question, What is *εὐτυχία*? he had

replied that *τύχη* and *πρᾶξις* were two things perfectly distinct: τὸ μὲν γὰρ μὴ ζητοῦντα ἐπιτυχεῖν τινι τῶν δέοντων εὐτυχίαν οἶμαι εἶναι· τὸ δὲ μαθόντα τι καὶ μελετήσαντα εὖ ποιεῖν εὐπραξίαν νομίζω. But this distinction could be admitted even by a decided advocate of Eudæmonism, such as Aristippus, as soon as he allowed that true and lasting happiness is to be attained not by the uncertain favour of chance, but by the exercise of the understanding, and that man must be active himself in order to have a right enjoyment of life. The other passage is to be found in a conversation with Euthydemus, the object of which is to convince him of his ignorance of what is good and what is evil. After it has been proved that all things

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however be understood from the purely theoretical character of the Socratic conception of virtue, which makes morality consist in knowledge, but at the same time does not explain what is the object of knowledge. From such a theory it is impossible to deduce definite moral actions, and no other alternative remains but to discover them in some other way, by a reference to experience and to the well-known consequences of actions. We can then hardly be justified in taking the most absolute statements found in Xenophon, which assert the identity of the good and the useful, for mere fragments of conversations which really aim at an opposite result—that of proving their essential difference. We should on the whole hesitate to declare a trait fictitious, which is not only found in scattered utterances of the Socrates of Xenophon, but runs through his whole description from beginning to end, unless undeniable testimony can be produced to that effect. We should also demur to throwing doubts on Xenophon's narrative to such an extent, that it would be almost useless as a historical source. The very fact that

considered by Euthydemus to be goods, wisdom included, may under certain circumstances be disadvantageous, Euthydemus says: *κινδυνεύει—ἀναμφιλογώτατον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν*, to which Socrates replies: *εἴ γε μὴ τις αὐτὸ ἐξ ἀμφιλογῶν ἀγαθῶν συντιθείη*, or as it is immediately explained, *εἴ γε μὴ προσθήσομεν αὐτῷ κάλλος ἢ ἰσχύον ἢ πλούτων ἢ δόξαν ἢ καὶ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων*, since among all these things

there is none which is not the source of much evil. Far from denying, this proceeds on the distinct understanding that happiness is the highest good. All that is required is, that an independent value should not be attributed to particular goods, but that they should be valued in proportion to their contributions to the sum of human well being.

the Cyrenaic doctrine of pleasure found a place among the Socratic schools, by the side of the rigid morality of the Cynics and the captious logic of the Megarians,<sup>1</sup> is in itself a testimony to the truth of Xenophon's description. The founder of the Cyrenaics, from all we can judge, firmly believed that he was clinging to the true spirit of the Socratic teaching; and it would be impossible to explain this fact at all unless Aristippus had found in the teaching of Socrates some link with which to connect his own. In theory, the Socratic doctrine of morals is far from being based upon pleasure; but nevertheless in its logical development it has the appearance of being founded on utility. Did not even Kant, despite his ordinary strictness, follow a utilitarian line of argument in proving the immortality of the

<sup>1</sup> Hermann (Plato, i. 257) has rightly drawn attention to this. But when he finds in the principle of relative value (or as he calls it, 'Das Vorherrschen der Relativität') not merely a weak point in the philosophy of Socrates, but at the same time an instance of Socratic modesty, one feels inclined to ask, In what does this modesty consist? And when he connects with this the more general doctrine, which in his view distinguishes the Socratic dialectic from the Sophistic, and is the foundation of the Socratic maxims on the truth of universal conceptions—the doctrine that all accidental qualities are relative, and that all grouping under conceptions has only a practical and unessential impor-

tance—he appears to advocate a doctrine neither to be found in the *Memorabilia* (iii. 8, 4-7; 10, 12; iv. 6, 9; 2, 13), nor in the *Hippias Major* (p. 288)—the latter in other respects a very doubtful authority. It is indeed stated in these passages, that the good and the beautiful are only good and beautiful for certain purposes by virtue of their use, but not that every application of these attributes to a subject has only a relative validity. This statement, however, would not under any circumstances prove a distinction between the Socratic and the Sophistic philosophy; since the characteristic of the Sophists consisted in their allowing only a relative value to all scientific and moral principles.

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soul? We would not therefore blame Socrates for being deficient in moral depth, but for failing to give a satisfactory intellectual development to the deeper truth of his doctrine.

D. *Particular  
moral rela-  
tions.*

To give a systematic account of moral actions was not a part of the intention of Socrates. His views were from time to time expanded as occasion offered, and chance has, to a certain extent, decided which of his dialogues should come down to us. Still it may be assumed that Socrates kept those objects more especially in view, to which he is constantly reverting, according to Xenophon's account of him. In addition to his general demand for moral knowledge, and for knowledge of self, we may notice three such points in particular:—1. The independence of the individual as secured by freedom from wants and desires; 2. The higher side of social life, as seen in friendship; 3. The demand for a commonwealth on a regularly organised plan. And to these may be added the question, 4. Whether, and How far, Socrates advanced beyond the ordinary morality of the Greeks by insisting on the duty of loving one's enemies?

(a) *Individual inde-  
pendence.*

Not only was Socrates himself a model of self-denial and abstemiousness, but he endeavoured to foster the same virtue in his friends. When was a subject more often the topic of conversation than abstemiousness in the dialogues of Xenophon? And did not Socrates distinctly call moderation the corner-stone<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Mem. i. 5, 4: ἀρὰ γε οὐ χρὴ ἐγκράτειαν ἀρετῆς εἶναι κρητῖδα, πάντα ἕνδοα, ἡγησάμενον τὸν ταύτην πρῶτον ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ κατα-



of all virtue? On this point his opinions nearly agreed with those which afterwards played so important a part in the schools of the Cynics and Stoics. Man can only become master of himself by being independent of his wants, and by the exercise of his powers; while depending on the conditions and pleasures of the body, he resembles a slave.<sup>1</sup> The philosopher who considers knowledge to be the highest good, will naturally insist upon the mind's devoting itself to the pursuit of truth, in preference to every other thing, without allowing its meditations to be disturbed by the desires and appetites of the senses:<sup>2</sup> the less value he attaches to external things and the more closely he perceives happiness to be bound up with the intellectual condition of man, the more pressing will he feel the call to carry these principles into practice, by really becoming independent of the external world. But all those other motives, which co-operated in leading the moralists of a later epoch to the same conclusion, were unknown to Socrates. He was not an ascetic in relation to the pleasures of

σκευάσθαι; This does not contradict the assertion that all virtue consists in knowledge. If Socrates had at all reflected, he would have explained moderation as a kind of knowledge. The above quoted passage might then be taken to mean, that the conviction of the worthlessness of sensual enjoyments must precede every other moral knowledge.

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Mem., i. 5, 3; i. 6, 5; ii. 1, 11; i. 2, 29; iii. 13, 3; and, in particular, iv. 5, 2;

Symp. 8, 23.

<sup>2</sup> This connection appears clearly Mem. iv. 5, 6. When Socrates had shown that want of moderation makes man a slave, whilst moderation makes him free, he continues: σοφίαν δὲ τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἀπείργουσα τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἢ ἀκρασία εἰς τοῦναντίον αὐτοῦς ἐμβάλλειν; for how can any one recognise and choose what is good and useful, if he is ruled by the desire of what is pleasant?



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the senses, but displayed less strictness than might have been anticipated, neither shrinking from enjoyment, nor yet feeling it needful. To continue master of himself in the midst of the allurements of the senses, by the unruffled dignity of his own inner life—that was the aim which his moderation proposed to itself.

The language which Socrates uses in reference to certain indulgences may serve to illustrate this. However exemplary his own conduct was in controlling his passions, yet, in theory, he does not object to more or less of license, provided it be not carried too far, so as to be out of proportion to the requirements of the body, or a hindrance to higher ends.<sup>1</sup> Independence of mind, not strict purity, was the leading thought of his moral teaching.

(b) *Friendship.*

To supplement this purely negative condition of morality, a positive side was necessary; and here the connection between man and his fellowmen was ready at hand in its simplest form—that of friendship. This relation, as we have already remarked, was defended by Socrates, on the ground of its advantages; but it cannot be denied that it possessed both for himself and for his philosophy, a deeper

<sup>1</sup> Mem. i. 3, 14: οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἀφροδισιάζειν τοὺς μὴ ἀσφαλῶς ἔχοντας πρὸς ἀφροδισιαζέτω χρῆναι πρὸς τοιαῦτα, οἷα μὴ πάνυ μὲν δεομένον τοῦ σώματος οὐκ ἂν προσδέξαιτο ψυχῇ, δεομένου δὲ οὐκ ἂν πράγματα παρέχοι. The last remark applies partly to the prejudicial workings of passion, which makes a slave of man, and deters him from what is

good, and partly to the harm it does to property, honour, and personal security. Socrates considers it ridiculous to incur danger and trouble for the sake of an enjoyment, which could be procured in a so much simpler manner from any common girl. Mem. ii. 1, 5; 2, 4. The use which the Cynics made of these principles will be seen hereafter.

meaning, which was the cause of its being zealously cultivated by all the Socratic schools. Since the possession of knowledge is the condition of all morality, philosophers, or those whose object it is to possess knowledge, need in the first place the help of each other to supply their moral wants; for true moral advancement can only be gained from one's equals in knowledge. Thus the identity of moral and scientific interests introduced a more intimate sympathy between teacher and pupil, and between pupils amongst themselves, than could have resulted from an association of an exclusively intellectual character. The same causes were now again being called into action, which had produced such effect in former times, when as lively a sympathy and as strong an appreciation of friendship and brotherhood had shown themselves in the Pythagorean association—the result of a common peculiarity, their moral and religious tone of life. Nor was Socrates wanting in impressive discourses on the value and nature of friendship.<sup>1</sup> In these he always comes back to the point, that true friendship can only exist amongst virtuous men, and that for them it is altogether natural and necessary; true friends, he says, will do everything for one another, but they can only be secured by virtue and active benevolence.<sup>2</sup>

From this vantage ground of true friendship the

<sup>1</sup> Mem. ii. 4–6.

<sup>2</sup> Similar explanations are worked into the Platonic Lysis, but probably in too free a manner

for us to be able to gain from them any information about Socrates.

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prevailing practice is then criticised. Socrates not only allows sympathy to assume the Greek form of love in the case of boys and men, but he adopts that form of it himself, and it can hardly be merely out of deference to the notions of others. But, in applying his own moral principles to this relation, he opposes the prevailing abuses, and demands their reformation, in order that the sensual conception of Eros may be transformed into the moral conception of Friendship.<sup>1</sup> True love, he declares, can only then be said to exist, when the good of the loved object is pursued disinterestedly; not when, with reckless selfishness, aims are directed and means employed, by which both persons become mutually contemptible. Unselfishness alone can secure fidelity and constancy. The plea that the attractions of one merit the kindly offices of another is wholly a mistaken one: for immorality and immodesty can never be used as means to moral ends.<sup>2</sup>

It would appear that with these principles Socrates was enunciating to his cotemporaries a new truth, or at least recalling one long since forgotten.<sup>3</sup> But in his low estimate of marriage he agreed with his countrymen. This was no doubt partly a consequence, resulting from the unnatural vice of the Greeks, but it was no less, in some degree, the cause

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Symp. 8, 12, the leading thought of which at least is Socratic.

<sup>2</sup> Symp. 8, 27: οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε πονηρὰ αὐτὸν ποιοῦντα ἀγαθὸν τὸν σύνοντα ἀποδειῖξαι, οὐδέ γε ἀναι-

σχυντίαν καὶ ἀκρασίαν παρεχόμενον ἐγκρατῇ καὶ αἰδοῦμενον τὸν ἐρώμενον ποιῆσαι.

<sup>3</sup> Conf. Plato. Symp. 178, C.; 180, C.; 216, E.

of that vice.<sup>1</sup> Without denying to women a moral disposition similar to that of men, and whilst even maintaining with some of them an intellectual interchange of opinions, his remarks on married life are yet more in keeping with the husband of Xanthippe, than with the friend of Aspasia. He allows that an able woman is as useful in a family as a man, and he reproaches men for not caring about the education of their wives,<sup>2</sup> but he considers the procreation of children the end of marriage,<sup>3</sup> and his own conduct shows little love for domestic life.<sup>4</sup> His social and his personal instincts are satisfied by friendly intercourse with men; in their society he sees a means of fulfilling his peculiar mission as an educator of mankind; and, more than this, with the peculiarity of a Greek, he considers the state, and not the family, to be the chief object of moral interest.

Of the state, and the duties it entails, a very high notion is entertained by Socrates. He who would live amongst men, he says, must live in a state, be it as ruler or as subject.<sup>5</sup> Not only is unconditional obedience to the laws required by him to such an extent that the conception of justice is reduced to

(c) *The state.*

<sup>1</sup> Conf. Plato, *Symp.* 192, A.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. *Œc.* 3, 10; but the question may be raised, in how far the substance of these remarks applies to Socrates himself. *Symp.* 2, 9.

<sup>3</sup> *Mem.* ii. 2, 4.

<sup>4</sup> If, in addition to the trait described by Plato, *Phædo*, 60, A., the character of Xanthippe (which has no pretensions to great

tenderness), and besides this, the joking character of the conversation in Xen. *Symp.* 2, 10, be thrown into the scale against the passage in Plato, *Apol.* 34, D., the balance of certainty is, that Socrates lived almost entirely in public, and almost never at home.

<sup>5</sup> *Mem.* ii. 1, 12.

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that of obedience to law, but he desires every competent man to take part in the administration of the state, the well-being of individuals depending on the well-being of the community.<sup>1</sup> These principles were really carried into practice by him throughout an entire life. With devoted self-sacrifice his duties as a citizen were fulfilled, and even death was endured in order that he might not violate the laws. He even regarded his philosophic labours as the fulfilment of a duty to the state, and, according to Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, he appears to have used every opportunity for urging able people to political activity, for deterring the incompetent, for awakening officials to a sense of their duties, and for giving them direction in the administration of their offices.<sup>2</sup> The political character of his labours was best expressed, when he included<sup>3</sup> all virtues in his conception of the art of ruling.<sup>4</sup>

But whilst deferring in this way to the Grecian view of the state, he is in other respects widely estranged from it. If knowledge is the condition of all true virtue, it must be no less the condition of all true political virtue, and all the more so because the conception of political virtue is the higher one.

<sup>1</sup> Mem. iii. 7, 9.

<sup>2</sup> Mem. iii. 2-7.

<sup>3</sup> βασιλική τέχνη in Mem. ii. 1, 17; iv. 2, 11. In Plato, *Euthyd.* 291, B., πολιτική stands for βασιλική.

<sup>4</sup> Accordingly the story told by Cicero, *Tusc.* v. 37, 108, and Plut. *de Exil.* c. 5, p. 600, that in answer to the question, to what

country he belonged, he replied that he was a citizen of the world, cannot command credit, and the question itself sounds strange as addressed to Socrates in Athens. The story has probably been attributed to him by some later philosopher who prided himself on being a citizen of the world.



Hence everyone who aspires to the position of a statesman is required to prepare himself for this calling<sup>1</sup> by a thorough self-enquiry and a course of intellectual labour; and conversely, Socrates refuses to recognise those as qualified or rightful aspirants to political offices, who do not fulfil the preparatory condition; it is not the possession of power, nor the fortune of the lot, nor a popular election, but knowledge alone, which confers a claim to rule.<sup>2</sup> With reference to the sovereignty of the masses, he asks how it can be possible for a statesman, desirous of furthering right and justice, to maintain himself against them; and when the masses are in power, what else can an upright man do but withdraw to a life of retirement?

A principle was here advocated, which brought Socrates not only into collision with the Athenian democracy, but with all the political notions of the

<sup>1</sup> Mem. iii. 6, particularly towards the end; iv. 2, 6; Plato, Symp. 216, A.

<sup>2</sup> Mem. iii. 9, 10: βασιλεῖς δὲ καὶ ἄρχοντας οὐ τοὺς τὰ σκῆπτρα ἔχοντας ἔφη εἶναι, οὐδὲ τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων αἰρεθέντας, οὐδὲ τοὺς κλήρω λαχόντας, οὐδὲ τοὺς βιασαμένους, οὐδὲ τοὺς ἐξυπατήσαντας, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐπισταμένους ἄρχειν: in all other cases obedience is given to men of professional knowledge;—which is then illustrated by the example of physicians, pilots, and others. Similarly in Mem. iii. 5, 21, and 4, 9: λέγω ἐγώ γε, ὥς ὅτου ἂν τις προστατεύῃ, ἐὰν γιγνώσκῃ τε ὧν δεῖ καὶ τοῦτα πορίζεσθαι δύνηται, ἀγαθὸς ἂν εἴη προστάτης.

<sup>2</sup> Similar views are advocated by Plato with the same illustrations, Polit. 297, D., and they appear to have been generally held in the school of Socrates. Thus according to Xenophon, the accuser charges Socrates with having contributed to bring existing institutions into contempt: λέγων ὡς μαρῶν εἴη τοὺς μὲν τῆς πόλεως ἄρχοντας ἀπὸ κυάμου καθίστασθαι, κυβερνήτην δὲ μηδένα θέλειν κεχρησθαι κυαμεντῷ μηδὲ τέκτονι μηδ' αὐλητῇ μηδ' ἐπ' ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, and Xenophon does not deny the accuracy of this statement, but only attempts to prove the harmlessness of such principles.

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Greeks. Instead of recognising the equality of all, or the privileges belonging to birth and wealth, he demanded an aristocracy of intelligence; instead of citizen-rulers, he demanded a race of officials intellectually educated; instead of a dominion of races and tribes, which is at the root of the Greek states, he demanded a government by professional adepts in their particular calling, which Plato, consistently developing the principles of Socrates, attempted to realise in his philosophic community.<sup>1</sup> In this Socrates followed the Sophists, who were the first to give a preparatory course of study, but who also made that course a necessary qualification for entering on a statesman's career. But his aim was entirely different to theirs. To him the end of politics was not the power of the individual, but the well-being of all; the object of study was not personal skill, but the attainment of truth; the means of culture was not the art of persuasion, but the science of what really is. Socrates aimed at a knowledge which should reform the state, the Sophists at one by which it might be governed.

This aristocratic view of politics might appear to be contradicted by the freedom with which Socrates rose above the social prejudices of his nation, opposing the scorn usually lavished on trade by the maxim, that no useful activity is a fit object of scorn, be it what it may, but that idleness and inactivity alone deserve contempt. Both the one and the other of

<sup>1</sup> Plato, *Apol.* 31, E.; *Conf. Rep.* vi. 496, C.

these opinions, however, was derived from the same source. He would have the value of the individual in the state measured by his abilities, but at the same time he would have every occupation appreciated, which leads to any good result.<sup>1</sup> Here, as elsewhere, the conception of good was paramount with Socrates.

One consequence of having the standard of morality fixed by the state in Greece, was that the duty of the virtuous man was traditionally summed up as doing good to friends and harm to foes. Xenophon put this definition in the mouth of Socrates,<sup>2</sup> at the same time considering it most natural that he should feel pain at the success of his enemies.<sup>3</sup> But in one of the earliest and most historical of Plato's dialogues,<sup>4</sup> Socrates declares it to be wrong to injure others: for injury being the same thing as wrong-doing, no one ought to wrong another under any circumstances, not even if he has been previously wronged by him. It is difficult to reconcile these conflicting accounts:<sup>5</sup> for assuming that the

(d) *Love  
for  
enemies.*

<sup>1</sup> Mem. i. 2, 56. In keeping with this, he urges a friend (ii. 7) to employ the maids of his house in woollen work, and another (ii. 8) to seek for occupation as a steward, in both cases refuting the objection, that such an occupation was unbecoming for free men. Xenophon held a very different view on the subject (see Œc. 4, 2, and 6, 5), and it is well known that Plato did so also. Socrates speaks as the son of a poor labourer. Xenophon and Plato as men of rank and property.

<sup>2</sup> Mem. ii. 6, 35: καὶ ὅτι ἔγνω-  
κας ἄνδρας ἀρετὴν εἶναι νικᾶν τοὺς  
μὲν φίλους εὖ ποιοῦντα τοὺς δὲ  
ἐχθροὺς κακῶς.

<sup>3</sup> Mem. iii. 9, 8: φθόρον δὲ  
σκοπῶν ὅ τι εἴη, λύπην μὲν τινα,  
ἐξεύρισκεν αὐτὸν ὄντα, οὔτε μέντοι  
τὴν ἐπὶ φίλων ἀτυχίαις οὔτε τὴν  
ἐπ' ἐχθρῶν εὐτυχίαις γιγνομένην.

<sup>4</sup> Crito 49, A. Also Rep. i. 334, B.

<sup>5</sup> Meiner's view (Gesch. der  
Wissenschaft. ii. 456) that So-  
crates considered it allowable to  
do harm (bodily) to enemies, but  
not to injure them in respect of

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Socrates of Xenophon was only speaking from a popular point of view, the fact remains that Xenophon appears to have known nothing of such expressions as those given by Plato. On the other hand, although doubts may be raised as to the strict truth of all that Plato says in the *Crito*, he can hardly be charged with a flagrant deviation from his master's teaching in a dialogue, written (as it probably was) almost immediately after the death of Socrates. That it is possible, cannot be denied, and therefore we must be content to remain in uncertainty as to whether the real principles of Socrates on this subject are more correctly expressed by Xenophon or by Plato.<sup>1</sup>

their true well-being, for which he alleges that Xenophon expressly allows *κακῶς ποιεῖν* while Plato as expressly forbids it, is not altogether satisfactory.

<sup>1</sup> Still less are we justified in asserting—as Hildebrand appears inclined to do ('Xenophont. et Arist. de *Œconomia publica Doctrina*,' part i.) that Socrates was in principle opposed to slavery. If many things which according to Grecian prejudices belonged to slaves were not by

him thought unworthy of a free-man, it by no means follows from this that he disapproved of slavery; and the view that slavery is contrary to nature (mentioned by Aristotle, *Polit.* i. 3) is not attributed to Socrates as its author. Had it belonged to him, it would undoubtedly have been mentioned as his. But the description does not apply to Socrates at all, to whom the distinction between *φύσει* and *νόμῳ* was strange. We ought rather to think of the Cynics.

## CHAPTER VIII.

CONTINUATION. ON NATURE. GOD AND MAN.

ENQUIRIES into nature, we have seen, did not form part of the scheme of Socrates. But, nevertheless, the direction taken by his speculations led him to a peculiar view of nature and its design. Any one who would consider the problem of human life attentively from so many points of view as he did, could not fail to observe that in many ways life bore a relation to the outer world. These relations, when judged by the standard which to Socrates appeared to be the highest type—the standard of what is useful for man—led him to the conviction, that the whole arrangement of nature was subservient to the well-being of the human race, in short that it was good and suited to a purpose.<sup>1</sup> To his mind, all that is good and serves a purpose appeared of necessity to be the work of reason; for just as man cannot do what is useful without intelligence, no more is it possible for what is useful to exist without intelligence.<sup>2</sup> His view of nature, therefore, was essen-

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A. Subor-  
dination of  
means to  
ends in  
nature.

<sup>1</sup> For Socrates, as has been already shown, understands by the argument from analogy the good, what is useful for man.

<sup>2</sup> See Mem. i. 4, 2, in which

is most clearly brought out.



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tially that of a system of means subordinated to ends, but their connection did not appear to him in the light of an inward necessity, by which the minutest bearings of the several parts upon each other might be explained, and the general purposes understood for which they existed and developed themselves; but, on the contrary, it seemed to be purely an accident, everything as a matter of experience, conducing to the good of man as its highest end. How this was brought about was only explained in the same popular manner by an appeal to the regulating power of reason, which, like an artificer, has framed things for purposes which appear to be accidental.

(a) *The superficial character of his way of conceiving the relation of means to ends.*

In the ethics of Socrates, the knowledge which was intended to exercise dominion over human actions was practically reduced to a superficial reflection on the good of particular courses of conduct. In the same way, the knowledge which formed the world could only be explained in his physics in a manner equally superficial. Thus, to show<sup>1</sup> what care has been taken to provide for man's needs he appeals to light, water, fire and air, to the sun shining by day,

Socrates is desirous of convincing friend of the existence of the Gods, and in this view proposes to him the question: Whether more intelligence is not required to produce living beings than to produce paintings like those of Polyclete and Zeuxis? Aristodemus will only allow this conditionally, and, in one special case, εἴπερ γε μὴ τύχη τινὶ ἀλλ' ὑπὸ γνώμης ταῦτα γεγένηται, but he is immediately met

by Socrates with the question: τῶν δὲ ἀτεκμάρτως ἐχόντων οὗτοῦ ἐνεκά ἔστι καὶ τῶν φανερώς ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ ὄντων πότῃ τῆς τύχης, καὶ πότῃ τῆς γνώμης ἔργα κρίνεις; Πρέπει μὲν, he is obliged to confess, τὰ ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ γινόμενα γνώμης εἶναι ἔργα. Compare also Plato, Phædo, 96, A., who is however here immediately describing his own intellectual training. Also Arist. M. Mor. i. 1.

<sup>1</sup> Mem. i. 4; iv. 3.

and the moon and the stars by night, to the heavenly bodies serving for divisions of seasons, to the earth's supplying us with food and other necessities, and to the change of seasons, which prevents excessive heat or cold. He reminds us of the advantages we derive from cattle, from oxen, from pigs, horses, and other animals. To prove the wisdom of the Craftsman who made man,<sup>1</sup> he refers to the organism of the human body, to the structure of the organs of sense, to the erect posture of man, to the priceless skill of his hands. He recognises a proof of a divine Providence in the natural impulse for propagation and self-preservation, in the love for children, in the fear of death. He is never weary of exalting the intellectual advantages of man, his ingenuity, his memory, his intelligence, his language, his religious disposition. He considers it incredible that a belief in God and in Providence should be naturally inborn in all men, and have propagated itself from time immemorial, not only clinging to individuals in the vigour of their age, but to whole nations and communities, unless it were really true. He appeals also to special revelations, which are vouchsafed to men for their good, either by prophecy or prognostications—all of which may appear unscientific arguments, but became nevertheless of very great importance for philosophy in the sequel.

Notwithstanding all their defects, the moral

<sup>1</sup> In Mem. i. 4, 12, a remark is found indicative of the popular character of these general considerations: τὸ δὲ καὶ τὰς τῶν ἀφροδισίων ἡδονὰς τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις ζώοις δοῦναι περιγράφαντας τοῦ ἔτους χρόνον, ἡμῖν δὲ συνεχῶς μέχρι γήρως ταῦτα παρέχειν;

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(b) *The value of this theory for natural philosophy.*

enquiries of Socrates established a scientific doctrine of morals; notwithstanding his popular treatment, the theory of the adaptation of means to ends introduced that ideal method of viewing nature, which ever after reigned supreme in the natural philosophy of the Greeks, and together with all its attendant abuses proved itself of so much value for the empirical study of nature. It would appear, indeed, that he was hardly aware how great a service he was rendering to the science of nature, having only considered the fitness of means to ends in the world, in the interest of piety and morals. At the same time, it may be observed how closely his view of nature was connected with the theory that knowledge applies only to conceptions, and how on the other hand, the shortcomings of that view were due to the undeveloped character of his intellectual principles.

B. *God and the worship of God.*

(a) *Popular use of the term Gods.*

If, in the next place, we ask what was the notion which Socrates formed to himself of the reason that created the world, the reply is, that he mostly speaks of Gods in a popular way as many,<sup>1</sup> meaning by that, the Gods of the popular faith.<sup>2</sup> But he also clearly perceived the oneness of God in contrast with this multiplicity, as is not uncommonly met with in the case of other Greeks:<sup>3</sup> in one passage he even distinguishes the creator and ruler of the universe from the rest of the Gods.<sup>4</sup> Do we not

<sup>1</sup> Mem. i. 1, 19; 3, 3; 4, 11; iv. 3, 3.

<sup>2</sup> Mem. iv. 3, 16.

<sup>3</sup> Mem. i. 4, 5; 7, 17: ὁ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ποιῶν ἀνθρώπους, — σοφοῦ

τινος δημιουργοῦ καὶ φιλοζώου — τὸν τοῦ θεοῦ ὀφθαλμόν, τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ φρόνησιν.

<sup>4</sup> Mem. iv. 3, 13. The gods are invisible; οἳ τε γὰρ ἄλλοι

recognise here, that union of polytheism and monotheism, which lay so ready at hand to a Greek, and which was brought about by reducing the many Gods of the popular faith to the rank of vassals of One Supreme God?

In as far as a consideration of the world, and its reasonable arrangement conducted Socrates to the notion of One Supreme Being, the mode in which he conceived this Being was like that of Heraclitus and Anaxagoras: God appeared as Reason ruling the world, and holding the same relation to the world that the soul does to the body.<sup>1</sup> Hence came his high and pure ideas of God as a being invisible, all-wise, all-powerful, present everywhere. As the soul, without being visible, visibly affects the body, so God affects the world. As the soul exercises unlimited dominion over the small portion of the world which belongs to it—its individual body—so God exercises dominion

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(b) *God  
conceived  
as the Rea-  
son of the  
world.*

ἡμῖν τὰ ἀγαθὰ διδόντες οὐδὲν τοιούτων εἰς τοῦμφανὲς ἰόντες διδόν-  
σιν, καὶ ὁ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον συντάτ-  
των τε καὶ συνέχων, ἐν ᾧ πάντα  
καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ ἐστί, καὶ αἰὲ μὲν  
χρωμένοις ἀτριβῇ τε καὶ ὑγιᾷ  
καὶ ἀγήρατον παρέχων, θάπτον  
δὲ νοήματος ἀναμαρτήτως ὑπηρε-  
τοῦντα, οὗτος τὰ μέγιστα μὲν  
πράττων ὁράται, τάδε δὲ οἰκονο-  
μῶν ἀόρατος ἡμῖν ἐστίν. Krische's  
argument (Forsch. 220) to prove  
that this language is spurious,  
although on his own showing it  
was known to Phædrus, Cicero,  
and the writer of the treatise on  
the world, appears inconclusive.

εἶναι . . . καὶ τάδε τὰ ὑπερμεγέθη  
καὶ πλῆθος ἅπειρα (the elements,  
or generally, the parts of the  
world) δι' ἀφροσύνην τινὰ οὕτως  
οἶει εὐτάκτως ἔχειν; 17: κατάμαθε  
ὅτι καὶ ὁ σὸς νοῦς ἐνῶν τὸ σὸν  
σῶμα ὅπως βούλεται μεταχειρί-  
ζεται· οἶεσθαι οὖν χρή καὶ τὴν ἐν  
τῷ παντὶ φρόνησιν τὰ πάντα ὅπως  
ἂν αὐτῇ ἡδὺ ᾖ, οὕτω τίθεσθαι· καὶ  
μὴ τὸ σὸν μὲν ὅμμα δύνασθαι ἐπὶ  
πολλὰ στάδια ἐξικνεῖσθαι, τὸν δὲ  
τοῦ θεοῦ ὀφθαλμὸν ἀδύνατον εἶναι  
ἅμα πάντα ὁρᾶν· μηδὲ, τὴν σὴν  
μὲν ψυχὴν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐνθάδε καὶ  
περὶ τῶν ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ καὶ Σικελίᾳ  
δύνασθαι φροντίζειν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ  
θεοῦ φρόνησιν μὴ ἰκανὴν εἶναι ἅμα  
πάντων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι.

<sup>1</sup> Mem. i. 4, 8: σὺ δὲ σαυτὸν  
φρόνιμον τι δοκεῖς ἔχειν, ἄλλοθι  
δὲ οὐδαμοῦ οὐδὲν οἶει φρόνιμον



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over the whole world. As the soul is present in all parts of its body, so God is in the Universe. And if the soul, notwithstanding the limitations by which it is confined, can perceive what is distant, and have thoughts of the most varied kinds, surely the knowledge and care of God must be able to embrace the whole universe at once.<sup>1</sup>

(c) *The  
fore-  
thought  
of God.*

The providential care of God had been already assumed<sup>2</sup> as a matter of belief, in arguing for His existence from the relation of means to ends. It appeared to be most readily explained by considering the analogous case of the care which the human soul exercises over the body. Socrates thought to discern in oracles a special proof of the divine care:<sup>3</sup> by them the most important things, which could not otherwise be known, were revealed by God to man. He, therefore, considered it equally foolish to despise oracles, or to consult them in cases capable of being solved by our own reflection.<sup>4</sup> It followed, as a matter of course, that prayer, sacrifice, and obedience<sup>5</sup> formed part of the worship of God.

(d) *His  
pure  
maxims  
for the  
worship of  
God.*

As to the form and manner of worship, he desired every one to follow the custom of his nation, but at the same time he laid down those purer maxims which corresponded to his own idea of God. He

<sup>1</sup> Compare the words in Mem. i. 4, 18: If you apply to the Gods for prophecy, γνώση τὸ θεῖον ὅτι τοσοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν, ὥσθ' ἅμα πάντα ὁρᾶν καὶ πάντα ἀκούειν καὶ πανταχοῦ παρῆναι, καὶ ἅμα πάντων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι· and the words in iv. 3, 12: ὅτι δέ γε

ἀληθῆ λέγω . . . γνώση, ἂν μὴ ἀναμένῃς, ἕως ἂν τὰς μορφὰς τῶν θεῶν ἴδῃς· also i. 1, 19.

<sup>2</sup> Mem. iv. 3; i. 4, 6 and 11.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. iv. 3, 12; i. 4, 14.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid. i. 1, 6.

<sup>5</sup> Compare Mem. iv. 3, 14; ii. 2, 14.



advised men not to pray for special, and least of all for external goods, but only to ask for what is generally good: for who but God knows what is advantageous for man, or knows it so fully? And, with regard to sacrifices, he declared that the greatness of the sacrifice is of no consequence compared with the spirit of him who sacrifices, and that the more pious a man is, the more acceptable will his offering be, so long as it is proportionate to his means.<sup>1</sup> He abstained from theological speculations on principle, desiring to lead his fellow men to piety far more than to inquire into the nature of God. This will explain why he never felt the need of uniting the various parts of his religious belief into one harmonious conception, so as to form a perfectly consistent picture, and thus eliminate the contradictory elements, which it may easily be shown to contain.<sup>2</sup>

A certain divine element Socrates thought to discern within the soul of man,<sup>3</sup> a view which had been already held by others before him. This, perhaps, led him to the belief in immediate revelations of God to the human soul, such as he thought that he himself enjoyed. As a theory, this must have

*C. Dignity  
of man.  
His im-  
mortality.*

<sup>1</sup> Mem. i. 3, 2; iv. 3, 17.

<sup>2</sup> We have all the less reason for supposing with Denis (Histoire des Théories et des Idées morales dans l'Antiquité, Paris et Strasb. 1856, i. 79), that Socrates, like Antisthenes, spared polytheism from regard to the needs of the masses, whilst he believed in only

one God. This assumption would belie not only the definite and repeated assertions of Xenophon, but also Socrates' unflinching love of truth.

<sup>3</sup> Mem. iv. 3, 14: ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀνθρώπου γε ψυχῇ, εἴπερ τι καὶ ἄλλο τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων, τοῦ θεοῦ μετέχει.

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been welcome to a philosopher who devoted his attention closely to the moral and spiritual nature of man, but it does not appear that Socrates ever attempted to explain it philosophically. Just as little did he give a scientific proof of the immortality of the soul, although as a belief he was disposed to accept it, partly in consequence of his high opinion of the dignity of man, and partly, too, on the ground of expediency.<sup>1</sup> At the same time, he expressed himself with the greatest doubt and caution on the subject in Plato's *Apology*,<sup>2</sup> on an occasion when the withholding of a conviction would least have been expected.<sup>3</sup> The expressions, however, of the dying Cyrus in Xenophon,<sup>4</sup> agree so well with the mind of Socrates, that we are fain to suppose that he considered the existence of the soul after death to be probable, although he did not pretend to any certain knowledge on the point. The future life of the soul was accepted by him as an article of faith, the scientific grounds of which belonged to those problems which surpass the powers of the human mind.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Compare Hermann in Marburger Lectionskatalog, 1835-6, Plat. 684.

<sup>2</sup> 40, C.; after his condemnation.

<sup>3</sup> Death is either an eternal sleep, or a transition to a new life, but in neither case is it an evil.

<sup>4</sup> *Cyrop.* viii. 7, 19. Several reasons are first adduced in favour of immortality, but they need to be greatly strengthened to be anything like rigid proofs. In conclusion, the possibility of

the soul's dying with the body is left an open question, but in either case death is stated to be the end of all evils.

<sup>5</sup> The above description of the philosophy of Socrates rests on the exclusive authority of Xenophon, Plato and Aristotle. What is stated by later writers is in a great measure drawn from these sources, and whenever it goes beyond them, there is no guarantee for its accuracy. It is, however, possible that some genuine utterances may have been preserved in

the writings of Æschines and others, which are omitted by our authorities. Such, for instance, are the statements of Cleanthes quoted by Clement (Stroma. ii. 417, D.), and repeated by Cicero (Off. iii. 3, 11), that Socrates taught the identity of justice and happiness, and pronounced a curse on the man who first made a distinction between them: the statements in Cic. Off. ii. 12, 43\* (taken from Xen. Mem. ii. 6, 39; conf. Cyrop. i. 6, 22); in Seneca, Epist. 28, 2; 104, 7 (travelling is of no good to fools); 71, 16 (truth and virtue are identical); in Plut. Ed. Pu. c. 7, on education (the passage in c. 9, is an inaccurate reference to Plato, Gorg. 470, D.); in Ders. Cons. ad Apoll. c. 9, that if all sufferings had to be equally divided, every one would gladly preserve his own; in Ders. Conj. Præc. c. 25, on the moral use of the looking glass; in Ders. Ser. Num. Vind. c. 5, deprecating anger; in Demet. Byz. quoted by Diog. ii. 21, (Gell. N. A. xiv. 6, 5), that philosophy ought to be confined to ὁ, τι τοι ἐν μεγάροις, κακὸν τ' ἀγαθὸν τε τέτυκται; in Diog. ii.

30, blaming the sophistry of Euclid; in Diog. ii. 31 (undoubtedly from a writing of a Cynic or Stoic) that intelligence is the only good, ignorance the only evil, and that riches and noble birth do more harm than good; in Diog. ii. 32, that to marry or to abstain from marriage is equally bad; in Gell. xix. 2, 7, that most men live to eat, whilst he eats to live; in Stob. Ekl. i. 54, giving a definition of God; Ibid. ii. 356, that self-restraint is the best form of government; in Teles. apud Stob. Floril. 40, 8, blaming the Athenians for banishing their best, and honouring their worst men. Stobæus in his Florilegium mentions a large number purporting to come from Socrates, but most of them are colourless, or run to epigrammatic points, which are a poor substitute for what is truly Socratic; and altogether their number makes them very suspected. Probably they were taken from a collection of proverbs which some later writer published under the name of Socratic proverbs.

## CHAPTER IX.

RETROSPECT. XENOPHON AND PLATO. SOCRATES  
AND THE SOPHISTS.

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*A. Truth-  
fulness of  
Xenophon's  
descrip-  
tion.*

IF from the point now reached we return to our former enquiry, and ask to which of his biographers we must look for a historically accurate account of Socrates and his teaching, we shall be obliged to admit, that not one of them affords us such a guarantee for the accuracy of his description, as any original writings or literal reports of the utterances of the great teacher. But so much is evident, that the personal character of Socrates, as portrayed by both Xenophon or Plato, is in all essential points, one and the same. Their descriptions mutually supplement each other on a few points, and contradict each other in none. The supplementary portions may, therefore, be referred to a common picture, which was before the eyes of both. It will also be found that the philosophy of Socrates as given by Plato and Aristotle is not different from it as given by Xenophon, provided those parts are alone considered in the writings of Plato which undoubtedly belong to Socrates, and in Xenophon a distinction is made between the underlying thought

*(a) Xeno-  
phon's view  
in har-  
mony with  
that of  
Plato and  
Aristotle.*

and the commonplace language in which it is expressed. In Xenophon, Socrates may be heard expressing the opinion that true knowledge is the highest object, and that this knowledge consists in a knowledge of conceptions only. In Xenophon may be observed all the characteristics of that method by which Socrates strove to produce knowledge. By Xenophon virtue is reduced to knowledge, and this position is supported by the same arguments, and is made to lead to the same results, as in Aristotle and Plato. In short, all the leading features of the philosophy of Socrates are preserved by Xenophon, granting at the same time that he was not fully aware of the deeper meaning of many a saying, and therefore failed to reproduce it as vividly as it deserved. Here and there, too, a common-place expression occurs in the writings of Xenophon instead of a philosophical one. For instance, instead of saying, 'All virtue is knowledge,' he substitutes with less accuracy, 'All virtue is wisdom.' If, again, the defects of the Socratic philosophy, the popular and prosaic way in which subjects are treated, the want of system, the utilitarian basis of moral teaching, appear more prominently in Xenophon than in Plato and Aristotle, this need not surprise us, when we consider the brevity with which Aristotle speaks of Socrates, and the extent to which Plato develops both the substance and the form of the Socratic teaching. On the other hand, Xenophon's description is confirmed partly by individual admissions of Plato, and partly by its



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inward truth and conformity to that picture which we must make for ourselves of the first appearance of the new principle in Socrates. All that can be conceded to the detractors of Xenophon is, that he did not understand the philosophical importance of his teacher, and therefore it falls into the background in his picture. To supplement this deficiency we must be content to draw from Plato and Aristotle. It cannot, however, be allowed that Xenophon has in any respect given a false account of Socrates, or that it is impossible to gather from his description the true character and importance of the doctrine of his master.

(b) *Schleiermacher's objection answered.*

It may be said that this estimate of Xenophon is refuted by the place which Socrates is known to have held in history. 'If,' as Schleiermacher observes,<sup>1</sup> 'Socrates had done nothing but discourse in a purer and loftier strain on subjects within those limits which are never passed in the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon, it would be impossible to understand how the charm of his speech could have emptied the marketplace and the workshops, the public walks and the schools, for so many years; how he could have satisfied so long Alcibiades and Critias, Plato and Euclid; how he could have played the part assigned to him in the dialogues of Plato; in short, how he could have been the founder and type of the philosophy of Athens.' But it is Plato himself who bears a valuable testimony to the accuracy of Xenophon's description. To what does Alcibiades refer, when

<sup>1</sup> Werke, iii. 2, 295.

anxious to bring out the higher fascination concealed in the strange language of Socrates, and under his Silenus-like appearance? What is implied in his admirable description of the impression produced on him by Socrates?<sup>1</sup> What in his view had been the cause of the revolutionary change in the inner life of Greece? What but the moral considerations which form the subject of the Socratic dialogues in Xenophon! These and these only are dwelt upon by Socrates in his Apology,<sup>2</sup> in speaking of his higher calling, and his services to his country: it is his business to exhort others to virtue; and if he considers his conversation attractive because of its critical attempts,<sup>3</sup> he is only referring to a process of which many examples are to be found in Xenophon, that of con-

<sup>1</sup> Symp. 215, E.: ὅταν γὰρ ἀκούω [Σωκράτους] πολὺ μοι μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν κορυβαντιῶντων ἢ τε καρδία πηδᾷ καὶ δάκρυα ἐκχεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων τῶν τούτου. ὁρῶ δὲ καὶ ἄλλους παμπόλλους τὰ αὐτὰ πάσχοντας: this was not the case with other speakers, οὐδὲ τεθορύβητό μου ἡ ψυχὴ οὐδ' ἡγανάκτει ὥς ἀνδραποδωδῶς διακειμένον, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τούτου τοῦ Μαρσύα πολλάκις δὴ οὕτω διετέθη, ὥστε μοι δοῆσαι μὴ βιωτὸν εἶναι ἔχοντι ὥς ἔχω . . . ἀναγκάζει γάρ με ὁμολογεῖν ὅτι πολλοῦ ἐνδεὴς ὢν αὐτὸς ἔτι ἑμαυτοῦ μὲν ἀμελῶ τὰ δ' Ἀθηναίων πράττω . . . πέπονθα δὲ πρὸς τοῦτον μόνον ἀνθρώπων, ὃ οὐκ ἂν τις οἶοιτο ἐν ἑμοὶ ἐνείναι, τὸ αἰσχύνεσθαι ὄντινον . . . δραπετεύω οὖν αὐτὸν καὶ φεύγω, καὶ ὅταν ἴδω αἰσχύνομαι τὰ ὁμολογημένα· καὶ πολλάκις μὲν ἡδέως ἂν ἴδοιμι αὐτὸν μὴ ὄντα ἐν ἀνθρώποις· εἰ δ' αὖ τοῦτο γένοιτο, εὖ οἶδα ὅτι πολλὸν

μεῖζον ἂν ἀχθοίμην, ὥστε οὐκ ἔχω, ὅ τι χρῆσθαι τούτῳ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ. Ib. 221, D.: καὶ οἱ λόγοι αὐτοῦ ὁμοιότατοι εἰσι τοῖς Σειληνοῖς τοῖς διοιγομένοις . . . διοιγομένους δὲ ἰδὼν αὖ τις καὶ ἐντὸς αὐτῶν γιγνόμενος πρῶτον μὲν νοῦν ἔχοντας ἔνδον μόνους εὐρήσει τῶν λόγων, ἔπειτα θειοτάτους καὶ πλεῖστ' ἀγάματ' ἀρετῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχοντας, καὶ ἐπὶ πλείστον τείνοντας, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐπὶ πᾶν ὅσον προσήκει σκοπεῖν τῷ μέλλοντι καλῷ κἀγαθῷ ἔσεσθαι.

<sup>2</sup> 29, B.; 38, A.; 41, E.

<sup>3</sup> Apol. 23, C.: πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οἱ νέοι μοι ἐπακολουθοῦντες οἷς μάλιστα σχολή ἐστίν οἱ τῶν πλουσιωτάτων αὐτόματοι χαίρουσιν ἀκούοντες ἐξεταζομένων τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ αὐτοὶ πολλάκις ἐμὲ μιμοῦνται εἰτα ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἄλλους ἐξετάζειν. An example of such an enquiry is to be found in the conversation of Alcibiades with Pericles, Mem. i. 1, 40.

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vincing people of ignorance in the affairs of their calling.

*B. Importance of the Socratic teaching for the age in which he lived.*

*(a) Great importance attaches to his method.*

The effect produced by the discourses of Socrates does not surprise us, even if they were only of the kind described by Xenophon. It is true, that as he reproduces them, they may often appear trivial and tedious; and with reference to the result attained in any particular case, they may really be so. The forger of armour is required to adapt the shield to the person of him who is to wear it:<sup>1</sup> the care of the body is said to be attended with many advantages:<sup>2</sup> friends, it is argued, must be secured by kindness and attention:<sup>3</sup> these, and such like maxims, which are often widely expanded by Socrates, contain for us nothing new, nor can they have appeared as novelties to his cotemporaries. The new and important element in these enquiries does not consist in their meaning, but in their method, in the fact that what was formerly presupposed without enquiry, and unconsciously admitted, was now consciously recognised by thought. Any too minute or pedantic application of this method on the part of Socrates would not probably have given the same offence to his cotemporaries as it would to us, who are not learning for the first time the art of thinking freely, or of being independent of the authority of lifeless customs.<sup>4</sup> Did not the enquiries of the Sophists contain much less, and did not the Sophists, not-

<sup>1</sup> Mem. iii. 10, 9.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. iii. 12, 4.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. ii. 10, 6, 9.

<sup>4</sup> Comp. Hegel, Gesch. d. Phil. ii. 59.

withstanding their being so much engaged with empty cavils, impart an almost electrical shock to their age, simply and solely because a new power, and a new method of reflection—travesty of thought as it was—had dawned upon the Greek mind? It would, therefore, be possible to understand in some degree the immediate influence of Socrates on his cotemporaries, even if he had confined himself to those unimportant topics, upon which so many of his dialogues exclusively turn.

But these unimportant topics hold a subordinate position even according to Xenophon. The leading object of Socrates, was to institute a real enquiry into the necessity of knowledge, into the nature of morality, into the conceptions of the various virtues, and to gain a thorough insight into man's moral and intellectual nature. This object he pursued by giving practical directions for the formation of conceptions, and by asking critical questions which obliged those who replied, to consider what their notions implied, and at what their actions aimed. Can we wonder that such enquiries should have produced a deep impression on the cotemporaries of Socrates, and an entire change in the Greek mode of thought, such as the testimony of history records? or, that a keener thinker anticipated behind those apparently commonplace and unimportant expressions of Socrates, which his biographers unanimously record, the sight of a newly discovered world? It was reserved for Plato and Aristotle to conquer this new world, but Socrates was the first to discover it, and to open

*(b) His leading object a deeply interesting one.*

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the way to it for others. Fully as we may recognise the shortcomings of his endeavours, and the limits which his individual nature imposed on him, we shall still find enough to make us honour him as the originator of a philosophy of conceptions, as a reformer of method, and as the first founder of a scientific doctrine of morals.

C. *Its relation to the teaching of the Sophists.*

To understand the relation of Socrates to the Sophists, we must consider the one-sided and unsatisfactory parts of his method as well as its more perfect and salient features. During the last thirty years, these points have been examined with the most opposite results. Before that time all critics seemed to agree in accepting Plato's view, and making Socrates the severe opponent of the Sophists. Hegel first gave currency to the contrary opinion, assigning to both Socrates and the Sophists the same common ground—an introspective and personal tendency—and Grote<sup>1</sup> has more recently contradicted the traditional notion of the antithesis between Socrates and the Sophists, though in a somewhat different way. If by a Sophist, he argues, taking the word in its historical meaning, we are to understand a public teacher, educating youth for practical life, Socrates is himself the true type of a Sophist. If on the other hand the term is used to characterise the tone and teaching of a school, it is an abuse to call this Sophistry, or to group together under one class all

<sup>1</sup> Hist. of Greece, viii. 479.



the different individuals who appeared as Sophists. The Sophists were not a sect or a school, but a profession, men of the most varied views, for the most part extremely deserving and excellent persons, with whose views we have not the least right to be offended. Hegel and his followers attacked the ordinary view of the relation of Socrates to the Sophists, because Socrates, in one respect, entirely agreed with the Sophists. Grote attacks it for the very opposite reason, because the most distinguished of the so-called Sophists agreed with Socrates.

Our previous enquiries will have shown, that much may be said in favour of either view, but that neither is altogether correct. Grote is right in saying that Sophist means in the first place a wise man, and secondly, one who imparts instruction in practical matters. But this need not prevent us from giving to the word the wider meaning which subsequent use established, and taking it to designate the peculiarities of a certain class of men. These peculiarities are not altogether expressed in the character of a public teacher of virtue—a point which Grote keeps exclusively in view. Still there is a common type belonging to that whole group of men whom we call Sophists, which may be recognised amid individual divergencies, if they only are referred to their source in the mind. The doubts of men such as Protagoras, Gorgias, and Euthydemus, the quibbling which characterised most, the display of words which was practised by all the Sophists, the show of technicalities, the pretensions to knowledge

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accompanied by an avowed indifference to the ends which knowledge should be made to serve;<sup>1</sup> all these peculiarities have a tendency in the same direction—to a partial culture of the understanding, to an indifference to real truth, and an aiming only at personal skill. Assuming then that the moral teaching of the older Sophists did not differ from the opinions and practices current in Greece at the time, the questionable principles of their successors were a natural expansion of the germ which their doubts, their subtleties, and their parade of words had planted.

From this it will appear that it is not consistent with history to contrast Socrates with the Sophists, in the same sense that sound and unsound philosophy

<sup>1</sup> Compare the promise of Protagoras to make the weaker side appear the stronger. Grote, viii. 499, thinks to avoid the offensiveness of this principle by remarking, that the same principle has been objected to in Isocrates and others, and even in Socrates. But this is changing the ground. It was not attributed to Protagoras falsely, but he avowed it himself, and explained it by saying that a teacher of eloquence could not meddle with the ends for which his art was employed, but must help towards the attainment even of wicked ends. Compare with this the opposite view taken of Rhetoric by Plato in the *Gorgias* and *Phædrus*, and by Aristotle, *Rhet.* i. 1. Now it is clear that a teacher of rhetoric cannot be answerable for the abuse of his

art; but it is one thing to teach an art, which may be abused, another thing to teach the art how to abuse it. An apothecary could more easily commit an act of poisoning, or a locksmith of housebreaking, than other people; but both would be justly censured if they professed to teach their pupils the art of poisoning or of housebreaking respectively. Grote also appeals to the fact that a lawyer is not blamed for helping the wrong side as well as the right side with his eloquence. But this is not altogether true. A lawyer is bound to say the best that can be said for a criminal, but if he were to make it his profession always to help the wrong side, he would be rightly called a perverter of justice.

are contrasted, or good and evil. In Xenophon, Socrates does not appear in such marked contradistinction to the Sophists as in Plato,<sup>1</sup> and in Plato the antithesis is not nearly so great as it is made by several modern writers.<sup>2</sup> But at the same time Socrates cannot be brought into so close a connection with the Sophists as Grote supposes; Hegel's view, that he was substantially like them, has, however, provoked a greater opposition than it deserves. Both Hegel and Grote do not deny that the sophistical notion of personal truth differed widely from that of Socrates, and neither they nor their opponents can deny that the Sophists were the first to draw philosophy away from nature to morals and the study of the mind—in short, to transplant thought to a relative soil. The whole question, therefore, really resolves itself into this:—Must we say that Socrates and the Sophists *resembled* one another, both taking personal truth as their ground, but differing in their views of personal truth? or that they *differed*, the nature of their treatment being a different one, whilst they agreed in making it relative? Or to put the question in another shape:—There being points both of agreement and difference between them, which of the two is the more important and decisive characteristic? The reply which we must here give, is that the difference far exceeded the resemblance. The Sophists failed in the

<sup>1</sup> Compare Xen. Mem. iv. 4. D.; 164, D.; 165, E.; Rep. i. 354,

<sup>2</sup> Proofs in Protagoras and A.; vi. 498, C.  
Gorgias, Thætet. 151, D.; 162,

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very thing which is the root of the philosophical greatness of Socrates—the striving after a real and universally valid knowledge, and after a method by which it could be attained. They could call in question all that had been previously believed, but they could not mark out a new and more certain road to truth. They may be like Socrates in neglecting the study of nature, and making the culture which applies to practical life their object, but this culture has with them a different character, and a different meaning to what it bears with Socrates. The ultimate end of their instruction is a superficial skill, subservient to individual caprice, all independent truth having been long since abandoned by them. With Socrates, on the contrary, the acquisition of truth is the ultimate end, in which alone is to be found a rule for the guidance of the individual. Hence in its further expansion the Sophistic teaching could not fail to separate from the scientific culture which preceeded it, and indeed from every kind of science. If it had succeeded in gaining undisputed sway, it would have sounded the death note of Greek philosophy. Socrates alone bore in himself the germ of a new life for thought. Socrates alone became by his philosophical principles the reformer of philosophy.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Hermann even allows this in saying (Plato, i. 232) that the importance of Socrates for the history of philosophy must be gathered far more from his personal opposition to the Sophists than from his general resemblance to them. The Sophists differed

from the wisdom of Socrates in their want of a fruit-bearing germ. But this admission is hardly consistent with making the second period of philosophy commence with the Sophists instead of with Socrates.

## CHAPTER X.

## THE DEATH OF SOCRATES.

WE are now for the first time in a position to pass judgment on the circumstances attending the tragic end of Socrates. The historical events which led to his death are well known. A whole lifetime had been spent at Athens, during which Socrates had been attacked frequently,<sup>1</sup> although never judicially,<sup>2</sup> when in the year 399 B.C.,<sup>3</sup> an accusation was preferred against him, charging him with unfaithfulness to the religion of his country, with introducing new Gods, and with exercising a harmful influence on youth.<sup>4</sup> The chief accuser,<sup>5</sup> was Meletus,<sup>6</sup> who was

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A. *Details of the accusation, his defence, sentence, and death.*  
(a) *The accusation.*

<sup>1</sup> Compare besides the Clouds of Aristophanes, Xen. Mem. i. 2, 31; iv. 4, 3; Plato, Apol. 32, C.; 22, E.

<sup>2</sup> Plato, Apol. 17, D.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 49.

<sup>4</sup> The accusation, according to Favorinus in Diog. ii. 40, Xen. Mem. (Begin), was: *τάδε ἐγράψατο καὶ ἀνταμύσατο Μέλητος Μελήτου Πιπθὲς Σωκράτει Σωφρονίσκου Ἀλωπεκῆθεν· ἄδικεῖ Σωκράτης, οὗς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἕτερα δὲ καὶνὰ δαιμόνια εἰσηγῆμενος· ἄδικεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νεοὺς διαφθεῖρων· τίμημα θάνατος.*

<sup>5</sup> See Plato, Apol. 19, B.; 24, B.; 28, A.; Euthyphro, 2, B.

Max. Tyr. ix. 2, proves nothing against this, as Hermann has shown, *De Socratis Accusatoribus*.

<sup>6</sup> For the way in which this name is written, instead of Μέλitos, as was formerly the custom, see Hermann. It appears by a comparison of various passages, that the accuser of Socrates is neither the politician, as Forchhammer makes him to be, nor the opponent of Andocides, with whom others have identified him, nor again the poet mentioned by Aristophanes (*Frogs*, 1302), but some younger man, perhaps the son of the poet.



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assisted by Anytus, one of the leaders and re-introducers of the Athenian democracy,<sup>1</sup> and by Lyco,<sup>2</sup> who is otherwise unknown. The friends of Socrates appear at first to have considered his condemnation to be an impossibility,<sup>3</sup> but he was under no delusion himself about the danger which threatened him.<sup>4</sup> Concern or anxiety, however, for his own defence was contrary to the nature of Socrates.<sup>5</sup> Not only did he

<sup>1</sup> Further particulars about him are given by Forchhammer, 79; and Hermann, 9. They are gathered from Plato, *Meno*, 90, A.; Schol. in *Plat. Apol.* 18, B.; *Lysias* adv. Dand. 8; adv. Agorat. 78; *Isoc.* adv. *Callim.* 23; *Plut.* *Herod. malign.* 26, 6; *Coriol.* c. 14; Schol. in *Æschin.* adv. *Tim.* § 87; *Diod.* xiii. 64. He is mentioned by *Xenoph.* *Hell.* ii. 3, 42, 44, as well as by *Isocrates*, as a leader of the Democratic party, together with *Thrasybulus*.

<sup>2</sup> For the various conjectures about him consult Hermann, p. 12. Besides the above-named persons a certain *Polyeuctus*, according to *Favorinus* in *Diog.* ii. 38, took part in assisting the accuser. Probably *Ἄνυτος* ought to be written in this passage instead of *Πολύευτος*, and in the following passage *Πολύευτος* instead of *Ἄνυτος*, *Πολύευτος* being here probably a transcriber's mistake for *Πολυκράτης*. But the words as they stand must be incorrect. The celebrated orator *Polycrates* is said to have composed the speech of Anytus, and it is proved beyond doubt by *Isocr.* *Bus.* 4; *Ælian*, V. H. xi. 10, that he drew up an indictment of Socrates. But it is also clear from *Favorinus*, that his indictment was not used at the

trial. Indeed it would appear from *Favorinus* that it was not written till some time after the death of Socrates.

<sup>3</sup> This is proved by the *Euthyphro*, if this dialogue, as *Steinhart* supposes, was hastily penned after the beginning of the trial, its object being to prove that Socrates, though accused of impiety, had a deeper piety and a keener appreciation of the nature of piety, than one who had incurred ridicule by his extravagances, but had nevertheless brought himself into the odour of sanctity. The treatment of the question is too light and satirical for the dialogue to belong to a time when the full seriousness of his position was felt.

<sup>4</sup> *Comp.* *Xen. Mem.* iv. 8, 6; *Plato, Apol.* 19, A.; 24, A.; 28, A.; 36, A.

<sup>5</sup> In *Xen. Mem.* iv. 8, 5, Socrates says that when he wished to think about his defence, his daimonium opposed him; and according to *Diog.* ii. 40; *Cic. de Orat.* i. 54; *Quintil. Inst.* ii. 15, 30; xi. 1, 11; *Val. Max.* vi. 4, 2; *Stob. Floril.* 7, 56, he declined a speech which *Lysias* offered him. It is asserted by *Plato, Apol.* 17, B., that he spoke without preparation.

consider it an unworthy and wrongful act to attempt anything except by simple truth, but more than that, it was impossible for him to forget his own peculiarities, and to make use of an artificial eloquence which went against his nature. But with the most perfect confidence, he could leave the issue in the hands of God, convinced that all would be for the best—a conviction which grew stronger and stronger, the more he became familiar with the idea that death would bring him more good than life, and that an unjust condemnation would only save him from the painful weaknesses of age, and leave his fair name unsullied.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Of the motives of Socrates the above seems to follow with certainty from passages in Plato, *Apol.* 17, B.; 19, A.; 29, A.; 30, C.; 34, C., and *Xen. Mem.* iv. 8, 4–10. Cousin and Grote, however, give him credit for a great deal more than can be reconciled with the testimony of history, or with the rest of his character. Cousin (*Œuvres de Platon*, i. 58), seems to think that Socrates was aware that he must perish in the conflict with his age, but he forgets that the explanation given in Plato's *Apology*, 29, B., is only a conditional one, and that the passage in that treatise 37, C., was written after the judicial sentence. Even Grote appears to go too far in asserting in his excellent description of the trial (viii. 654), that Socrates was hardly anxious to be acquitted, and that his speech was addressed far more to posterity than to his judges. History only warrants the belief, that with magnanimous devotion to his cause Socrates was indifferent to the result of his words, and endeavoured from the first to reconcile himself to a probably unfavourable result. It does not, however, follow, that he was anxious to be condemned; nor have we reason to suppose so, since he could have wished for nothing which he considered to be wrong, and his modesty kept him uncertain as to what was the best for himself. See *Apol.* 19, A.; 29, A.; 30, D.; 35, D. We cannot therefore believe with Grote that Socrates had well considered his line of defence, and chosen it with a full consciousness of the result; that in his conduct before the court he was actuated only by a wish to display his personal greatness and the greatness of his mission in the most emphatic manner; and that by departing this life when at the summit of his greatness, he desired to give a lesson to youth the most impressive which it was

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X.(b) *Socrates' defence of himself.*

Such was the mental attitude, in which he pronounced his defence.<sup>1</sup> The language is not that of a criminal, who only wishes to save his life, but that of an impartial arbiter, who would dispel erroneous

in the power of man to give. To presuppose such calculation on the part of Socrates is not only contradictory to the statement that he uttered his defence without preparation, but it appears to be opposed to the picture which we are accustomed to see of his character. In that picture, as far as it goes, his conduct does not appear to be a work of calculation, but a thing of immediate conviction, a consequence of that uprightness of character which would not allow him to go one step beyond his principles. His principles, however, did not allow him to consider results, since he could not know what result would be beneficial to him. It was his business to speak the truth alone, and to despise anything like corrupting the judges by eloquence. This may appear a narrow-minded view, but no other course of conduct would so well have corresponded with the bearing and character of Socrates; and herein consists his greatness, that he chose what was in harmony with himself in the face of extreme danger, with classic composure and unruffled brow.

<sup>1</sup> We possess two accounts of the speech of Socrates before his judges, a shorter one in Xenophon and a longer one in Plato's Apology. Xenophon's Apology is certainly spurious, and with it any value attaching to the testimony of Hermogenes, to whom the compiler professes to be in-

debted for his information, is lost. In reference to Plato's, the current view seems well established, that this Apology is not a mere creation of his own, but that in all substantial points, it faithfully records what Socrates said, and the attempt of Georgii to prove the contrary will not stand. Georgii complains that in the Socrates of Plato that *μεγαληγορία* is wanting, which Xenophon commends in him—a judgment with which few will agree, and which the writer of the Apology attributed to Xenophon did not follow. He also considers the sophism with which the charge of atheism was met, improbable in the mouth of Socrates, though it may just as likely have come from him as from one of his disciples. He doubts whether Socrates could have maintained a composure so perfect; although all that we know of Socrates shows unruffled calm as a main trait in his character. He sees in the prominent features of that character a diplomatic calculation, which others will look for in vain. He considers it incredible that Socrates should have begun with a studied quotation from the Clouds of Aristophanes, aiming at nothing else but the refutation of prejudices, which lasted undeniably, (according to the testimony of Xenophon, Mem. i. 1, 11; Eccl. 12, 3; Symp. 6, 6), till after his own death, and perhaps contributed much to his con-

views by a simple statement of the truth, or of a patriot raising a warning voice against wrong-doing and overhastiness. The accuser has to be convinced of his ignorance; the accusation to be refuted by criticism. But at the same time dignity and principle are never for one moment forgotten. No entreaties are addressed to the judges. Their sentence is not feared, whatever it may be. He stands in the service of God, and is determined to keep his post in the face of every danger. No commands can make him faithless to his higher calling, or prevent him from obeying God rather than the Athenians.

demnation. He misses in Plato many things, which Socrates might have said in his defence, and did actually say according to the *Apology* of Xenophon. But to this no importance can be attached, and it is probable that in an unprepared speech Socrates omitted much, which might have told in his favour. Then again he can hardly be convinced that Socrates cross-questioned Miletus so searchingly as Plato describes; but this passage agrees with the usual character of the discourse of Socrates, and the sophism by which Socrates proved that he did not corrupt youth is quite his own. That Socrates should have met the charge of atheism by quibbles, instead of appealing to the fact of his reverence for the Gods of the state, he can only understand, by supposing it an expression of Plato's religious views: although Plato would have had no reason for suppressing the fact, supposing Socrates had really made such an appeal; he even describes the

devotion of his master to the Gods of his country, and is himself anxious to continue that service. The same may be said in reply to most of the reasoning of Georgii. On the contrary, the difference in style between the *Apology* and Plato's usual writings, seems to prove that this *Apology* was not drawn up with his usual artistic freedom, and the notion of Georgii referring it to the same time as the *Phædo* appears altogether inconceivable considering the great difference between the two in regard to their philosophical contents and their artistic form. It certainly was not Plato's intention to record literally the words of Socrates, and we may be satisfied with comparing his *Apology* to the speeches in Thucydides, as Steinhart does, bearing in mind what Thucydides, i. 22, says of himself,—that he had kept as close as possible to the sense and substance of what was said—and applying it equally to Plato.



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X.(c) *His  
condemna-  
tion.*

The result of his speech was, what might have been expected. The majority of the judges were undoubtedly disposed to pronounce him innocent, but the bearing which he displayed in court could not fail to offend the members of a popular tribunal, before which men of the highest distinction and eminence had quailed.<sup>1</sup> Accordingly many who would otherwise have given their votes in his favour, decided against him, and by only a very small majority<sup>2</sup> he was condemned to death.<sup>3</sup> According to

<sup>1</sup> Let the attitude of Pericles be remembered on the occasion of the accusation of Aspasia, and that depicted by Plato in the Apology, 34, C. Indeed it is a well-known fact, that it was a special hobby of the Athenian people, to sit in judgment, and that it watched with peculiar jealousy this attribute of its sovereignty.

<sup>2</sup> According to Plato, Apol. 36, A., he would have been acquitted if 3, or as another reading has it, if 30 of his judges had been of a different mind. But how can this be reconciled with the statement of Diog. ii. 41: *κατεδικάσθη διακοσίαις ὀγδοήκοντα μὴ πλείοσι ψήφοις τῶν ἀπολλουσῶν*? Either the text here must be corrupt, or a true statement of Diogenes must have been strangely perverted. Which is really the case it is difficult to say. It is generally believed that the whole number of judges who condemned him was 281. But since the Heliaea always consisted of so many hundreds, most probably with the addition of one deciding voice (400, 500, 600 or 401, 501 601), on this hypothesis no proportion of votes can be made out, which is compatible with Plato's

assertion, whichever reading is adopted. We should have then to suppose with Böckh, that a number of the judges had abstained from voting, a course which may be possible. Out of 600 Heliasts, 281 may have voted against and 275 or 276 for him. It is however possible, as Böckh suggests, that in Diogenes, 251 may have originally stood instead of 281. In this case there might have been 251 against and 245 or 246 for the accused, making together nearly 500; and some few, supposing the board to have been complete at first, may have absented themselves during the proceedings, or have refrained from voting. Or if the reading *τριάκοντα*, which has many of the best MSS. in its favour, is established in Plato, we may suppose that the original text in Diogenes was as follows: *κατεδικάσθη διακοσίαις ὀγδοήκοντα ψήφοις, ξ' πλείοσι τῶν ἀπολλουσῶν*. We should then have 280 against 220, together 500, and if 30 more had declared for the accused, he would have been acquitted, the votes being equal.

<sup>3</sup> This course of events is not only in itself probable, taking



the Athenian mode of procedure, the next thing that had to be done, was to determine the nature of the penalty. With undaunted courage Socrates declared that if called upon to state what he had deserved, he must claim to be publicly entertained in the Prytaneum. He repeatedly assured the judges, that he could not on any account depart from his previous course of life. But at last, yielding to the entreaties of his friends, he declared himself ready to pay a penalty of thirty minæ, because this could be done without confessing himself to be guilty.<sup>1</sup> It may be readily understood, that to the majority of the judges, such conduct would appear in the light of incorrigible obstinacy and contempt for the judicial office, and hence the penalty claimed by the accusers was awarded—a sentence of death.<sup>2</sup>

The sentence was received by Socrates with a com-  
posure corresponding to his previous conduct. He still continued to assert that he did not in any way repent of his previous life; and frequently expressed it as his conviction, that for him death would be no misfortune.<sup>3</sup> The execution of the sentence being

(d) *His death.*

into account the character of the speech of Socrates and the nature of the circumstances, but Xenophon (Mem. iv. 4, 4), distinctly asserts that he would certainly have been acquitted, if he had in any way condescended to the usual attitude of deference to his judges. See also Plato, Apol. 38, D.

<sup>1</sup> The above is stated on the

authority of Plato's Apology, in opposition to which the less accurate assertion of Xenophon's, that he rejected any pecuniary composition, and that of Diog. ii. 41, cannot be allowed to be of any weight.

<sup>2</sup> According to Diog. ii. 42, it was carried by eighty more votes than his condemnation.

<sup>3</sup> Plato, Apol. 38, C.

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delayed because of the state-embassy to Delos,<sup>1</sup> he continued in prison thirty days, holding the ordinary intercourse with his friends, and maintaining during the whole period his usual cheerfulness of disposition.<sup>2</sup> Flight from prison, for which his friends had made every preparation, was rejected as a false and unworthy step.<sup>3</sup> His last day was spent in quiet intellectual conversation, and when the evening came, the draught of hemlock was drunk with a courage so undaunted, and a resignation so complete, that a feeling of wonder and admiration repressed the feeling of grief even in his nearest relatives.<sup>4</sup> It is said that among the Athenians, dislike for the disagreeable preacher of morals was soon succeeded by remorse, and that in consequence, his accusers were afterwards visited with severe penalties;<sup>5</sup> but these

<sup>1</sup> Mem. iv. 8, 2; Plato, *Phædo*, 58, A.

<sup>2</sup> *Phædo*, 59, D.

<sup>3</sup> According to Plato, Crito urged him to flight. The Epicurean Idomeneus, who says it was Æschines (*Diog.* ii. 60; iii. 36) is not a trustworthy authority.

<sup>4</sup> Compare the *Phædo*. His account appears to be true in the main. See 58, E.; 116, A.; Xen. Mem. iv. 8, 2. Whether the statements in Xen. *Apol.* 28; *Diog.* ii. 35; *Ælian*, V. H. i. 16, are historical, is a moot point. Those in *Stob. Floril.* 5, 67, are certainly not.

<sup>5</sup> *Diodor.* xiv. 37, says that the people repented of having put Socrates to death, and attacked his accusers, putting them to death without a judicial sentence.

*Suidas* makes Meletus die by stoning. *Plut.* de *Invid.* c. 6, says that the slanderous accusers of Socrates became so hated at Athens, that the citizens would not light their fires, or answer their questions, or bathe in the same water with them, and that at last they were driven in despair to hang themselves. *Diog.* ii. 43, says that the Athenians soon after, overcome with compunction, condemned Meletus to death, banished the other accusers, and erected a brazen statue to Socrates, and that Anytus was forbidden to set foot in Heraclea. *Themist. Or.* xx. 239, says: The Athenians soon repented of this deed; Meletus was punished, Anytus fled, and was stoned at Heraclea, where his grave may still be seen.

statements are not to be depended on, and appear on the whole very improbable.<sup>1</sup>

The circumstances which brought about the death of Socrates are among the clearest facts of history. There is nevertheless the greatest difference of opinion as to the causes which led to it and the justice of his condemnation. In former times it was quite naturally referred to accidental impulse and an outburst of popular feeling. But supposing Socrates to have been that insipid ideal of virtue, delineated by those who were lacking in a deeper insight into his position in history, it would seem impossible that he could have inflicted sufficient injury on any one

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B. *The cause of this sentence of condemnation.*

(a) *It was not the work of the Sophists.*

Aug. De Civ. Dei, viii. 3, reports that one of the accusers was slain by the people and the other banished for life.

<sup>1</sup> This view, already expressed by Forchhammer and Grote, appears to be the correct one notwithstanding Hermann's arguments to the contrary. For though it is possible that political or personal opponents of Anytus and his fellow accusers may have made use of their appearance against Socrates to bring a charge against them, and to procure their condemnation, yet (1) the testimonies are by no means so ancient or so unimpeachable that we can depend upon them. (2) They contradict one another in all their details, not to mention Diogenes' anachronism about Lysippus. And (3) the main point is, that neither Plato, nor Xenophon nor the writer of Xenophon's Apology ever mention an occurrence, which they could not have failed to regard with great satis-

faction. On the contrary, five years after the death of Socrates Xenophon thought it necessary to defend him against the attacks of his accusers, while Æschines appealed to the sentence on Socrates without dreading the very obvious answer, that his accusers had met with their deserts. That Isocrates is referring to this occurrence rather than to any other (*περὶ ἀντιδόσ.* 19) is not established, nor need the passage contain a reference to any event in particular. And lastly, nothing can be made of the apocryphal story coming from some editor of Isocrates, to the effect that the Athenians, ashamed of having put Socrates to death, forbade any public mention of him, and that when Euripides (who died seven years before Socrates) alluded to him in the Palamedes, all the audience burst into tears. It is only lost labour to suggest that these scenes took place at some later time, when the play was performed.

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class of interests to justify a serious attack upon him. If in spite of the absence of any such ground for attack, he was nevertheless accused and condemned, what else can have been the cause but the lowest of motives—personal hatred? Now as no class of men had so much reason for hating Socrates as the Sophists, whose aims and actions he was always thwarting, and who were supposed to be capable of any crime, it must have been at their instigation that Anytus and Meletus induced Aristophanes to complete his play of the Clouds, and afterwards themselves brought Socrates to trial. This was the general view of the learned in former times.<sup>1</sup>

Fréret, in the last century, was the first to point out<sup>2</sup> that this was a view quite untenable. He proved that Meletus was a child when the Clouds was performed, and that at a much later period Anytus was on good terms with Socrates; that neither Anytus had anything to do with the Sophists—Plato always represents him as the inveterate enemy and despiser of them<sup>3</sup>—nor Meletus with Aristophanes;<sup>4</sup> and he showed, that no historian of any weight mentions the Sophists as taking part in the accusation of Socrates.<sup>5</sup> Besides, the Sophists, who had little

<sup>1</sup> Reference to Brucker, i. 549, in preference to any others.

<sup>2</sup> In the admirable treatise: *Observations sur les Causes et sur quelques Circonstances de la Condamnation de Socrate*, in the *Mém. de l'Académie des Inscript.* i. 47, 209.

<sup>3</sup> Meno, 92, A.

<sup>4</sup> Aristophanes often amuses himself at the expense of the poet Meletus, but, as has been remarked, this Meletus was probably an older man than the accuser of Socrates. See Hermann, *De Socr. Accus.* 5.

<sup>5</sup> Ælian (V. H. ii. 13) the chief authority for the previous hy-



or no political influence in Athens,<sup>1</sup> could never have procured the condemnation of Socrates. Least of all, would they have preferred against him charges which immediately recoiled on their own heads.<sup>2</sup> This argument of Fréret's, after passing unnoticed for a long time,<sup>3</sup> has latterly met with general approval.<sup>4</sup> Many of the details, however, are doubtful, and it is an open question whether the condemnation of Socrates was a work of private revenge, or whether it resulted from more general motives; if the latter, whether these motives were political, or moral, or religious; and lastly, whether the sentence was, according to the popular view, a crying wrong, or whether it may admit of a partial justification.<sup>5</sup> It has even been asserted by one writer, following in the steps of Cato,<sup>6</sup> that of all sentences ever passed, the sentence on Socrates was the most strictly legal.

Among these views the one which comes next and

pothesis, knows nothing about a suborning of Anytus by the Sophists.

<sup>1</sup> The political career of Damon, who according to the use of the Greek language can be called a Sophist, establishes nothing to the contrary.

<sup>2</sup> Protagoras had been indicted for atheism before Socrates, and on the same plea Socrates was attacked by Aristophanes, who never spared any partizans of sophistry.

<sup>3</sup> The treatise of Fréret was written as early as 1736, but not published till 1809, when it appeared together with several other of his writings. It was

therefore unknown to the German writers of the last century, who for the most part follow the old view; for instance, Meiners, *Gesch. d. Wissenschaft*, ii. 476; Tiedeman, *Geist d. spek. Phil.* ii. 21. Others, such as Buhle, *Gesch. d. Phil.* i. 372; Tenneman, *Gesch. d. Phil.* ii. 40, confine themselves to stating generally, that Socrates made many enemies by his zeal for morality, without mentioning the Sophists.

<sup>4</sup> There are a few exceptions, such as Heinsius.

<sup>5</sup> Forchhammer: *Die Athener und Socrates, die Gesetzlichen und der Revolutionär.*

<sup>6</sup> *Plut. Cato*, c. 23.



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(b) *It did not proceed from personal animosity.*

(a) *Anytus may have borne him a grudge.*

lies nearest to hand, is that of some older writers, who refer the execution of Socrates to personal animosity, and give up as untenable the idea that the Sophists were in any way connected with it.<sup>1</sup> A great deal may be said in its favour. In Plato,<sup>2</sup> Socrates declared that he was not the victim of Anytus or Meletus, but of the ill-will which he incurred by his criticism of men. Anytus, however, as we know, bore him a grudge on personal grounds. Plato suggests<sup>3</sup> that he was aggrieved with the judgments passed by Socrates on the leading statesmen of the time; but, according to Xenophon's *Apology*,<sup>4</sup> he was offended because Socrates urged him to prepare his son for a higher profession than that of a dealer in leather; by which it appears he had made the young man discontented with his business.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This is found in Fries, *Gesch. d. Phil.* i. 249, who speaks of the 'hatred and envy of a great portion of the people,' as the motives which brought about the trial. Sigwart, *Gesch. d. Phil.* i. 89, gives prominence to this motive, and Brandis, who distinguishes two kinds of opponents to Socrates (*Gr. röm. Phil.* ii. 26), those who considered his philosophy incompatible with ancient discipline and morality, and those who could not endure his moral earnestness, attributes the accusation to the latter. Grote, viii. 637, inclines to the same view. He proves how unpopular Socrates must have made himself by his criticism of men. He remarks that Athens was the only place where it would have been possible to carry it on so long, and that

it is by no means a matter for wonder, that Socrates was accused and condemned, but only that this did not happen sooner. If he had been tolerated so long, there must have been special reasons, however, for the accusation; and these he is inclined to find partly in his relations to Critias and Alcibiades, and partly in the hatred of Anytus.

<sup>2</sup> *Apol.* 28, A.; 22, E.; 23, C.

<sup>3</sup> *Meno*, 94; in reference to which *Diog.* ii. 38, says of Anytus: οὗτος γὰρ οὐ φέρων τὴν ὑπὸ Σωκράτους χλευασμὸν.

<sup>4</sup> Compare with this Hegel, *Gesch. d. Phil.* ii. 92; Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, viii. 661.

<sup>5</sup> Later writers know more. According to *Plut. Alc.* c. 4; *Amator.* 17, 27; and *Satyrus* in *Athenæus*, xii. 534, e, Anytus was

Anytus is said to have been the first who suggested to Aristophanes the idea of a comedy on Socrates; and he afterwards took part with Meletus in the formal accusation.<sup>1</sup> Nor is it improbable that some such motives were active in producing the attack on Socrates, and contributed in no small degree to its success. To convince men of their ignorance is the most thankless of tasks. Any one who could do so for a life-time so unsparingly as Socrates, must expect to make many enemies; and they will be dangerous ones, if he singles out men of distinguished position or talents for the objects of his criticism.

But personal animosity cannot have been the sole cause of the condemnation of Socrates, nor is Plato's language about Anytus conclusive. Indeed the more Socrates and his pupils became convinced of the justice of his cause, the less were they able to discover the real grounds of the accusation. If the one wish of Socrates was to do what was best, what ground could any one possibly have had for opposing him, except wounded pride? The story in Xenophon would at best only explain the hatred of Anytus, but it would not account for the widely spread prejudice against Socrates. Whether it is true at all is questionable; and supposing it to be true, it is doubtful whether this personal injury was the only cause

(β) *But there must have been other causes at work to lead to his condemnation.*

a lover of Alcibiades, but was rejected by him, whilst Alcibiades showed every attention to Socrates, and hence the enmity of Anytus to Socrates. Such an improbable story ought not to

have deceived Luzac (*De Socr. Cive*, 133); especially since Xenophon and Plato would never have omitted in silence such a reason for the accusation.

<sup>1</sup> Ælian, V. H. ii. 13.

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(γ) *This is  
proved by  
Plato's  
language.*

which influenced Anytus against him.<sup>1</sup> Allowing, too, that Socrates made many enemies of influential people, is it not strange that their personal animosity should never have burst forth till immediately after the re-establishment of order in Athens? In the most unsettled and corrupt times no serious persecution had been set on foot against him, and at the time of the enquiry into the mutilation of the Hermæ, no advantage had been taken of his connection with Alcibiades; nor had he suffered from the incensed state of popular feeling after the battle of Arginusæ.<sup>2</sup> Even Plato allows<sup>3</sup> that what told against Socrates most at the trial, was the general conviction that his teaching was of a dangerous character; and he states that as matters then stood, it was impossible for any one to speak the truth in political matters without being derided as a vain babbler, and persecuted as a corrupter of youth.<sup>4</sup> On this point the testimony of writers so opposite as Xenophon and Aristophanes proves that it was not merely a passing prejudice, at least not in Athens, but that it lasted a whole life-time, not confined to the masses, but shared by men of high importance and influence in the state.

<sup>1</sup> This is just possible. That the character of Anytus was not unimpeachable we gather from the story (Aristot. in Harpocration δικάζων; Diodor. xiii. 64; Plut. Coriol. 14), that when he was first charged with treason he corrupted the judges. On the other hand, Isocr. (in Callim. 23) praises him for being together with Thrasybulus faithful to the

treaties, and not abusing his political power to make amends for his losses during the oligarchical government.

<sup>2</sup> The astonishment expressed by Tenneman at this is natural from his point of view. Only his solution of the difficulty is hardly satisfactory.

<sup>3</sup> Apol. 18, B.; 19, B.; 23, D.

<sup>4</sup> Polit. 299, B.; Rep. vi. 488,

With regard to Aristophanes, it has been asserted latterly<sup>1</sup> that real feeling cannot be united with his coarse kind of wit: earnest and real patriotism can never express itself in sneers and ridicule: even when it appears to be seriously meant, it is the seriousness of frivolity, praising for the moment what is great and sacred, and treading it in the dust directly afterwards with zeal greater in proportion to the praise. Others have with justice come to the rescue of the moral character of Aristophanes against such a depreciation.<sup>2</sup> To make him a dry preacher of morals would be ridiculous. It is equally unsatisfactory to bring into such prominence the political motives of his plays as to forget their worth as works of art, and to cloth a comedian, who in a mad fit exposes to ridicule all authorities divine and human, with the serious garb of a political prophet.<sup>3</sup> But it is again an error to lose sight of the grave vein which underlies the comic license of his plays, and to mistake his occasional pathos for off-hand jest. If nothing but flippancy were intended, the insincerity of the sentiment would soon show itself in artistic defects, as is actually the case in the modern French and German Romances. There the utter

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(δ) *And also by Aristophanes, who was a real patriot.*

496, C.; Apol. 32, E.; Gorg. 473, E.; 521, D.

<sup>1</sup> By Droysen in his translation of Aristophanes, i. 263; iii. 12.

<sup>2</sup> Brandis, Gr. röm. Phil. ii. a, 26; Schnitzer in his translation of the Clouds.

<sup>3</sup> Rötischer's spirited description suffers from this onesidedness, and even Hegel, in his

passage on the fate of Socrates, Gesch. d. Phil. ii. 82, is not quite free from it, although both of them justly recognise (Hegel, Phänomena log. 560; Æsthetik, 537, 562; Rötischer, p. 365), that there is an element subversive of Greek life, quite as much in the comedies of Aristophanes, as in the state of things of which he complains.

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hollowness of all moral foundation is the cause of that fatal want of unity, which baffles every attempt at perfect poetry, and with discordant notes destroys the harmony of the parts. But instead of this, a real feeling of patriotism may be observed in Aristophanes, not only in the unsullied beauty of many individual utterances, but like a key-note sounding through all his plays, perhaps in the earlier ones disturbing his poetic flow,<sup>1</sup> but proving all the more conclusively, how near the love of country lay to his heart.

This alone could have induced him to give a political turn to his comedies, by which, as he justly takes credit to himself,<sup>2</sup> comedy gained a far higher ground than had been allowed it by his predecessors. At the same time it cannot be denied that Aristophanes is as much deficient as others in the morality and the faith of the earlier ages.<sup>3</sup> No doubt, when men and circumstances had so thoroughly changed, it was absurd to endeavour to return to the olden time. But it by no means follows that the attempt was not made by him in good faith.

His was indeed a case frequently met with in history—a man attacking a principle in others, which he is unconsciously following himself. Aristophanes attacked innovations in morals, politics, religion, and art. But being in his inmost soul the offspring of his age, he combated them with the weapons and

<sup>1</sup> Compare Schnitzer, and the passages quoted by him.

<sup>2</sup> Peace, 732; Wasps, 1022; Clouds, 537.

<sup>3</sup> Compare Droysen.



in the spirit of this age, and thus became entangled in the contradiction of trying to revive, and yet by one and the same act destroying, the old morality. It can just as little be questioned that he was guilty of this inconsistency, as it can be doubted that it was a proof of shortsightedness to attempt to preserve a form of culture which had been irretrievably lost. But that he was conscious of this inconsistency cannot be believed. A buffoon without sentiment—(this is what Droysen makes him to be)—would hardly have ventured to attack Cleon, a task so fraught with peril. And would Plato have brought him into the society of Socrates in the Symposium, and made him utter a speech full of gaiety, if he had seen in him so despicable a character? If, however, the attack upon Socrates was seriously meant, and Aristophanes really took him to be a Sophist dangerous alike to religion and morality—which was the view he expresses in the Clouds—it will be seen that the charges preferred at the trial were not an empty sham, and that something more than personal grudges must have been active in producing his condemnation.

If, then, taking into account all that is known of the trial and the personal character of the accusers, we ask what were really the causes at work, we have but one of two alternatives left: either the attack on Socrates was specially directed against his political creed,<sup>1</sup> or it was directed in general against his

(c) *Was he the victim of a political party?*

<sup>1</sup> This is the view of Fréret, of *crate juste damnato* (Lips. 1738), Dresig in the dissertation *De So-* of Süvern (notes to Clouds), of

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mode of thought and teaching in regard to morals, religion, and politics.<sup>1</sup> Both explanations are to a great extent the same, but they are not so identical that we can avoid distinguishing them.

A great deal may be alleged in favour of the view, that the attack on Socrates was undertaken in the interest of the democratic party. Anytus, one of the accusers, was a leading democrat at the time. The judges too are spoken of as men, who had been banished and had returned with Thrasybulus.<sup>2</sup> Further, one of the charges preferred against Socrates was, that Critias, the most unscrupulous and the most hated of the oligarchical party, had been his pupil;<sup>3</sup> and Æschines<sup>4</sup> plainly says to the Athenians: You have put to death the Sophist Socrates, because he was the teacher of Critias. Others, too, are found among the friends and pupils of Socrates, who must have been hated by the democrats because of their aristocratical sympathies. Such were Charmides,<sup>5</sup> and Xenophon, who was banished from Athens<sup>6</sup> about the time of the trial of Socrates, perhaps

Ritter, *Gesch. d. Phil.* ii. 30, and of Forchhammer (*Die Athener und Socrates*). More indefinite is Hermann, *Plat.* i. 35, and Wiggers, *Socr.* p. 123.

<sup>1</sup> Hegel, *Gesch. d. Phil.* ii. 81; Röscher, p. 256, 268, specially with reference to the *Clouds* of Aristophanes; Henning, *Princ. der Ethik.* p. 44. Compare, Baur, *Socrates und Christus*, Tüb. Zeitschrift, 1837.

<sup>2</sup> Plato, *Apol.* 21, A.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. *Mem.* i. 2, 12; Plato, *Apol.* 33, A.

<sup>4</sup> *Adv. Tim.* 173. No great importance can be attached to this authority, as the context shows. Æschines is talking as an orator not as an historian.

<sup>5</sup> Charmides, the uncle of Plato, one of the thirty, was, according to Xen. *Hell.* ii. 4, 19, one of the ten commanders at the Peiræus, and fell on the same day with Critias in conflict with the exiled Athenians.

<sup>6</sup> Forchhammer, p. 84, also mentions Theramenes, the supporter of the thirty tyrants, who

even in connection with it, because of his intimacy with Cyrus, the friend of the Spartans. And lastly, it is especially recorded, that in one of the formal indictments Socrates was charged with using slighting expressions regarding the democratic form of election by lot,<sup>1</sup> and with teaching his audience to treat the poor with insolence,<sup>2</sup> by so frequently quoting the words—

Each prince of name or chief in arms approved,  
He fired with praise, or with persuasion moved.

But if a clamorous vile plebeian rose,  
Him with reproof he cheek'd or tamed with blows.<sup>3</sup>

may have been a pupil of Socrates without, as Forchhammer will have it, adopting the political opinions of his teacher. But Diodor., xiv. 5, from whom the story comes, is a very uncertain authority. For Diodorus combines with it the very improbable story that Socrates tried to rescue Theramenes from the clutches of the thirty, and could only be dissuaded from this audacious attempt by many entreaties. Neither Xenophon nor Plato mention Theramenes among the pupils of Socrates. In the accusation brought against the victors at Arginusæ, it was Socrates who espoused their cause, and Theramenes who by his intrigues brought about their condemnation.

<sup>1</sup> Mem. i. 2, 9,

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. i. 2, 58.

<sup>3</sup> Iliad. ii. 188. Forchhammer detects a great deal more in these verses. He thinks that Socrates was thus expressing his conviction of the necessity of an

oligarchical constitution, and was using the words of Hesiod *ἔργον δ' οὐδὲν ὕνειδος* (which the accusers also took advantage of, as a plea for not delaying, but for striking when the time for action came. The real importance of the quotation from Homer, he contends, must not be sought in the verses quoted by Xenophon, but in those omitted by him (Il. ii. 192–197, 203–205): the charge was not brought against Socrates for spreading anti-democratic sentiments, which Xenophon alone mentions, but for promoting the establishment of an oligarchical form of government. This is however the very opposite of historical criticism. If Forchhammer relies upon the statements of Xenophon, how can he at the same time assert that they are false in most important points? And if on the other hand he wishes to strengthen these statements, how can he use them to uphold the view, by which he condemns them? He has, how-

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Taking all these facts into account, there can be no doubt that the interests of the democratic party were involved in the trial of Socrates.

(d) *He was the victim of more general causes?*

(α) *The charges were not directed against the political element in his teaching only.*

But we cannot rest content with these reasons. The indictment by no means brings into prominence the anti-republican sentiments of Socrates. The charges against him were, that he rejected the Gods of his country and that he corrupted youth.<sup>1</sup> These Gods were however not merely the Gods of the republican party, but the Gods of Athens. If in individual cases, as for instance in the affair of the Hermæ, insult to the Gods was connected with attacks on the republican government, the connection was by no means a necessary one, nor was it named in the act of accusation. With regard to the corruption of youth,<sup>2</sup> it certainly was one of the charges brought against Socrates that he instilled aristocratic insolence into young men, and a scorn for republican forms of government, and also that he was the teacher

ever, detected oligarchical tendencies elsewhere, where no traces of them exist. For instance, he enumerates not only Critias but Alcibiades among the anti-democratical pupils of Socrates; and he speaks of the political activity of Socrates after the battle of Arginusæ by remarking that the oligarchs elected on the council board their brethren in political sentiments. It is true the levity of Alcibiades made him dangerous to the democratic party, but in his own time he never passed for an oligarch, but for a democrat. See Xen. Mem. i. 2, 12; Thuc. viii. 63, 48 and 68:

With regard to the condemnation of the victors of Arginusæ, Athens had then not only partially, but altogether shaken off the oligarchical constitution of Pisander. This may be gathered from Fréret's remark, from the account of the trial (Xen. Hell. i. 7), as well as from the distinct statement of Plato (Apol. 32, C.: καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἦν ἔτι δημοκρατουμένης τῆς πόλεως); not to mention the fact that these generals were decided democrats, and hence could not have been elected by oligarchs.

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Apol. 24, B.

<sup>2</sup> Mem. i. 2, 9.



of Critias. But credit was also given him on account of his being the teacher of Alcibiades, who had injured the city by republican rather than by aristocratic opinions. A further charge was, that he taught sons to despise their fathers,<sup>1</sup> and that he permitted them to indulge in actions which brought gain,<sup>2</sup> no matter how base or unjust they might be.

It would appear from this, that not only was the political side of his teaching, in the narrower sense of the term, the subject of attack, but its bearings on morals and religion were also included. The latter points are what chiefly engaged the attention of Aristophanes. After all the ancient and modern discussions as to the scope of the *Clouds*,<sup>3</sup> it may be taken for established, that the Socrates of this comedy is not intended to be a representative—exaggerated of course by comic license—of a mode of thought which Aristophanes knew was foreign to the real Socrates.<sup>4</sup> Aristophanes did not desire to attack the propensity to subtle distinctions in general, and the absurdities of sophistry and useless learning; but the play was distinctly aimed at the peculiar tendency of the Socratic philosophy. It cannot, however, be supposed, after what has been already said, that this attack proceeded only from malice or from personal animosity

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(β) *But extended to its moral and religious bearings.*

<sup>1</sup> Xen. Mem. i. 2, 49; Apol. 20 and 29.

<sup>2</sup> Mem. i. 2, 56.

<sup>3</sup> Röscher (Aristophanes, p. 272), gives a review of previous opinions. Since then, Droysen and Schnitzer in the introductions

to their translations of the *Clouds*, have further expanded the question.

<sup>4</sup> As is assumed by G. Hermann, *Præf. ad Nubes*, and by others.



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on the part of Aristophanes, Plato's description of the Symposium places this out of the question. The opinions of Reisig<sup>1</sup> and Wolf<sup>2</sup> are equally untenable. Reisig makes the character which Aristophanes assigns to Socrates, belong not to the individual Socrates, but to the whole body of his pupils, in particular to Euripides. The spectators, however, would certainly have referred the whole to Socrates, and hence we may infer that Aristophanes intended them to do so. Wolf suggests that the portrait in the Clouds depicts the younger years of Socrates, when he was devoted to natural philosophy. But the very same objections were raised against him eighteen years later in the Frogs;<sup>3</sup> and we gather from Plato's Apology that the current view of Socrates and his teaching up to the time of his death agreed substantially with that of Aristophanes. Besides, it hardly needs to be repeated here that Socrates probably never was a lover of natural philosophy; and that in the Clouds he is attacked as a Sophist rather than as a natural philosopher.

(γ) *This is proved by the part assigned to Socrates in the Clouds.*

Aristophanes must really have believed that he discerned in the Socrates with whom the history of philosophy has to do, a principle deserving his attack. This is, of course, not saying that he did not exaggerate the historical figure and consciously attribute to it many features in reality foreign to it. But we must suppose that the outline of his picture agreed with the idea he had formed to himself of Socrates,

<sup>1</sup> Præf. ad Nubes.

Similarly Van Heusde, Characterismi, p. 19.

<sup>2</sup> In his translation of the Clouds. See Röscher, 297.

<sup>3</sup> Frogs, 1491.

and with current opinion. He would otherwise have been guilty of a misrepresentation, quite out of keeping with his usual character and with the attitude he occupied towards Socrates according to Plato's account; a misrepresentation, too, which would have injured the success of the play. Plato tells us expressly, that public opinion pronounced the picture of Aristophanes to be in the main correct; and hence the belief of Süvern cannot possibly be right,<sup>1</sup> that the Socrates of the *Clouds* is not meant to be an individual, but a type of a school of cavilling and display,<sup>2</sup> this school being the real object of attack. Far from it, Socrates was made to be the champion of sophistry because Aristophanes really regarded him as a Sophist and believed that in his public capacity he was guilty of the things laid to his charge. Not a single part of his picture has an exclusively political colour. Independently of what is altogether irrelevant and obviously fabricated, the charges against him are three: his being occupied with useless physical and intellectual subtleties,<sup>3</sup> his rejecting the Gods of the city,<sup>4</sup> and what is the turning point of the whole play, his sophistic facility of speech, which can gain for the wrong side the victory, and make the weaker argument appear to be the stronger.<sup>5</sup> In other words,

<sup>1</sup> In the treatises already referred to.

<sup>2</sup> 143-234, 636.

<sup>3</sup> 365-410.

<sup>4</sup> Not to mention the false opinion, which however is supported by Hertzberg, that the play was aimed at Alcibiades, who is concealed under the name of Phidippides.

<sup>5</sup> *Clouds*, 889. Droysen unfairly blames this play for making a stronger argument into a right one. The *λόγος κρείττων* is the really stronger case in point of justice, which is however thrown into the

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the speculative, irreligious, and sophistical bearings of the Socratic teaching are attacked; but there is not one word which relates to an anti-republican tendency, although Aristophanes, had he observed it, might have been expected to insist on it more than anything else. Even at a later time<sup>1</sup> these were the only charges mentioned by Aristophanes, and the only ones which, according to Plato, continued to wield any influence on his opponents.<sup>2</sup> Hence when Plato assures us (18, B.) that these charges were particularly fatal to Socrates, there is every reason to believe that his assurance may be accepted.

(δ) *Socrates attacked not only because of his anti-republican views, but as being an enemy of the good old time.*

Allowing however that political motives had some weight in the condemnation of Socrates, how can this admission be made to agree with the previous statement? The reply to this question has been already pointed out.<sup>3</sup> The conviction of the guilt of Socrates resulted from a belief, that the tendency of his teaching was dangerous to morality and religion, but the reason that he was judicially presented lay without doubt in the special political circumstances of the times. The growth of sophistry was neither the sole nor the chief cause of the fall of Athens in the Peloponnesian war, but

shade by the λόγος ἥττων; and what is meant by τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν is, making the case which in point of justice is weaker, to be the stronger as to the actual result,—giving to an unjust act the colour of justice.

<sup>1</sup> Frogs, 1491.

<sup>2</sup> Apol. 23, D.: λέγουσιν, ὡς Σωκράτης τίς ἐστι μιαιώτατος καὶ διαφθείρει τοὺς νέους· καὶ ἐπειδὴν

τις αὐτοὺς ἐρωτᾷ, ὃ τι ποιῶν καὶ ὃ τι διδάσκων, ἔχουσι μὲν οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀγνοοῦσιν, ἵνα δὲ μὴ δοκῶσιν ἀπορεῖν, τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφούντων πρόχειρα ταῦτα λέγουσιν, ὅτι τὰ μετέωρα καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς, καὶ θεοὺς μὴ νομίζειν καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν.

<sup>3</sup> Ritter, p. 31. Marbach, Gesch. d. Phil. i. 185, 9; and Schwelger, Gesch. d. Phil. 30.

yet it contributed to that result; and naturally the opponents of the new culture were disposed to lay more to its charge than it deserved. Had not the schools of the Sophists sent forth many of the modern statesmen, who had either as aristocrats or as demagogues torn the state to pieces? Was it not in those schools that a corrupt form of morality was taught, which substituted the wishes and caprice of the individual in place of the customary morality and religion, put self-interest in the place of right, and taught that absolute sovereignty was the summit of human happiness? Were not those schools the cradle of an unmeaning eloquence, which employed a variety of technical tricks for any purpose, no matter what, and made it its highest triumph to gain a victory for the side of the wrong? Can we then wonder that Aristophanes considered the new-fangled education responsible for all the misfortunes of the commonwealth;<sup>1</sup> that Anytus cannot find terms strong enough to express his horror of the pernicious influence of the Sophists;<sup>2</sup> that all friends of the good old time believed that they saw in Sophistry the chief malady of the state; and that this feeling was intensified during the last years of the Peloponnesian war, and under the concluding reign of force? It was only natural that those who rescued Athens from an oligarchy, and with the old constitution re-established her political independence, should wish by suppressing the education of the Sophists to stop the evil at its source. Besides, Socrates not only appeared as a

<sup>1</sup> Clouds, 910; Knights, 1373.      <sup>2</sup> Meno, 91, C.



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teacher of the modern sophistic school, but the evil effects of his teaching were discernible in several of his pupils, and principally in Critias and Alcibiades.<sup>1</sup> Under such circumstances, what is more easy to be understood, than that those who were interested in the restoration of a popular form of government, and of the ancient glory of Athens, should regard him as a corrupter of youth, and a dangerous citizen? Thus he fell a victim to the republican reaction which set in after the overthrow of the thirty tyrants, although his political views were not in themselves the principal causes which provoked the attack. His guilt was supposed to consist in undermining ancient customs and piety. From this the anti-republican tendency of his teaching was supposed to follow as a secondary consequence, and for this it also served as an occasional manifestation.

*C. Justice of the sentence.*

How do matters then really stand in regard to the justice of his accusation<sup>2</sup> and of the sentence to which

<sup>1</sup> How much this circumstance contributed towards the condemnation of Socrates is proved by Xen. Mem. i. 2, 12, as well as by the above-mentioned authority, Æschines.

<sup>2</sup> It is well known that Hegel has defended it on the side of Greek law, and Dresig, a hundred years earlier, maintained in a very superficial treatise, that Socrates, as an opponent of a republican government, had been justly condemned. Forchhammer goes a great deal further in his treatise, and so does Denis. The answer of Heinsius to Forchhammer is

unimportant, and the learned *Apologia Socratis contra Meliti redivivi Calumniam*, by P. van Limburg Brouwer (Grön. 1838), is deficient in insight into the general questions involved, and is inferior to the treatise of Preller, although many of its details are valuable. Luzac, despite his usual learning, does little for the question. But Grote's remarks on the extenuating circumstances, which do not altogether justify but excuse the condemnation of Socrates, are deserving of all attention. Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, viii. 678, 653.



it led? And what must be thought of the modern attempts to justify them? Most of the charges which were preferred against Socrates, rest undeniably on misunderstandings, perversions, or false inferences. Socrates is said to have rejected the Gods of the state, although we have seen this contradicted by all historical testimonies.<sup>1</sup> He is said to have substituted his Dæmonium in their place, although he neither put it in the place of the Gods, nor sought by it to encroach on the ground of the oracles. It was a private oracle over and above, not instead of those recognised by the state; and in a country where divine revelations were not the exclusive property of the priesthood, a private oracle could be refused to no one.<sup>2</sup> He is said to have been devoted to the atheism of Anaxagoras,<sup>3</sup> although he expressly declared it to be absurd. He is said by Aristophanes to have given instruction in the rhetorical display of the Sophists—a charge so untrue, that

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(a) *Unfounded charges.*

(a) *In relation to his teaching, life, and influence.*

<sup>1</sup> Forchhammer repeats the charge without proof, as if its truth were obvious of itself, and he speaks of orthodoxy and heresy like a modern theologian. But a Greek thought far less of belief than of outward service, and hence Xenophon, Mem. i. 1, 2, refutes the charge by an appeal to the fact, that he had sacrificed to the Gods.

<sup>2</sup> Xenophon therefore refers to the Dæmonium (Mem. i. 1, 2) as a proof of Socrates' belief in the Gods, and Plato compares his revelations with the prophecies of Euthyphro (Euthyphro, 3, B). It is known from other sources,

how much private divination was practised besides appealing to public oracles.

<sup>3</sup> Not only Aristophanes but Meletus brings this charge against him in Plato. If Forchhammer considers it incredible that Meletus should have given such a careless reply to Socrates, he forgets that it is always the way of the world to confound relative with positive atheism, doubts about particular religious notions with the denial of all religion. This is quite universal in the nations of antiquity, and therefore the early Christians were called *ἄθεοι*.

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even Meletus did not venture to bring it against him. He is blamed for having been the teacher of Critias and Alcibiades, to which even Xenophon justly replied<sup>1</sup> that these men did not learn their vices from Socrates, nor fall into them until after they had been separated from him. Allowing, too, that a teacher ought to instil into his pupils a permanent love for what is good,<sup>2</sup> is it his fault if he does not succeed in particular cases? The value of any instruction can only be estimated by its collective effects, and these bear as bright a testimony to the value of the instruction of Socrates as any that can be produced. A man whose beneficial influence was not only felt by many individuals,<sup>3</sup> but by whom a new foundation for morals was laid which served its purpose for centuries, was, as a matter of course, no corrupter of youth. Objection has been taken to the verses of Hesiod, by which Socrates sought to promote useful activity;<sup>4</sup> but Xenophon has already shown that he is not to blame for the use that was made of them. He has been accused of teaching men to despise parents and relations, because he maintained that knowledge alone constituted worth;<sup>5</sup> but surely this is a most unfair inference from principles, which had a simple meaning in his mouth. Any one who tells his pupil that he must learn in order to become a useful and estimable man, is surely doing what is right. None but the most bigoted could

<sup>1</sup> Mem. i. 2, 12.<sup>2</sup> Forchhammer, p. 43.<sup>3</sup> Plato's Apol. 33, D., mentions a whole string.<sup>4</sup> Mem. i. 2, 56; Plato, Char. 163, B.<sup>5</sup> Mem. i. 2, 49.

blame the wish to make sons wiser than their fathers. If Socrates had spoken with scorn of the ignorance of parents, or set lightly by the duty of children, it would have been a different thing; but he was far from so doing.<sup>1</sup> It may possibly be replied that one who judged the worth of a man simply and solely by his knowledge, and who at the same time found everybody deficient in knowledge, was making his pupils self-conceited, and teaching them to consider themselves above all authority by their own imaginary knowledge. But at the same time that Socrates overrated the value of knowledge, he practically anticipated the inference to which this over-estimate might lead, above all endeavouring to make his friends conscious of their own want of knowledge, and laying no claim to knowledge himself, but only professing to pursue it. No fear that any one imbued with this spirit of humility and modesty, would abuse the teaching of his master. For a misconception of his teaching and all its consequences Socrates is as little responsible as any other teacher.

Another point which is touched upon in the judicial proceedings is of more moment—the relation

(β) *Charges affecting his posi-*

<sup>1</sup> Conf. Mem. ii. 2, 3. A further charge is connected with the above, viz., that he induced many young men to follow him rather than their parents in culture. Xen. (Apology) allows it, and attempts to justify it. But to decide whether it is an established fact, and whether Socrates is here to blame (it is quite possible) we need more trustworthy authorities, and we

ought to know the circumstances better. In the single fact there mentioned, that of the son of Anytus, the historical character of which appears doubtful, Socrates probably did not set the son against his father, but urged the father to give him a better education, or else expressed himself to a third party to that effect.

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state.*

of Socrates himself to the Athenian democracy. As is well known, Socrates considered the existing constitution a complete failure. He would not have places of power in the state determined by lot or by election, but by the qualification of the individuals; and he occasionally expressed opinions respecting the multitudes who thronged the Pnyx and filled the theatre, which certainly had a great deal of truth in them, but came very near treason against the sovereignty of the people.<sup>1</sup> It was but natural that his accusers should make use of such expressions, and that they should influence the judges. But to blame existing institutions boldly is by no means treason. Some Grecian states may have confined the liberty of speech within very narrow limits, but at Athens the freedom of thought and of speech was unlimited, and formed an essential portion of the republican constitution. The Athenians regarded it as an inalienable right and were proud to be distinguished by it from every other state.<sup>2</sup> In the time of the most violent party quarrels there is no instance of interference with either political views or political teaching. The outspoken friends of a constitution like that of Sparta could openly adhere to their colours, so long as they refrained from actual attacks on the existing state of things; and was Socrates

<sup>1</sup> In Mem. iii. 7, Socrates attempts to relieve Charmides of his dread of appearing in public by reminding him, that the people whom he was afraid of, consisted of peasants, shoe-makers, pedlars, &c., and therefore did not deserve such con-

sideration. The charge preferred by the accuser, Mem. i. 2, 58, that Socrates thought it was reasonable for the rich to abuse the poor, is clearly a misrepresentation.

<sup>2</sup> Compare Plato, Gorg. 461, E.

not to be allowed the same privilege?<sup>1</sup> Nothing, however, in the shape of actual deeds could be laid to his charge. He had never transgressed the laws of the state. His duties as a citizen had been conscientiously fulfilled. His avowed opinion was that man must live for the state and obey its laws. He was no partizan of the oligarchical faction. On the contrary, he had twice hazarded his life, once to rescue the victors at Arginusæ—good democrats—from the extrajudicial mercies of an infuriated populace, the other time to avoid an unjust command of one of the thirty tyrants. His school, too, in as far as it can be called a school, had no decided political bias. If the greater number of his pupils belonged to the upper classes,<sup>2</sup> and hence were naturally in favour of the aristocratic party, there were others amongst his most intimate friends,<sup>3</sup> who were companions of Thrasybulus. Most of his adherents however seem to have taken no decided line in politics. In reference again to the political inactivity which has been laid to his charge in modern times, different views may be held, varying with the different sides from which it is regarded. We are inclined to praise him for continuing faithful to his higher calling and not wasting his powers and his life on a career, in which he would have attained no success,

<sup>1</sup> Grote's reference to the Platonic state, in which no freedom of individual opinion was allowed, is not altogether to the point. The fundamental ideas of Plato's state are different to those then prevailing in Athens. Plato,

Rep. viii. 557, B., reckons freedom of speech among the evils of a democracy, his type of which was the Athenian form of government.

<sup>2</sup> Plato, *Apol.* 23, C.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* 21, A.



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and for which his character unfitted him. But whatever view may be taken, it is certainly not a punishable offence to avoid a statesman's career ; least of all when he who avoids it is convinced that he can be of more service to the state in other ways. To help the state in his own way was to Socrates an object of the highest and deepest interest. His political theories might not correspond with the existing state of things, but his character as a citizen must be admitted to be pure ; and according to the laws of Athens, he was guilty of no crime against the state.<sup>1</sup>

(b) *Relation borne by his theory to the ancient morality.*

The political views of Socrates were not the only things which gave offence. His whole attitude was, as Hegel has shown,<sup>2</sup> at variance with the ground occupied by the old Greek morality. The moral life of Greece, like every national form of life, rested originally on authority. It relied partly on the unquestioned authority of the laws of the state, and partly on the all-powerful influence of custom and education, regarding general convictions as the unwritten laws of God, which no one could trace to a definite origin. To oppose this traditional morality was a rash and self-conscious act, an offence against God and the state. A doubt with regard to its possible justification never occurred to any one, and was

<sup>1</sup> At an earlier period it might have given offence, if Socrates appeared to hold aloof from the political party questions of his time, and an appeal might have been made to the old law of Solon threatening neutrals in case of an internal quarrel with loss of civil rights. But this

law had long fallen into disuse, if indeed it had ever been in force ; and who can blame Socrates for remaining neutral when he could conscientiously side with none of the conflicting parties ? Perhaps it was a political narrowness, but it was not a crime.

<sup>2</sup> Gesch. d. Phil. ii. 81.

permitted to none. For this very reason, the need of an enquiry into the foundations of morality was never felt, nor was the duty recognised of proving its necessity, or of supporting it by an appeal to personal conviction.

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Socrates, however, demanded the enquiry. With him nothing might be believed, and nothing might be done, until men were fully convinced of its truth or expediency. For him it was not enough to have a definite course, universally recognised and legally established. The individual was required to think out each subject for himself, and to discover its reasons: true virtue and right actions are only possible when they spring from personal conviction. Hence his whole life was spent in examining the current notions regarding morals, in testing their truth, and seeking for their reasons. This examination brought him in nearly all points to the same principles as those which were established by custom and opinion; and if his notions were clearer and better expressed, this advantage was one which he shared in common with the best and wisest of his contemporaries. Just as little can he be charged with imperilling public morality, by making expediency its foundation: for in this he was following the customary practice. But, nevertheless, tried by the standard of the old Greek morality, his position seems very critical. In the first place the ordinary code of morals, and the received rules of conduct resting on authority and tradition, were by him de-

(a) *Personal conviction substituted for deference to authority.*

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Apol. 29, C.

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prived of their chief value. They were so much depreciated in the face of knowledge, and of the conscious virtue of Socrates, that not only was a shock given to the self-love of individuals, but the actual validity of the laws was called in question. If man has only to follow his convictions, he will agree with the popular will only when, and in as far as, it agrees with his convictions. If the two come into collision, there can be doubt, which he will follow. This is candidly avowed by Socrates in his defence, in his celebrated declaration that he would obey God rather than the Athenians.<sup>1</sup> And thus his principle was, even in theory, a sharp and pointed contrast to the older view. It was impossible to guarantee a perfect agreement between law and individual convictions; indeed it was highly improbable that such an agreement should always exist; and, as a matter of fact, Socrates by his political views was undeniably opposed to the existing state of things.

(β) *Less  
importance  
attached to  
politics.*

In the next place it cannot be concealed that the whole character of the Socratic philosophy is at variance with the preponderance given to the political interests, without which the Greek states could never, considering their limited range, have done so much that is famous in the history of the world. The duty of the individual towards the community was indeed recognised by Socrates to its full extent. When any of his friends showed ability for the task, he urged them to devote their attention to public affairs; but as for those who were young and un-

<sup>1</sup> Mem. iii. 6; iv. 2; Plato, Symp. 216, A.

formed, it must have been deemed, from the point of view of ancient Greece, a meritorious action to have kept them back from appearing in public. The maxim that man must be clear about himself, and be sure of his own moral well-being before he interferes with that of others and with the community;<sup>1</sup> the conviction of Socrates that political activity was not only alien to his own character, but impossible in the then state of things, to a man of integrity;<sup>2</sup> the whole inward turn which he gave to thought and action, his demand for knowledge of self, for moral knowledge, for self-training—all this could not but create in himself and his pupils a disinclination for political life. It could not fail to make the moral perfection of the individual the main point, while activity for the state—that highest and most immediate duty of a citizen according to the ancient view—was reduced to a subordinate position.

And, lastly, assuming that Socrates was himself fully persuaded of the injustice of the charge that he rejected the Gods of his country, his theory, it must be admitted, imperilled the belief in their existence. A consistent development of what he was introducing, and an application of his method to religious questions, in order to discover what people understood by religion, was alone needed to bring about the same result as in politics; and in the case of Antisthenes this result was actually seen in religion. This is also true of his *daemonium*: as a kind of oracle it had indeed a place on the ground

(γ) *His position subversive of religion.*

<sup>1</sup> Plato.<sup>2</sup> Id., Apol. 31, C.

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of the Greek faith, but by its internal character it made the decision depend on the subject instead of depending on external portents and other signs. And yet how dangerous was this proceeding in a country in which oracles were not only a religious but a political institution? How easily might others be led to imitate the example of Socrates, following, however, their own criticism instead of an undefined inward feeling, and thus thinking little of belief in the Gods or of their utterances? We may indeed be convinced that Socrates was in the right in all these points, and it is quite true that he was the precursor and founder of our moral view of the world; but how could this new idea of right be admitted by any one who held the traditions of the ancient Greek morality? How could a state built upon these traditions allow such an idea to be spread, without committing an act of suicide? Therefore, even while we remember that Socrates laboured and taught in his simple manner, not in the Sparta of Lycurgus, but in Athens and amongst the generation that had fought at Marathon, we shall still find it quite natural for the state to endeavour to combat his work. For Athens was absolutely ignorant of that freedom of personal conviction, which Socrates required, nor could she endure it.<sup>1</sup> In such a

<sup>1</sup> To say that the line adopted by Socrates was not opposed to the constitution of Solon, as Georgii asserts, is not correct. Nor can it be said that Socrates required a return to the old life of Greece. For not only did he express disapproval of appointing by lot to public offices, which was an institution later than Solon's time, but he disliked the popular elections of Solon; and his prin-



community the punishment of an innovator could cause no surprise. For was not a dangerous doctrine, according to old notions, a crime against the state? And if the criminal resolutely refused to obey the sentence of the judges, as Socrates actually did, how could the penalty of death fail to follow? To one who starts from the old Grecian view of right and the state, the condemnation of Socrates cannot appear to be unjust.<sup>1</sup>

It is another question whether Athens then had a right to this opinion, a point which the defenders of Athens assume far too readily.<sup>2</sup> To us the question appears to deserve an unqualified negation. If a Socrates had appeared and been condemned in the time of Miltiades and Aristides, his sentence might be regarded as a simple act of retaliation of the old morality on the spirit of innovation. In the period after the Peloponnesian war such a view can no longer be admitted. For where was the solid morality which Anytus and Meletus were supposed to defend? Had not all kinds of relations, views, and modes of life long since been penetrated by an individualising tendency far more dangerous than that of Socrates? Had not men been long accustomed to see demagogues and aristocrats instead of the great statesmen of old—demagogues at vari-

(c) *Relation borne by his theory to the times, in which he lived.*

(a) *The old morality was already in a state of decay.*

ciple of free investigation is widely removed from the spirit of Solon's times.

<sup>1</sup> Compare the remarks of Kock on Aristophanes, i. 7.

<sup>2</sup> Hegel is most nearly right, although he regards the Athe-

nians exclusively as the representatives of the old Grecian morality. Forchhammer, on the contrary, is anything but impartial, in making the Athenians conservative, and Socrates a revolutionary.

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ance with each other on every other point, but agreeing in the wild play of rivalry and ambition? Had not all the cultivated men of that time passed through a school of transition which had entirely disposed of the beliefs and the morals of their ancestors? Had not men brought themselves in a lifetime to believe that laws were the creations of caprice, and that natural right and positive right were different things? What had become of the olden chastity when Aristophanes could tell his hearers in the midst of his attacks on Socrates, half in joke, half in derision, that they were one and all adulterers?<sup>1</sup> What had become of ancient piety at a time when the sceptical verses of Euripides were in every one's mouth, when every year the happy thoughts of Aristophanes and other comedians in successful derision of the inhabitants of Olympus were being circulated, when the most unprejudiced complained that piety, trust, and faith, had vanished,<sup>2</sup> and when the stories of future retribution were greeted with derision?<sup>3</sup>

(β) *Socrates only fell in with what he found existing.*

Socrates did not produce this state of things; he found it already in existence. The charge brought against him therefore really amounts to this, that he entered into the spirit of his time, trying to reform it by means of itself, without making the useless and mistaken attempt to bring it back to a type of culture which was gone for ever. It was an obvious mistake of his opponents to make him responsible

<sup>1</sup> Clouds, 1083.

<sup>2</sup> Thuc. iii. 82; ii. 53.

<sup>3</sup> Plato, Rep. i. 330, D.

for the corruption of faith and morals, which he was trying to stem in the only possible way. It was a palpable delusion on their part to imagine themselves men of the good old time. His condemnation was a crying political anachronism, one of those unfortunate measures, by which a policy of reaction is ever sure to expose its incompetence and short-sightedness. Socrates certainly left the original ground of Greek thought, and transported it beyond the bounds, within which this particular form of national life was alone possible. But he did not do so before it was time, nor before the untenableness of the old position had been amply demonstrated. The revolution which was silently transforming the whole spirit and character of the Greeks, was not the fault of one individual, but it was the fault of destiny, or rather it was the general fault of the time. The Athenians, in punishing him condemned themselves, and committed the injustice of making him pay the penalty of what was historically the fault of all. The condemnation did not in the least degree effect the purpose intended: instead of being banished, the spirit of innovation was, on the contrary, strengthened all the more. The collision was not a simple one between two moral powers equally justified and equally limited. Guilt and innocence were not equally divided between the parties. On the one hand was a principle historically necessary and of high importance, of which Socrates had an unquestioned claim to be the representative. On the other hand, one far more limited, represented by his opponents, but

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to which they can hardly be said to have a perfect right, since they do not faithfully adhere to it. This is the peculiar tragic turn in the fate of Socrates. A reformer who is truly conservative is attacked by nominal but pretended restorers of old times. The Athenians in punishing him give themselves up as lost; for in reality it is not for destroying morals that he is punished, but for attempting to restore them.

(γ)  
*breach  
between  
Socrates  
and his  
country-  
men was  
absolutely  
necessary.*

To form a correct judgment of the whole occurrence, we must not forget that Socrates was condemned by only a very small majority, that to all appearance it was in his own power to secure his acquittal, and that undoubtedly he would have escaped with a far less punishment than death, had he not challenged his judges by the appearance of pride. These circumstances must make it doubly doubtful, whether his ruin was an unavoidable consequence of his having opposed the spirit of his nation. They also place the guilt of the Athenians in a milder light, by laying it in part on the head of the accused. At the same time they prove that accidental events, in no way connected with the leading character of his teaching, had great weight in the final decision. No doubt Socrates was at variance with the ground occupied by the ancient morality and with its requirements; but it by no means follows that in the existing state of opinion at Athens a breach between him and his nation must necessarily have arisen. Although the political reaction after the expulsion of the thirty tyrants was sufficiently powerful to bring

about an attack on him, the conviction of his guilt was not so universal but that it might have been possible for him to escape the punishment of death.

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It was a happy thing for his honour and his cause, that he did not escape. What Socrates in pious faith expressed after his condemnation—that to die would be better for him—has been fully realised in his work. The picture of the dying Socrates must at the time have been in the highest degree, what it is now after centuries have past—a simple testimony to the greatness of the human mind, to the power of philosophy, and to the victory of a spirit pious and pure, reposing on clear convictions. It must have appeared to his followers like a guiding star for their inner life shining in all its glory; and thus it is depicted by Plato's master hand. It must have increased their admiration for their teacher, their zeal to imitate him, their devotion to his teaching. By his death the stamp of higher truth was impressed on his life and words. The sublime repose and happy cheerfulness with which he met death, was the strongest corroboration of all his convictions, the zenith of a long life devoted to knowledge and virtue. Death did not add to the substance of his teaching, but it added greatly to its influence. A life had been spent in sowing the seeds of knowledge with a zeal unequalled by any other philosopher either before or after; the result was seen at his death, when they brought forth fruit abundantly in the Socratic Schools.

IV. *The  
result of  
his death.*



## PART III.

### THE IMPERFECT FOLLOWERS OF SOCRATES.

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#### CHAPTER XI.

THE SCHOOL OF SOCRATES : HIS POPULAR PHILOSOPHY.

XENOPHON : ÆSCHINES.

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*A. School  
of Socrates.*

A MIND so great and active in every way as that of Socrates could not fail to make a lasting impression on every kind of character with which it came into contact. But if the most perfect systems are often not understood by their adherents in the sense in which they were intended by their authors, may not a much greater dissimilarity and difference of apprehension be expected, in a case where no complete system existed, but where there were only fragments and germs of what might be one—a person, a principle, a method, a mass of individual utterances and of occasional discussions? The greater part of the followers of Socrates confined their attention to what was most obvious, and lay nearest to an ordinary intelligence—the originality, the purity of character, the intelligent view of life, the deep piety and the beautiful moral expression of

their teacher. A smaller number devoted themselves to the deeper thoughts, which were concealed under so unpretentious an outside; but even of these the majority took a very limited view of the subjects which occupied Socrates. They combined older theories with the teaching of their master, which it is true needed such a supplement; but they did it in such a way as almost to lose sight of the merits of his philosophy. One only with a deeper insight into the spirit of Socrates has succeeded in creating a system which reproduces in a more brilliant and extended form what Socrates had attained in another manner and on a narrower scale.

Of the pupils of Socrates who are known to us, by far the greater number undoubtedly belong to those first mentioned.<sup>1</sup> Many of the writings attributed to

<sup>1</sup> Among them Crito (Xen. *Symp.* 173, B., 174, A., 223, B.); Mem. ii. 9; Plato, Crito, Phædo, 59, B., 60, A., 63, D., 115, A.; Euthydemus; Diog. ii. 121, who makes him the author of seventeen books, which, however, belong to him as little as his supposed children do to Hermogenes), and Clitobulus his son (Xen. Mem. i. 3, 8, ii. 6; Ec. 1-6; *Symp.* 4, 10; Plato, *Apol.* 33, D., 38, B.; Phædo, 59, B.; Æsch. in *Athenæus* v. 220, a.); Chærephon (Mem. i. 2, 48; ii. 3; Plato, *Apol.* 20, E.; Charm. 153, B.; Gorgias, Aristophanes, *Clouds*, 1296) and his brother Chærecrates. Also Apollodorus (Mem. iii. 11, 17; Plato, *Apol.* 34, A., 38, B.; Phædo, 59, B., 117, D.; *Symp.*); Aristodemus (Mem. i. 4; Plato, *Symp.* 173, B., 174, A., 223, B.); Euthydemus (Mem. iv. 2; 3; 5; 6; Pl. *Sym.* 222, B.); Theages (Pl., *Apol.* 33, E.; Rep. vi. 496, B.); Hermogenes (Xen. Mem. ii. 10, 3, iv. 8, 4; *Sym.* 4, 46; *Apol.*, Pl. Phædo, 59, B.); Hermocrates (Mem. i. 2, 48; Pl. *Tim.* 19, C.); Phædonides (Mem. i. 2, 48; Pl. Phædo, 59, C.); Theodotus (Pl., *Apol.* 33, E.); Epigenes (Phædo, 59, B.; Mem. iii. 12); Menexenus (Phædo, 59, B.; *Lysis*, 206, D.); Ctesippus, (Phædo, Euthydemus, and *Lysis*); Theætetus (Theætet. *Soph.* Pol.); Terpsion (Pl. Theæt.; Phædo, 59, C.); Charmides (Xen. Mem. iii. 7; 6, 14; *Symp.* 4, 29; *Hellen.* ii. 4, 19; Plato, Charm. *Sym.* 222, B.; Prot. 315, A.); Glaucon (Mem. iii. 6; the same

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them appear to be spurious. Others, which are known to us by their titles, were, on an average doubtless little more than summaries of popular moral maxims.<sup>1</sup> One of the best illustrations of this mode of understanding and applying the doctrines of Socrates may be found in Xenophon.<sup>2</sup>

B. *Xenophon.*

It is impossible in reading his works not to be struck with the purity and loftiness of his sentiments, with his chivalrous character, and the healthy tone of his mind; but his philosophical capacity cannot be estimated at a very high rate. His description of Socrates is full of admiration for the greatness of his character; but he has only imperfectly understood his

individual to whom Diog. ii. 124, attributes nine genuine and thirty-two spurious dialogues); Cleombrotus (Phæd. 59, C.; perhaps the same who is said by Callim. in Cic. Tusc. i. 34, 84, to have committed suicide, probably not from misunderstanding the exhortation to a philosophic death, but from shame because his conduct was blamed in the Phædo). Diodorus (Mem. ii. 10); Critias and Alcibiades in their younger years, (Mem. i. 2, 12); not to mention others who were acquainted with Socrates, but did not join his way of thinking, such as Phædrus, Callias, the younger Pericles, Aristarchus, Eutherus, and many others.

<sup>1</sup> Crito and Glaucon.

<sup>2</sup> Xenophon, the son of Gryllus, born probably 444 or 445 B.C., is said to have been previously acquainted with Socrates by Diog. ii. 48, whose account does not in other respects appear very

trustworthy. Two years before the death of Socrates he joined the army of the younger Cyrus, and conducted and afterwards described its glorious retreat. Banished for this from Athens, he served at Sparta for several years, and then took up his abode at Scillus, near Elis. Afterwards he was driven thence, 371 B.C., and settled at Corinth; where he died, 355 B.C. His writings, which are distinguished for purity and grace of language, and the unadorned clearness of the description, appear to have been preserved entire. The Apology, however, the Agesilaus, and the treatise on the Athenian constitution can hardly be genuine, and the books on hunting, and the Spartan constitution are suspected. For his life and writings consult Diog. ii. 48; Krüger, *De Xenoph. Vita*, Halle, 1832, and Ranke, *De Xenoph. Vita et Scriptis*, Berlin, 1851.

philosophical merit and his intellectual labours. Not only does he share the narrowness of the point of view taken by Socrates—as for instance when he quotes the derogatory opinions of his master about natural science in proof of his piety and intelligence,<sup>1</sup>—but he misunderstands the true greatness of the discussions he reports. The formation of conceptions, in which lies the germ of the whole teaching of Socrates, is only mentioned by him when he wishes to prove the merits of his teacher as shown by his care for the culture of his friends.<sup>2</sup> All that he gathers from Socrates' peculiar method of pursuing knowledge, and his habit of asking every one about his mode of life, is that he tried to make himself useful to all,<sup>3</sup> not excluding artisans or persons in any rank of life whatsoever. It is also difficult to discover from his account the import of those sayings relative to virtue, which are at the bottom of all the Socratic Ethics. We may hence conclude that their import was far from being understood by Xenophon himself.<sup>4</sup> Many echoes and reminiscences of the Socratic mode of teaching are to be found in his independent writings, but he is too much occupied with practical applications of them to engage in any really scientific researches. He describes the catechetical mode of teaching,<sup>5</sup> in which he seems to have been somewhat skilled; but his dialogues are not, like those of the genuine Socratic type, directed to the formation of conceptions.

<sup>1</sup> Mem. i. 1, 11; iv. 7.<sup>2</sup> Ibid. iv. 6.<sup>3</sup> Ibid. iii. 10, 1; v. 1.<sup>4</sup> Mem. iii. 9.<sup>5</sup> Ec. 19, 14.

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He recommends knowledge of self,<sup>1</sup> but he takes knowledge in its popular sense, meaning that no one ought to attempt what is beyond his powers. He insists on piety, self-restraint,<sup>2</sup> and so forth, but he appears not to hold the maxim of Socrates,<sup>3</sup> that all these virtues consist in knowledge. Following the method used by Socrates, he proves that every one is ready to submit to the wise,<sup>4</sup> that right and law are synonymous terms,<sup>5</sup> and that the rich are not more happy than the poor.<sup>6</sup> He repeats what Socrates had said about truth and error,<sup>7</sup> but not without pointing out that this principle is liable to be abused. With the same decision as his master, he declares against the sensual and unnatural abuses of love;<sup>8</sup> and, following out his train of thought, he requires that woman should have a recognised social position, and that great attention should be devoted to her culture.<sup>9</sup> On the knowledge and omnipotence of the Gods, on their care for mankind, on the blessing consequent upon piety,<sup>10</sup> he expresses himself with warmth; but at the same time in regard to predictions and sacrifices he fully shares the belief of his nation.<sup>11</sup> He makes Cyrus express the hope of a life after death, and con-

<sup>1</sup> *Cyrop.* vii. 2, 20.<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* viii. 1, 23.<sup>3</sup> Compare the conversation between Cyrus and Tigranes, *Cyrop.* iii. 1, 16, and *Mem.* i. 2, 19, in which the ordinary view is taken rather than the view of Socrates, although the language allows the latter.<sup>4</sup> *Cyrop.* i. 6, 21.<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.* i. 3, 17.<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.* viii. 3, 40; *Sym.* 4,29; *Mem.* i. 6, 4.<sup>7</sup> *Cyrop.* i. 6, 31; *Mem.* iv. 2, 13.<sup>8</sup> *Symp.* 8, 7.<sup>9</sup> *Æc.* 3, 13.<sup>10</sup> *Symp.* 4, 46; *Cyrop.* i. 6, 2.<sup>11</sup> Compare amongst other passages, *Cyrop.* i. 6, 2; 23; 44: *Æc.* 5, 19; 7, 7; 11, 8; *Cyrop.* i. 6, 23, agrees fully with *Mem.* i. 1, 6.



firms his view by several considerations, but yet he does not utter the belief with full assurance. He reminds us that the soul is invisible; that vengeance surely comes on the murderers of the innocent, and that honour is due to the dead. He cannot believe that the soul which gives life to the body should be mortal, or that reason should not survive in greater purity after its separation from the body, seeing that prophesying in sleep is an indication of the separate life of the soul.<sup>1</sup> In all these passages we may discern the faithful and thoughtful follower of Socrates, but there is not a trace of original thought. Indeed it is doubtful whether the few passages in which Xenophon seems to have somewhat amplified the teaching of his master, ought not really to be attributed to Socrates.

His larger work on politics, the *Cyropædeia*, is, as a book of political philosophy, unimportant. He proposes there to carry out the Socratic idea of a ruler who understands his business,<sup>2</sup> and who devotes the same care to his people that a shepherd does to his flock;<sup>3</sup> but what he really gives, is a description of a valiant and prudent general,<sup>4</sup> of an upright man, and of a chivalrous conqueror. There is not a single attempt made to mark out more clearly the province of government, to give a higher meaning to the state, or to ensure its destiny by fixed institutions. The de-

<sup>1</sup> *Cyrop.* viii. 7, 17.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* i. 1, 3.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* viii. 2, 14; *Mem.* i. 2, 32.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* 6, 12, speaks of these

duties in language similar to *Mem.* iii. 1. Perhaps Xenophon may be the nameless friend in this passage.

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mand for a careful education<sup>1</sup> may reveal the follower of Socrates, but there is so little reference in that education to knowledge,<sup>2</sup> that it might be far sooner taken for a Spartan than for a Socratic education. Every thing centres in the person of the prince. The state is an Asiatic kingdom. The highest aim to which all its institutions tend,<sup>3</sup> is the strength and wealth of its sovereign and the aristocracy. And even this view is very imperfectly carried out, and many important departments of government are altogether omitted.<sup>4</sup> His smaller treatise on family life is more successful. It bears witness to an intelligent mind and a benevolent heart, which shows itself in particular in the position assigned to woman<sup>5</sup> and in the treatment of slaves.<sup>6</sup> But it makes no pretensions to be a philosophical treatise, though it may contain many Socratic thoughts.<sup>7</sup> The history of philosophy can therefore gain but little from Xenophon.

C. *Æschines*.

Æschines<sup>8</sup> would appear to have treated the teach-

<sup>1</sup> *Cyrop.* i. 2, 2 ; viii. 8, 13 ; vii. 5, 72.

<sup>2</sup> A weak echo of the principle of Socrates is found i. 4, 3.

<sup>3</sup> Compare viii. 1, The treaty between Cyrus and the Persians, viii. 5, 24, has for its object, security by the advantages of government.

<sup>4</sup> Compare the spirited remarks of Mohl, *Gesch. d. Staatswissenschaft*, i. 204.

<sup>5</sup> C. 3, 13.

<sup>6</sup> 12, 3 ; 14, 9 ; c. 21 ; 7, 37 ; 41.

<sup>7</sup> The maxim that nothing is good of which the right use is not understood, belongs here, and

also the expressions already quoted about woman.

<sup>8</sup> Æschines, son of Lysanias, (*Plato*, *Apol.* 33 E. (against whom *Diog.* ii. 60, can have no weight), is praised for his adherence to Socrates (*Diog.* ii. 31 ; *Senec. Benef.* i. 8). *Plato* mentions him (*Phædo*, 59, R.), among those who were present at the death of Socrates. *Idomeneus* however, (*Diog.* ii. 60, 35 ; iii. 36), transferred to him the part played by *Crito* in *Plato*, probably out of spite to *Plato*. We afterwards encounter him in the company of

ing of Socrates in the same way. The writings of this disciple,<sup>1</sup> are reckoned among the best models of Attic prose.<sup>2</sup> By some these writings are preferred to those of Xenophon.<sup>3</sup> It is moreover asserted that they reproduce the spirit of Socrates with wonderful fidelity,<sup>4</sup> and the few fragments which are preserved of them confirm these statements. But they appear to have been singularly poor in real philosophic thought. Their strength consisted far more in the grace and elegance of their language than in an independent treatment of the Socratic teaching.

The two Thebans, Simmias<sup>5</sup> and Cebes,<sup>6</sup> would seem to have been true philosophers; they were both pupils of Philolaus,<sup>7</sup> and are described by Plato<sup>8</sup> as

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*D. Sim-  
mias and  
Cebes.*

the younger Dionysius (Diog. ii. 61; 63; Plut. *Adul. et Am.* c. 26; Philost. v. *Apollon.* i. 35; Lucian, *Paras.* c. 32), to whom he had been recommended by Plato, according to Plutarch, by Aristippus according to Diogenes. Aristippus appears as his friend in Diog. ii. 82; Plut. *Coh. Ira*, 14. Poor to begin with (Diog. ii. 34, 62) he was still poor in after-life on his return to Athens. He did not venture it is said to found a school, but delivered a few speeches and treatises for money (Diog. ii. 62). Whether the dirty stories are true which Lysias in *Athen.* xiii. 611, lays to his charge, is an open question. His writings according to *Athen.* would lead us to expect an honourable man. The time of his death is not known.

<sup>1</sup> According to Diog. ii. 61, 64, Phrynichus in Phot. *Bibliothek*, these were considered to

be genuine. The scanty remains of them have been collected by Hermann, *De Æschin. Socr. Reliquiis*, Gött. 1850.

<sup>2</sup> Longin. *περὶ εὐρέας*; *Rhet.* Gr. ix. 559.

<sup>3</sup> Phrynich. in Phot. *Cod.* 61; Hermogenes, *Form. Orat.* ii. 3; *Rhet.* Gr. iii. 394. He is said to have imitated Gorgias in speaking, Diog. ii. 63.

<sup>4</sup> Aristid. *Or.* xlv. p. 35. Hence the story (Diog. ii. 60, 62; *Athen.* xiii. 611), that his speeches had been composed by Socrates, and given to him by Xanthippe. Diog. ii. 47 ranks him among the most distinguished followers of Socrates.

<sup>5</sup> Xen. *Mem.* i. 2, 48; iii. 11, 17; Plato, *Phædo*, 59, C., 63 A.

<sup>6</sup> *Mem.*; *Phædo*, 59, C., 60, C.

<sup>7</sup> *Phædo*, 61, D.

<sup>8</sup> It is said (*Phædo*, 242, B.), that Simmias, delivered and composed more philosophical speeches

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thoughtful men; but nothing certain is known of their opinions or their logical affinities. The writings attributed to them<sup>1</sup> were rejected even by Panætius<sup>2</sup> as far as he knew them, and the single one extant, known as the 'Mirror' of Cebes, is certainly spurious.<sup>3</sup> Still less can any dependence be placed on the writings which were circulated at a later time under the name of the shoemaker Simon.<sup>4</sup> He is probably altogether an imaginary person.<sup>5</sup>

In addition to Plato, four founders of Socratic schools are known to us: Euclid, Phædo, Antisthenes, and Aristippus. The two former are much alike, but the others followed courses peculiar to themselves.

than any one else. In the Phædo, 85, C., he is made to utter the maxim, that every question should be pursued as far as possible. Of Cebes, it is said (Phædo, 63, A., 77, A.), that he could always raise objections, and was the most inveterate doubter; and the part which he and Simmias play in the Phædo, corresponds with this description.

<sup>1</sup> Diog. ii. 124, mentions twenty-three lectures of Simmias and three of Cebes, including the Mirror.

<sup>2</sup> Diog. ii. 64: πάντων μέντοι τῶν Σωκρατικῶν διαλόγων Παναίτιος ἀληθεῖς εἶναι δοκεῖ τοῦς Πλάτωνος, Ξενοφῶντος, Ἀντισθένης, Αἰσχίνου· διστάζει δὲ περὶ τῶν Φαίδωνος καὶ Εὐκλείδου, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἀναιρεῖ πάντας.

<sup>3</sup> In modern times there have been supporters of its genuineness, for instance, Bähr and Schweighäuser; but their assumption is refuted by two passages

in it, one of which mentions a Peripatetic, and the other quotes a word from Plato's Laws. In other respects too, notwithstanding a general want of definiteness, traces appear of later times, e.g. Stoic morality and attacks on false culture.

<sup>4</sup> See Diog. ii. 122; Suid. Σωκράτης· Epist. Socrat. 12, 13; Plut. c. Prin. Philos. c. 1; Böckh, in Plat. Minoëm. 42.

<sup>5</sup> What Diogenes says of him is unsatisfactory, and the story that Pericles asked to be taken in by him, but that he refused, besides being chronologically suspicious, is hardly likely to be true. Of the dialogues attributed to him a great part are found in writings belonging to other people. It is suspicious, that he is not mentioned by any ancient authority, and that both Plato and Xenophon should be silent about an old and very remarkable pupil of Socrates.



Thus there arose three distinct kinds of Socratic Schools: the Megarian-Elean, the Cynic, and the Cyrenaic. These are all descended from Socrates, but are one-sided in their aims; and since they hold aloof from earlier systems, they only imperfectly reproduce the spirit of the teaching of Socrates, and deviate from him and from one another in the most opposite directions. The highest duty of man was, by Socrates, placed in the knowledge of the good. What that good was he could not determine more accurately, but he was partly satisfied with a practical view of it, and was partly restricted to a theory of relative pleasure. These various sides of his philosophy now diverge, and are rounded into systems. One party confines itself to the general burden of the teaching of Socrates—the abstract idea of the good. Others start from pleasure, making it the gauge of the good, and the good itself something relative. Again within the former class some make the theoretical, others the practical treatment of the good, to be the main point. Thus the Socratic teaching gave rise to the three Schools just named, which in so far as they bring into prominence individual elements in the spirit of Socrates, revert to older lines of thought, long since passed in the historical development of philosophy. The Megarians and Cynics go back to the Eleatic doctrine of the One and All, and to the sophistry of Gorgias; the Cyrenaics to the negative teaching of Protagoras, and to the early scepticism of Heraclitus.



## CHAPTER XII.

## THE MEGARIAN AND THE ELEAN-ERETRIAN SCHOOLS.

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XII.*The  
Megarians.  
A. History  
of the  
School.*

THE founder of the Megarian school<sup>1</sup> is Euclid.<sup>2</sup> A faithful friend and admirer of Socrates,<sup>3</sup> but at the same time intimately acquainted with the Eleatic

<sup>1</sup> Deycks, *De Megaricorum Doctrina*, Bonn, 1827, whose careful work has not been added to by Mallet's *Histoire de l'École de Mégare*, Par. 1845. More independent but sometimes too diffuse is Henne, *École de Mégare*, Par. 1843. Ritter, *Ueber die Philosophie der Meg. Schule*. Hartstein, *Ueber die Bedeutung der Meg. Schule für die Gesch. d. Metaphys.* Prautl, *Gesch. d. Logik*, i. 33, which enters most deeply into the logical teaching of the Megarians.

<sup>2</sup> Euclid's home was Megara, (Plato, *Theætet.*; *Phædo*, 59, C.); that it was his birth-place is asserted by Cic. *Acad.* iv. 42, 129; Strabo, ix. 1; *Diog.* ii. 106. The statement that he came from Gela (*τινὲς* in *Diog.*) must rest on a misunderstanding. Deycks imagines it arose from confounding him with Euclid the jester. Henne conjectures, but without sufficient reason, that he was educated at Gela. The time of his birth cannot be accurately determined. He was however

probably older than Plato. This seems to be attested by the fact, that on the death of Socrates he served for some time as a centre to his disciples. The time of his death is also uncertain. If Stilpo and Pasicles were his personal pupils, he must have lived at least till 360 B.C. But very little is known of him. A celebrated utterance of his to his brother, which bears witness to a gentle character, is quoted by *Plut. de Ira*, 14; *Frat. Am.* 18; *Stob. Flor.* 84, 15. *Diog.* ii. 108, mentions six discourses of his.

<sup>3</sup> The story told by Gell., N. A. vi. 10, of his nightly visits to Athens is well known. It cannot, however, go for much, though not in itself improbable. On the contrary, it may be gathered from Plato's *Theætet.* 142, C. that Euclid constantly visited Socrates from Megara, and from the *Phædo*, 59, C. that he was present at his death. A further proof of his close connection with the followers of Socrates will be found in the fact (*Diog.* ii. 106; iii. 6)

doctrine,<sup>1</sup> Euclid made use of the latter, to develop the Socratic philosophy in a way peculiar to himself. He thus established a separate branch of the Socratic School,<sup>2</sup> which continued until the early part of the third century.<sup>3</sup> Ichthyas<sup>4</sup> is named as his pupil and successor, but nothing further is known of him.<sup>5</sup> Of greater note was Eubulides,<sup>6</sup> the celebrated dialectician,<sup>7</sup> who wrote against Aristotle,<sup>8</sup> and who is

that Plato and other followers of Socrates stayed with him for a considerable time after the death of their master. He is usually spoken of as a disciple of Socrates, and has a place amongst his most distinguished disciples.

<sup>1</sup> As may be gathered from his system with greater certainty than from Cic. and Diog. When Euclid became acquainted with the Eleatic Philosophy is uncertain. It is most probable that he was under its influence before he came under that of Socrates, although the story in Diog. ii. 30 is too uncertain to prove much.

<sup>2</sup> Called Megarian or Eristic or Dialectic, Diog. ii. 106. Consult Deyck about these names. He proves that the terms Eristic and Dialectic were not confined to the Megarian School. Compare Sextus Empiricus, who generally understands by Dialecticians, Stoics, for instance, Pyrrh. ii. 146, 166, 229, 235.

<sup>3</sup> How early Euclid was at the head of a special circle of pupils, and whether he appeared formally as a Sophist, or like Socrates only gradually gathered about him men desirous to learn, we are not told. Perhaps the emigration of

many followers of Socrates to Megara gave occasion for the establishment of this school, i.e. to the formation of a society, which at first moved about Euclid's house and person, busying itself with discussions. It is no where stated, that Plato and his friends removed to Megara, attracted by the fame of the School of Euclid, as Henne maintains, p. 27.

<sup>4</sup> Suid. *Εὐκλείδης*—Diog. ii. 112, only makes the general remark, that he belonged to the School of Euclid.

<sup>5</sup> His name is still found in Diog. ii. 112; vi. 80 (Diogenes dedicated to him a dialogue called Ichthyas). Athen. viii. 335.

<sup>6</sup> From Miletus according to Diog. ii. 108. Whether he was the head of a school, or whether he was an immediate disciple of Euclid, we do not know: Socrates only says, *τῆς δ' Εὐκλείδου διαδοχῆς ἐστὶ καὶ Εὐβ.*

<sup>7</sup> Compare Diog. ii. 108; Sext. Math. vii. 13.

<sup>8</sup> Diog. ii. 109; Aristocles in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 2, 5; Athen. viii. 354, b. Themist. Or. xxiii. 285, c. From these passages it is seen that the attack of Eubulides on Aristotle was very violent, and

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mentioned as the teacher of Demosthenes.<sup>1</sup> Cotemporary with him were Thrasy-machus<sup>2</sup> of Corinth, and Diocli-des,<sup>3</sup> perhaps also Clinomachus.<sup>4</sup> Pasicles<sup>5</sup> however, would appear to be younger. Apollonius of Cyrene, surnamed Cronus,<sup>6</sup> the teacher of the sharp-witted Diodorus Cronus,<sup>7</sup> was also a pupil of Eubulides, and another of his pupils was Euphantus, who is only known to us as a poet and historian.<sup>8</sup> The

not free from personal abuse. We also hear from Athen. x. 437 of a comedy of Eubulides. But he can hardly be the individual whose work on the Cynic Diogenes is quoted by Diog. vi. 20, 30.

<sup>1</sup> The fact seems pretty well established (although it is conspicuously omitted by Plutarch in his life of Demosthenes), being not only attested by Diog. ii. 108; Pseudoplut. v. Dec. Orat. viii. 21; Apulei. De Mag. c. 15; Suid. Δημοσθένης, and Phot. Cod. 265, but being also alluded to by the Comedian in Diog., who can hardly have spoken of a bare acquaintance as a disciple.

<sup>2</sup> According to Diog. ii. 121, a friend of Ichthyas, and a teacher of Stilpo's.

<sup>3</sup> Suid. Στίλπων, a pupil of Euclid and the teacher of Pasicles.

<sup>4</sup> A Thurian (according to Diog. ii. 112), and a teacher of Stilpo's son Bryso, Suid. Πύρρων. Diog. says he was the first to write about predicates, sentences, and such like.

<sup>5</sup> The relations of this man are not clear; Diog. vi. 89, calls him a pupil of Euclid, and a brother of the Cynic Crates, both of which are hardly compatible.

Suid. Στίλπων calls him a disciple of his brother Crates and of Diocli-des, and the teacher of Stilpo.

<sup>6</sup> Diog. ii. 111; Strabo, xiv. 2, 21; xvii. 3, 22.

<sup>7</sup> Diodorus a native of Iasos in Caria (Diog. and Strabo explain the name Cronus in various ways), belongs to the most distinguished dialecticians of the Megarian School. Cic. De Fato, 6, 12, calls him 'valens dialecticus'; Sext. Math. i. 309, διαλεκτικώτατος. Sext. and Diog. ii. 111, give two epigrams of Callimachus addressed to him. His fallacies and his researches into motion, and into hypothetical sentences, will be mentioned hereafter. Pique at a dialectical defeat inflicted by Stilpo at the table of Ptolemy Soter, is said to have killed him (Diog.; Plin. His. Nat. vii. 53, 18). He bequeathed his dialectic to his five daughters; Clem. Al. Strom. iv. 523, A.; Hieron. adv. Jovin. i. t. iv. 186; see Steinhart.

<sup>8</sup> All we know of him is from Diog. ii. 110, who calls him the tutor of King Antigonos, and to Antigonos he addressed a book, περὶ βασιλείας. Athen. vi. 251 quotes an extract from the fourth

rest were thrown into the shade by Stilpo,<sup>1</sup> a pupil of Thrasymachus. His spirited lectures made him an object of wonder to his cotemporaries, and the crowds who flocked from all sides to listen to them shed a lustre on the Megarian school such as it had not hitherto enjoyed.<sup>2</sup> At the same time a new direction was imparted by him to the development of the Megarian doctrine. The principles of the Cynic School, into which Diogenes had initiated him,<sup>3</sup> were united with those of his own School to such an extent, that doubts may be felt whether Stilpo rather

book of his history, in which if he has not made a gross mistake, *πρώτον* must be read for *τρίτον*. Calli-crates, also mentioned by Athenæus, is known from Diodor. xx. 21, as a favourite of Ptolemy Soter.

<sup>1</sup> Stilpo of Megara, Diog. ii. 113, must have lived to the end of the fourth century. At least he survived the capture of Megara by Ptolemy Lagi, and his defeat by Demetrius Poliorcetes, two events which happened 307 and 306 B.C. respectively. On the former occasion, the interview with Diodorus Cronus may have happened; for Stilpo never visited Egypt (Diog. 115). Since he died at an advanced age, we may approximately place his birth in 380, and his death in 300 B.C. Probably we ought to place the date of both later, for the notices about his pupils in Diog. ii. 113-120, Senec. Epist. 10, 1, lead us to believe, that his activity was cotemporary with that of Theophrastus; and accordingly it cannot have begun long before the death of

Aristotle. Some of the pupils of Euclid are mentioned as his teachers, and (Diog. ii. 113), in particular Thrasymachus. Even Euclid himself is named by some, but the latter statement we can hardly accept as probable. His character, about which more will be said hereafter, is commended as upright, gentle, persevering, open, generous, and unselfish, Diog. ii. 117; Cic. De Fato, 5, 10; Plut. Vit. Pud. c. 18; adv. Col. 22, 1. He also took part in public business, Diog. 114. Nine of his dialogues are mentioned by Diog. ii. 120.

<sup>2</sup> Diog. ii. 113, exaggerates in saying, *τοσοῦτον δ' εὐρεσιλογία καὶ σοφιστεία προῆγε τοὺς ἄλλους, ὥστε μικροῦ δεῖσαι πᾶσαν τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἀφορῶσαν εἰς αὐτὸν μεγαλίσαι*. He also mentions the pupils, who joined him, coming from other philosophers, and the universal admiration paid to him at Athens and by several princes. It is all the more striking that Diog. 120 call his speeches *ψυχροί*.

<sup>3</sup> Diog. vi. 76.



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belongs to the Cynics or to the Megarians.<sup>1</sup> He would thus be the immediate precursor of the Stoa, in which two branches of the Socratic philosophy were united by his pupil Zeno.<sup>2</sup> Other Megarians, however, continued faithful to the exclusively critical character of this School. Alexinus of Elis, a cotemporary of Stilpo,<sup>3</sup> but somewhat younger, is notorious for his captiousness; and logical subtleties are recorded<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The proof of this will be given later.

<sup>2</sup> That Zeno was a pupil of Stilpo is stated by Diog. ii. 120; vii. 2, 24. The same person is no doubt intended in Diog. ii. 114, by Zeno the Phœnician. The founder of the Stoa is frequently called a Phœnician, Diog. vii. 15, 25, 30. In no case can Zeno of Sidon the pupil of Apollodorus, be thought of, who was himself a pupil of Epicurus, and who, according to Diog. x. 25, vii. 35, continued faithful to Epicureanism. It is more likely that Zeno the Sidonian is meant, whom Diog. vii. 38, reckons among the pupils of Socrates.

<sup>3</sup> Diog. ii. 109, speaks of him as a pupil of Eubulides (*μεταξὺ δὲ ἄλλων ὄντων τῆς Εὐβουλίδου διαδοχῆς Ἀλεξίνος ἐγένετο Ἡλείος*). The age in which he lived can be approximately determined by his disputes with Stilpo (Plut. Vit. Pud. c. 18), with Menedemus (Diog. ii. 135), and with Zeno, whose strongest opponent he was, Diog. ii. 109; Sext. Math. ix. 108; Plut. Comm. Not. 10, 3. He must have been younger than Stilpo, and have flourished in the first ten years of the third century. His love of

contention and dispute gained for him the derisive epithet *Ἐλεγγίς*, Diog. Plut. Vit. Pud. 18. We also learn from Hermippus in Diog. that he retired to Olympia in his last years, in order to establish a new school there. Since this place of abode did not suit his pupils, he alone remained there, but soon died of an injury. For his writings consult Diog. ii. 110; vii. 163; Athen. xv. 696.

<sup>4</sup> Diog. vii. 16, a passage which does not appear so ambiguous as Ritter would have it, particularly when the subsequent accounts are taken into consideration. Diog. relates that Zeno of Cittium was fond of his society; Clement, Stromat. iv. 523, and Jerome adv. Jov. i., quote from his *Menexenus*, the passage already given, on the daughters of Diodorus, of whom he must then have spoken in terms of praise. It is a clear mistake on the part of Jerome to make him the teacher of Carneades. Still stranger is Mallet's mistake, confounding the disputant Philo with Philo of Larissa, the founder of the fourth Academy. The latter was his junior by 150 to 200 years. Nor can Philo be reckoned among the Stoics, although



of Philo, the pupil of Diodorus.<sup>1</sup> The verbal refinements of the Megarians gave rise to Pyrrho's philosophy of doubt, in the same way that the critical subtleties of the Eleatics led to the sophistical doubts of Gorgias. The connecting links were Pyrrho, who studied under Stilpo's son Bryso,<sup>2</sup> and Timon, who is said to have been under Stilpo himself.<sup>3</sup>

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The Megarian philosophy is only partially known to us from the fragmentary notices of the ancients; and frequently it is impossible to decide whether their statements refer to the founder and the older members, or only to the later followers of the School. It is all the more satisfactory to be able to learn a little more about the Megarians from Plato,<sup>4</sup> by

B. *Their doctrine.*

Fabricius and Prautl have so regarded him.

<sup>1</sup> Diog. vii. 191, 194, mentions Philo's writings *περὶ σημασιῶν*, and *περὶ τρόπων*, against which Chrysippus wrote; and without doubt he means this Philo. To the same individual must be referred what Cic. Acad. ii. 47, 143, and Sext. Math. viii. 113, Pyrrh. ii. 110, say about his view of hypothetical sentences being a different one from that of Diodorus. By Diog. and Clement he is surnamed *ὁ διαλεκτικός*.

<sup>2</sup> Diog. ix. 61; Suid. *Πύρρων*. Bryso himself, or *Δρύσων*, as he also is called by Diog., is said to have studied under Clinomachus. But this statement is not without its difficulties. Allowing it to be possible that Clinomachus and not Stilpo instructed Bryso, or that he enjoyed the instruction

of both, the chronology is still troublesome. For how can Pyrrho, before Alexander's expedition to Asia, have studied under the son of a man, whose own professional career probably comes after that expedition? It seems as though the relation of Pyrrho to Bryso as pupil and teacher were an imaginary combination, designed to connect the school of Pyrrho with the Megarian; or perhaps Bryso, the teacher of Pyrrho, has been wrongly made to be the son of this Stilpo. Suid. *Σωκράτ.* calls Bryso, the teacher of Pyrrho, a pupil of Socrates, or a pupil of Euclid according to some.

<sup>3</sup> Diog. ix. 109.

<sup>4</sup> Soph. 242, B. Plato defined Sophistry to be the art of deception. The difficulty immediately arises, that deception is only then possible, when not-being, to which all deception refers, has a certain

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the aid of a passage in which Schleiermacher<sup>1</sup> first recognised Megarian views, and which, in common with most writers,<sup>2</sup> we feel justified in applying to them.<sup>3</sup>

kind of being. It may then be asked, how is the being of the not-being possible? To answer this, Plato reviews various opinions about being. In the first place he examines the two most opposite statements, that being is the many, and that it is the one, and after having shown that neither a manifoldness of original substances without a substratum of unity, nor the Eleatic unity of all excluding the many, can be admitted, he continues: *τοὺς μὲν τοίνυν διακριβολογουμένους ὄντος τε περί καὶ μὴ πάντας μὲν οὐ διεληλύθαμεν, ὅμως δὲ ἱκανῶς ἐχέτω· τοὺς δὲ ἄλλως λέγοντας αὐ θεατέον.* These are again divided into classes, those who only allow reality to what is material, and others who are called *οἱ τῶν εἰδῶν φίλοι*. Of the latter it is stated 246, B.: *τοιγαροῦν οἱ πρὸς αὐτοὺς (the materialists) ἀμφισβητοῦντες μάλα εὐλαβῶς ἄνωθεν ἐξ ἀοράτου ποθὲν ἀμύνονται νοητὰ ἅττα καὶ ἀσώματα εἶδη βιαζόμενοι τὴν ἀληθινὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι· τὰ δὲ ἐκείνων σώματα καὶ τὴν λεγομένην ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἀλήθειαν κατὰ σμικρὰ διαθράοντες ἐν τοῖς λόγοις γένεσιν αὐτ' οὐσίας φερομένην τινὰ προσαγορεύουσιν.*

<sup>1</sup> Platon's Werke, ii. 2.

<sup>2</sup> Ast, Platon's Leben u. Schreiben, 201; Deycks, 37; Heindorf on Soph. 246, B.; Brandis, ii. a., 114; Hermann, Plat. 339; Stallbaum, Plat. Parm. 60; Steinhart, Allg. Encyk. i. 29, 53; Platon's Werke, iii. 204, 554; Henne, École de Mégare, 84-158; Prautl,

Gesch. d. Log. i. 37. Against Schleiermacher are Ritter, Petersen, and Mallet. Henne refers the description in Theætet. 185, C. of the formation of conceptions, to the Megarians, on the ground that it does not agree with Plato's own method. But it would seem that he is wrong in doing so, since we have no reason to think of others besides Plato and Socrates. Just as little may the passage in Parm. 131, B. be referred to the Megarians, as has been done by Schleiermacher, Pl. Werke, i. 2, 409, and Deycks, p. 42. The question whether things participate in Ideas, is one which the Megarians did not examine, and it is widely remote from the view discussed in the Sophistes.

<sup>3</sup> The following are the reasons. It is clear and generally allowed that Plato's description is too minute to be without reference to some philosophic School then existing. There is also definite reference to a Socratic School in the passage where an opinion is attributed to certain philosophers, to the effect that true existence only belongs to immaterial things. A philosophy of conceptions was unknown before the time of Socrates, and the description agrees with no one of the pre-Socratic Schools. The philosophers of conceptions are distinguished from the Eleatics, and are manifestly quite different from them. Still less can the Pythagoreans be thought of, as Mallet has done; for they had neither a philosophy

By making use of the evidence of Plato, and by considering the internal connection of their individual theories, we hope to construct a picture of the Megarian doctrine, which shall, in the main, faithfully represent the facts upon which it has been constructed.

The starting-point of the Megarian philosophy must be looked for in the search for a knowledge of conceptions which Socrates had insisted on. With

(a) *Conception of being and becoming.*

of conceptions, nor did they indulge in those subtle arguments with their opponents, which Plato attributes to these philosophers. The statement of Plato, 246, C., cannot be quoted to prove the contrary. Speaking there of the dispute between the idealists and the materialists he says that: *ἐν μέσῳ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα ἄπλετος ὁμοφωτέρων μάχη τις αἰεὶ ξυνέστηκεν*. This does not mean that this dispute has always existed, but that it was as old as the Schools themselves, or that, every time the point was touched upon, a violent altercation ensued between the parties. We are not obliged by this statement to refer this view to an earlier period than that of Socrates. And among the Socratic Schools there is none to which it can be attributed with so much probability as to the Megarian. To think that the passage refers to Plato (as Socher, *Plat. Schriften*, 265, does)—to whom the description does not properly apply—would only be possible by considering the Sophistes to be a spurious dialogue, as Socher really does. On the other hand it cannot be imagined, (as Ritter would have it) that a

School with a developed theory and a great importance for that time, should have remained unknown to us. We shall also find that all that Plato tells us about the philosophers of conceptions agrees with what we otherwise know of the Megarians; that many of his statements (the denial of motion, and the critical explaining away of the corporeal) depict most tellingly the well-known peculiarity of this School; whilst others aptly supply what is otherwise unknown. It is, however, quite a mistake to assert, that Plato would not have spoken of the Megarians simply as *ἄλλως λέγοντες*. Certainly he would not have spoken of the 'friends of ideas,' with whom he had to do, no matter who they may have been, in a derogatory way; for he always treats them with respect, but *ἄλλως λέγοντες* may be taken literally for 'those who speak differently,' with whom all does not turn, as with the Eleatics, upon the antithesis of being and not-being. This antithesis is not insisted on by these philosophers of ideas, but with them the distinction between being and becoming is the most important.

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this Euclid united the Eleatic doctrine of a difference between the knowledge derived from the senses and the knowledge derived from the reason. Believing that the difference between these two kinds of knowledge depended far more on the objects than on the form of knowledge, he arrived at the conviction that the senses show us what is capable of change and what comes into being, and that the mind alone supplies us with the knowledge of what is unchangeable and really exists.<sup>1</sup> He stood, therefore, in general, on the same footing as Plato, and it is possible that this view was arrived at by both philosophers simultaneously in their intellectual intercourse, and that Euclid was indebted to Plato for Heraclitus' view of a world of the senses.

Socrates made the immediate business of the mind to be the acquisition of knowledge of conceptions, conceptions, according to him, representing the part of a thing which never changes. But in Euclid's view not material things, but only immaterial groups of things admit of true being.<sup>2</sup> Stilpo expressed the same view, when he refused to allow the general conception to apply to individual things, because the general conception implies something quite different

<sup>1</sup> Plato, 248, A.: Γένεσιν, τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν χωρὶς που διελόμενοι λέγετε; ἢ γάρ;—Ναί.—Καὶ σώματι μὲν ἡμᾶς γενέσκει δι' αἰσθήσεως κοινωνεῖν, διὰ λογισμοῦ δὲ ψυχῇ πρὸς τὴν ὄντως οὐσίαν, ἣν αἰεὶ κατὰ ταῦτ' ὥσαύτως ἔχειν φατέ, γένεσιν δὲ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως. For this reason Aristotle, in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 17, 1, says of the Megarians and Eleatics together: οἰονταὶ γὰρ

δεῖν τὰς μὲν αἰσθήσεις καὶ φαντασίας καταβάλλειν, αὐτῷ δὲ μόνον τῷ λόγῳ πιστεύειν.

<sup>2</sup> In the passage of the Soph. 246, B., the words τὰ δὲ ἐκείνων σώματα must not be taken to mean 'the bodies of those conceptions,' εἶδη ἀσώματα, but 'the bodies of the materialists,' in which they look for all real being.



from every individual thing, which was existing long before.<sup>1</sup> In this respect the Megarians again agree with Plato.<sup>2</sup> But in the sense of living spiritual forces—for as such Plato regarded his conceptional groups—conceptions were rejected by Euclid, following in the steps of Parmenides, who denied every kind of motion to being. By Parmenides, action and passion were reduced to the sphere of the becoming. Being, he asserted, could neither admit of action, of passion, nor even of motion.<sup>3</sup>

Connected with this denial of the becoming is the assertion, probably belonging to Euclid, and cer-

<sup>1</sup> Diog. ii. 119, says of him: ἔλεγε, τὸν λέγοντα ἄνθρωπον εἶναι μηδὲνα (in which we suggest εἰπεῖν instead of εἶναι), οὔτε γὰρ τόνδε λέγειν οὔτε τόνδε. τί γὰρ μᾶλλον τόνδε ἢ τόνδε; οὔτε ἄρα τόνδε. καὶ πάλιν· τὸ λάχανον οὐκ ἐστὶ τὸ δεικνύμενον. λάχανον μὲν γὰρ ἦν πρὸ μυρίων ἐτῶν· οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶ τοῦτο λάχανον. Diogenes introduces this with the remark: δεινὸς δὲ ἄγαν ὧν ἐν τοῖς ἐριστικοῖς ἀνήρει καὶ τὰ εἶδη, and it would in itself be possible, that Stilpo and others had brought their hostility to general conceptions, and especially to the Platonic ideas, from the Cynic School. But the above examples are not directed against the reality of groups expressed by a general conception, but against the reality of particular things. Stilpo denies that the individual is a man, because the expression man means something universal and different from any particular man. He denies that what is shown to him is cabbage, because there was cabbage 10,000 years ago; in other words, because the general conception of

cabbage means something unchangeable, not something which has come into being. We may then believe with Hegel, Gesch. d. Phil. ii. 123, and Stallbaum, Plat. Parm. 65, that either Diogenes or his authority must have made some mistake here.

<sup>2</sup> Probably expressions like 'Hi quoque multa in Platone,' said of the Megarians by Cic. Acad. iv. 42, 129, refers to such points of similarity.

<sup>3</sup> Plato, Soph. 248, C.: λέγουσιν, ὅτι γενέσει μὲν μέτεστι τοῦ πάσχειν καὶ ποιεῖν δυνάμεως, πρὸς δὲ οὐσίαν τοῦτων οὐδετέρου τὴν δύναμιν ἀρμόττειν φασίν. It is accordingly afterwards repeatedly stated as their view: [τὸ παντελῶς ὄν] ἀκίνητον ἐστὶς εἶναι. ἀκίνητον τὸ παράπαν ἐστάναι, and in opposition to this view Plato requires: καὶ τὸ κινούμενον δὴ καὶ κίνησιν συγχωρητέον ὡς ὄντα . . . μήτε τῶν ἐν ἡ καὶ πολλὰ εἶδη λεγόντων τὸ ἥν ἐστηκὸς ἀποδέχεσθαι.—Aristocl. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 17, 1. The proofs by which the Megarians denied motion will be described hereafter.



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tainly coming from his school, that capacity does not exist beyond the time of its exercise, in short, that what is actual is alone possible.<sup>1</sup> What is simply possible would be a something, which at the same time is not. It would be the very contradiction which Parmenides thought that he discovered in the becoming, and the change from being possible to being actual would be one of those changes which Euclid could not harmonise with the conception of being.<sup>2</sup> In short, what is immaterial and unchangeable is alone allowed by him to be actual, and is alone admitted to be the object of science.

(b) *The Good.*

The highest object of knowledge had been described by Socrates as the good. In this he was followed by Euclid.<sup>3</sup> But in regarding the highest

<sup>1</sup> Arist. Metaph. ix. 3: εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἱ φασιν, οἷον οἱ Μεγαρικοί, ὅταν ἐνεργῇ μόνον δύνασθαι, ὅταν δὲ μὴ ἐνεργῇ οὐ δύνασθαι. οἷον τὴν μὴ οἰκοδομοῦντα οὐ δύνασθαι οἰκοδομεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὴν οἰκοδομοῦντα ὅταν οἰκοδομῇ· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. In refuting this, Aristotle observes that it would make all motion and becoming impossible, which was just what the Megarians wanted. Further particulars on this point will be quoted from Diodorus in the sequel. The passage in the Sophistes, 248, C., which Henne connects with that of Aristotle, refers to something different.

<sup>2</sup> Hartenstein, p. 205, is of opinion that the above statement is made in direct contradiction to Aristotle. It would in this case belong to Eubulides. But the Aristotelian technical terms

δύνασθαι, ἐνεργεῖν, do not establish a great deal. Aristotle often expressed the statements of others in his own terminology. On the other hand a too great importance for the system of Aristotle must not be attached to the Megarian doctrine already quoted, even if it comes from Euclid. It is only a peculiar way of understanding the Eleatic doctrine against becoming and motion.

<sup>3</sup> That his assertions about the good should have nothing to do with the Socratic knowledge (Hermann, Ges. Abhandlung, 242) could only be accepted on the supposition that that knowledge was not knowledge about the good, and that Euclid was not a pupil of Socrates. Nor can it be readily conceded that a purely Eleatic philosopher, if he had only moved in an ethical sphere of

object of knowledge as essentially real—a consistent course from his point of view—Euclid transferred to the good all the attributes which Parmenides had assigned to real being. There is only one real good, unchangeable, and ever the same, of which our highest conceptions are only different names. Whether we speak of God, or of Intelligence, or of Reason, we always mean one and the same thing, the Good.<sup>1</sup> Thus the moral goal, as Socrates had already shown, is one—the knowledge of the Good,—and if we speak of many virtues, all these are names of one and the same thing.<sup>2</sup>

But what is the relation of other things to this one Good? Even Euclid, as accounts tell us, denied any existence to what is not good;<sup>3</sup> from which it follows immediately, that besides the Good nothing is real. This statement is attributed to

ideas, would have treated this part of philosophy in the same way as Euclid. As long as he remained a purely Eleatic philosopher, he could not have taken this ethical direction and have placed the conception of the good at the head of his system.

<sup>1</sup> Cic. Acad. iv. 42, 129: Megarici qui id bonum solum esse dicebant, quod esset unum et simile et idem semper (οἶον, ὁμοιον ταυτόν). Diog. ii. 106, says of Euclid: οὗτος ἐν τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἀπεφαίνετο πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι καλούμενον· ὅτε μὲν γὰρ φρόνησιν, ὅτε δὲ θεόν, καὶ ἄλλοτε νοῦν καὶ τὰ λοιπά.

<sup>2</sup> Diog. vii. 161, says of the Stoic Aristo: ἀρετὰς τ' οὔτε

πολλὰς εἰσήγεν, ὥς ὁ Ζήνων, οὔτε μίαν πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι καλουμένην, ὥς οἱ Μεγαρικοί. That this one virtue was the knowledge of the good, appears not only from the internal connection of the system and its external relation to Socrates, but also from Cicero and others, who assert: a Menedemo autem . . . Eretriaci appellati; quorum omne bonum in mente positum et mentis acie, qua verum cerneretur. Illi (the Megarians) similia, sed, opinor, explicata uberius et ornatiùs. Conf. Plato, Rep. vi. 505, B., in which Antisthenes is mentioned in addition to Euclid.

<sup>3</sup> Diog.: τὰ δὲ ἀντικείμενα τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἀνήρπει μὴ εἶναι φάσκων.

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the later Megarian School.<sup>1</sup> But it is difficult to see how the existence of many conceptions, all of which are supposed to be real, can be asserted at the same time with the one Good. The plea that these conceptions are only different names for the Good, might, it is true, be urged.<sup>2</sup> It is more probable that the Megarians spoke of a manifoldness of conceptions, when contrasting conceptions more immediately with objects of sense, and that the idea of a plurality of conceptions belongs to the time in which their system was being expanded on the basis of this contrast.<sup>3</sup> At a later period they appear to have used the manifoldness of conceptions only for the purpose of attacking popular notions, but otherwise to have kept this aspect in the background, and to have confined themselves exclusively to the essential oneness of being and the Good.<sup>4</sup> Inconsistent, no doubt, they were ; but we can understand how they became involved in this inconsistency, by gradually, but logically, developing the Socratic theory of con-

<sup>1</sup> Arist. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 17, 1: ὅθεν ἡξίουσι οὗτοι γε [οἱ περί Σίλπωνα καὶ τοὺς Μεγαρίκους] τὸ ὄν ἐν εἶναι καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν ἕτερον εἶναι, μηδὲ γεννᾶσθαι τι μηδὲ φθεῖρεσθαι μηδὲ κινεῖσθαι τοπαράπαν. Arist. Metaph. xiv. 4, refers to Plato, and can hardly be applied to the Megarians.

<sup>2</sup> Prautl's view that the conceptions of the Megarians must invariably have a nominalistic meaning, does not agree with the statements of Plato. If the Megarians declared conceptions and conceptions alone to be ἀληθινὴ οὐσία, surely they were

Realists, not Nominalists. Not even Stilpo can, according to the above, be called a Nominalist, besides which, he had absorbed too much of the Cynic doctrines for us to be able to form from him any conclusion about the original Megarian views.

<sup>3</sup> Plato, at least in the passage before quoted, does not mention a good which is one, but on the contrary, he characterises his philosophers of conceptions as differing from the Eleatics in assuming many conceptions.

<sup>4</sup> Comp. what will be subsequently said of Stilpo.

ceptions to the abstract doctrine of the Eleatic One.<sup>1</sup>

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In proportion, however, to the sharpness of the contrast which they presented to the current mode of thought, became the necessity of fortifying their own position against assault. To do this they had only to follow the example of the Eleatics. But it was no easy matter to prove the soundness of their position directly, as Parmenides had done. More brilliant results might be expected, if their opponents' ground was assailed by the criticism of Zeno and Gorgias. The founder of the School had undoubtedly from the first appropriated the Eleatic doctrine in this its critical function—for it was by the arguments of Zeno and the Sophists that the attention of Greece was first drawn to logical criticism;—and criticism was the instrument which the Megarians adopted with such striking zeal, that the whole school thence derived its name. We are assured by Diogenes,<sup>2</sup> that it was the practice even in the time of

<sup>1</sup> Henne tries to avoid the difficulty in another way. The Megarians, he believes, attributed being to each particular idea, in as far as it was a unity, and various conceptions were used by them to express various kinds of the good. But this very point—the being of various kinds of good—was what the Megarians denied. Starting with the oneness of being they cannot have arrived at the notion of a manifoldness of conceptions, since this oneness excludes in its abstract form any development or sub-

ordinate distinction. But it is quite possible that the Socratic conceptions may gradually have been lost in the Eleatic unity.

<sup>2</sup> ii. 107: ταῖς τε ἀποδείξεσιν ἐνίστατο οὐ κατὰ λήμματα ἀλλὰ κατ' ἐπιφοράν. Since in Stoical terminology—which we are of course not justified in ascribing to Euclid on the strength of this passage—λήμμα means the major premiss, or more often both premisses, and ἐπιφορά the conclusion, it is most probable that the meaning given above is the real meaning of these words.



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XII.(a) *That  
of Euclid.*

Euclid, to attack conclusions and not premises—in other words, to refute by a *reductio ad absurdum*. It is also said that Euclid<sup>1</sup> rejected explanations by analogies—a form much used by Socrates—because a similar thing does not make the first one any clearer, and a dissimilar thing is not to the point. The most perfect description of Euclid's procedure will probably be found in Plato, who, speaking in the *Sophistes* of the philosophers of conceptions, says that in their discourses they destroy matter piecemeal, in order to prove that it has no real being, but is subject to flux and change. This is exactly the line which Zeno adopted, in order to prove the uncertainty of the perceptions of the senses; and which again appears in the *Sorites* of the later Megarians. Matter which is apparently real is divided into its component parts, which are again subdivided, and since there appears to be no limit to the division, and no ultimate atom on which contemplation can rest, it is argued that matter must be itself unreal, and a mere passing phenomenon. Euclid is accordingly rightly regarded as the founder of the Megarian criticism. But with him criticism does not simply bear the character of empty wrangling, although objections may be raised against the captiousness of his arguments,<sup>2</sup> but it would

<sup>1</sup> Ibid. καὶ τὸν διὰ παραβολῆς λόγον ἀνῆρει, λέγων ἥτοι ἐξ ὁμοίων αὐτὸν ἢ ἐξ ἀνομοίων συνίστασθαι· καὶ εἰ μὲν ἐξ ὁμοίων, περὶ αὐτὰ δεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ οἷς ὁμοιά ἐστιν ἀναστρέφεισθαι· εἰ δ' ἐξ ἀνομοίων, παρέλκειν τὴν παράθεσιν.

<sup>2</sup> According to *Diog. ii. 30*, Socrates had already observed,

that because of his captiousness, he might associate possibly with Sophists, but not with human beings. But this statement can only go for little, since it uses the term *Sophist* in a way peculiar to post-Socratic times. It is more worthy of belief (*Diog. ii. 107*) that Timon called him a



appear that, like Zeno before him, he was seriously anxious to establish some positive principles, and that he only used the subtleties of argument as a means to this end. Nothing, at least, is known of him which would lead to an opposite conclusion, and not one of the quibbling fallacies, for which the Megarian school was afterwards notorious, is laid to his charge.

Among the first successors of Euclid, however, the element of mere captiousness prevailed over positive teaching. The doctrines of these thinkers were too barren to command attention for long, and too abstract to admit of further development; but a polemic against prevailing opinions presented to the sharp-witted, to the contentious, and to those ambitious of intellectual distinction, an unexplored field, over which the Megarians eagerly ranged.<sup>1</sup> In doing this their metaphysical assumptions were not seldom used only as occasions for engaging in wordy disputes. Of the fallacies which are imputed to Eubulides,<sup>2</sup>

quarrelsome person, who introduced amongst the Megarians a rage for disputes.

<sup>1</sup> The ordinary form of these captious proofs is that of asking questions. Hence the regular expression: *λόγον ἐρωτᾶν* (to raise a point) in *Diog. ii. 108; 116; Sext. Math. x. 87*; and the *Μεγαρικά ἐρωτήματα* in the fragment of Chrysippus. But like the Sophists, they refused every answer but Yes or No. *Diog. ii. 135.*

<sup>2</sup> *Diog. ii. 108*, enumerates 7: that called *ψευδόμενος*, that called *διαλανθάνων*, the Electra, the ἐγ-

*κεκαλυμμένος*, the *σωρίτης*, the *κερατίνης*, the *φαλακρός*. The first of them is given as follows by *Arist. Soph. El. 25. 180, a. 34. b, 2; Alex. ad loc. Cic. Acad. iv. 29, 95*: If a man says, he is at the moment telling a lie, is he telling a lie, or is he speaking truth? The *διαλανθάνων*, the *ἐγ-κεκαλυμμένος*, and the Electra are different forms of the same fallacy. Do you know who is concealed? Do you know who is behind the veil? Did Electra know her brother before he announced himself to her? and the solution of them all consists in

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XII.(b) *Captiousness of Eubulides.*

though probably older,<sup>1</sup> only one, the Sorites, has any intelligible relation to their metaphysics. It could be proved by the Sorites that real being does not belong to objects of sense, and that every object of sense passes into its opposite, and represents what is changing, and not what is real and unchangeable.<sup>2</sup> The rest appear to be real fallacies, having no other object than to involve opponents in difficulties.<sup>3</sup>

(c) *That of Alexinus.*

The powers of Alexinus in argument seem to have been of a similar kind; at least he is only known to us as a captious disputant. Beyond this fact, if we except an argument in which he vainly

the fact, that he who was concealed, or behind the veil, or had not yet announced himself respectively, was known to, but not immediately recognised by, the lookers on. The *κερατίνης* is as follows: Have you lost your horns? If you say Yes, you allow that you had horns. If you say No, you allow that you have them still. Diog. vii. 187; vi. 38; Seneca, Ep. 45, 8; Gell. xvi. 2, 9. The Sorites consists in the question: How many grains make a heap? or more generally: With what number does Many begin? Of course it is impossible to assign one. See Cic. Acad. ii. 28, 92; 16, 49; Diog. vii. 82; Pers. Sat. vi. 78. The *φαλακρὸς* is another form of the same: How many hairs must you lose to become a bald-head? See Hor. Ep. ii. 1, 45.

<sup>1</sup> There are, for instance, indications of the Sorites in Zeno and Euclid. In general it is difficult to say who is the discoverer of quibbles, which are

taken seriously at the time they are produced, but are after all only bad jokes. Seneca, Ep. 45, 10, says that many books had been written on the *ψευδόμενος*, among which those of Theophrastus and Chrysippus are known to us from Diog. vii. 196. Chrysippus, according to Diog. vii. 198, 192, also wrote on the *διαλανθάνων*, the *ἐγκεκαλυμμένος*, and the *σωρίτης*. Philetas of Cos is said to have worked himself to death in writing about the *ψευδόμενος*. The *κερατίνης* and *ἐγκεκαλυμμένος* were also attributed to Diodorus (Diog. ii. 111), and the former (Diog. vii. 187) as also the Sorites (Diog. vii. 82) to Chrysippus, certainly without reason to Chrysippus.

<sup>2</sup> Compare what will be later said about Diodorus' proofs in denying motion.

<sup>3</sup> The motive which Prautl sees in the *ἐγκεκαλυμμένος* is not so patent, and the assumptions of Brandis, p. 122, do not seem accurate.

attempted to entangle Menedemus in what is called the 'horned' fallacy,<sup>1</sup> and a refutation of Xenophon's proofs of the reasonable arrangement of the world,<sup>2</sup> a refutation which was subsequently repeated by the Academicians,<sup>3</sup> nothing is known of him. In close connection with the Megarian doctrines may be placed the discussions of Diodorus on motion and destruction, on the possible, and on hypothetical sentences.

Tradition has preserved four arguments, by which Diodorus attempted to support the fundamental teaching of his school on the impossibility of motion. The first,<sup>4</sup> which in the main is the same as that of Zeno, is as follows. Supposing anything to move, it must either move in the space in which it is, or in the space in which it is not. It has not room to move in the former, because it entirely fills it. In the latter it can neither act nor be acted upon; and hence motion is inconceivable.<sup>5</sup> The second is a

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(d) *That of*  
*Diodorus.*  
(a) *On*  
*Motion.*

<sup>1</sup> In Diog. ii. 135.

<sup>2</sup> Sext. Math. ix. 107: Zeno had concluded, because the world is the best possible, and reason is higher than the absence of reason, that the world must have reason. See Cic. De N. D. ii. 8, 21; iii. 9, 22. To this Alexinus replied: τὸ ποιητικὸν τοῦ μὴ ποιητικοῦ καὶ τὸ γραμματικὸν τοῦ μὴ γραμματικοῦ κρεῖττόν ἐστι· καὶ τὸ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας θεωρούμενον κρεῖττόν ἐστι τοῦ μὴ τοιοῦτου. οὐδὲ ἐν δὲ κόσμῳ κρεῖττόν ἐστι· ποιητικὸν ἔρα καὶ γραμματικὸν ἐστὶν ὁ κόσμος.

<sup>3</sup> Cic. N. D. iii. 8, 21; 10, 26; 11, 27.

<sup>4</sup> Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 242; iii. 71; Math. x. 85.

<sup>5</sup> Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 243, men-

tions a similar argument against becoming in general, in immediate connection with the proof given above: Neither can what is come into being, for it exists already; nor can what is not, for nothing can happen to it; consequently nothing at all is. It is possible that this argument also belongs to Diodorus. But Steinhart is wrong in attributing to him (Allg. Encykl. sect i. bd. xxv. p. 288) the distinction between space in the wider and in the narrower sense, which is found in Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 75; Math. x. 95. since it would appear from these passages, that the distinction was made with a view to meet Diodore's objections.

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less accurate form of the same proof.<sup>1</sup> All that moves is in space. What *is* in space reposes, therefore what is moved reposes. A third proof<sup>2</sup> proceeds by taking it for granted that there are infinitesimal atoms and particles. It is generally attributed to Diodorus,<sup>3</sup> but probably he only used it hypothetically, as Zeno did his argument, to refute ordinary notions.<sup>4</sup> It is this: As long as the particle A is in the corresponding space A, it does not move, because it completely fills it. Just as little does it move when it is in the next following space, B; for no sooner is it there than its motion has ceased. Accordingly it does not move at all. In this conclusion one cannot fail to discover the note of Zeno's inferences, and of that critical process which had been already described by Plato. The fourth proof,<sup>5</sup> besides assuming the existence of atoms, distinguishes between partial and complete motion.<sup>6</sup> Every moving body must first have the majority of its particles moved, before it can move altogether; and similarly it must first have the majority of that majority moved, and so on. Hence it follows, that when the division has come to an end, and there are say 10,000 particles, two of these must first move whilst the remainder are at

<sup>1</sup> Sext. Math. x. 112.<sup>2</sup> Id. x. 143.<sup>3</sup> Id. ix. 362: Pyrrh. iii. 32; Dionys. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 23, 4; Stob. Ekl. i. 310, all of which refer to one common source.

Diodorus called these atoms ἀμερῆ.

<sup>4</sup> Even the first proof, according

to Sext. Math. x. 85, was put in such a shape as to prove, that every atom fully occupied its space; but this is unimportant here.

<sup>5</sup> Sext. Math. 113.<sup>6</sup> κίνησις κατ' ἐπικράτειαν and κίνησις κατ' εἰλικρίνειαν.

rest. These two can clearly not overcome the rest. A movement of the majority of particles, therefore, becomes impossible, and consequently that of the whole body. Motion is therefore inconceivable. Sextus has already noticed<sup>1</sup> that there are links wanting in this proof. Diodorus, however, appears to have considered the argument unanswerable, and hence, after all his researches, he concludes that it never can be said of a thing, It is moving, but only, It has moved;<sup>2</sup>—in other words, he was prepared to allow what the senses seemed to prove,<sup>3</sup> that a body is now in one place and now in another, but he declared the transition from the one to the other to be impossible. This is indeed a contradiction, and as such it was laid to his charge by the ancients, and by him very inadequately met.<sup>4</sup> At the same time it was a deviation from the original teaching of his school. Euclid absolutely denied motion, and would just as little have allowed a completed motion as a transition in the present.

The argument of Diodorus to prove that nothing perishes, agrees in substance with the third of these proofs. It is as follows. Walls, he says, do not perish; so long as the stones keep together, they stand; but when the stones are separated they are no longer there.<sup>5</sup> He appears, therefore, to have

(β) *On  
Destruction.*

<sup>1</sup> Ibid. 112, 118. A further argument, the first argument of Zeno's is not attributed to Diodorus by Sext. Math. x. 47. He only says as to its result, that Diodorus agreed therein with the Eleatics.

<sup>2</sup> Sext. Math. x. 48; 85; 91; 97-102.

<sup>3</sup> This reason is specially mentioned by Sext. Math. x. 86.

<sup>4</sup> See Sext. 91, 97.

<sup>5</sup> Sext. Math. x. 347.



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equally allowed that it was possible for them to *have* perished.

(γ) *On the Possible.*

His discussions on what is possible are closely related to the enquiry into motion. In both cases the possibility of change is the point raised, but in one case it is raised in reference to something, in the other abstractedly. In both cases, Diodorus stands on exactly the same footing with regard to his School. The older Megarians only allowed what actually is to be possible, understanding by actual what was before them in the present. To this Diodorus added what might be in the future, by saying: Possible is what either is actual or what will be actual.<sup>1</sup> In proof of this statement he gave an argument, which goes by the name of *κυριεύων*, and is still admired after centuries,<sup>2</sup> as a masterpiece of subtle criticism. It is in the main as follows: From anything possible nothing impossible can result; but it is impossible that the past can be different to what it is; for had it been possible at a past moment, something impossible would have resulted from something possible. It was therefore never possible, and generally speak-

<sup>1</sup> Cic. De Fato, 6, 12; 7, 13; 9, 17; Ep. ad Div. ix. 4; Plut. Sto. Rep. 46; Alex. Aph. in Anal. Pr. 59. The above sentence is expressed here thus: Possible is *ὅπερ ἢ ἐστὶν ἀληθὲς ἢ ἔσται*.

<sup>2</sup> Comp. Epict. Diss. ii. 18, 18: we ought to be proud of moral actions, *οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ τὸν κυριεύοντα ἐρωτῆσαι*, and just before: *κομψὸν*

*σοφισμάτιον ἔλυσας, πολὺ κομψότερον τοῦ κυριεύοντος*. He also mentions, ii. 19, 9, treatises of Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Antipater, and Archidemus on the *κυριεύων*. Chrysippus could only meet it (according to Alex. in Anal. Pr. 57, b. in Schol. to Arist. 163) by asserting that possibly the impossible might result from the possible.

ing it is impossible that anything should happen differently to what has happened.<sup>1</sup>

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Philo, a pupil of Diodorus, was far less exacting when he declared everything to be possible, even if compulsory outward circumstances should prevent it from being realised,<sup>2</sup> provided only the capacity for it pre-existed. This was undeniably a departure from the Megarian teaching.

(e) *That of Philo.*  
(a) *On the Possible.*

In regard to the truth of hypothetical sentences, Philo laid down criteria different to those of his teacher.<sup>3</sup> Diodorus declared those conditional sentences to be true, in which the protasis being accepted as true, there neither is nor can have been a false apodosis. Philo says more vaguely, those are true in which there is not a true protasis and a false apodosis. It appears however to have been merely a question of correctness in speaking of logical rules.<sup>4</sup>

(β) *On hypothetical sentences.*

With Diodorus' view of what is possible the assertion appears to be connected, that no words are meaningless or ambiguous, each one having always a meaning and requiring to be taken in a particular sense.<sup>5</sup> The possible meaning of a word, is only that

(γ) *On the meaning of words.*

<sup>1</sup> Epict. Diss. ii. 19, 1: ὁ κυριεύων λόγος ἀπὸ τοιούτων τινῶν ἀφορμῶν ἡρωτησθαι φαίνεται· κοινῆς γὰρ οὔσης μάχης τοῖς τρισὶ τοῦτοις πρὸς ἄλληλα, τῷ 'πάντα παρεληλυθὸς ἀληθὲς ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι,' καὶ τῷ 'δυνατὶ ἀδύνατον μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν,' καὶ τῷ 'δυνατὸν εἶναι ὃ οὐτ' ἔστιν ἀληθὲς οὐτ' ἔσται,' συνιδὼν τὴν μάχην ταύτην ὁ Διόδωρος τῇ τῶν πρώτων δυοῖν πιθανότητι συνεχρήσεται πρὸς παράστασιν τοῦ μηδὲν εἶναι δυνατόν

ὃ οὐτ' ἔστιν ἀληθὲς οὐτ' ἔσται.

<sup>2</sup> Alex.-Simpl. in Categ.-Schol. in Arist. 65, b, 5.

<sup>3</sup> See Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 110; Math. viii. 113; i. 309; Cic. Acad. iv. 47, 143.

<sup>4</sup> The inferences by which Sextus M. viii. 115, refutes Philo, do not touch his real meaning at all, however much they may follow from the words of his definition.

<sup>5</sup> Gell. xi. 12; Ammon, De In-

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one which is present to the speaker's mind. Our information, however, about Diodorus, and about the whole Megarian School, is far too scanty to enable us to bring the fragments of their teaching into a perfectly satisfactory context,<sup>1</sup> even granting that enough is known to trace one and the same tendency in all these thinkers. It may then be assumed as probable, that the Megarians did not confine themselves to those logical subtleties which are known to us, but that our notices are too deficient for us to be able to attribute others to them with anything like certainty.<sup>2</sup>

(f) *That of Stilpo, which adopted much from the Cynics.*  
(a) *Every combination of*

A peculiar position in the Megarian philosophy is occupied by Stilpo. Ever ready to defend the teaching of the School, at the head of which he stood, clinging to universal conceptions, maintaining the impossibility of becoming, the unity of being, and the difference between sensuous and rational perceptions,<sup>5</sup> he at the same time combines with his Me-

terpret. 32, a. In order to show that every word has a meaning, Diodorus, according to Ammon., gave the name ἀλλαμην to one of his slaves.

<sup>1</sup> Ritter's conjectures seem in many respects to go beyond historical probability, and beyond the spirit of the Megarian teaching. To illustrate this here would take too long.

<sup>2</sup> Prautl believes that the majority of the sophisms enumerated by Aristotle, really belong to the Megarians. Most of them, however, would appear to come from the Sophists, in proof of which a reference may be made to Plato's Euthydemus, which

can hardly have the Megarians in view. Towards Euclid Plato would not have so expressed himself; as may be gathered from the Sophistes, 246, C., and the introduction to the Theætetus; and Eubulides had not appeared when Plato composed the Euthydemus. That the Megarians made use of many of the Sophistic fallacies, is of course not denied. Only nothing accurate is known about it.

<sup>3</sup> Compare the passage in Aristocles, in which οἱ περὶ Στίλπονα καὶ τοὺς Μεγαρίκους are spoken of in addition to the Eleatics.

garian views theories and aims which originally belonged to the Cynics. In the first place he rejected, as did Antisthenes, every combination of subject and predicate, since the conception of the one is different from the conception of the other, and two things with different conceptions can never be declared to be the same.<sup>1</sup> The doctrine of the unity of being, in as far as it can be shown to have originated with Stilpo, may be deduced as a corollary from this view; for if nothing can be predicated of anything else, it follows that being can alone be predicated of itself.

Traces of Cynicism may be further seen in Stilpo's moral principles. The captious logic to which other Megarians devoted themselves with speculative one-sidedness, to the entire neglect of the ethical element,<sup>2</sup> was no less a characteristic of Stilpo,<sup>3</sup> and perhaps it

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*subject and  
predicate  
rejected  
as impossi-  
ble.*

<sup>1</sup> Plut. adv. Col. 22, 1. The Epicurean Stilpo raises the objection: τὸν θεὸν ἀναιρεῖσθαι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, λέγοντος ἕτερον ἑτέρου μὴ κατηγορεῖσθαι. πῶς γὰρ βιωσόμεθα, μὴ λέγοντες ἄνθρωπον ἀγαθὸν . . . . ἀλλ' ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρωπον καὶ χωρὶς ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθόν; . . . and again: οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐπὶ Στίλπωνος τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν. εἰ περὶ ἵππου τὸ τρέχειν κατηγοροῦμεν, οὐ φησι τοῦτόν εἶναι τῷ περὶ οὗ κατηγορεῖται τὸ κατηγοροῦμενον, ἀλλ' ἕτερον μὲν ἀνθρώπῳ τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι τὸν λόγον, ἕτερον δὲ τῷ ἀγαθῷ· καὶ πάλιν τὸ ἵππον εἶναι τὸ τρέχοντα εἶναι διαφέρειν· ἑκάτερον γὰρ ἀπαιτούμενοι τὸν λόγον οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν ἀποδίδουμεν ὑπὲρ ἀμφοῖν. ὅθεν ἀμαρτάνειν τοὺς ἕτερον ἑτέρου κατηγοροῦντας. The very same thing will be found in the case of Antisthenes. All the less reason has Plutarch to re-

gard Stilpo's assertion as a mere joke. The same proof is given by Simpl. Phys. 26: διὰ δὲ τὴν περὶ ταῦτα (the distinction between the different categories and the ambiguity of words) ἄγνοιαν καὶ οἱ Μεγαρίκοι κληθέντες φιλόσοφοι λαβόντες ὥς ἐναργῇ πρότασιν, ὅτι ὧν οἱ λόγοι ἕτεροι ταῦτα ἕτερά ἐστι καὶ ὅτι τὰ ἕτερα κενώριστα ἀλλήλων, ἐδόκουν δεικνύναι αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ κενωρισμένον ἑκάστον: i. e. since the conception of Σωκράτης μουσικὸς is a different one to that of Σωκράτης λευκός, the one according to Megarian hypotheses must be a different person to the other.

<sup>2</sup> Excepting Euclid's doctrine of the oneness of virtue, nothing bearing on Ethics is known as belonging to the Megarians.

<sup>3</sup> See Chrysipp. in Plut. Sto. Rep. 10, 11, p. 1036.



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XII.(β) *The  
highest  
good placed  
in apathy.*

is only chance that no captious assertion or invention of his is on record. But not only is his character always mentioned by biographers with the greatest respect,<sup>1</sup> but many stories are told of him, which identify his morality with that of the Cynics. The highest good he placed in an apathy, forbidding the feeling of pain even to exist. The wise man was required to be in himself independent, and not even to stand in need of friends to secure happiness.<sup>2</sup> When Demetrius Poliorcetes enquired about his losses by the plunder of Megara, he replied, that he had seen no one carrying off his knowledge.<sup>3</sup> When reminded of the immoral life of his daughter, he rejoined, that if he could not bring honour on her, she could not bring disgrace on him.<sup>4</sup> Banishment he would not allow to be an evil.<sup>5</sup> To be independent of everything without, and to be absolutely free from wants—this highest standard of Cynicism—was also his ideal. And lastly, the free attitude towards religion adopted by the Cynics was also occupied by him, and expressed in many of his utterances.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See p. 215, note 1.

<sup>2</sup> Sen. Ep. 9, 1: 'An merito reprehendat in quadam epistola Epicurus eos, qui dicunt sapientem se ipso esse contentum et propter hoc amico non indigere desideras scire. Hoc objicitur Stilboni ab Epicuro et iis, quibus summum bonum visum est animus impatiens.' And a little further on: 'Hoc inter nos et illos interest: noster sapiens vincit quidem incommodum omne sed sentit; illorum ne sentit quidem.'

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, Demet. c. 9; Tran-

quil. An. c. 17; Puer. Ed. c. 8; Sen. de Const. 5, 6; Epis. 9, 18; Diog. ii. 115. That Stilpo thereby lost his wife and daughter is probably a rhetorical exaggeration of Seneca.

<sup>4</sup> Plut. An. Tran. c. 6; Diog. ii. 114.<sup>5</sup> In the fragment in Stob. Flor. 40, 8.<sup>6</sup> According to Diog. ii. 116, he proved that the Athene of Phidias was not a God, and then before the Areopagus, evasively replied that she was not a θεός



Whether he attempted to form a logical connection between the Cynic and Megarian theories, and if so, in what way the attempt was made, we are not told. In itself it was not difficult. By asserting that no subject could admit a predicate, he approximated to Euclid's hostile attitude against proof by analogy; for this too rests on the general proposition that things dissimilar cannot be compared. This assertion is also quite in harmony with the negative criticism of the Megarians, and if Euclid denied to the good any form of manifoldness, others might add, as Antisthenes really did, that the one and not the manifold could alone exist. Moreover from the oneness of the good the apathy of the wise man might be deduced, by considering that all else besides the good was unreal and indifferent.<sup>1</sup> The denial of the popular faith was also involved in the doctrine of the one, as it was first expressed by Xenophanes. There were not wanting, it is true, in the Cynic element adopted by Stilpo, points in which it approached the Megarian; but it was a deviation from the original form of the Megarian teaching to allow explicitly such an element to exist.

Closely connected with the Megarian school is the Elean-Eretrian, about which very little has come down to us. Its founder was Phædo of Elis,<sup>2</sup> the

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(γ) *The Cynic and Megarian theories not logically harmonised by him.*

II. *Elean-Eretrian School.*

A. *Its history.*

but a θεός, and when Crates asked him about prayers and sacrifices, replied that these subjects could not be discussed in the streets.

<sup>1</sup> Conf. Diog. ii. 106.

<sup>2</sup> See Preller's Phædo's Life and Writings; Rhein. Mus. für

Philol. iv. 391. Phædo, the scion of a noble Elean family, had been taken captive not long before the death of Socrates (probably 400 or 401 B.C. Preller concludes from Phædo, 89, B., that he was not eighteen years of age at the

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well-known favourite of Socrates.<sup>1</sup> On the death of his teacher, Phædo collected a circle of disciples in his native town, who thence received the name of the Elean philosophers.<sup>2</sup> Plistanus is named as his successor,<sup>3</sup> in addition to whom Archipylus and Moschus are called his pupils.<sup>4</sup> Excepting their names we know nothing of them. By Menedemus and Asclepiades,<sup>5</sup> the school was removed to Eretria, and it was

time of the death of Socrates; it may, however, be asked whether Phædo followed Athenian customs in his dress), and employed as a slave in most humiliating services at Athens, until one of Socrates' friends (besides Crito, Cebes and Alcibiades are both mentioned, the latter certainly not being at Athens at the time, and probably not being alive) redeemed him at the intercession of Socrates. See Diog. ii. 31, 105: Suid. under *Φαῖδων*; Gell. N. A. ii. 18; Macrob. Sat. i. 11; Lact. Inst. iii. 25, 15; Orig. c. Cels. iii. 67; Cic. N. D. i. 33, 93; Athen. xi. 507, c. Preller not improbably finds the source of the story in Hermippus, *περὶ τῶν διαπρεψάντων ἐν παιδείᾳ δούλων*. Most probably Phædo left Athens on the death of Socrates. But whether he at once returned home, or repaired with others to Euclid at Megara, is unknown. Diog. ii. 105, mentions two genuine and four spurious dialogues of his. His Zopyrus is even quoted by Pollux, iii. 18. Panætius seems to have had doubts about all the treatises. He is called by Gellius, 'philosophus illustris,' and his writings are spoken of as 'admodum elegantes.' Even Diog. ii. 47, enumerates him among the most distinguished Socraticists.

<sup>1</sup> Compare for his relations to Socrates the Phædo, 58, D. 89, H.

<sup>2</sup> *Ἡλειακοί*, Strabo, ix. 1, 8; Diog. ii. 105, 126.

<sup>3</sup> Diog. ii. 105.

<sup>4</sup> 126. Perhaps these men were not immediate pupils of his. Since nothing is said of Menedemus' studying under Plistanus, the latter we may suppose, was no longer alive.

<sup>5</sup> The account given by Diog. ii. 125 of these philosophers in his life of Menedemus probably taken from Antigonus of Carystus and Heraclides Lembus, is as follows: Menedemus of Eretria, originally a tradesman, had been sent as a soldier to Megara. There he became acquainted with the school of Plato (Diog. says with Plato, but this is chronologically impossible) and joined it together with his friend Asclepiades, both of them (according to Athen. iv. 168) earning a living by working at night. Soon, however, they joined Stilpo at Megara, and thence went to Moschus and Archipylus at Elis, by whom they were introduced to the Elean doctrines. Returning to their native city and becoming connected by marriage they continued together in faithful friendship until the death of Ascle-

then called the Eretrian.<sup>1</sup> Flourishing as was its condition here for a time, it appears soon to have died out.<sup>2</sup>

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Among its adherents there are only two,<sup>3</sup> Phædo and Menedemus, about whose opinions any information is to be had, and what is known of them is little enough. By Timon<sup>4</sup> Phædo is classed with Euclid as a babbler, which points to an argumentative tendency. Perhaps, however, he may have meddled with Ethics<sup>5</sup> more than Euclid did. Menedemus appears to have been distinguished from the cotemporary philosophers of captiousness, by directing his attention to life and to moral questions. He is, however, described as a sharp and skilful disputant;<sup>6</sup> and it gives us the impression of captiousness, to hear that he only allowed affirmative judgments to

B. Remains of their teaching.

piades, even after Menedemus had risen to highest rank in the state, and had attained wealth and influence with the Macedonian princes. The sympathetic noble and firm character of Menedemus, his pungent wit, his moderation (Diog. ii. 139; Athen. x. 419, e), his liberality and his merits towards his country, are a subject of frequent panegyric. Soon after the battle of Lysimachia, which took place 278 B.C. he died, possibly by suicide—the result of a grief which is differently stated—at the age of seventy-four. According to Antigonus in Diog. ii. 136, he left no writings.

certain Ctesibius as a pupil of Menedemus, but what he says of him has nothing to do with philosophy. A treatise of the Stoic Sphærus against the Eretrian School in 260 B.C. is the last trace of its existence. Diog. vii. 178.

<sup>4</sup> Diog. ii. 107.

<sup>5</sup> A short but clever fragment on the subject of morals, which Sen. Ep. 94, 41 quotes from Phædo, probably belongs to him.

<sup>6</sup> Diog. ii. 134: ἦν δὲ δυσκατανόητος ὁ Μ. καὶ ἐν τῷ συνθέσθαι δυσανταγώνιστος. ἐστρέφετό τε πρὸς πάντα καὶ εὐρεσιλόγει· ἐριστικατὸς τε καθά φησιν Ἀντισθένης ἐν διαδοχαῖς, ἦν. The words of Epicrates in Athen. ii. 59, cannot well refer to this Menedemus, since they are also directed against Plato, who was then still living.

<sup>1</sup> Strabo, ix. 1, 8; Diog. ii. 105, 126; Cic. Acad. iv. 42, 129.

<sup>2</sup> Plut. Tranqu. An. 13.

<sup>3</sup> Athen. iv. 162, e, mentions a

be valid, but rejected negative and hypothetical ones.<sup>1</sup> Chrysippus<sup>2</sup> blames him as well as Stilpo, for his plausible fallacies.<sup>3</sup> On the other hand, it is asserted that in positive opinions he was a Platonist, and only employed argument for amusement.<sup>4</sup> From what has been stated above, this seems incredible, and it appears all the more so from his disputes with Alexinus.<sup>5</sup> Any leaning on his part towards Platonism is also improbable.<sup>6</sup> Still the assertion would appear to be to a certain degree correct, because, together with Stilpo, he estimated ethical doctrines above argument. Not only do we hear that he admired Stilpo, who was his teacher, more than any other philosopher,<sup>7</sup> and that he was often reproached with being a Cynic,<sup>8</sup> but we know that he busied himself with the ques-

<sup>1</sup> Diog. ii. 135. This does not agree with what Simpl. Phys. 20 says: the Eretrians asserted *μηδὲν κατὰ μεθενὸς κατηγορεῖσθαι*. They appear in this passage to be confounded with the Cynics and the later Megarians.

<sup>2</sup> Plut. Sto. Rep. 10, 11.

<sup>3</sup> Hermann, Ges. Abh. 253, refers to Menedemus the verses of John of Salisbury, in which a certain Endymion is mentioned, who called *fides*, *opinio vera*, and error, *opinio fallax*, and who denied that you could know what was false, for no knowledge could be deceptive. The allusion does not, however, appear probable. The continuation, that the sun corresponds to truth, and the moon to falsehood, that error and change bear rule under the moon, but truth and immutability in the domain of the sun, certainly

does not come from Menedemus.

<sup>4</sup> Heraclides in Diog. ii. 135, Ritter's conjecture that this Menedemus is confounded with Menedemus the Platonist, whom we know from Plut. adv. Col. 32, 8, and Athen., is hardly to be trusted. For Heraclides Lembus had treated the Eretrians in detail, as we learn from Diog., so that it is difficult to imagine such a confusion. The context also tells against that view.

<sup>5</sup> Diog. 135, 136, says that he was constantly attacking Alexinus with violent derision, but yet did him some service.

<sup>6</sup> Diog. 134: *τῶν δὲ διδασκάλων τῶν περὶ Πλάτωνα καὶ Ξενοκράτην . . . κατεφρόγει*.

<sup>7</sup> Diog. 134.

<sup>8</sup> Diog. 140: *τὰ μὲν οὖν πρῶτα κατεφρονεῖτο, κύων καὶ λῆρος ὑπὸ τῶν Ἐρετρίων ἀκούων*.



tions of the chief good in a practical way. He affirmed that there was only one good—intelligence,<sup>1</sup> which, in his view, was identical with a rational direction of the will.<sup>2</sup> The virtues, which are commonly spoken of as distinct, were, he maintained, only different names of this one virtue;<sup>3</sup> and, by his activity as a statesman,<sup>4</sup> he proved that he did not aim at an unfruitful knowledge. In his free views of religion he reminds us of Stilpo and the Cynics.<sup>5</sup> But stragglers, such as the Eretrians, soon found themselves unable to exercise any important influence; and about this time, Zeno united the most valuable parts of the Megarian and Cynic doctrine in the more comprehensive system of the Stoics.

<sup>1</sup> Cic. Acad. iv. 42; Diog. 129: πρὸς δὲ τὸν εἰπόντα πολλὰ τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἐπύθετο πόσα τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ εἰ νομίζοι πλείω τῶν ἑκατόν· and in 134 are some questions to prove that the useful is not the good.

<sup>2</sup> Diog. 136: καὶ ποτέ τινος ἀκούσας, ὥς μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν εἶη τὸ πάντων ἐπιτυχάνειν ὧν τις ἐπιθυμεῖ, εἶπε· πολὺν δὲ μείζον· τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν ὧν δεῖ.

<sup>3</sup> Plut. Virt. Mor. 2: Μενέδημος μὲν ὁ ἐξ Ἐρετρίας ἀνῆρει τῶν ἀρετῶν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὰς διαφοράς, ὥς μίας οὐσης καὶ χρωμένης πολ-

λοῖς ὀνόμασι· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ σωφροσύνην καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ δικαιοσύνην λέγεσθαι, καθάπερ βροτὸν καὶ ἄνθρωπον.

<sup>4</sup> That he exercised a considerable influence on his friends by his teaching and his personality is shown by Plutarch, *Adul. et Am. c. 11*; Diog. ii. 127-129.

<sup>5</sup> Diog. 135: Βίωνός τε ἐπιμελῶς κατατρέχοντος τῶν μάντεων, νεκροὺς αὐτὸν ἐπισφάττειν ἔλεγε· against which a trait of personal fear, such as is described by Diog. 132, proves nothing.



## CHAPTER XIII.

## THE CYNICS.

CHAP.  
XIII.A. Ex-  
ternal  
History  
of the  
Cynics.

THE Cynic, like the Megarian School, arose from a fusion of the teaching of Socrates with the doctrines of the Eleatics and Sophists, as has been already remarked. Its teaching was united with the Megarian by Stilpo, and with it passed over to the Stoa of Zeno.<sup>1</sup> Its founder, Antisthenes, a native of Athens,<sup>2</sup> appears to have become acquainted with Socrates only late

<sup>1</sup> Accordingly the connection of these schools is incompatible with history, if the Cyrenaics are placed between the Cynics and the Megarians, as Tennemann, Hegel, Marbach, Braniss, Brandis and Strümpell have done. It is otherwise of no moment whether we advance from the Megarians to Antisthenes and thence to Aristippus, or *vice versa*, for these three schools are not developments of one another, but grew up side by side from the same origin. The order followed above appears, however, to be the most natural; for the Megarians confined themselves more closely to the fundamental position of Socrates; Antisthenes considered its practical consequences; and Aristippus its effects on happiness.

<sup>2</sup> Antisthenes was the son of an Athenian and a Thracian slave (Diog. vi. 1.; ii. 31; Clement, Strom. i. 302, C. in calling him a Phrygian, is confounding him with Diogenes, or else he must have drawn a false conclusion from the anecdote in Diog. vi. 1). He lived, according to Xen. Mem. ii. 5; Sym. 3, 8, 4, 34, in extreme poverty. The time of his birth and death is not further known to us. Diodor. xv. 76, mentions him as one of the men who lived about 366 B.C. and Plut. Lycurg. 30, Sch., quotes a remark of his on the battle of Leuctra. According to Eudocia (Villoison's Anecd. i. 56,) he attained the age of 70 years, which would place his birth in 436 B.C., but the circumstance is uncertain.

in life,<sup>1</sup> but ever afterwards to have been devoted to him<sup>2</sup> with enthusiastic admiration, and to have endeavoured to reproduce<sup>3</sup> his method of reasoning, though not always without an element of captiousness and quibbling. Early in life Antisthenes had enjoyed the instruction of Gorgias,<sup>4</sup> and included other Sophists also among his friends.<sup>5</sup> He had indeed himself appeared in the capacity of a Sophist, as a pleader and teacher, before he made the acquaintance of Socrates.<sup>6</sup> It was therefore only a return to his old mode of life, when on the death of Socrates he opened a School.<sup>7</sup> But at the same time he did not neglect to

<sup>1</sup> We have every reason, to refer Plato's *γερόντων τοῖς ἀψιμάθεισι*, Soph. 251, B., to him, as will be subsequently seen. The only thing against it is the account in Diog. vi. 1, that Antisthenes was praised by Socrates for his valour in the battle of Tanagra. This objection applies even if the battle referred to was not the victory of the Athenians in the year 456 B.C. (in which it is impossible that Antisthenes can have taken part), but the battle which was fought late in the autumn of 423 B.C. between Delium and Tanagra (Thuc. iv. 91), which is usually called the battle of Delium. The account, however, cannot be of any weight; for Diog. ii. 31 quotes the same words of Socrates in a different way, and it was probably a fiction of later times to make the battle of Tanagra the occasion.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Mem. iii. 11, 17; Sym. 4, 44; 8, 4-6. Plato, Phædo, 59, B.; Diog. vi. 2.

<sup>3</sup> This is the way in which he is represented by Xen. Symp. 2, 10; 3, 4; 6; 4, 2; 6; 6, 5; 8.

<sup>4</sup> Diog. vi. 1, is immediately referring to the rhetorical school of Gorgias, but he did not deny that it applied to his philosophy. At a later period Antisthenes wrote against Gorgias, Athen. v. 220.

<sup>5</sup> According to Xen. Symp. 4, 62, he introduced Prodicus and Hippias to Callias, and recommended to Socrates an unknown Sophist from Heraclea.

<sup>6</sup> Hermippus in Diog. vi. 2.

<sup>7</sup> In the *γυμνάσιον* of Cynosarges, which was intended for those who, like himself, were of mixed Athenian blood. Diog. vi. 13; Götting. Ges. Abh. i. 253: Plut. Themist. c. 1. According to Diog. vi. 4, he had but few pupils because of his harsh and severe treatment of them. It is not reported of him, that he required payment but he appears to have received voluntary presents. Diog. vi. 9.

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commit his views to writing in numerous volumes,<sup>1</sup> the language and style of which are spoken of in the highest terms of praise.<sup>2</sup>

Among the pupils<sup>3</sup> of Antisthenes, Diogenes<sup>4</sup> of

<sup>1</sup> Diog. vi. 15, gives a list of these writings, which, according to Diog. ii. 64, was in the main approved of by Panætius. Excepting a few fragments, the only ones which are preserved are the two small and comparatively worthless declamations, Ajax and Ulysses, the genuineness of which is fully ascertained. Winckelmann (*Antisthenis Fragmenta*, Zür. 1842) has collected all the fragments. Because of his many writings, Timon called him *παντοφυή φλεδόνα*, Diog. vi. 18.

<sup>2</sup> See Theopomp. in Diog. vi. 14, and vii. 19; Dionys. Jud. de Thuc. c. 31; Epictet. Diss. ii. 17, 35; Phrynich. in Phot. Cod. 158; Fronto, De Orat. i. p. 218; Longin. De Invent. Rhet. Gr. ix. 559; Cic. ad Att. xii. 38; and Lucian adv. Indoct. c. 27; Theopompus also criticises his delivered addresses.

<sup>3</sup> Called by Aristotle, *Metaph.* viii. 3. *Ἀντισθένεια*, but in later times universally called *Κυνικοί*, probably even in the time of Antisthenes, partly from their place of meeting, partly because of their mode of life. Conf. Diog. vi. 13; Lact. Inst. iii. 15. g. E. Schol. in Arist. 23. Antisthenes was already called *ἄπλοκόνων*, and Brutus speaks disparagingly of a Cynic (Plut. Brut. 34). Diogenes boasted of the name (Diog. 33; 40; 45; 55–60; Stob. Ecl. ii. 348,) and the Corinthians placed a marble dog on his grave. (Diog. 78.)

<sup>4</sup> Steinhart, Diogenes, Allg.

Encyc. sect. i. bd. xxx. 301; Göttling, Diog. der Cyniker. Ges. Abb. i. 251. Diogenes was the son of a money-changer at Sinope. In his youth he had been engaged with his father in issuing counterfeit coin, in consequence of which he was obliged to leave his country. See Diog. vi. 20; Plut. Inimic. Util. c. 2. Musonius in Stob. Floril. 40, 9. Lucian, Bis Accus., 24. Dio Chrys. Or. viii. We have no reason to doubt this fact, although the accounts may disagree in a few details. In Athens he became acquainted with Antisthenes, who, for some reason or other, drove him away with a stick, but was at length overcome by his perseverance. (Diog. 21; Ælian V. H. x. 16; Hieron. adv. Jovin. ii. 206.) When this took place is unknown, and Bayle's conjecture, that the condemnation of Socrates was the cause of Antisthenes' hatred of mankind, is not to be depended upon for chronological reasons. Diogenes now devoted himself to philosophy in the Cynic sense of the term, and soon surpassed his master in self-denial and abstemiousness. He appears to have lived a very long time at Athens, at least, if the account of his meeting with Philip before the battle of Chæronea may be trusted, according to which he was then still living there. But it is also possible—and this agrees with his principle of having no home—that he may have visited other places

Sinope is alone known to fame, that witty and eccentric individual, whose imperturbable originality, ready wit, and strength of character, admirable even in its excesses, no less than his fresh and vigorous mind, have been held up to view, as forming the peculiar type of character of the ancient world.<sup>1</sup>

Of the pupils of Diogenes,<sup>2</sup> Crates is by far the

as a wandering preacher of morals, particularly Corinth. (Diog. 44; 63; Plut. Prof. in Virt. 6, p. 78; Dio Chrys. Or. vi; Val. Max. iv. 3; Diog. ii. 66; vi. 50.) According to Diogenes, he met Aristippus in Syracuse. On some such journey he fell into the hands of pirates, who sold him to Xenocrates, a Corinthian. For this event see Diog. vi. 29; Plut. Tran. An. 4, p. 466; Stob. Floril. 3, 63; 40, 9; Epict. Diss. iii. 24, 66; Philo, Qu. Omni. Prob. Lib. 883, C. Xenocrates made him the instructor of his sons, a duty which he admirably discharged. Highly esteemed by his pupils and by their parents, he remained with them till his death. At this time occurred the conversation with Alexander, so greatly exaggerated by tradition. (Diog. 32; 38; 60; 68; Sen. Benef. v. 4, 3; Juvenal, xiv. 311; Theo. Progym. c. 5; Julian, Or. vii. 212.) The most simple version of it is that found in Plut. Alex. c. 14; De Alex. Virt. c. 10; ad Princ. Inerud. c. 5. Diogenes died at Corinth, on the same day, it is said, as Alexander (Plut. Qu. Conv. viii. 1, 4; Demet. in Diog. 79), i.e. 353 B.C. at an advanced age (Diog. 76, says almost ninety, Cens. Di. Nat. 15, 2, says eighty-one). The nature of his death is de-

scribed in very different ways. (Diog. 76; 31; Plut. Consol. ad Apoll. c. 12; Ælian, V. H. viii. 14; Tatian adv. Gr. c. 2; Hieron. adv. Jovin. ii. 207; Lucian, Dial. Mort. 21, 2; Cic. Tusc. i. 34, 104; Stob. Floril. 123, 11.) Most probably he succumbed to old age. The Corinthians honoured him with a solemn burial and a tomb, and Sinope erected a monument to his memory (Diog. 78; Pausan. ii. 2, 4; Anth. Gr. iii. 558). Diog. 80, mentions many writings which bear his name. A portion of them were, however, rejected by Sotion. Others denied that he left any writings.

<sup>1</sup> That he exercised an irresistible charm over many persons by his manners and words is attested by Diog. 75, and confirmed by examples like that of Xenocrates, Onesicritus, and his sons.

<sup>2</sup> Amongst them are known besides Crates and Stilpo, Onesicritus, the companion and biographer of Alexander, with his sons Androsthenes and Philiscus (Diog. vi. 75; 73; 80; 84); Monimus of Syracuse, the slave of a Corinthian money-changer, who was driven away by his master for throwing money out of the window in Cynic fanaticism, one of the most distinguished Cynics, and the author of several writings,



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most celebrated; <sup>1</sup> and it was by his influence that Hipparchia <sup>2</sup> and her brother Metrocles <sup>3</sup> were added to the Cynic School. The names of several immediate and remote pupils of Metrocles <sup>4</sup> are known, through whom the School may be traced down to the end of the third century. But all its nobler features were cultivated by the Stoics from the beginning of the third century, by whom they were not only deprived of any lingering extravagances, but were also supplemented by the addition of other valuable ele-

amongst them of *παίγνια σπουδῇ λαληθυία μεμιγμένα* (Diog. vi. 82); Menander and Hegesias, and perhaps Bryson. Phocion is also said to have been an adherent of Diogenes, but Plutarch was not aware of it; and as Phocion adhered to the Academy, there is probably no truth in the statement beyond the fact of a passing acquaintance.

<sup>1</sup> The Theban Crates, generally called a pupil of Diogenes, but by Hippobotus, a pupil of Bryson the Achæan (Diog. vi. 78), flourished about 325 B.C. (Diog. vi. 87). Since, however, he is not mentioned as tilting with Stilpo (Diog. ii. 117), but as quarrelling with Menedemus in his later years, his life must have lasted to the third century. Another Crates, a pupil of Stilpo, who is mentioned Diog. ii. 114, must not be confounded with the Cynic Crates. He is probably the same as the Peripatetic of that name in Diog. iv. 23. In zeal for the Cynic philosophy, Crates gave away his considerable property. He died at an advanced age. Diog. 98 mentions some letters

of his, the style of which resembled Plato's in part, some tragedies, also moral and satirical poems. From Diog. 91; Apul. Floril. 14, we learn that he was ugly and deformed.

<sup>2</sup> The daughter of an opulent family from Maronea in Thrace, who from love to Crates renounced her prospects and habits of comfort, and followed him in his beggar's life, Diog. 96; Apul. Floril. ii. 14.

<sup>3</sup> Formerly a pupil of Theophrastus, but won over to Cynicism by Crates, after having been cured by him of his childish idea of suicide. At a later period, however, he hung himself to escape the burdens of age, Diog. 94.

<sup>4</sup> Diog. 95. His pupils were Theombrotus and Cleomenes; the former was the teacher of Demetrius, the latter of Timarchus, and both of them of Echeclus, the teacher of Menedemus. Menippus of Sinope also belongs to the more distinguished members of this school. Contemporary with Echeclus was Colotes, Diog. vi. 102. Contemporary with Metrocles was Diodore of Aspendus.



ments. Henceforth it was useless as a special branch of the Socratic philosophy, and all the subsequent attempts which were made to preserve its distinct character only resulted in caricatures. Two of the basest of its later representatives are known to us in the persons of Menedemus<sup>1</sup> and Menippus.<sup>2</sup> Soon after it became extinct as a School, and only reappeared at a very much later time as an offshoot of Stoicism.

The Cynic philosophy claims to be the genuine teaching of Socrates. But the many sided view of Socrates, by which he brought the scientific and the moral elements into complete unison, and thus laid the foundations of a more extended and more deeply penetrating science, was above the powers of Antisthenes. Naturally of a narrow and dull comprehension,<sup>3</sup> but fortified with singular strength of will, Antisthenes admired<sup>4</sup> above all things the independence of his master's character, the strictness of his principles, his self-control, and his universal cheerfulness in every position in life. He did not understand how these moral traits could be in a

B. *Their teaching.*

(a) *Depreciation of theoretical knowledge.*

<sup>1</sup> A Cynic who used to deliver his condemnatory addresses in the mask of a fury (Diog. 102).

<sup>2</sup> Menippus was originally a Phœnician slave. He is described as a stingy miser and money-changer, whose Cynicism was only surface-deep. When his money was stolen, he hung himself (Diog. 99). It appears from Diog. that he lived in the third century. His satirical writings were imitated by Varro; Macrob. Sat. i. 11.

<sup>3</sup> His teaching proves this,

independently of the opinions of opponents, such as Plato, Theætet. 155, E., in which the words *σκληροὺς καὶ ἀντιτύπους ἀνθρώπους* and *μάλ' εὖ ἄμουνσαι* refer without doubt to Antisthenes; Soph. 251, B. *γερόντων τοῖς ὀψιμάθεσι . . . ὑπὸ πείρας τῆς περὶ φρόνησιν κτήσεως τὰ τοιαῦτα τεθναμάκοσι*. Arist. Metaph. v. 29; viii. 3.

<sup>4</sup> As Cic. De Orat. iii. 17, 62, and Diog. vi. 2, remark, apparently on the same authority.

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great measure the result of free enquiry on the part of Socrates, and how they could thus be preserved from narrowness. The principle of a knowledge of conceptions reached far beyond the limits of his intellectual horizon. All knowledge not immediately subservient to ethical purposes he rejected as unnecessary, or even as injurious, wishing even to suppress it as the offspring of vanity and love of pleasure. Virtue, he maintained, was an affair of action, and could dispense with words and with wisdom. All that it needed was the strength of will of a Socrates.<sup>1</sup> Thus his School not only regarded logical and physical enquiries as worthless, but uttered the same opinion about all science and art which has not the moral improvement of mankind<sup>2</sup> for its immediate

<sup>1</sup> Diog. 11, Antisthenes teaches αὐτάρκη δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν, μηδενὸς προσδευμένην ὅτι μὴ Σωκρατικῆς ἰσχύος. τὴν τ' ἀρετὴν τῶν ἔργων εἶναι, μήτε λόγων πλείστων δεομένην μήτε μαθημάτων.

<sup>2</sup> Diog. 103: ἀρέσκει οὖν αὐτοῖς τὸν λογικὸν καὶ τὸν φυσικὸν τόπον περιαιρεῖν, ἐμφερῶς Ἀρίστωνι τῷ Χίῳ, μόνῳ δὲ προσέχειν τῷ ἠθικῷ. According to Diocles, Diogenes said—what others attribute to Socrates—that we ought to learn ὅττι τοι ἐν μεγάροισι κακὸν τ' ἀγαθὸν τε τέτυκται. παραιτοῦνται δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐγκύκλια . . . περιαιροῦσι δὲ καὶ γεωμετρίαν καὶ μουσικὴν καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα. When a dial was shown him, Diogenes replied, that it was not a bad instrument to avoid being late for meals. Ibid. 27: τοὺς δὲ γραμματικούς ἐθαύμαζε [Ἀντισθένης] τὰ μὲν τοῦ

Ὀδυσεύως κατὰ ἀναζητοῦντας τὰ δ' ἴδια ἀγνοοῦντας· καὶ μὴν καὶ τοὺς μουσικοὺς τὰς μὲν ἐν τῇ λύρᾳ χορδὰς ἀρμόττεσθαι, ἀνάρμοστα δ' ἔχειν τῆς ψυχῆς τὰ ἥθη· τοὺς μαθηματικούς ἀποβλέπειν μὲν πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον καὶ τὴν σελήνην, τὰ δ' ἐν ποσὶ πράγματα παρορᾶν· τοὺς ῥήτορας λέγειν μὲν ἐσπουδακέναι τὰ δίκαια, πράττειν δὲ μηδαμῶς. The passage on astronomers may possibly have been supported by the story of Thales, who fell into a well whilst contemplating the heavens, and corresponding to it is the passage in the Theætetus 174, A, on the Thracian maiden who upbraided him for so doing. The mother of Antisthenes was a Thracian slave, and the words which Plato puts into the mouth of the Thracian girl closely resemble those quoted by Diogenes. It would also correspond with the charac-

object. For said Diogenes,<sup>1</sup> as soon as other things engross attention, self is neglected. Even reading and writing Antisthenes declared could be dispensed with.<sup>2</sup>

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The last statement must in any case be taken with limitation,<sup>3</sup> nor can the Cynic School as a whole be regarded as altogether hostile to culture, however much such language may seem to imply it. In fact decided expressions on the value of culture, coming from Antisthenes,<sup>4</sup> Diogenes,<sup>5</sup> Crates,<sup>6</sup> and Monimus,<sup>7</sup> are on record, and Diogenes is said to have

(b) *Limits to the depreciation of culture.*

ter of Antisthenes, that he as an ἀπαιδευτος should be charged with not troubling himself about the general conception of things. Diog. 73 says of Diogenes: μουσικῆς τε καὶ γεωμετρικῆς καὶ ἀστρολογίας καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἀμελεῖν ὡς ἀχρήστων καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκαίων. Conf. Diog. 24; 39; Julian, Or. vi. 190; Seneca, Ep. 88; Stob. Floril. 33, 14; id. 80, 6: an astronomer pointing to a map of the heavens says: οὗτοί εἰσιν οἱ πλανώμενοι τῶν ἀστέρων· upon which Diogenes replies, pointing to those present: μὴ ψεύδου· οὐ γὰρ οὗτοί εἰσιν οἱ πλανώμενοι, ἀλλ' οὗτοι.

<sup>1</sup> According to Stob. in the extracts from John of Damascus, ii. 13, 61.

<sup>2</sup> Diog. 103: γράμματα γοῦν μὴ μαθάνειν ἔφασκεν ὁ Ἀντισθένης τοὺς σώφρονας γενομένους, ἵνα μὴ διαστρέφονται τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις.

<sup>3</sup> It would be hardly credible in a man so fond of writing. If the above statement is not altogether a fancy, it may either rest upon some individual expression, such as, that it would

be better not to read at all than to read such nonsense, or it is based upon more general statements such as that quoted by Diog. 5, that wisdom must not be written in books, but in the soul.

<sup>4</sup> Stob. Ekl. ed. Gaisf. App. ii. 13, 68: δεῖ τοὺς μέλλοντας ἀγαθοῖς ἄνδρας γενήσεσθαι τὸ μὲν σῶμα γυμνασίους ἀσκεῖν, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν παιδεύειν.

<sup>5</sup> Diog. 68: τὴν παιδείαν εἶπε τοῖς μὲν νέοις σωφροσύνην, τοῖς δὲ πρεσβυτέροις παραμυθίαν, τοῖς δὲ πένησι πλοῦτον, τοῖς δὲ πλουσίοις κόσμον εἶναι.—Stob. Ekl. ed. Gaisf. App. ii. 13, 29; ἡ παιδεία ὁμοία ἐστὶ χρυσῷ στεφάνῳ· καὶ γὰρ τιμὴν ἔχει καὶ πολυτέλειαν.

<sup>6</sup> Diog. 86: ταῦτ' ἔχω ὅσος ἔμαθον καὶ ἐφρόντισα καὶ μετὰ Μουσῶν σέμν' ἐδάην. τὰ δὲ πολλὰ καὶ ὄλβια τύφος ἔμαρψε. A parody of this verse is the epitaph on Sardanapalus in Clem. Stromat. ii. 411, D.

<sup>7</sup> Stob. Ekl. ed. Gaisf. App. ii. 13, 88: Μόνιμος . . . ἔφη κρείττον εἶναι τυφλὸν ἢ ἀπαιδευτὸν· τὸν μὲν γὰρ εἰς τὸν βάθρον, τὸν δ' εἰς τὸ βάραθρον ἐμπίπτειν.

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zealously instilled the words of poets and of prose writers into his pupils.<sup>1</sup> Besides, it cannot be conceived that men, who wrote so much that was good, should have declared war against all culture. One thing we may however take as established, that the worth of culture was alone and exclusively estimated by its efficiency in producing the Cynic type of virtue. Hence they depreciated all speculative knowledge, and only studied logic and physics, in as far as these sciences seemed necessary for ethical purposes.<sup>2</sup> We are not justified, in exempting even the founder from this judgment.<sup>3</sup> All that is known

<sup>1</sup> Diog. 31, according to Eubulus: κατεῖχον δὲ οἱ παῖδες πολλὰ ποιητῶν καὶ συγγραφέων καὶ τῶν αὐτοῦ Διογενοῦς, πᾶσάν τ' ἔφοδον σύντομον πρὸς τὸ εὐμνημόνευστον ἐπήσκει.

<sup>2</sup> Krische, Forschungen, 237. See Ritter, ii. 120.

<sup>3</sup> Although the division of philosophy into Logic, Ethics, and Physics can have been hardly introduced in the time of Antisthenes, and hence the words in Diog. 103 cannot be his, it does not thence follow that the statement there made is false. Amongst the writings of Antisthenes some are known to us, which would be called logical writings, to use a later division; others are on physical subjects. To the first class belong *Περὶ λέξεως*, *Ἀλήθεια*, *Περὶ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι*, *Σάβων ἢ περὶ τοῦ ἀντιλέγειν*, *Περὶ διαλέκτου*, *Περὶ ὀνομάτων*, *Περὶ ὀνομάτων χρήσεως*, *Περὶ ἐρωτήσεως καὶ ἀποκρίσεως*, *Περὶ δόξης καὶ ἐπιστήμης*, *Δόξαι ἢ ἐριστικὸς*, *Περὶ τοῦ μανθάνειν*

*προβλήματα*. To the second, *Περὶ ζώων φύσεως*, *Περὶ φύσεως*, (perhaps the same which Cicero mentions N. D. i. 13, 32), *Ἐρωτημα περὶ φύσεως*. A commentary on the writings of Heraclitus, which Diog. ix. 15 mentions, does not belong to him. So little, however, is known of these writings, that no conclusions can be arrived at which contradict the above assumptions. His logical writings, to judge by their titles, appear to have contained those polemical dissertations on conceptions, judgments, and expressions, which were required as a foundation for critical researches. Of the writings on Physics, it is not known whether they treat of other than those natural subjects, which Antisthenes required immediately for his Ethics, in order to bring out the difference between nature and custom and the conditions of a life of nature. Even the writing *περὶ ζώων φύσεως* may have had this object. Probably Plato, *Phileb.* 44, C.



of the sentences of Antisthenes on logic, consists in a polemic against the philosophy of conceptions, the object of which is to prove the impossibility of speculative knowledge. In the same way his remarks upon nature are only intended to show, what is natural for man. For this no deep researches seemed to him to be necessary;<sup>1</sup> a healthy intelligence can tell everyone what he ought to know. Anything further he considered only useless subtlety.

In support of these views Antisthenes put forward a theory, based it is true, on a leading position of Socrates,<sup>2</sup> but one which in its expanded form and in its sceptical results, plainly shows the disciple of Gorgias. As Socrates required the essence and conception of every object to be investigated before anything further could be predicated of it, so Antisthenes required the conceptions of things to be determined, that it might be known in what they really consist.<sup>3</sup> But in confining himself to this point of view exclusively, he arrived at the conclusion of the Sophists, that every object can only be called by its own peculiar name, and consequently that no pre-

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(c) *Nominalism.*

reckoned Antisthenes among the μάλα δεινούς λεγομένους τὰ περὶ φύσιν, only because in all questions about morals and prevailing customs, he invariably referred to the requirements of nature.

<sup>1</sup> Even Cicero ad Attic. xii. 38, calls Antisthenes 'homo acutus magis quam eruditus.'

<sup>2</sup> Compare the relation of this theory to the doctrine of ideas, and what Diog. 39 says of Diogenes, with what the Scholiast on

Arist. Categor. says of Antisthenes, and what Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 66, in general asserts of a Cynic, that he refutes the arguments against motion by walking up and down.

<sup>3</sup> Diog. vi. 3: πρῶτός τε ὠρίσατο λόγον εἰπῶν· λόγος ἐστὶν ὁ τὸ τί ᾗν ἢ ἐστὶ δηλῶν. Alexander in Top. 24, Schol. in Arist. 256, on the Aristotelian τί ᾗν εἶναι says that the simple τί ᾗν, which Antisthenes wanted, is not sufficient.



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dicare can be applied to a subject which contains a different idea to that of the subject. Thus it can not be said that a man is good, but only that a man is human, or that the good is good.<sup>1</sup> And moreover, since every explanation of a conception consists in making one conception clearer by means of others, he rejected all definition, on the ground that it is language, which does not touch the thing itself. If, with regard to composite things, he allowed, that their component parts could be enumerated, and that they could be explained in this sense, he insisted all the more strongly with regard to simple ones that this was impossible. They might be compared with others, but they could not be defined.

<sup>1</sup> Arist. *Metaph.* v. 29: διὸ Ἀντισθένης φέτο εὐήθως μηδὲν ἀξιῶν λέγεσθαι πλὴν τῷ οἰκείῳ λόγῳ ἐν ἐφ' ἐνός· ἐξ ὧν συνέβαινε, μὴ εἶναι ἀντιλέγειν, σχεδὸν δὲ μηδὲ ψεύδεσθαι. Alexander on the passage. Plato, *Soph.* 251, B.: ὅθεν γε, οἶμαι, τοῖς τε νέοις καὶ τῶν γερόντων τοῖς ὀψιμαθέσι θοίνην παρεσχέκαμεν· εὐθὺς γὰρ ἀντιλαβέσθαι παντὶ πρόχειρον ὡς ἀδύνατον τά τε πολλὰ ἐν καὶ τὸ ἐν πολλὰ εἶναι, καὶ δὴ πού χαίρουσιν οὐκ ἔωντες ἀγαθὸν λέγειν ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθόν, τὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρωπον.—Cf. *Philebus* 14, C.; Arist. *Soph. El.* c. 17. 175, b. 15; *Phys.* i. 2. 185, b. 25. The forward step which Hermann once thought to discern in these sentences of Antisthenes, seemingly proving that Antisthenes recognised all analytical judgments a priori to be true, he has been obliged to modify

(*Plat.* i. 217, *Ges. Abh.* 239) on being reminded by Ritter (*Gesch. d. Phil.* ii. 133) that Antisthenes could only be speaking of identical judgments. But he still adheres to it so far as to state that by the teaching of Antisthenes, philosophy for the first time gave to identical judgments an independent value. In what this value consists, it is hard to say, for nothing is gained by recognising identical judgments, nor has it ever occurred to any philosopher to deny them, as Hermann asserted though without quoting a single instance in support of it. Still less can it be a forward step in philosophy to deny all but identical judgments. Far from it, such a denial is the result of an imperfect view of things, and is destructive of all knowledge.

Names might be given to them, but not conceptions of qualities. Their true appearance might be settled, but no knowledge of them could be gained.<sup>1</sup> The characteristic of a thing, however, that which can never be defined, its real conception, which is borrowed from nothing else, and therefore can never be used as a predicate, consists alone in its proper name. By this it is known when it can be explained by nothing else. All that is real is strictly individual. General conceptions do not express the nature of things, but they express men's thoughts about them. The very same demand which Socrates had made for a know-

<sup>1</sup> Arist. Metaph. viii. 3: ὥστε ἡ ἀπορία, ἣν οἱ Ἀντισθέнейοι καὶ οἱ οὕτως ἀπαίδευτοὶ ἠπόρουσιν, ἔχει τινὰ καιρὸν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τὸ τί ἐστὶν ὀρίσασθαι, τὸν γὰρ ὄρον λόγον εἶναι μακρὸν—see Metaph. xiv. 3, and Schwegler on this passage—ἀλλὰ ποῖον μὲν τί ἐστὶν ἐνδέχεται καὶ διδάξαι, ὥσπερ ἄργυρον τί μὲν ἐστὶν, οὐ, ὅτι δ' οἶον καττίτερος. ὥστ' οὐσίας ἔστι μὲν ἧς ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ὄρον καὶ λόγον, οἶον τῆς συνθέτου, ἐάν τε αἰσθητὴ ἐάν τε νοητὴ ᾗ. ἐξ ὧν δ' αὕτη πρῶτων οὐκ ἔστιν.—Alexander on the passage, explains it more fully, but without adding anything fresh. That this view was maintained by the disciples of Antisthenes, appears from Plato's Theætet. 201, E.: ἐγὼ γὰρ αὐτὸν ἐδόκουν ἀκούειν τινῶν ὅτι τὰ μὲν πρῶτα ὥσπερ εἰ στοιχεῖα, ἐξ ὧν ἡμεῖς τε συγκείμεθα καὶ τὰλλα, λόγον οὐκ ἔχοι. αὐτὸν γὰρ καθ' αὐτὸ ἕκαστον ὀνομάσαι μόνον εἶη, προσεῖπεν δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο δυνατόν, οὐθ' ὥς ἔστιν οὐθ' ὥς οὐκ ἔστιν . . . ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τὸ αὐτὸ οὐδὲ τὸ

ἐκεῖνο οὐδὲ τὸ ἕκαστον οὐδὲ τὸ μόνον προσοιστέον, οὐδ' ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα· ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ περιτρέχοντα πᾶσι προσφέρεσθαι, ἕτερα ὄντα ἐκείνων οἷς προστίθεται. δεῖν δὲ, εἴπερ ἦν δυνατόν αὐτὸ λέγεσθαι καὶ εἶχεν οἰκεῖον αὐτοῦ λόγον, ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων λέγεσθαι. νῦν δὲ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ὅτι οὖν τῶν πρῶτων βῆθῆναι λόγῳ· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι αὐτῷ ἀλλ' ἢ ὀνομάζεσθαι μόνον· ὄνομα γὰρ μόνον ἔχειν· τὰ δὲ ἐκ τούτων ἤδη συγκείμενα, ὥσπερ αὐτὰ πέπλεκται, οὕτω καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα αὐτῶν συμπλεκέντα λόγον γεγονέναι· ὀνομάτων γὰρ σύμπλοκὴν εἶναι λόγου οὐσίαν. And 201, C: ἔφη δὲ τὴν μὲν μετὰ λόγον δόξαν ἀληθὴ ἐπιστήμην εἶναι, τὴν δὲ ἄλογον ἐκτὸς ἐπιστήμης· καὶ ὧν μὲν μὴ ἔστι λόγος, οὐκ ἐπιστητὰ εἶναι, οὕτως καὶ ὀνομάζων, ἃ δ' ἔχει, ἐπιστητά. This whole description agrees with what has been quoted from Aristotle so entirely, that we cannot possibly refer it to any one else but Antisthenes.

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ledge of conceptions was by Plato expanded into a system of the most decided Realism, and was developed by Antisthenes into the barest Nominalism. General conceptions, he maintained, were only imaginary objects. Horses and men were seen, not however the conception of a horse or a man.<sup>1</sup> From this position he opened a campaign against his fellow pupil, with whom he was for other reasons not on good terms,<sup>2</sup> but his fire was met with corresponding spirit.<sup>3</sup> It is only natural that Antisthenes with his

<sup>1</sup> Simpl. in Categ. Schol. in Arist. 66 says: τῶν δὲ παλαιῶν οἱ μὲν ἀνέρουσαν τὰς ποιότητας τελέως, τὸ ποιὸν συγχωροῦντες εἶναι (the terminology of course belongs to the Stoics) ὥσπερ Ἀντισθένης, ὃς ποτε Πλάτῳ διαμφισβητῶν, 'ὦ Πλάτων,' ἔφη, 'ἵππον μὲν ὁρῶ, ἱππότητα δὲ οὐχ ὁρῶ,' to which Plato replied: True, for you have the eye with which you see a horse, but you are deficient in the eye with which you see the idea of horse. David, *ibid.* 68, says: Ἀντισθένην καὶ τοὺς περὶ αὐτὸν λέγοντας, ἀνθρώπου ὁρῶ ἀνθρωπότητα δὲ οὐχ ὁρῶ. Diog. vi. 53, tells the same of Diogenes and Plato, only using *τραπεζότης* and *κυαθότης* instead of *ἀνθρωπότης*. Ammon. in Porph. Isag. 22, says: Ἄ. ἔλεγε τὰ γένη καὶ τὰ εἶδη ἐν ψιλαῖς ἐπινοαῖς εἶναι, and then he mentions *ἀνθρωπότης* and *ἱππότης* as examples. Plato is no doubt referring to this assertion of Antisthenes, when he raises in the *Parm.* 132, B., an objection to the theory of ideas, μὴ τῶν εἰδῶν ἕκαστον ἢ τούτων νόημα καὶ οὐδαμοῦ αὐτῷ προσήκη ἐγγίγνεσθαι ἄλλοι: ἢ ἐν ψυχαῖς.

<sup>2</sup> The character and position in life of the two men was widely different, and Plato must have felt himself as much repelled by the plebeian roughness of a philosopher taken from the masses, as Antisthenes would have been annoyed by the refined delicacy of Plato.

<sup>3</sup> Compare Plato, *Soph.* 251, C., and the anecdotes in *Diog.* iii. 35, vi. 7, and the corresponding ones about Plato and Diogenes, which are partially fictions, in vi. 25; 40; 54; 58; *Ælian*, V. H. xiv. 33; *Theo. Progym.* p. 205; *Stob. Floril.* 13, 37. For the Cynical attack which Antisthenes made on Plato in his *Σάθων*, see *Diog.* iii. 35, vi. 16; *Athen.* v. 220, xi. 507. The *Euthydemus* of Plato 301, A., also contains a trace of Antisthenes' polemic against the doctrine of ideas. Plato there meets the assertion of the Sophist that beauty is only beautiful by the presence of beauty, by saying: ἐὰν οὖν παραγένηται σοι βοῦς, βοῦς εἶ, καὶ ὅτι νῦν ἐγὼ σοι πάρεμι Διονυσόδωρος εἶ; We may suppose that Antisthenes really made use of the illustration of oxen,

view of the question, should have laid the greatest stress upon names.<sup>1</sup> But by stopping at names, and refusing to allow any further teaching about things, he in truth put every scientific enquiry out of the question. This he partially admitted, when from his hypotheses he drew the conclusion that it was impossible to contradict oneself.<sup>2</sup> Taken strictly those

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(d) *Con-  
tradiction  
denied.*

to which Plato then replied by making use of the same illustration in the person of Dionysodorus.

<sup>1</sup> Antisth. in Epict. Diss. i. 17, 12: ἀρχὴ παιδείσεως ἡ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐπίσκεψις. It is a pity that we do not know more accurately the sense and the connection of this utterance, and hence we cannot judge whether it required an individual enquiry into the most important names, or only a general enquiry into nature and the meaning of names, which the principles contained in the above should develope.

<sup>2</sup> Arist. Metaph. v. 29; Top. i. 11. οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν, καθάπερ ἔφη Ἀντισθένης, which Alex. (Schol. in Arist. 732) thus explains: φέτο δὲ ὁ Ἀντισθένης ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων λέγεσθαι τῷ οἰκείῳ λόγῳ μόνῳ καὶ ἓνα ἕκαστον λόγον εἶναι . . . ἐξ ὧν καὶ συνάγειν ἐπείρατο ὅτι μὴ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἀντιλέγοντας περὶ τινος διάφορα λέγειν ὀφείλειν, μὴ δύνασθαι δὲ περὶ αὐτοῦ διαφόρους τοὺς λόγους φέρεσθαι τῷ ἓνα τὸν οἰκείον ἕκαστον εἶναι· ἓνα γὰρ ἐνὸς εἶναι καὶ τὸν λέγοντα περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν μόνον· ὥστε εἰ μὲν περὶ τοῦ πράγματος τοῦ αὐτοῦ λέγοιεν, τὰ αὐτὰ ἂν λέγοιεν ἀλλήλοις (εἰς γὰρ ὁ περὶ ἐνὸς λόγος) λέγοντες δὲ ταῦτα οὐκ ἂν ἀντιλέγοιεν ἀλλήλοις·

εἰ δὲ διαφέροντα λέγοιεν, οὐκ ἐτι λέξειν αὐτοὺς περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ. In exactly the same way Plato's Dionysodorus (Euthyd. 285, E.) establishes his assertion, that it is impossible to contradict; εἰσὶν ἕκαστῳ τῶν ὄντων λόγοι; Πάνυ γε. Οὐκοῦν ὥς ἔστιν ἕκαστον ἢ ὥς οὐκ ἔστιν; Ὡς ἔστιν. Εἰ γὰρ μέμνησαι, ἔφη, ὦ Κτήσιππε, καὶ ἄρτι ἐπεδείξαμεν μηδένα λέγοντα ὥς οὐκ ἔστι. τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὂν οὐδεὶς ἐφάνη λέγων. Πότερον οὖν . . . ἀντιλέγομεν ἂν τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος λόγον ἀμφοτέροι λέγοντες, ἢ οὕτω μὲν ἂν δήπου ταῦτά λέγοιμεν; Συνεχάρει. Ἄλλ' ὅταν μηδέτερος, ἔφη, τὸν τοῦ πράγματος λόγον λέγῃ, τότε ἀντιλέγομεν ἂν; ἢ οὕτω γε τὸ παράπαν οὐδ' ἂν μεμνημένος εἴῃ τοῦ πράγματος οὐδέτερος ἡμῶν; Καὶ τοῦτο συνωμολογεῖ. Ἄλλ' ἄρα, ὅταν ἐγὼ λέγω μὲν τὸ πρᾶγμα, σὺ δὲ οὐδὲ λέγεις τὸ παράπαν· ὁ δὲ μὴ λέγων τῷ λέγοντι πῶς ἂν ἀντιλέγοι; Plato probably had an eye to Antisthenes, although this line of argument can hardly come from him. Here too belongs the maxim of Antisthenes in Stob. Flor. 82, 8; to the effect that contradiction ought never to be used, but only persuasion. A madman will not be brought to his right mind by another's madness. Contradiction is madness. For he who contradicts,



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hypotheses would have led him not only to the inference already drawn by Aristotle<sup>1</sup> that no propositions are false, but also to the further inference that no propositions of any kind are possible. The teaching of Antisthenes, if taken consistently, was calculated to do away with all knowledge and with every kind of judgment.

C. *Theory  
of Morals.*  
(a) *Good  
and evil.*

But the Cynics were themselves by no means disposed to renounce knowledge. Four books came from the pen of Antisthenes, on the difference between knowledge and opinion,<sup>2</sup> and the whole School prided itself no little on having advanced beyond the deceptive sphere of opinions,<sup>3</sup> and being in full possession of truth. With them, however, knowledge is directed entirely to a practical end, its object being to make men virtuous, and happy in being virtuous. Thus the highest object in life was allowed by the Cynics, as by all other moral philosophers, to consist in happiness,<sup>4</sup> but happiness was not distinguished from virtue, at least, not to the extent to which the distinction is generally drawn, so as to suppose it possible without virtue, but was absolutely identified with virtue. To the Cynic nothing is good but virtue,

does what is in the nature of things impossible.

<sup>1</sup> Procl. in Crat. 37: 'Αντισθένης ἔλεγεν μὴ δεῖν ἀντιλέγειν· πᾶς γὰρ, φησί, λόγος ἀληθεύει· ὁ γὰρ λέγων τι λέγει· ὁ δὲ τι λέγων τὸ ὄν λέγει· ὁ δὲ τὸ ὄν λέγων ἀληθεύει. Conf. Plato, Crat. 429, D.

<sup>2</sup> περὶ δόξης καὶ ἐπιστήμης, Diog. 17.

<sup>3</sup> Diog. 83 says of Monimus:

οὗτος μὲν ἐμβριθέστατος ἐγένετο, ὥστε δόξης μὲν καταφρονεῖν, πρὸς δ' ἀλήθειαν παρορμαῖν. Menander says of the same Cynic: τὸ γὰρ ὑποληφθὲν τύφον εἶναι πᾶν ἔφη. In Lucian v. Acut. 8, Diogenes calls himself a prophet of truth and freedom.

<sup>4</sup> Diog. ii.: αὐτάρκη τὴν ἀρετὴν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν, so that happiness is the end, and virtue the means. Stob. Ecl. 103, 20, 21.



nothing bad but vice, and what is neither the one nor the other is for man indifferent.<sup>1</sup> There can be but one good for everything—the good which belongs to it.<sup>2</sup> The only real thing which belongs to man is mind:<sup>3</sup> everything else is a matter of chance. Man's mental and moral powers therefore are alone free to act. Intelligence and virtue constitute the only armour which can protect man against all the attacks of chance,<sup>4</sup> and that man alone is free who

<sup>1</sup> Diog. vi. 104: ἀρέσκει δ' αὐτοῖς καὶ τέλος εἶναι τὸ κατ' ἀρετὴν (ἦν ὡς Ἀντισθένης φησὶν ἐν τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ, ὁμοίως τοῖς στωικοῖς. 105: τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας ἀδιάφορα λέγουσιν ὁμοίως Ἀρίστωνι τῷ Χίφ. Diocles. in Diog. 12 says of Antisthenes: τὰγαθὰ καλὰ, τὰ κακὰ αἰσχροῦ. See Athen. in Diog. vi. 14, who addresses them—

ᾧ στωϊκῶν μύθων εἰδήμονες, ᾧ πανάριστα  
δόγματα ταῖς ἱεραῖς ἐνθέμενοι  
σελίσιν·

τὰν ἀρετὰν ψυχᾶς ἀγαθὸν μόνον·  
ἄδε γὰρ ἀνδρῶν  
μοῦνᾶ καὶ βιοτὰν ῥύσατο καὶ  
πολιάς.

Epiph. Exp. Fid. 1089, C. says of Diog.: ἔφησε τὸ ἀγαθὸν οἶσθν παντὶ σοφῷ εἶναι, τὰ δ' ἄλλα πάντα οὐδὲν ἢ φλυαρίας ὑπάρχειν.

<sup>2</sup> This maxim follows from Diog. 12, who states as the teaching of Antisthenes: τὰ πονηρὰ νομίξε πάντα ξενικά. Compare Plato, Symp. 205, E.: οὐ γὰρ τὸ ἐαυτῶν, οἶμαι ἕκαστοι ἀσπάζονται, εἰ μὴ εἴ τις τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν οἰκεῖον καλοῖ καὶ ἐαυτοῦ, τὸ δὲ κακὸν ἀλλότριον. In the Charm. 163, C. Critias says, only the useful and good is οἰκεῖον. Although Antisthenes is not here men-

tioned by name, yet the passage in Diogenes makes it probable that the antithesis of ἀγαθὸν and οἰκεῖον belongs to him, even if he was not the first to introduce it.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Symp. 4, 34, puts the following words to the same effect in the mouth of Antisthenes: νομίζω, ᾧ ἄνδρες, τοὺς ἀνθρώπους οὐκ ἐν τῷ οἴκῳ τὸν πλοῦτον καὶ τὴν πενίαν ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς· this is then further expanded; and Epictet. Diss. iii. 24, 68, makes Diogenes say of Antisthenes: ἐδίδαξέ με τὰ ἐμὰ καὶ τὰ οὐκ ἐμὰ· κτήσις οὐκ ἐμὴ· συγγενεῖς, οἰκεῖοι, φίλοι, φήμη, συνήθεις, τόποι, διατριβή, πάντα ταῦτα ὅτι ἀλλότρια. σὸν οὖν τί; χρήσις φαντασιῶν. ταύτην ἐδειξέ μοι ὅτι ἀκώλυτον ἔχω, ἀνανάγκαστον, κ. τ. λ. We have, however, certainly not got the very words of Diogenes or Antisthenes.

<sup>4</sup> Diog. 12: ἀναφαίρετον ὄπλον ἀρετὴ . . . τεῖχος ἀσφαλίστατον φρόνησιν· μήτε γὰρ καταρῥεῖν μήτε προδίδοσθαι. The same is a little differently expressed by Epiph. Exp. Fid. 1089, C. Diog. 63 says of Diogenes: ἐρωτηθεὶς τί αὐτῷ περιέγονεν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας, ἔφη· εἰ καὶ μηδὲν ἄλλο, τὸ γοῦν πρὸς πᾶσαν τύχην παρσκευάσθαι—and

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obeys nothing external and listens to no calls from without.<sup>1</sup>

Thus man requires nothing to make him happy but virtue. All else he may learn to despise, so as to become content with virtue alone.<sup>2</sup> For what is wealth without virtue? A prey for flatterers and venal charms, a stimulus to avarice, the root of all evil, the fountain of untold crimes and deeds of shame, a possession for ants and dung-beetles, without either glory or enjoyment.<sup>3</sup> Indeed what else can wealth be but this, if it is true that it is incompatible with virtue?<sup>4</sup> if the Cynic's beggar-life is alone the true path to wisdom?<sup>5</sup> What is honour and shame? The

105: ἀρέσκει αὐτοῖς τύχη μηδὲν ἐπιτρέπειν. Stob. Ekl. ii. 348: Διογένης ἔφη ὄρᾶν τὴν Τύχην ἐνορῶσαν αὐτῷ καὶ λέγουσαν· τοῦτον δ' οὐ δύναμαι βαλέειν κύνα λυσσητῆρα. The same verse is applied by David, Schol. in Arist. 23, to Antisthenes.

<sup>1</sup> This is what Diogenes says of himself in Epict. Diss. iii. 24, 67: ἐξ οὗ μ' Ἀντισθένης ἡλευθέρωσεν, οὐκέτι ἐδούλευσα, and he also asserts in Diog. 71 that he led the life of a Hercules, μηδὲν ἐλευθερίας προκρίνων. Crates in Clem. Strom. ii. 413, A. praises the Cynics:

ἡδονῇ ἀνδραποδῶδει ἀδούλωτοι  
καὶ ἄκαμπτοι  
ἀθάνατον βασιλείαν ἐλευθερίαν  
τ' ἀγαπῶσιν,

and he exhorts his Hipparchia  
τῶνδε κράτει ψυχῆς ἡθεὶ ἀγαλ-  
λομένη,  
οὐθ' ὑπὸ χρυσίων δουλουμένη  
οὐθ' ὑπ' ἐρώτων θηξιπόθων.

<sup>2</sup> See Diog. 105: ἀρέσκει δ'

αὐτοῖς καὶ λιτῶς βιοῦν, πλούτου καὶ δόξης καὶ εὐγενείας καταφρονούσι. Diog. 24. Epict. Diss. i. 24, 6.

<sup>3</sup> Antisth. in Stob. Floril. i. 30; 10, 42; Xen. Sym. 4, 35; Diog. in Diog. 47; 50; 60; Galen. Exhort. c. 7, i. 10, K. Metrocles in Diog. 95; Crates in Stob. 97, 27; 15, 10; Ders. in Julian Or. vi. 199, D.

<sup>4</sup> Stob. Floril. 93, 35: Διογένης ἔλεγε, μήτε ἐν πόλει πλουσία μήτε ἐν οἰκίᾳ ἀρετὴν οἰκεῖν δύνασθαι. Crates therefore disposed of his property, and is said to have settled it in such a way that it should be restored to his children when they ceased to be philosophers (Diog. 88, on the authority of Demetrius Magnes). Unfortunately, however, Crates can at that time have neither had a wife or children.

<sup>5</sup> Diog. 104; Diog. in Stob. Floril. 95, 11; 19. See Lucian, V. Auct. 11; Crates in Epiph. Exp. Fid. 1089, C.: ἐλευθερίας εἶναι τὴν ἀκτημοσύνην.

talk of fools, about which no child of reason will trouble himself? For in truth the very opposite to what we think is true. Honour amongst men is an evil. To be despised by them is a good, since it keeps us back from vain attempts. Glory only falls to his lot, who seeks her not.<sup>1</sup> What is death? Clearly not an evil. For only what is bad<sup>2</sup> is an evil. And death we do not experience to be an evil, since we have no further experience when we are dead.<sup>3</sup> All these things are then only empty fancies,<sup>4</sup> nothing more. Wisdom consists in raising one's thoughts above them.<sup>5</sup> The most worthless and the most harmful thing is—what men most covet—pleasure. Of pleasure, the Cynics not only deny that it is a good, but they declare it to be the greatest evil, and a saying is preserved of Antisthenes, that he would rather feel madness than pleasure.<sup>6</sup> Where the love of pleasure

<sup>1</sup> Epict. Diss. i. 24, 6 : Διογένης λέγει, ὅτι εὐδοξία (Winckelmann, p. 47, suggests ἀδοξία, which certainly might be expected from what preceded) ψόφος ἐστὶ μαίνοντων ἀνθρώπων. Diog. 11 says of Antisth. : τήν τ' ἀδοξίαν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἴσον τῷ πόνῳ, and 72 : εὐγενείας δὲ καὶ δόξας καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα διέπαιξε (Diogenes), προκοσμήματα κακίας εἶναι λέγων. In 41 he speaks of δόξης ἐξανθήματα. In 92 : ἔλεγε δὲ (Crates) μέχρι τούτου δεῖν φιλοσοφεῖν, μέχρι ἂν δόξωσιν οἱ στρατηγοὶ εἶναι ὀνηλάται. Compare also 93. Doxopater in Aphthon. c. 2, Rhet. Gr. i. 192, says that Diogenes, in answer to the question, How is honour to be gained? replied 'By not troubling yourself at all about it.'

<sup>2</sup> Epict. : λέγει, ὅτι ὁ θάνατος οὐκ ἔστε κακόν, οὐδὲ γὰρ αἰσχρόν.

<sup>3</sup> Diogenes in Diog. 68. Conf. Cic. Tusc. i. 43, 104. Certainly the Cynic does not mean immortality here, nor does it follow from the remark of Antisthenes on Il. xxiii. 15 (Schol. Venet.) to the effect that the souls have the same forms as their bodies.

<sup>4</sup> Or as the Cynic technically calls it, mere smoke, τῦφος. See Diog. 26, 83, 86.

<sup>5</sup> Clement. Strom. ii. 417, B. (Theod. Cur. Gr. Aff. xi. 8.) : Ἀντισθένης μὲν τὴν αἰτυφίαν (τέλος ἀπέφηνει).

<sup>6</sup> Diog. vi. 3 : ἔλεγε τε συνεχές· μακρίν μᾶλλον ἢ ἡσθεῖν. Ib. ix. 101 [ἡ ἡδονὴ δοξάζεται] κακὸν ὑπ' Ἀντισθένους. The same

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gives rise to unbridled passion, as in love, there no means can be too violent to eradicate it.<sup>1</sup> And on the contrary, what most men are afraid of, labour and toil, are good, because labour and toil alone bring man to a healthy state, and thus make him independent.<sup>2</sup> Hercules<sup>3</sup> is thus the patron saint and pattern for the Cynic,<sup>4</sup> because no one fought his

in Gell. ix. 5, 3; Clement. Stromat. ii. 412, D.; Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 13, 7 (Theod. Cur. Gr. Aff. xii. 47). Conf. Diog. vi. 8, 14. Plato is no doubt referring to this Cynical dictum, Phileb. 44, C.: *λίαν μεμισηκότων τὴν τῆς ἡδονῆς δύναμιν καὶ νενομικῶτων οὐδὲν ὑγιές, ὥστε καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο αὐτῆς τὸ ἐπαγωγὸν γοήτευμα οὐχ ἡδονὴν εἶναι*, and Arist. Eth. x. 1: *οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὰγαθὸν ἡδονὴν λέγουσιν, οἱ δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας κοιμῶν φαῦλον*. Ib. vii. 12: *τοῖς μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ οὐδεμία ἡδονὴ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν οὔτε καθ' αὐτὸ οὔτε κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι ταῦτ' ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδονήν*.

<sup>1</sup> Clement. 406, C.: *ἐγὼ δὲ ἀποδέχομαι τὸν Ἀντισθένην, τὴν Ἀφροδίτην, λέγοντα, κὰν κατατοξεύσαιμι, εἰ λάβοιμι· ὅτι πολλὰς ἡμῶν καλὰς καὶ ἀγαθὰς γυναικὰς διέφθειρεν. τὸν τε ἔρωτα κακίαν φησὶ φύσεως· ἧς ἥττους ὄντες οἱ κακοδαίμονες θεὸν τὴν νόσον καλοῦσιν*. Crates in Diog. vi. 86; Clement. Strom. ii. 412, D.; Julian, Or. vi. 198, D.:

*ἔρωτα παύει λιμός, εἰ δὲ μή, χρόνος·*

*εἰ δὲ τούτοις μὴ δύνῃ, χρῆσθαι βρόχος.*

On the same subject compare also Diog. vi 38; 51; 67; Stob. Floril. 64, 1; 6, 2; 18, 27; Diog. 66: *τοὺς μὲν οἰκέτας ἔφη τοῖς*

*δεσπόταις, τοὺς δὲ φαῦλους ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις δουλεύειν.*

<sup>2</sup> Diog. vi. 2, says of Antisthenes: *καὶ ὅτι ὁ πόνος ἀγαθὸν συνέστησε διὰ τοῦ μεγάλου Ἡρακλέους καὶ τοῦ Κύρου*. Diogenes says in Stobæus (App. to Gais. Ekl. ii. 13, 87) that boys ought to be educated by abstemiousness, as long as they are susceptible of culture, if they are to come to any good.

<sup>3</sup> Who had also a temple near Cynosarges.

<sup>4</sup> Antisthenes speaks of two Hercules, Diog. 2, 18. Diogenes says of himself in Diog. 71: *τὸν αὐτὸν χαρακτῆρα τοῦ βίου διεξάγειν ὅνπερ καὶ Ἡρακλῆς, μηδὲν ἐλευθερίας προκρίνων*. Therefore Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 13, 7, calls Antisthenes *Ἡρακλεωτικός τις ἀνὴρ τὸ φρόνημα*, and in Lucian, V. Auct. 8, Diogenes replies to the query as to whom he was imitating: *τὸν Ἡρακλέα*, at the same time showing his stick for a club, and his philosopher's cloak for a lion's skin, with the addition, which probably comes from a Cynic writing: *στρατεύομαι δὲ ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνος ἐπὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς . . . ἐκκαθαίρει τὸν βίον προαιρούμενος, . . . ἐλευθερωτῆς εἰμι τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἱατρὸς τῶν παθῶν*. See Julian, Or. vi. 187, C.



way through a life of toil and trouble for the good of mankind with so much courage as he did. Antisthenes appears to have supported his view of pleasure by arguing that pleasure is nothing but rest after fatigue.<sup>1</sup> On this supposition it would of course appear absurd to pursue pleasure; for pleasure can never be attained, except by having previously experienced a corresponding amount of pain.

Antisthenes was led to this rigid development of the principles of the Cynics partly by his own natural temperament,<sup>2</sup> and partly by considering<sup>3</sup> asceticism valuable as a means of training. But later Cynics so far departed from this rigid rule as to recognise a certain kind of pleasure to be legitimate. Pleasure which is not followed by remorse,<sup>4</sup> or more strictly, pleasure resulting from labour and effort,<sup>5</sup> is said to

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Phileb. 44, B., speaks of people, whom he describes as μάλα δεινούς λεγόμενους τὰ περὶ φύσιν, οἱ τοπαράπαν ἡδονὰς οὐ φασιν εἶναι, for they maintain λυπῶν ταύτας εἶναι πάσας ἀποφυγὰς ἅς νῦν οἱ περὶ Φίληβον ἡδονὰς ἐπνομάζουσιν. This passage refers without doubt to Antisthenes. Wendt (Phil. Cyren. 17, 1) is wrong in applying it to philosophers who declare freedom from pain to be the highest good.

<sup>2</sup> Plato continues: τούτοις οὖν ἡμᾶς πότερα πείθεσθαι συμβουλεύεις, ἢ πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες;—Οὐκ, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ μάντεσι προσχρησθαί τισι, μαντευομένοις οὐ τέχῃ, ἀλλὰ τινι δυσχερεῖα φύσεως οὐκ ἀγεννοῦς, λῖαν, κ. τ. λ.

<sup>3</sup> Arist. Eth. x. 1: Some hold pleasure to be altogether a mistake: οἱ μὲν ἴσως πεπειμένοι οὕτω

καὶ ἔχειν, οἱ δὲ οἰόμενοι βελτίον εἶναι πρὸς τὸν βίον ἡμῶν ἀποφαίνειν τὴν ἡδονὴν τῶν φαύλων, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐστίν· ῥέπειν γὰρ τοὺς πολλοὺς πρὸς αὐτὴν καὶ δουλεῖν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς, διὸ δεῖν εἰς τοῦναντίον ἄγειν· ἐλθεῖν γὰρ ἂν οὕτως ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον. Diog. vi. 35: μιμεῖσθαι, ἔλεγε (Διογένης) τοὺς χοροδιδασκάλους· καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνους ὑπὲρ τόνον ἐνδιδύει ἕνεκα τοῦ τοὺς λοιποὺς ἄσασθαι τοῦ προσήκοντος τόνου.

<sup>4</sup> Athen. xii. 513, a: Ἀντισθένης δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι φάσκων, προσέθηκε τὴν ἀμεταφίλητον, but we require to know the context in which Antisthenes uttered this.

<sup>5</sup> Antis. in Stob. Flor. 29, 65: ἡδονὰς τὰς μετὰ τοὺς πόνους διωκτέον, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ τὰς πρὸ τῶν πόνων.



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have been called a good, even by Antisthenes. In Stobæus,<sup>1</sup> Diogenes recommends justice as the most useful and at the same time as the most pleasant thing, because it alone affords peace of mind, protects from trouble and sickness, and even secures bodily enjoyments. He also asserts,<sup>2</sup> that happiness consists in that true joy, which can only be obtained by an unruffled mental calm. And when the Cynics wished to assert the superiority of their philosophy, they did not fail to follow in the steps of Socrates, by asserting that their life was far more pleasant and independent than that of other men, that their abstemiousness sharpened their powers of appreciating enjoyment, and that mental delights afforded a far higher pleasure than sensual ones.<sup>3</sup> At the same time this language only proves, that their theory was imperfectly developed, and that their mode of expression was inaccurate. Their meaning was that pleasure as such

<sup>1</sup> Floril. 9, 49; 24, 14, where probably the Cynic Diogenes is alluded to. Whether the words are taken from a genuine writing of his, is the question.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. 103, 20; 21.

<sup>3</sup> Thus in Xen. Symp. 4, 34, where the description appears on the whole to be true, Antisthenes proves that in his poverty he was the happiest of men. He enjoyed his food, his drink, and his sleep. Better clothes he did not need. And in other ways he had more enjoyment than he liked. He needed so little, that he never was in trouble for support. He had leisure to associate with Socrates, and if he wanted

a pleasant day, he needed not to purchase materials for it in the market, but he had them ready in the soul. Diogenes in Diog. 71, speaks in a similar strain: he who has learned to despise pleasure, finds therein his highest pleasure, and in Plut. De Exil. 12, he congratulates himself on not having, like Aristotle, to wait for Philip for breakfast. Plut. Tranquil. An. 4, says that Crates passed his life in jesting and joking, like one perpetual festival; and Metrocles (in Plutarch as Diogenes in Lucian V. Auct. 9) blesses himself for being happier than the Persian king. See Diog. 44, 78.

ought in no case to be an end,<sup>1</sup> and that when it is anything but a natural consequence of action and of satisfying our most essential wants, it should be avoided.

From these considerations followed the conclusion, that everything excepting virtue and vice is indifferent for us, and that we ought to be indifferent to everything. Only those who rise above poverty and wealth, shame and honour, ease and fatigue, life and death, and who are prepared to submit to any condition and state in life, who fear no one, and trouble themselves about nothing—only such as these can be secure against misfortunes; only such as these can be free and happy.<sup>2</sup>

These are however, as yet, only the negative conditions of happiness. What then is the positive side (β) *Virtue*.

<sup>1</sup> As Ritter, ii. 121, has remarked, the difference between the teaching of Antisthenes and that of Aristippus might be thus expressed: Aristippus considered the result of the emotion of the soul to be the good; Antisthenes considered the emotion itself to be the end, and that the value of the action lay in the doing of it. Ritter, however, asks with justice whether Antisthenes ever went back so far as this, since it is never distinctly imputed to him. And in the same way it will be found that Aristippus never regarded pleasure as a state of rest, but as a state of motion for the soul. The contrary is not established by what Hermann, Ges. Abh. 237, f. alleges. Hermann proves, it is true, that Antisthenes considered the good to be virtuous activity, and that Aristippus took it to be pleasure, but he does not prove

that Antisthenes and Aristippus spoke in explicit terms of the rest and the motion of the soul.

<sup>2</sup> Diog. in Stob. Floril. 86, 19, says the noblest men are οἱ καταφρονούντες πλούτου δόξης ἡδονῆς ζωῆς, τῶν δὲ ἐναντίων ὑπεράνω ὄντες, πενίας ἀδοξίας πόνου θανάτου. Diog. 29 says of the same; ἐπῆναι τοὺς μέλλοντας γαμεῖν καὶ μὴ γαμεῖν, καὶ τοὺς μέλλοντας καταπλεῖν καὶ μὴ καταπλεῖν, καὶ τοὺς μέλλοντας πολιτεύεσθαι καὶ μὴ πολιτεύεσθαι, καὶ τοὺς παιδοτροφεῖν καὶ μὴ παιδοτροφεῖν, καὶ τοὺς παρασκευαζομένους συμβιῶν τοῖς δυνάσταις καὶ μὴ προσιόντας. Crates, ibid. 86, says that what he had gained by philosophy was θερμῶν τε χοῖνιξ καὶ τὸ μηδενὸς μέλειν. Antis. in Stob. Floril. 8, 14: ὅστις δὲ ἐτέρους δέδοικε δοῦλος ὧν λέληθεν ἑαυτόν. Diogenes in Diog. 75: δοῦλον τὸ φοβεῖσθαι.

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corresponding to them? It has been seen that virtue alone brings happiness, and that the goods of the soul are alone worth possessing, but in what does virtue consist? Virtue, replies Antisthenes, in the language of Socrates and Euclid, consists in knowledge or in intelligence,<sup>1</sup> and Reason is the only thing which gives a value to life.<sup>2</sup> Hence he concludes as his teacher had done before him, that virtue is one and indivisible,<sup>3</sup> that the same moral problem is presented to every class of men,<sup>4</sup> and that virtue is the result of teaching.<sup>5</sup> But he also maintains that virtue is a possession which will endure, for what is once known can never be forgotten.<sup>6</sup> He thus bridges over a gulf in the teaching of Socrates by creating a system which is due to the influence of Sophistical views<sup>7</sup> no less than to the dictates of a practical instinct, which makes virtue in itself in-

<sup>1</sup> This follows from Diog. 13: *τεῖχος ἀσφαλέστατον φρόνησιν... τεῖχη κατασκευαστέον ἐν τοῖς αὐτῶν ἀναλώτοις λογισμοῖς*, if we connect with it his maxims about the oneness and the teachableness of virtue, and his doctrine of the wise man.

<sup>2</sup> Compare the saying attributed to Antisthenes in Plut. Sto. Rep. 14, 7, and to Diogenes in Diog. 24: *εἰς τὸν βίον παρεσκευάσθαι δεῖν λόγον ἢ βρόχον*.

<sup>3</sup> Schol. Lips. on Il. O. 123: *Ἀντισθένης φησίν, ὥς εἴ τι πράττει ὁ σοφὸς κατὰ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ἐνεργεῖ*.

<sup>4</sup> Diog. 12 according to Diocles: *ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετή*.

<sup>5</sup> Diog. 10: *διδασκὴν ἀπεδείκνυε (Ἀντισθένης) τὴν ἀρετὴν*. 105: *ἀρέσκει δ' αὐτοῖς καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν διδασκὴν εἶναι, καθά φησιν Ἀντισθένης ἐν τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ, καὶ ἀναπόβλητον ὑπάρχειν*.

<sup>6</sup> Diog. 12: *ἀναφαίρετον ὕπλον ἡ ἀρετή*. Xen. Mem. i. 2, 19: *ἴσως οὖν εἴποιεν ἂν πολλοὶ τῶν φασκόντων φιλοσοφεῖν, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ποτε ὁ δίκαιος ἄδικος γένοιτο, οὐδὲ ὁ σῶφρων ὑβριστής, οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδέν, ὃν μάθησις ἐστίν, ὁ μαθὼν ἀνεπιστήμων ἂν ποτε γένοιτο*.

<sup>7</sup> The maxim that nothing once known can ever be forgotten is the counterpart to the sophistical maxim, that nothing can be learnt which is not already known.

dependent of everything external.<sup>1</sup> But the Cynics could not say more precisely in what real knowledge consisted. If it was described as knowledge concerning the good, this as Plato justly observed,<sup>2</sup> was little else but a tautology. If on the other hand, virtue was described as consisting in unlearning what is bad,<sup>3</sup> this negative expression does not convey us a single step further. So much alone is clear, that the knowledge of Antisthenes and his School, is the same as a right state of will, of strength, of self-government and of uprightness; and this brings us back to the Socratic doctrine of the oneness of virtue and knowledge. Thus, when they spoke of learning virtue, they understood moral exercise rather than intellectual research.<sup>4</sup> They would not have recognised

<sup>1</sup> It is only independent of external circumstances, when it cannot be lost: for since the wise and virtuous man will never, as long as he continues wise and virtuous, wish to forgo his wisdom and virtue, and since according to the teaching of Socrates, no one intentionally does wrong, it follows that knowledge can only be taken away by a cause foreign to the will of the individual.

<sup>2</sup> Plato, Rep. vi. 505, B.: ἀλλὰ μὴν τόδε γε οἶσθα, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν πολλοῖς ἡδονὴ δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθόν, τοῖς δὲ κομψότεροις φρόνησις . . . καὶ ὅτι γε, ὦ φίλε, οἱ τοῦτο ἡγούμενοι οὐκ ἔχουσι δεῖξαι ἥτις φρόνησις, ἀλλ' ἀναγκάζονται τελευτῶντες τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φάναι. If the Cynics are not here exclusively meant, the passage at any rate refers to them in particular.

<sup>3</sup> Diog. 8, according to Phainias: (Ἀντισθένης) ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπὸ

τοῦ . . . τί ποιῶν καλὸς καὶ κακὸς ἔσοιτο, ἔφη· εἰ τὰ κακὰ ἄ ἔχεις ὅτι φευκτά ἐστὶ μάθοις παρὰ τῶν εἰδόντων. Ibid. 7: ἐρωτηθεὶς τί τῶν μαθημάτων ἀναγκαιοτάτον, ἔφη, τὸ κακὰ ἀπομαθεῖν. The same is found in Stob. Ekl. ed. Gais. App. ii. 13, 34.

<sup>4</sup> Here it may be sufficient to call to mind what Diogenes in Diog. 70 says: διττὴν δ' ἔλεγεν εἶναι τὴν ἀσκήσιν, τὴν μὲν ψυχικὴν, τὴν δὲ σωματικὴν· ταύτην . . . καθ' ἣν ἐν γυμνασίᾳ συνεχεῖς γινόμεναι αἱ φαντασίαι εὐλυσίαν πρὸς τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἔργα παρέχονται· εἶναι δ' ἀτελεῆ τὴν ἑτέραν χωρὶς τῆς ἑτέρας . . . παρετίθετο δὲ τεκμήρια τοῦ βραδίως ἀπὸ τῆς γυμνασίας ἐν τῇ ἀρετῇ καταγίνεσθαι· for in every art practice makes perfect; οὐδὲν γε μὴν ἔλεγε τὸ παράπαν ἐν τῷ βίῳ χωρὶς ἀσκήσεως κατορθοῦσθαι, δυνατὴ δὲ ταύτην πᾶν ἐκνικῆσαι.



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the Platonic and Aristotelian distinction between a conventional and a philosophical, an ethical and an intellectual virtue; and in answer to Meno's<sup>1</sup> question, whether virtue was produced by exercise or instruction, they would have replied, that exercise was the best instruction.

(γ) *Wisdom and Folly.*

He who has attained to virtue by the help of the Cynic teaching, is a wise man. Every one else is lacking in wisdom. In describing the advantages of the one, and the misery of the other, no words are too strong for the Cynics. The wise man never suffers want, for all things are his. He is at home everywhere, and can accommodate himself to any circumstances. Faultless and love-inspiring, he is unmoved by fortune.<sup>2</sup> An image of the divinity, he lives with the Gods. His whole life is a festival, and the Gods, whose friend he is, bestow on him everything.<sup>3</sup> The opposite is the case with the bulk of mankind, most of whom are mentally deformed, the slaves of fancies, and divided only by a very narrow line from madmen. To find a real man, the Cynics thought it was necessary to search with a lantern in broad daylight.

<sup>1</sup> Plato, Meno, init.

<sup>2</sup> Diog. 11: αὐτάρκη τ' εἶναι τὸν σοφόν· πάντα γὰρ αὐτοῦ εἶναι τὰ τῶν ἄλλων. Ibid. 12: τῷ σοφῷ ξένον οὐδὲν οὐδ' ἄπορον. ἀξιέραστος ὁ ἀγαθός. Ibid. 105: ἀξιέραστος τε τὸν σοφὸν καὶ ἀνὰ μάρτητον καὶ φίλον τῷ ὁμοίῳ, τύχη τε μὴδὲν ἐπιτρέπειν. But Diogenes, in Diog. 89, allows that no one is perfectly free from faults.

<sup>3</sup> Diogenes, in Diog. 51: τοὺς

ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας θεῶν εἰκόνας εἶναι. Ibid. 37, 72: τῶν θεῶν ἐστὶ πάντα· φίλοι δὲ οἱ σοφοὶ τοῖς θεοῖς· κοινὰ δὲ τὰ τῶν φίλων. πάντ' ἄρα ἐστὶ τῶν σοφῶν. Diog. in Plut. Tran. An. 20: ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς οὐ πάσαν ἡμερὰν ἑορτὴν ἡγείται; Stob. Ekl. ed. Gais. App. ii. 13, 76: Ἀντισθένης ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπὸ τινος τί διδάξει τὸν υἱόν, εἶπεν· εἰ μὲν θεοῖς μέλλει συμβιοῦν, φιλόσοφον, εἰ δὲ ἀνθρώποις, ῥήτορα.



Misery and stupidity are the universal fate of mortals.<sup>1</sup> All mankind are divided into two classes. Innumerable fools stand opposite to a small number of wise men. A small minority alone is happy in intelligence and virtue. The rest live in misfortune and folly, and, to add to their misfortune, only the smallest part of them are conscious of their deplorable state.

Following out these principles, the Cynics conceived it to be their special mission to make themselves patterns of strict morality, of abstemiousness, of the independence of the wise man, and also to exercise a beneficial and strengthening influence on the minds of others. To this mission they devoted themselves with extraordinary self-denial, but at the same time they fell into such extravagances and absurdities, such open coarseness, utter shamelessness, overbearing self-conceit, and empty boasting, that it is hard to say whether their strength of mind rather calls for our admiration, or their eccentricities for our derision; whether they ought to command our esteem, our dislike, or our commiseration. Our previous enquiries will, however, make it possible for us to

C. *The practical effects of their teaching.*

<sup>1</sup> Diog. 33: ἀναπήρους ἔλεγε (Διογένης) οὐ τοὺς κωφοὺς καὶ τυφλοὺς, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὴ ἔχοντας πῆραν. Ibid. 35: τοὺς πλείστους ἔλεγε παρὰ δάκτυλον μαίνεισθαι. Ibid. 47: τοὺς ῥήτορας καὶ πάντας τοὺς ἐνδοξολογούντας τρισανθρώπους ἀπεκάλει ἀντι τοῦ τρισαθλίου. Ibid. 71: Instead of becoming happy by the practice of virtue, men παρὰ τὴν ἀνοιαν κακοδαίμονοι. Ibid. 33: πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα Πύθια νικῶ ἄνδρας, ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, εἶπεν, ἄνδρας, σὺ δ' ἀνδράποδα.

Ibid. 27: men he had found nowhere, but boys he had found in Lacedæmon. Ibid. 41: The story of Diogenes with his lantern. Ibid. 86: verses of Crates on the stupidity of mankind. Compare also Stob. Floril. 4, 52. Diogenes in Diog. Ekl. ed. Gais. App. ii. 13, 75, says that the vilest thing upon earth is a man without culture. Either Diogenes or Philiscus asserts in Stob. Flor. 22, 41: ὁ τυφὸς ὥσπερ ποιμὴν οὗ θέλει [τοὺς πολλοὺς] ἄγει.

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trace back these various peculiarities to the one common source.

(a) *Self-renunciation.*

The leading thought of Cynicism is the self-sufficiency of virtue. Crude and unsatisfactory as was their conception of this maxim, the Cynics were not content with a mere inward independence of the enjoyments and wants of life. Their aim they thought, could only be realised by an entire renouncement of all enjoyment, by limiting their wants to what was absolutely indispensable, by blunting their feelings to outward impressions, and by cultivating indifference to all that was not in their own power. The being independent of wants<sup>1</sup> on which Socrates had insisted, became with them a renunciation of the world. Poor to begin with,<sup>2</sup> or renouncing their property voluntarily,<sup>3</sup> they lived as beggars.<sup>4</sup> Possessing no houses of their own, they passed the day in the streets or in other public places. The nights they spent in porticoes, or wherever else chance might

<sup>1</sup> According to Diog. vi. 105, Diogenes repeated the language which we saw Socrates used. To the same effect is the story that Diogenes refused to look for a runaway slave, at the beginning of his Cynic career, because he could do without his slave as well as the slave could do without him. Diog. 55; Stob. Floril. 62, 47.

<sup>2</sup> Such as Antisthenes, Diogenes, and Monimus.

<sup>3</sup> Such as Crates and Hipparchia.

<sup>4</sup> According to Dioecles in Diog. vi. 13, Antisthenes already assumed the staff and scrip, the

beggar's guise; nor is the truth of his account impugned by Socrates, who says that Diodore of Aspendus was the first to do so; for this statement is not to be trusted. In Diog. 22, Diogenes is described with great probability as the originator of the full mendicant garb, and he is also said to have been the first to gain his living by begging. Diog. 38; 46; 49; Teles. in Stob. Flor. v. 67; Hieron. adv. Jovin. ii. 207. His followers Crates (Diog. 85; 90) and Monimus (Diog. 82) adopted the same course.

guide them.<sup>1</sup> Furniture they did not need.<sup>2</sup> A bed seemed superfluous.<sup>3</sup> The simple Greek dress was still further simplified by them, and they were content with the tribon of Socrates, the ordinary dress of the lower orders,<sup>4</sup> without any underclothing.<sup>5</sup> In

<sup>1</sup> Diogenes must have been the first to do so. For Antisthenes in Xen. Symp. 4, 38, still speaks of having a house, although its furniture was confined to the bare walls. Diogenes, however, and the later Cynics lived as described. See Diog. 22; 38; 76; 105; Teles. Hieron. Lucian, V. Auct. 9. Diogenes for a time took up his abode in a tub at Athens, as had been done by homeless folk before. Diog. 23; 43; 105; Sen. Ep. 90, 14. But it cannot have been as Juvenal xiv. 208, and Lucian, Consc. His. 3, represent it, that he spent his whole life there without any other home, and even carried his tub about with him, as a snail does its shell. It is probably true that he jokingly said, that the door of his comfortable house could be turned to suit the wind. Diog. 52 does not contradict this. See Steinhart, p. 302; Götting Ges. Abh. 258 and Brücker. Equally fictitious is the romantic story that Crates and Hipparchia lived in a tub. Simp. in Epict. Enchir. p. 270.

<sup>2</sup> The story that Diogenes threw away his cup, when he had seen a boy drinking with the hollow of his hand, is well known. Diog. 37; Plut. in Virt. 8; Seneca, Ep. 90, 14. He is also reported to have trampled on Plato's costly carpets with the words, *πατῶ τὸν Πλάτωνα τῶφον*, to which

Plato replied, *ἐτέρωγε τῶφω, Διογενές*. Diog. 26.

<sup>3</sup> Antisthenes in Xen. Symp. 4, 38, is heard to boast that he slept admirably on the simplest bed. And the fragment in Demet. de Elocut. 249, belongs here. As far as Diogenes and Crates are concerned, they slept, as a matter of course, on the bare ground, as the poor in Greece, often did, and as is often done now in southern climates.

<sup>4</sup> That is at Athens; at Sparta the *tribon* was universal (Götting, 256; Hermann, Antiquit. iii. § 21) from which it will be seen, that the word did not originally mean something worn out, but a rough dress which rubbed the skin, an *ἱμάτιον τρίβον* not an *ἱμάτιον τετριμμένον*, and that *ἱμάτιον τρίβαν γενόμενον* in Stob. Floril. v. 67, means a covering which had grown rough.

<sup>5</sup> This was the way of the poor in other instances. Antisthenes, however, or Diogenes according to others made this dress the characteristic dress of the Cynic, allowing the *tribon* to be doubled for better protection against the cold. Diog. 6; 13; 22; 76; 105. The Cynic ladies adopted the same dress, Diog. 93. This single article of dress was often in the most miserable condition. See the anecdotes about Crates, Diog. 90, and the verses on him, *ibid.* 87. Because of the self-

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scantiness of diet they even surpassed the very limited requirements of their fellow countrymen.<sup>1</sup> It is said that Diogenes tried to do without fire, by eating his meat raw,<sup>2</sup> and he is credited with saying that everything without exception, human flesh included, might be used for purposes of food.<sup>3</sup> Even in extreme age he refused to depart from his accustomed manner of living,<sup>4</sup> and lest his friends should expend any unnecessary trouble on his corpse, he forbade their performing any funeral rites whatever.<sup>5</sup> A life in harmony with nature,<sup>6</sup> the suppression of everything artificial, the simple satisfaction of all natural wants, is the watchword of his School. To attain to it, bodily

satisfaction with which Antisthenes exposed to view the holes in his cloak, Socrates is said to have observed that his vanity peeped through them. Diog. 8.

<sup>1</sup> Their ordinary food consisted of bread, figs, onions, garlic, linseed, but particularly of the *θήρμιοι*, or beans of some kind. Their drink was cold water. Diog. 105; 25; 48; 85; 90; Lucian, V. Auct. 9; Dio Chrys. Or. vi. 12. But in order to prove their freedom, they occasionally allowed a pleasure to themselves and others. Diog. 55; Arist. Or. xxv. 560.

<sup>2</sup> Diog. 34; 76; Pseudo-Plut. de Esu Carn. i. 6; Dio Chrys. Or. vi. 25.

<sup>3</sup> In Diog. 73, it is supported by the argument, that everything is in everything else, even flesh in bread, &c. Diog. refers for this to a tragedy of Thyestes, the writer of which was not Diogenes but Philiscus. A similar statement was subsequently made by the Stoics.

<sup>4</sup> See Diog. 34.

<sup>5</sup> See the accounts which differ in details in Diog. 79; 52; Cic. Tusc. i. 43, 104; Ælian, V. H. viii. 14; Stob. Floril. 123, 11. The same is repeated by Chrysippus in Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 248; Math. xi. 194.

<sup>6</sup> Which Diogenes required, as for instance when he said, Diog. 71: *δέον οὖν ἀντὶ τῶν ἀχρήστων πόνων τοὺς κατὰ φύσιν ἐλομένους ζῆν εὐδαιμόνως, παρὰ τὴν ἄνοιαν κακοδαιμονοῦσι.*

<sup>7</sup> Compare the expressions of Diogenes in Diog. 44; 35; Stob. Floril. 5, 41; 67, the hymn of Crates on *εὐτέλεια*, and his prayer to the Muses in Julian Or. vi. 199, in addition to what Plut. de Sanit. 7, p. 125, Diog. 85; 93, and Stobæus tell of him. Compare also Lucian V. Auct. 9, and the anecdote of the mouse, the sight of which confirmed Diogenes in his renunciation of the world in Plut. Prof. in Virtut. 6; Diog. 22, 40.



and mental hardships were submitted to on principle.<sup>1</sup> It is said that when his teacher did not appear to treat him with sufficient severity,<sup>2</sup> Diogenes imposed on himself a severe discipline.<sup>3</sup> The scorn and contempt which this manner of life could not fail to attract, were borne by the Cynics with the greatest composure.<sup>4</sup> They accustomed themselves to contumely<sup>5</sup> on the ground that the reproaches of enemies teach man to know himself,<sup>6</sup> and they thought that the best way of taking revenge on enemies, was to amend one's faults.<sup>7</sup> In case life should become insupportable from any reason, they reserved to themselves the right of securing their freedom by suicide, as the Stoics did at a later time.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Diog. 30. Perhaps Diogenes' training may have been described by Eubulus in the same glowing terms that that of Cyrus was by Xenophon. Stob. Ekl. ed. Gaisf. App. ii. 13, 68; 67. Diogenes in Stob. Floril. 7, 18, expresses the view that mental vigour is the only object of all exercise, even that of the body.

<sup>2</sup> Dio Chrys. Or. viii. 2; conf. Diog. 18.

<sup>3</sup> According to Diog. 23; 34, he rolled in the summer in the burning sand, and in winter he walked barefoot in the snow, and embraced icy columns. On the other hand, Philemon's words about Crates in Diog. 87, that he went about wrapped up in summer and in rags in winter, are probably only a comedian's jest on his beggarly covering.

<sup>4</sup> Antisthenes in Diog. 7, requires; *κακῶς ἀκούοντας καρτερεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ εἰλθοῖς τις βάλῃαιτο*.

He also says in Epict. Diss. iv. 6, 20: *βασιλικόν, ὦ Κῦρε, πράττειν μὲν εἶδ, κακῶς δ' ἀκούειν*. It is said of Diogenes, Diog. 33, and also of Crates, Diog. 89, that when his body had been ill-treated, he only wrote by the side of his wounds the names of those by whom they had been inflicted.

<sup>5</sup> Diog. 90 says of Crates, *τὰς πόρνas ἐπίτηδες ἐλοιδῶρει, συγγυμνάζων ἑαυτὸν πρὸς τὰς βλασφημίας*.

<sup>6</sup> Antisthenes remarks, Diog. 12: *προσέχειν τοῖς ἐχθροῖς· πρῶτοι γὰρ τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων αἰσθάνονται*. The same person also says in Plut. Inim. Util. 6: *τοῖς μέλλουσι σώζεσθαι ἢ φίλων δεῖ γνησίαν ἢ διαπύρων ἐχθρῶν*.

<sup>7</sup> Diog. in Plut. Inimic. Util. 4.

<sup>8</sup> When Antisthenes in his last illness became impatient under his sufferings, Diogenes offered him a dagger (Diog. 18)



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XIII.(b) *Renun-  
ciation of  
social life.*(a) *Of  
family life.*

Among external things of which it is necessary to be independent, the Cynics included several matters which other men are in the habit of regarding as morally good and as duties. To be free in every respect, the wise man must be fettered and hampered by no relations to others. He must satisfy his social wants by himself alone,<sup>1</sup> or he will be dependent on others, and nothing which is out of his power ought to influence his happiness. Thus it is with family life. Antisthenes would not do away with marriage, because he thought it useful to keep up the race of men,<sup>2</sup> but Diogenes already discovered that this object might be attained by a community of wives.<sup>3</sup> At the same time these philosophers were too deeply imbued with Grecian peculiarities to require the entire uprooting of all sexual desires in the spirit of a later asceticism. But they believed that natural impulses could be satisfied in a far more simple way than by marriage, and since

to put an end to his life, but Antisthenes had not the courage to make use of it. That Diogenes made away with himself, is indeed asserted in several of the accounts to which reference has been made, but it is not established. In Ælian, V. H. x. 11, he refuses the contemptuous challenge to put an end to his sufferings by suicide; for the wise man ought to live. But Metrocles put an end to himself (Diog. 95), not to mention Menedemus (ibid. 100). So also Crates in Diog. 86; Clement. Strom. ii. 412, D.

<sup>1</sup> In Diog. 6, Antisthenes in reply to the question, What good he had got by philosophy, an-

swers: τὸ δύνασθαι ἑαυτῷ ὀμλεῖν. Out of this came the caricature of later Cynicism, described by Lucian, V. Auct. 10. A Diogenes and Crates were certainly haters of their fellow men.

<sup>2</sup> Diog. 11: γαμήσειν τε [τὸν σόφον] τεκνοποιῖτας χάριν ταῖς εὐφροσύναις συνιόντα γυναιξί.

<sup>3</sup> Diog. 72: ἔλεγε δὲ καὶ κοινὰς εἶναι δεῖν τὰς γυναῖκας, γάμον μηδένα νομίζων, ἀλλὰ τὸν πείσαντα τῇ πεισθείσῃ συνέλπειν· κοινὸν δὲ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τοὺς νύκτας. The correctness of this is supported by the fact that Zeno and Chrysippus, according to Diog. vii. 33, 131, wished for the same state of things in their ideal state.

<sup>4</sup> Something of the same kind

moreover their mendicant life did not afford them an opportunity<sup>1</sup> for home pleasures, it is perfectly credible that they were in general averse to women and to marriage,<sup>2</sup> or at least treated family life as indifferent. Diogenes is said to have seen nothing

has been already observed in Socrates. But this treatment of the relation between the sexes, becomes an extravagance and a deformity with the Cynics. In Xen. Symp. 4, 38, Antisthenes boasts of his comforts, since he only associates with those to whom others would have nothing to say. The same is attributed to him on principle, Diog. 3, and he is said to have satisfied his lusts in a coarser way, complaining that hunger could not be treated in the same way. Brucker i. 880, Steinhart, p. 305, and Göttling, p. 275, doubt the truth of these and similar stories. Without vouching for their accuracy, it may be enough to say that they are quoted by Diog. 46, 49; Dio Chrys. Or. vi. 16; Lucian, V. Auct. 10; Galen. Loc. Affect. vi. 5; Athen. iv. 158; S. Chrys. 34 Hom. in Math.; S. Aug. Civ. Dei, xiv. 20. According to Plut. Sto. Rep. 21, it would appear that Chrysippus had on this account vindicated the Cynic, and from Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 206, Zeno appears to have done the same. The stories told however are not so out of keeping with the ways of Antisthenes, that we could call them impossible; and the very thing which to us appears so unintelligible, this public want of modesty, makes them very likely to be true of Diogenes. If true, they were an attempt on his part

to expose the folly of mankind. It is from this point of view rather than on any moral grounds that the Cynics conduct their attacks on adulterers and careless spendthrifts. To them it seemed foolish in the extreme to incur much toil, danger, and expense for an enjoyment, which might be had much more easily. See Diog. 4; 51; 60; 66; 89; Plut. Ed. Pu. 7; Stob. Floril. 6. 39; 52. Diogenes is also accused of having publicly practised unchastity, Diog. 69; Theod. Cur. Gr. Aff. xii. 48. In Corinth the younger Laïs, according to Athen. xiii. 588, or Phryne, according to Tertull. Apol. 46, is said to have offered to bestow on him her favours gratuitously, and the philosopher to have accepted them. On the other hand his morality is commended, Demet. de Eloc. 261.

<sup>1</sup> The case of Crates is an exception, and even Crates had not wooed Hipparchia. He only married her, when she would not renounce her affection for him, but was prepared to share his mode of life. He certainly married his children in a peculiar way, according to Diog. 88; 93.

<sup>2</sup> See the apophthegms in Diog. 3, and Lucian, V. Auct. 9: *γάμον δὲ ἀμελήσεις καὶ παίδων καὶ πατρίδος*. Far less objectionable is the maxim of Antisthenes in Diog. 12; *τὸν δίκαιον περὶ πλείονος ποιεῖσθαι τοῦ συγγενούς*.

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XIII.(β) *Of civil life.*

revolting<sup>1</sup> in marriage between the nearest relations.

Another point which they considered to be equally indifferent with family life for the wise man, was civil life. Indeed the sharp contrast between slavery and freedom does not affect the wise man. The man who is really free can never be a slave—for a slave is one who is afraid—and for the same reason a slave can never be free. The wise man is the natural ruler of others, although he may be called a slave, in the same way that the physician is the ruler of the sick. It was on this account that when Diogenes had to be sold, he had the question asked: Who is in want of a master? and declined the offer of his friends to buy him back.<sup>2</sup> The wise man of the Cynics feels himself also above the restraints which civil life imposes: for where is the constitution which comes up to his requirements? A popular government is severely censured by Antisthenes.<sup>3</sup> An absolute monarch only appeared to these freedom-

<sup>1</sup> Dio Chrys. Or. x. 25, whose statement is confirmed by its agreeing with the universal doctrine of the Stoics.

<sup>2</sup> Diog. 29; 74. According to Diog. 16, Antisthenes wrote *περὶ ἐλευθερίας καὶ δουλείας*, and perhaps this is the origin of the account in Stob. Flor. 8, 14.

<sup>3</sup> Arist. Pol. iii. 13, tells the fable—the application of which to a democracy is obvious—of the hares suggesting universal equality to the lions. The blame which he attaches to those states, which do not distinguish the good

from the bad (Diog. 5; 6) must be intended for a hit at democracy. The words in Diog. 8, that should the Athenians nominate their asses horses, it would be quite as good as choosing incompetent generals—must also be directed against a popular form of government. According to Athen. v. 220, Antisthenes had made a sharp attack on all the popular leaders at Athens. Thus in Diog. 24; 41, Diogenes calls them *ὄχλου διακόνους*, and he amuses himself at the expense of Demosthenes. Ibid. 34.

loving philosophers in the light of a bad and miserable man.<sup>1</sup> Existing aristocratical institutions fell far below their ideal, none of them being calculated for the rule of wise men: for what law or custom can fetter him, whose life is regulated by the laws of virtue?<sup>2</sup> and what state can be extensive enough for those who regard themselves as citizens of the world?<sup>3</sup> Whilst allowing the conditional necessity for a state and laws,<sup>4</sup> the Cynics<sup>5</sup> refused to have anything to do with them themselves, and wanted no homes. They only wished to be citizens of the world; and in as far as they endeavoured to realise their ideal state, they really destroyed all political life.<sup>6</sup> All mankind were to live together like a flock.

<sup>1</sup> Compare Xen. Symp. 4, 36; Dio Chrys. Or. vi. 47; Stob. Floril. 49, 47; 97, 26; Diog. 50.

<sup>2</sup> Antisthenes, in Diog. 11, says: τὸν σόφον οὐ κατὰ τοὺς κειμένους νόμους πολιτεύσεσθαι ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν τῆς ἀρετῆς. Diogenes, *ibid.* 38: ἔφασκε δ' ἀντιτιθέναι τύχῃ μὲν θάρσος, νόμῳ δὲ φύσιν, πάθει δὲ λόγον. This antithesis of νόμος and φύσις seems to be what Plato has in view, Phil. 44, C.

<sup>3</sup> Diog. 63 says of Diogenes: ἐρωτηθεὶς πόθεν εἴη, κοσμοπολίτης, ἔφη. *Ibid.* 72: μόνῃν τε ὁρθὴν πολιτείαν εἶναι τὴν ἐν κόσμῳ. Antisthenes, *ibid.* 12: τῷ σοφῷ ξένον οὐδὲν οὐδ' ἄπορον. Crates, *ibid.* 98:

οὐχ εἰς πάτρας μοι πύργος, οὐ μίαν στέγην,  
πάσης δὲ χέρσου καὶ πόλις καὶ δόμος

ἕτοιμος ἡμῖν ἐνδιατᾶσθαι πάρα.  
The same individual in Plut. de Adul. 28, shows that banish-

ment is no evil, and according to Diog. 93, he is said to have given a negative answer to Alexander's question, whether he did not wish to see Thebes rebuilt: ἔχειν δὲ πατρίδα ἀδοξίαν καὶ πενίαν ἀνάλωτα τῇ τύχῃ καὶ Διογένηος εἶναι πολίτης ἀνεπιβουλεύτον φθόνην. See also Epict. Diss. iii. 24, 66. Lucian, V. Auct. 8.

<sup>4</sup> The confused remarks of Diogenes in Diog. 72 support this.

<sup>5</sup> Antisthenes was not without a citizen's rights, although a proletarius by birth and circumstances. Diogenes was banished from Sinope, and lived at Athens as a foreigner. Crates had chosen this life, but his native town had been afterwards destroyed. Monimus was a slave, whom his master had driven away.

<sup>6</sup> Stob. Floril. 45, 28: Ἀντισθένης ἐρωτηθεὶς πῶς ἂν τις προσέλθοι πολιτείᾳ, εἴπε καθάπερ πυρί,



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No nation was to have its own special laws and boundaries. Confining themselves to the barest necessities of life, needing no gold, that source of so much mischief, abstaining from marriage and social life, they wished to return to the simplicity of a state of nature,<sup>1</sup> the leading thought of their extensive political sympathies being far less the oneness and the union of mankind than the freedom of the individual from the bonds of social life and the limits of nationality. Here again may be seen the negative spirit of their morality, which is devoid of all creative power.

(γ) *Suppression of modesty.*

The same character may be recognised in a feature for us the most revolting in Cynicism—their inten-

μήτε λίαν ἐγγὺς ἵνα μὴ καῖς, μήτε πόρρω ἵνα μὴ ριγώσῃς.

<sup>1</sup> The above description rests only in part on direct testimony, but the combination which is the basis of it does not lack great probability. We know on authority that Diogenes in his *πολιτεία* (Diog. 80) demanded a community of wives and children, and that in the same treatise he proposed a coinage of bones or stones (*ἀσπραγάλοι*) instead of gold and silver, Athen. iv. 159.

We know further that Zeno's *πολιτεία* ran to this effect: ἵνα μὴ κατὰ πόλεις μηδὲ κατὰ δῆμους οἰκῶμεν, ἰδίῳις ἕκαστοι διωρισμένοι δίκαιοις, ἀλλὰ πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἡγώμεθα δημότας καὶ πολίτας εἰς δὲ βίος ἥ καὶ κόσμος, ὥσπερ ἀγέλης συννόμου νόμῳ κοινῷ τρεφομένης, Plut. Alex. Vit. i. 6; and since this treatise of Zeno was always considered to express the opinions of the Cynic School, we have every reason to look for

those views in it. That these views were on the whole advocated by Antisthenes, is in itself probable, and is confirmed by Plato's *Politicus*. Beginning as he does by rejecting the analogy between statesmanship and the superintendence of a flock, we might naturally think that Plato was provoked to it by some such theory; and since we know from Plutarch's account of Zeno, that the Cynics reduced the idea of the state to that of a herd of men, it is most natural to think of them. The description of the natural state, *Rep.* ii. 372, appears also to refer to Antisthenes. Plato at first describes it as though from himself, but he afterwards clearly intimates, that it belongs to another, when he calls it a state fit for pigs. And we know of no one else to whom it could be referred but the founder of the Stoic School.



tional suppression of the natural feeling of shame. They did not consider this feeling altogether unjustifiable,<sup>1</sup> but they maintained that we need only be ashamed of what is bad, and that what is in itself good may be displayed before the eyes of all. They allowed themselves, therefore, to do what they considered natural, no matter where, and even what other men prefer to do in secret they did not shrink from doing in the public streets.<sup>2</sup> For fear of in any way foregoing his independence, the Cynic puts out of sight all regard for others, and what he thinks he need not be ashamed of himself, he thinks he need

<sup>1</sup> It is expressly told of Diogenes, Diog. 37; 54, that he expostulated with a woman who lay in an improper position in a temple, and that he called blushes the colour of virtue.

<sup>2</sup> This is especially said of Diogenes, Diog. 22: *παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐχοῖτο εἰς πάντα, ἀριστῶν τι καὶ καθεύδων καὶ διαλεγόμενος*, and according to Diog. 69, he supported this by the argument, If it is at all allowable to breakfast, it must be allowable to breakfast in public. Following out this principle he not only took his meals in public in the streets (Diog. 48; 58), but he also did many other eccentric and startling things, in the sight of all passers by (Diog. 35; 36). It is even asserted of him, Diog. 69: *εἰώθει δὲ πάντα ποιεῖν ἐν τῷ μέσῳ, καὶ τὰ Δήμητρος καὶ τὰ Ἀφροδίτης*. Theod. Cur. Gr. Aff. xii. 48, tells the same of him, mentioning an instance. We have already observed that these statements can

hardly be altogether fictitious. But it is incredible that Crates and Hipparchia, as is said to have been the case, consummated their nuptials in the midst of numerous spectators. There are, however, not a few authorities for it: Diog. 97; Sext. Pyrrh. i. 153; iii. 200; Clement. Stromat. iv. 523, A.; Apul. Floril. 14; Lact. Inst. iii. 15, who mentions it as the common practice of the Cynics; S. Aug. Civ. Dei, xiv. 20, who does not altogether credit it, but does not improve it by his interpretation of it. But all these are later authorities, and the whole story may be based upon some fact such as that this married couple once passed a night in the *στοὰ ποικίλη*, or else upon the theoretical assertion of some Cynic philosophers, that a public consummation of nuptials was permissible. We have no reason, however, to doubt what Diog. 97 says, that Hipparchia went about in public dressed as a man.

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not be ashamed of before the world. The opinion of men is to him indifferent. He does not feel himself injured by their familiarity with his personal life, nor is he afraid of such an injury.

(c) *Renun-  
ciation of  
religion.*

To the same cause may be referred the Cynic attitude towards religion. A course of study under Antisthenes was certainly not needed to make men entertain doubts about the truth of the popular faith. Since the appearance of the Sophists, doubts were being raised in the most opposite quarters, and had penetrated to all classes. Even the Socratic circle had not passed unscathed.<sup>1</sup> Antisthenes in particular must have been familiar with freer views about the Gods and their worship, derived from his intercourse with Gorgias, and the other Sophists, and particularly from the principles of the Eleatics, who had also in other respects influenced him. But for him these views had a peculiar meaning; which may serve to explain the sharp and hostile attitude of the Cynics to the popular faith, in which they so distinctly deviated from the example of Socrates. The wise man who is independent of everything external, cannot possibly be dependent on a traditional faith. He cannot feel himself obliged to follow popular opinions, or to connect his well being with customs and devotional practices, which have nothing to do with his moral state.<sup>2</sup> Thus in religious matters the

<sup>1</sup> As we gather from the dialogues of Aristodemus and Euthydemus, Xen. Mem. i. 4; iv. 3; not to mention Critias.

the free thought of Aristodemus, Mem. i. 4, 2, 9-11; 14; who is also described by Plato, Symp. 173, B., as a kindred spirit to Antisthenes.

<sup>2</sup> In this way we must explain

Cynics are decidedly on the side of free thought. The existence of a God they do not deny, and their wise man cannot do without one; but they object to a number of Gods resembling men—popular Gods, who, they say,<sup>1</sup> owe their existence to tradition: in reality there is but one God, who resembles nothing visible, and cannot be represented by any symbol.<sup>2</sup> And in their opinion the same holds good of the worship of the Gods. There is but one way of pleasing God—by virtue. Every other form is based on superstition. Wisdom and integrity make us resemble the Gods, and make us their friends. But what is generally done to secure their favour is worthless and perverse. The wise man honours God by virtue, and not by sacrifice,<sup>3</sup> which is not required of him. He knows that a temple is not more holy than any other place.<sup>4</sup> He does not pray for things which are considered goods by those wanting in intelligence; not for riches, but for righteousness.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cic. N. D. i. 13, 32: 'Antisthenes in eo libro, qui physicus inscribitur, populares Deos multos, naturalem unum esse dicens,' which is repeated by Minu. Fel. Oct. 19, 8, and Lact. Inst. i. 5, epit. 4; Clement, Protrept. 46, C., and also Stromat. v. 601, A., says: 'Ἀντισθένης . . . θεὸν οὐδενὶ εἰοικέναι φησὶν· διόπερ αὐτὸν οὐδεὶς ἐκμαθεῖν ἐξ εἰκόνης δύναται. Theod. Cur. Gr. Affect. i. 75, p. 14: 'Ἀντισθένης . . . περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ τῶν ὄλων βοᾷ· ἀπὸ εἰκόνης οὐ γνωρίζεται, ὀφθαλμοῖς οὐχ ὁράται, οὐδενὶ εἰοικε διόπερ αὐτὸν οὐδεὶς ἐκμαθεῖν ἐξ εἰκόνης δύναται.

<sup>2</sup> The Cynics are therefore Atheists in the ancient sense of

the term, i.e. they denied the Gods of the state, although from their point of view they were certainly right in rejecting the charge of atheism. Nothing follows from the anecdotes in Diog. 37; 42.

<sup>3</sup> Julian, Or. vi. 199, B. says of Diogenes in excusing him because of his poverty, that he never entered a temple or offered sacrifice. Crates, *ibid.* 200, A. promises to honour Hermes and the Muses οὐ δαπάναις τρυφεραῖς, ἀλλ' ἀρεταῖς δόσιαις.

<sup>4</sup> See Diog. 73: μηδέν τι ἄτοπον εἶναι ἐξ ἱεροῦ τι λαβεῖν.

<sup>5</sup> See the prayer of Crates in Julian and Diog. 42.

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But with this is involved the renunciation of the ordinary notion of prayer, for every one owes virtue to his own exertions. It may therefore be understood how Diogenes ridiculed prayers and vows.<sup>1</sup> Of oracles, prognostications, and prophecies,<sup>2</sup> he takes the same sweeping view. The mysteries also were assailed with biting scorn,<sup>3</sup> both by Diogenes and Antisthenes who, as far as religious views were concerned, held a perfectly independent attitude towards the popular faith. At the same time, when they were able by them to support their own arguments, they endeavoured to make use of those points which mythology supplied, and felt it all the more necessary to do so, in proportion to the earnestness with which they endeavoured to influence the masses; Antisthenes no doubt being aided in so doing by the sophistical training which he had previously enjoyed.<sup>4</sup> The traditions everywhere current must then be explained in harmony with this, and in particular those which say that Antisthenes interpreted the myths and the poets in an allegorical manner, and that he wrote a work in explanation of Homer, which

<sup>1</sup> Compare the anecdotes in Diog. 37; 59.

<sup>2</sup> In Diog. 24 he says that when he beholds pilots, physicians, and philosophers, he thinks man the most intelligent being, but when he looks at interpreters of dreams, or prophets, or credulous believers in them, he considers him the most foolish creature. Similar things in Diog. 43; 48; Theod. Cur. Gr. Aff. vi. 20, and Dio. Or. x. 2; 17.

Antisthenes appears also in Xen. Sym. 8, 5, to have doubts about the δαιμόνιον of Socrates, but little can be decided from a passage so jocular.

<sup>3</sup> Diog. 4; 39; 42; Plut. Aud. Poet. 5; Clement, Protrept. 49, C.

<sup>4</sup> For the allegorical interpretations of that period consult Krische, Forsch. 234; Xen. Sym. 3, 6; Plato, Theætet. 153, C.; Rep. ii. 378, D; Io, 530 C.; Phædrus, 229, C.



he completed in numerous volumes.<sup>1</sup> By following the ordinary practice, and looking for a hidden meaning<sup>2</sup> in mythical stories, Antisthenes was enabled to discover moral teaching everywhere, and to draw moral considerations from every story.<sup>3</sup> And by laying it down as a further axiom, that the poet was not always expressing his own opinion,<sup>4</sup> he had no difficulty in finding anything anywhere. Traces of this allegorical interpretation may also be noticed in Diogenes.<sup>5</sup> But the Cynics appear on this point to have been far behind the Stoics;<sup>6</sup> which may be easily understood, since the Cynic doctrine was imperfectly expanded,<sup>7</sup> and their love for learned activity was very small.

It will be seen from the above, in what sense the Cynics spoke of the independence of virtue. The wise man must be absolutely and in every respect independent; independent of wants, of desires, of prejudices and of after-thoughts. The devotion and

*E. Their  
influence  
on the  
world.*

<sup>1</sup> Diog. 17, mentions twelve or thirteen volumes of his on Homer and various portions of the Homeric poems, and one on Amphiaraus. Here too belong the volumes on Hercules. Julian, Or. vii. 209, A.; 215, C.; 217, A., frequently attests the fact of his using myths.

<sup>2</sup> The *ὑπόνοια* or *διάνοια*.

<sup>3</sup> Thus on Od. i. 1, he enquired in what sense *πολυτροπία* was praise. On Od. v. 211; vii. 257, he remarked, that no reliance could be placed upon lovers' promises. In Il. xv. 123, he found his doctrine of the oneness of virtue.

<sup>4</sup> Dio Chrys. Or. liii. 5, says that whereas the same had been previously said of Zeno, *ὁ δὲ*

*λόγος οὗτος Ἀντισθένους ἐστὶ πρότερον, ὅτι τὰ μὲν δόξη τὰ δὲ ἀληθεία εἴρηται τῷ ποιητῇ· ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν οὐκ ἐξεργάσατο αὐτὸν, ὁ δὲ καθ' ἑκάστον τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους ἐδήλωσεν.*

<sup>5</sup> According to Stob. Floril. 29, 92, he explained the story of Medea to mean, that by bodily exercise she made effeminate men young again.

<sup>6</sup> Dio says this expressly, and little is known of Cynic interpretations.

<sup>7</sup> Even their Ethics are scanty enough, and their system gave no opportunity for those lengthy physical discussions, on which the Stoics were so great.



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strength of will with which they compassed this end, has certainly something great about it; but by disregarding the limits of individual existence, and by losing sight of the conditions of a natural life and conduct, the Cynic morality borders on pride, and their strength of principle on self-will. A value out of all proportion was attached to outward conduct by the Cynics, to such an extent that they again made themselves dependent on external circumstances. The sublime became ridiculous, and every freak of fancy was put forward and made to assert a claim to honour on the score of being higher wisdom. Plato, or whoever it was by whom the saying was uttered, was not altogether wrong, when he called Diogenes a mad Socrates.<sup>1</sup>

But with all these pretensions, the independence of these philosophers was not so great, that they could dispense with all consideration for their fellow-men. They found it very natural that all virtuous persons should be united with one another as friends,<sup>2</sup> and they considered it the wise man's business to raise the rest of mankind to his own level, and to be anxious not to keep the blessings of virtue to himself, but to share them with others. They wished to appear as the educators of their people, and if possible to bring back a luxurious and effeminate nation to the days of simplicity and moral strictness. The mass of men are fools, slaves of pleasure, suffering

<sup>1</sup> Ælian, V. H. xiv. 33; Diog. vi. 54.

<sup>2</sup> Diog. ii: καὶ ἐρασθήσεσθαι δὲ μόνον γὰρ εἰδέναι τὸν σοφὸν, τινῶν χρὴ ἐρᾶν . . . ἀξίεραστος ὁ ἀγαθός.

οἱ σπουδαῖοι φίλοι. Antisthenes wrote both an Ἐρωτικὸς and an Ἐράμενος (Diog. 14; 18), and he had mentioned love in his Hercules (Procl. in Alc. 98, 6).

from self-conceit and pride. The Cynic is a physician who heals their disease.<sup>1</sup> He is a guide who leads them to what is good,<sup>2</sup> and on this account he considers himself bound in duty to care for the outcast and despised. The physician exists for the sick,<sup>3</sup> and does not fear contamination from intercourse with them, any more than the sun does from shining in the most impure haunts.<sup>4</sup>

But the improvement of mankind is no easy task.<sup>5</sup> He who is to be saved must hear the truth; for if any one thing is more destructive than another it is flattery.<sup>6</sup> But truth is always unpleasant;<sup>7</sup> it can only be told either by an incensed enemy or by a real friend. The Cynics propose to render to mankind this friendly service,<sup>8</sup> and they are not distressed

<sup>1</sup> Diog. 4: Ἀντισθένης ἐρωτῆθεις διὰ τί πικρῶς τοῖς μαθηταῖς ἐπιπλήττει, καὶ οἱ ἱατροί, φησι, τοῖς κάμνουσιν. Ibid. 6: καὶ οἱ ἱατροί φησι, μετὰ τῶν νοσούντων εἰσὶν, ἀλλ' οὐ πυρέττουσιν. In Stob. Floril. 13, 25, Diogenes, when asked why he remained in Athens, whilst he was always praising the Spartans, replied: οὐδὲ γὰρ ἱατρὸς ὑγείας ὧν ποιητικὸς ἐν τοῖς ὑγιαίνουσι τὴν διατριβὴν ποιεῖται. Therefore Diogenes calls himself in Lucian, V. Auct. 8, ἐλευθερωτὴς τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἱατρὸς τῶν παθόντων, and he expresses astonishment in Dio, Or. viii. 7, that men less frequently apply to him, the healer of souls, than they do to an oculist or dentist.

<sup>2</sup> When Diogenes was purchased by Xenias, he is said to have told Xenias that he would have to obey his slave, just as in another case he would have to

obey a pilot or physician. Diog. 30; 36; Plut. An. Vitios. c. 3; Stob. Flor. 3, 63; Philo, Qu. Omn. Pr. Lib. 833, E.

<sup>3</sup> According to Epict. iii. 24, 66, Diogenes read a lesson to the pirates who captured him. It cannot however have done much good, for they sold him notwithstanding; and the story is altogether very uncertain.

<sup>4</sup> Diog. 63.

<sup>5</sup> Diog. 4.

<sup>6</sup> Diog. 4; 51; 92; Stob. Floril. 14, 16; Antisthenes in Plut. Vit. Pud. c. 18.

<sup>7</sup> Diogenes in Stob. Ecl. ed. Gaisford. App. ii. 31, 22: τὸ ἀληθὲς πικρὸν ἐστὶ καὶ ἀηδὲς τοῖς ἀνοητοῖς. It is like light to those who have weak eyes.

<sup>8</sup> Diogenes in Stob. Flor. 13, 26: οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι κύνες τοὺς ἐχθροὺς δάκνουσιν, ἐγὼ δὲ τοὺς φίλους, ἵνα σώσω.

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if they frequently cause offence in the discharge of this duty; for a really good man always makes enemies;<sup>1</sup> he who does no one any harm has nothing great about him.<sup>2</sup> It was also one of their principles, to pitch their demands and example above what was really wanted, because men only follow an example at a distance. Thus they forced their exhortations on friends and strangers alike,<sup>3</sup> Diogenes, in particular, instilling his views in their most revolting form,<sup>4</sup> though even in these, more gentle traits are not altogether wanting.<sup>5</sup> At the same time the coarseness of their appearance was somewhat relieved by the wit which Diogenes and Crates displayed. They loved to clothe the serious element they were teaching in the form of a joke,<sup>6</sup> or to fire off a volley of short cutting sayings<sup>7</sup> against the folly of mankind.<sup>8</sup> Diogenes, like

<sup>1</sup> δυσβάστακτον εἶναι τὸν ἀσ-  
τεῖον.—Antisth. in Philo Qu.  
Omn. Pr. Lib. 869, C.

<sup>2</sup> In Plut. Virt. Mort. c. 12.  
Diogenes says of Plato: τί δ'  
ἐκείνος ἔχει σεμνὴν, ὃς τοσοῦτον  
χρόνον φιλοσοφῶν οὐδένα λελύ-  
πηκεν;

<sup>3</sup> Compare what Diog. vi. 10  
says of Antisthenes, and vi. 26;  
46; 65 of Diogenes; also Lucian  
V. Auct. 10. Because of his im-  
portunity, Crates received the  
name of *θυρεπανόκτης*.—Diog.  
86; Plut. Qu. Conv. ii. 1, 7, 4;  
Apul. Floril. iv. 22.

<sup>4</sup> Diog. 24; 32; 46; Stob. Ekl.  
ed. Gaisf. App. i. 7, 43.

<sup>5</sup> Plut. De Adul. 28, relates  
that when Demetrius Phalerius,  
after his banishment, fell in with  
Crates, he was not a little sur-  
prised at being received with

friendly words of warm comfort  
instead of the violent language he  
expected. The attractiveness of  
the conversation of Antisthenes  
and Diogenes is also commended  
Diog. 14.

<sup>6</sup> See Diog. 27; 83; 85; De-  
met. de Elocut. 170; 259; Plut.  
Tranqu. An. 4.

<sup>7</sup> Hermog. Progym. c. 3; Theo.  
Progym. c. 5; Nicol. Progym. c. 3.

<sup>8</sup> Abundant examples of these  
ways of the Cynics are to be  
found in the *ἀποφθέγματα* of Dio-  
genes, in his sixth book, and in  
Stobæus' Floril. See also Winckel-  
mann, Antisth. Frag.; Plut. Prof.  
in Virt. c. 11; Virt. Doc. c. 2;  
Coh. Ira, c. 12; Curios. c. 12;  
Cup. Div. c. 7; Exil. c. 7; De  
Alex. Virt. c. 3; Epict. Diss. iii.  
2, 11; Gell. xviii. 13, 7, not to  
mention others.

the oriental prophets, attempted to give greater force to his words by symbolical actions, and thus to attract attention.<sup>1</sup>

The position occupied by the Cynics in the Greek world is no doubt a peculiar one. Ridiculed because of their eccentricities,<sup>2</sup> and admired for their self-denial, despised as beggars, and feared as moralists, full of pride in the face of folly, of pity at the moral misery of their fellow men, they opposed both the wisdom and the effeminacy of their time with the rough strength of a sturdy will. Hardened even to insensibility, with the cutting, ever ready native wit of the plebeian, benevolent, with few wants, full of whims and jokes, and national even to their very dirtiness, they resemble in many points the friars of the Middle Ages;<sup>3</sup> and it cannot be doubted that notwithstanding all their extravagances, they in many ways did much good. Science, however, could expect but little from this mendicant philosophy, which did not indeed bring forth much fruit until it had been supplemented by other elements, and had been regulated and brought into connection with a wider view of the world by the Stoics. The Cynic School, as such, appears to have had only a very narrow sphere, nor will this appear strange, when the unbending severity of its demands is considered. In other respects it

<sup>1</sup> See Diog. 26; 31; 39; 64; 41; Stob. Flor. 4, 84. This eccentricity becomes a caricature in Menedemus, Diog. 102.

<sup>2</sup> Diog. 83, 87, 93.

<sup>3</sup> The Cynics really have a historical connection with the

monks of Christendom. The connecting link is the Cynicism of the time of the Cæsars, and the late Pythagorean asceticism, which exercised so important an influence on eastern monasticism.

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was incapable of scientific developement, and the practical good it did was chiefly of a negative character. It attacked the vices and the follies of men. It required independence and self-denial, but it separated man from man. It placed the individual entirely by himself, thus affording play to moral pride, vanity, and the most capricious whims, which were not without ill effects. The abstract sovereignty of the personal will resulted ultimately in individual caprice, and Cynicism trenched on the ground of the philosophy of pleasure, to which as a system it was diametrically opposed.



## CHAPTER XIV.

THE CYRENAICS.<sup>1</sup>

THE information we possess respecting the Cyrenaic branch of the Socratic school is quite as imperfect, or perhaps even more so, than that which we are able to obtain about the Cynics. Aristippus<sup>2</sup> of Cyrene,<sup>3</sup> its founder, had been led to Athens<sup>4</sup> by a call from Socrates, whose wonderful personal influence had unusual attractions for him,<sup>5</sup> although it was

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ward  
history of  
the  
Cyrenaics.

<sup>1</sup> See Wendt, *De Philosophia Cyrenaica*, Gött. 1841.

<sup>2</sup> The accounts of the ancient and the views of modern writers on the life of Aristippus are found in detail in H. v. Stein's *De Philosophia Cyrenaica*.

<sup>3</sup> All authorities without exception state this. His father is called Aritadas by Suid. Ἀρίστιππος.

<sup>4</sup> Æschin. in Diog. ii. 65, says that he came to Athens κατὰ κλέος Σωκράτους, and Plut. Curios. 2, gives full particulars how at the Olympic games he heard of Socrates and his teaching from Ischomachus, and was at once so taken by it that he did not rest till he had made his acquaintance. See Diog. ii. 78; 80.

<sup>5</sup> Aristippus is not only universally described as a follower of Socrates (Diog. ii. 47; 74; 80;

Strabo, xvii. 3, 22; Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 18, 31), but he also regarded himself as such, and paid a tribute of most genuine respect to his teacher. According to Diog. ii. 76, he prayed that he might die like Socrates. Ibid. 71, he says that if anything good can be truly repeated of himself, he owes it to Socrates, and Arist. Rhet. ii. 23, says Ἀρίστιππος πρὸς Πλάτωνα ἐπαγγελτικώτερόν τι εἰπόντα, ὡς ᾤετο· ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ ἐταῖρός γ' ἡμῶν, ἔφη, οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον, λέγων τὸν Σωκράτην. We also see from Xen. Mem. i. 2, iii. 8, that he was on an intimate footing with Socrates, and Plato in blaming him, Phædo, 59, C., for being absent from the circle of friends, who met on the day of Socrates' death, evidently reckons him as belonging to this circle.

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too weak to keep him by his master's side in the time of his last trial.<sup>1</sup> From Cyrene, his luxurious home, which at that time was at the height of its wealth and power,<sup>2</sup> Aristippus had brought habits far removed from the simplicity and self-denial of Socrates;<sup>3</sup> perhaps he had been already touched by those Sophistical influences which may be observed in his subsequent career,<sup>4</sup> but at any rate we may assume that he had already attained to a certain maturity of thought when he first became acquainted with Socrates.<sup>5</sup> If

<sup>1</sup> Plato, who however only says that Aristippus and Cleombrotus had been in Ægina. That on this fertile island they caroused on the day of their master's death, as Demet. de Elocut. 288 asserts, is barely possible. The accuracy of Plato's statement is indisputable, notwithstanding Diog. iii. 56; ii. 65, but whether Aristippus left Athens from excessive regard for his own safety, or whether his weakness led him to wish to escape the painful interval pending the death of Socrates, cannot be ascertained.

<sup>2</sup> See Thrige, *Res Cyrenensium*, 191.

<sup>3</sup> This may be gathered from Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 1, in addition to the proof afforded by his later conduct. That Aristippus belonged to a wealthy family would seem to be established by his whole mode of living, and by the journey which he undertook to Athens.

<sup>4</sup> We might have imagined that a city so rich and cultivated as Cyrene, would not have been neglected by the Sophists, even if there were no express evidence

to prove it. But it is known from Plato, *Theætet.* 145, A.; 161, B.; 162, A., that the celebrated mathematician, Theodore of Cyrene, was a friend of Protagoras, and the principles of Protagoras are also afterwards met with in Aristippus. From the zeal with which Aristippus followed Socrates it may be further conjectured that the study of philosophy was to him no new thing.

<sup>5</sup> The chronology of his life is very uncertain. Neither the time of his birth nor of his death is known to us. According to Diodore, xv. 76, he was alive in 366, B.C., and Plut. Dio. 19, tells us that he met Plato on his third visit to Sicily, which is placed in 361, B.C. But Diodore probably derived from Dionysius his anecdote about the interview with Plato. Its accuracy cannot therefore be relied upon; and as we are ignorant how old Aristippus was at the time, these accounts are anything but satisfactory. According to Diog. ii. 83, however, it would appear, he was older by several years than Æschines; and it would also

this is borne in mind it will not seem strange that a young man<sup>1</sup> so full of promise as Aristippus should have met his teacher with a considerable amount of independence,<sup>2</sup> and that on the whole he did not follow him so devotedly as to sacrifice his own peculiarities of character and thought. It is said that before the death of Socrates he appeared as a teacher.<sup>3</sup> That he did so afterwards is a better established fact, no less than that he required payment for his instruction,<sup>4</sup> thus following the practice usual among the Sophists, but in opposition to the principles of his greatest friend. He also followed the example of the Sophists by passing a great portion of his life in wandering from place to place without any settled home.<sup>5</sup> Subsequently he appears to have returned to

appear that at the time he followed Socrates he was independent in his civil relations, and further that he was connected with him for several years.

<sup>1</sup> This is what he appears to have been from all that is known.

<sup>2</sup> See Xen. Mem. ii. 1 ; iii. 8.

<sup>3</sup> According to Diog. ii. 80, Socrates blamed him for taking pay for his instruction. How little dependence can be placed upon this will be seen from the fact that Aristippus says in his reply, that Socrates did the same, only taking less. Another passage, Diog. ii. 65, seems to imply that Aristippus offered to give Socrates some of the money he had gained in this way. Perhaps, however, all that was said was, that Aristippus had taken pay, and offered it to his teacher,

without however bringing the two facts into closer temporal connection.

<sup>4</sup> Phantias in Diog. ii. 65; Ibid. 72 ; 74 ; 80, where it is also stated in what way he defended this conduct. Alexis in Athen. xii 544; Plut. Edu. Pu. 7; Stob. Ekl. ed. Gais. App. ii. 13, 145 (that Aristippus is meant here appears from 146). Also Xen. Mem. i. 2, 60, appears to allude to him. The amount of these fees are estimated at 1000 drachmæ by Plutarch, at 500 by Diog. 72.

<sup>5</sup> He says of himself in Xen. Mem. ii. : οὐδ' εἰς πολιτείαν ἐμάντον κατακλείω, ἀλλὰ ξένος πανταχοῦ εἰμί. In Plut. Virt. Doc. p. 2, some one asks him : πανταχοῦ σὺ ἄρα εἶ ; to which he replies with a bad joke. He is mentioned by later writers, often no doubt bad authorities, as having been in

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his native city, and to have made it his permanent abode,<sup>1</sup> and here it is that we first hear of his family

different places : in Megara, where he met with Æschines (Diog. ii. 62): in Asia Minor, where he was imprisoned by the Persians (Diog. ii. 79): in Corinth, where he revelled with Lais (Ath. xiii. 599; Diog. ii. 71): in Ægina, where he is said not only to have lived for a time after the death of Socrates, but where, according to Athen. xiii. 588, he every year took up his residence in company with Lais: and at Scilus, where Xenophon read to him his *Memorabilia*. Much in particular is told of his stay at the court of Syracuse, of his hostile encounter with Plato, and of many other adventures, which he there experienced. But in all these notices there is great confusion, since at one time the elder Dionysius, at another, the younger Dionysius, at another, simply Dionysius is spoken of. It is asserted by the Scholiast on Lucian, Men. 13, that Aristippus was at Syracuse under the elder Dionysius. This is borne out by Hegesander in Athen. xii. 544; for the Antiphon there mentioned was (according to Plut. *De Adulat.* 27) executed by command of the elder Dionysius. The anecdote of his shipwreck in Galen. *Exhort.* c. 5, must be referred to the same time. It can only belong to his first visit to Sicily, but by Vitruv. vi. *Præfat.* was transferred to the island of Rhodes. On the other hand, Plut. *Dio.* 19, brings him into contact with Plato on Plato's third journey to Sicily, 361, B.C., in the time of the younger Dionysius. The notices

in Athen. xi. 507; Diog. ii. 66-69, 73, 75, 77-82, are indefinite, although the stories there told harmonise better with the court of the younger Dionysius than with that of his father. Nothing can however be established with certainty about the visits of Aristippus to Sicily. That he visited Sicily may be believed on tradition. That he there met Plato is not impossible, though it is also possible that the account of this meeting was invented in order to bring out the contrast between both philosophers. Plato's journeys to Sicily were a favourite topic for later anecdotes. But any one of the above stories, taken by itself alone, must be accepted with caution, and it is not even established that he visited both the Dionysiuses. The supposed meeting between Aristippus and Plato was probably spread as an anecdote, without any attention having been paid to its historical connection, and when this was done by subsequent biographers, it became impossible to find out what was genuine.

<sup>1</sup> Whether this stay was shortened by frequent travels, whether Aristippus died in Cyrene or elsewhere, and how long he lived, are points unknown. The journey to Sicily in 361, B. C. is, as we have seen, uncertain. The twenty-ninth letter, which Socrates is supposed to have addressed to his daughter from Lipara after his return, and in expectation of death, is valueless as a historical testimony, and does not even render the



and his School.<sup>1</sup> The heiress to his principles was a daughter, Arete, a lady of sufficient education to bring up her son,<sup>2</sup> the younger Aristippus,<sup>3</sup> in his grandfather's principles. Besides his daughter, Æthiops and Antipater are also mentioned as pupils of the elder Aristippus.<sup>4</sup> His grandson, the younger Aristippus, is said to have instructed Theodore, called the Atheist;<sup>5</sup> the fruits of Antipater's teach-

existence of a corresponding tradition probable, and the assumption based on Diog. ii. 62, that Aristippus flourished at Athens in 356, has been with justice refuted by Stein.

<sup>1</sup> Generally called Cyrenaics, more rarely Hedonists, as in Athen. vii. 312; xiii. 588.

<sup>2</sup> Who was thence called *μητροδιδάκτος*.

<sup>3</sup> Strabo xvii. 3, 22; Clement, Strom. iv. 523; Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 18, 32; Theod. Cur. Gr. Aff. xi. 1; Diog. ii. 72, 84, 86; Suid. *Ἀριστίππος*; Themist. Or. xxi. 244. If therefore Ælian, H. Anim. iii. 40, calls Arete the sister of Aristippus, it must be through an oversight. Besides this daughter he is said to have had a son, whom he did not recognise, Diog. 81; Stob. Floril. 76, 14. Most likely this was only the child of an *ἐταῖρα*, although Stobæus calls his mother a wife.

<sup>4</sup> Diog. ii. 86. We know further from Cic. Tusc. v. 38, 112, that Antipater bore the loss of sight with resignation. Cicero tells a somewhat doubtful joke about it.

<sup>5</sup> Diog. 86. This Theodore appears to have belonged to the Optimates, who were driven from

Cyrene in the party quarrels immediately after the death of Alexander, and took refuge with the Egyptian sovereigns. Thrige, Res Cyren. 206. We hear of him again as an exile in the last years of the fourth century (Plut. De Exil. 16; Diog. 103; Philo, Qu. Omn. pr. Lib. 884, C.), in Greece and particularly at Athens (Diog. ii. 100, 116; iv. 52; vi. 97), where a friend of Ptolemy's, Demetrius Phalereus, helped him, between 316 and 306, B.C., and subsequently at the court of Ptolemy, on whose behalf he undertook an embassy to Lysander (Diog. 102; Cic. Tusc. i. 43, 102; Valer. vi. 2, 3; Philo, Plut., Stob. Flor. 2, 33). At last he returned to his own country, and was there held in great honour by Magas, the Egyptian governor, Diog. 103. What made him particularly notorious was his atheism. On this account he was indicted at Athens, but was rescued by Demetrius, and obliged to leave the city (Diog. 101; Philo). The assertion of Amphicrates (in Diog. and Athen. xiii. 611), that he was put to death by a hemlock-draught, is contradictory to all we know of him. According to Antisth. in Diog. 98, he was a pupil not



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ing<sup>1</sup> were Hegesias<sup>2</sup> and Anniceris.<sup>3</sup> All these men established separate branches of the Cyrenaic School, which bore their respective names.<sup>4</sup> Amongst the pupils of Theodore were Bio the Borysthenite,<sup>5</sup> and perhaps Euemerus, the well-known Greek rationalist,<sup>6</sup>

only of Aristippus, his junior in years, but also of Anniceris and of the dialectician Dionysius. It is however difficult to see how he can have been younger than Anniceris. Suid. Θεοδ. makes Zeno, Pyrrho, and Bryso his teachers, the first one probably with reason, the two others quite by mistake. Under Σώκρατ. he makes him a pupil of Socrates, at the same time confounding him with a mathematician from Cyrene of the same name, who is known to us through Plato. In Diog. ii. 102, iv. 52, he is called a Sophist, i.e. one who took pay for his instruction.

<sup>1</sup> According to Diog. 86, through Epitimidēs of Cyrene and his pupil Παράβates, the latter of whom is said to have studied under Aristippus.

<sup>2</sup> A cotemporary of Ptolemy Lagi, who is said to have prohibited him from lecturing, because he described the ills of life so graphically that many were led to commit suicide. Cic. Tusc. i. 34, 83; Valer. Max. viii. 9, 3; Plut. Am. Prol. 5. Suicide was also the subject of his book Ἀποκαρτερῶν, Cic. Hence his name Πεισιθάνατος, Diog. 86.

<sup>3</sup> Probably also under Ptolemy I., although Suidas places him in the time of Alexander.

<sup>4</sup> For the Θεοδώρειοι and their teaching see Diog. 97; Callimachus in Athen. vi. 252: for

the Ἡγησιακοί, Diog. 93; for the Ἀννικεῖριοι, ibid. 96; Strabo, xvii. 3. 22; Clement, Strom. ii. 417, B.; Suid. Ἀννίκ. Strabo calls Anniceris ὁ δοκῶν ἐπανορθῶσαι τὴν Κυρηναϊκὴν αἵρεσιν καὶ παραγαγεῖν αὐτ' αὐτῆς τὴν Ἀννικερίαν. To the Anniceans belonged Posidonius the pupil, and probably also Nicoteles, the brother of Anniceris.

<sup>5</sup> This individual, who lived at Athens and other places as a teacher of philosophy towards the end of the fourth, and in the beginning of the third century (Diog. iv. 46, 49, 53; ii. 135), had first attended the Academy, then the School of Crates, and then turned to Theodore, and at last to Theophrastus, Diog. iv. 151. His free thought and the instability of his moral principles recall the School of Theodore. See Diog. iv. 49, 53. In other respects he is rather a literary wit than a philosopher. See Diog. iv. 46-57.

<sup>6</sup> Euemerus, of Agrigentum, according to Clement, Protr. 15, A; of Messene, according to Plut. Is. et Os. 23; Euseb. Pr. Ev. ii. 2, 52; Lactant. Inst. i. 11; of Cos according to Athen. xiv. 658; of Tegea, according to Pseudo-Plut. Plac. Phil. i. 7, 1, is often mentioned in connection with Theodore, Diagoras, and other Atheists. The notion that Theodore was his teacher, rests solely on hypothesis. A connection

while amongst his contemporaries was Aristotle of Cyrene.<sup>1</sup>

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The Cyrenaic doctrine, which as to its leading thoughts undoubtedly belongs to Aristippus,<sup>2</sup> follows

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with the Cyrenaic School is not in itself improbable, since this was the only School which at that time busied itself with combating the popular belief. The tame resolution of the myths into mere history, by which Euemerus became known, is also quite in their style, and the Cynics who, together with the Cyrenaics, were then the representatives of free thought, did not make use of natural explanations but of allegory. In point of time Euemerus may easily have been a pupil of Theodore. He lived under the Macedonian Cassander (311 to 298 B. C.), and the latter sent him on a journey on which he visited the fabulous island of Panchæa, and pretended to have discovered in a temple there the history of the Gods, the account of which is given in his *ἱερὰ ἀναγραφὴ*. Diodor. in Eus. Pr. Ev. ii. 2, 55; Plut. De Is. 23. Copious extracts from this work are found in Diodore, v. 41-46, and fragments in the translation undertaken by Ennius, or in a revision of this translation in Lactant. Inst. i. 11, 13; see Vahlen, Ennian. Poes. Reliq. p. xciii.

<sup>1</sup> According to Diog. ii. 113, president of a philosophical School in the time of Stilpo, to all appearances at Athens. Diogenes there calls him *Κυρηναϊκός*, not with the view of describing his descent, but his philosophic creed. Ælian however, V. H. x. 3, in re-

cording a saying of his, calls him *Κυρηναίος*. A saying in Stob. Floril. 63, 32, belongs to him according to some MSS., but to Aristippus according to Cod. B.

<sup>2</sup> This is not altogether undisputed. Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 18, 31, says of the elder Aristippus without doubt on the authority of Aristocles: *ἀλλ' οὐδὲν μὲν οὕτως ἐν τῷ φανερῷ περὶ τέλους διελέξατο, δυνάμει δὲ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔλεγεν ἐν ἡδοναῖς κεῖσθαι. αἰ γὰρ λόγους περὶ ἡδονῆς ποιουμένους εἰς ὑποψίαν ἤγε τοὺς προσιόντας αὐτῷ τοῦ λέγειν τέλος εἶναι τὸ ἡδέως ἔσθαι: and of the younger one, *ὃς καὶ σαφῶς ὥρίσατο τέλος εἶναι τὸ ἡδέως ἔσθαι, ἡδονὴν ἐντάττων τὴν κατὰ κίνησιν*. This testimony appears to be further corroborated by the fact that Aristotle, in refuting the doctrine of pleasure, Eth. x. 2, does not mention Aristippus, but Eudoxus, as its representative. To this must be added what Sosicrates and others, according to Diog. 84, maintained, that Aristippus left no writings; which would at least point to a lower development of his teaching. The assertion of Sosicrates however appears to be without foundation; for Diogenes gives two lists of the works of Aristippus, which agree in the main, and one of which was acknowledged by Sotion and Panætius. Theopompus knew of his writings, for according to Athen. xi. 508, he accused*

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the Cynic in dealing with the practical side of the teaching of Socrates. Of Aristippus and his pupils it was asserted, no less than it was of the Cynics, that they neglected questions relative to nature and logic and gave themselves wholly to the study of ethics.<sup>1</sup> Nor is this assertion disproved by their inability to

Plato of plagiarism from the diatribes of Aristippus. Allowing then that subsequent additions were made to the writings of Aristippus, it cannot be supposed that the whole collection is fictitious. Perhaps in ancient times, and in Greece proper, these writings were less diffused than those of the other followers of Socrates. This fact may easily be explained, supposing the greater part of them not to have been written till Aristippus had returned to his native country. It may also be the reason that Aristotle never mentions Aristippus, unless it were that he included him among the Sophists, *Metaph.* iii. 2. The remarks of Eusebius can only be true in one sense, viz. that the elder Aristippus does not make use of the expression *τέλος*, and does not put his sentences in the form which subsequently prevailed in the Schools. That he recommended pleasure, that he declared it to be a good in the most decided manner, that thus the leading features of the Cyrenaic teaching is due to him, cannot be doubted, taking into account the numerous witnesses which affirm it, nor would the unity of his School be otherwise comprehensible.

<sup>1</sup> *Diog.* ii. 92: ἀφίσταντο δὲ

καὶ τῶν φυσικῶν διὰ τὴν ἐμφαινομένην ἀκαταληψίαν, τῶν δὲ λογικῶν διὰ τὴν εὐχρηστίαν ἤπτοντο. Μελέαγρος δὲ . . . καὶ Κλειτόμαχος . . . φασὶν αὐτοὺς ἀχρησता ἡγεῖσθαι τό τι φυσικὸν μέρος καὶ τὸ διαλεκτικόν. δύνασθαι γὰρ εὖ λέγειν καὶ δεισιδαιμονίας ἐκτὸς εἶναι καὶ τὸν περὶ θανάτου φόβον ἐκφεύγειν τὸν περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν λόγον ἐκμεμαθηκότα. *Sext. Math.* vii. 11: δοκοῦσι δὲ κατὰ τινὰς καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Κυρήνης μόνον ἀσπάζεσθαι τὸ ἠθικὸν μέρος παραπέμπειν δὲ τὸ φυσικὸν καὶ τὸ λογικὸν ὥς μηδὲν πρὸς τὸ εὐδαιμόνως βιοῦν συνεργοῦντα. *Plut.* in *Eus. Pr. Ev.* i. 8, 9: Ἀριστιππος ὁ Κυρηναῖος τέλος ἀγαθῶν τὴν ἡδονήν, κακῶν δὲ τὴν ἀλγῆδονα, τὴν δὲ ἄλλην φυσιολογίαν περιγράφει, μόνον ὠφέλιμον εἶναι λέγων τὸ ζητεῖν. Ὅτι τοι ἐν μεγάροισι κακὸν τ' ἀγαθὸν τε τέτυκται, which is also told of Socrates and Diogenes. *Arist. Met.* iii. 2: ὥστε διὰ ταῦτα τῶν σοφιστῶν τινες οἶον Ἀριστιππος προεπηλάκιζον αὐτὰς [τὰς μαθηματικὰς ἐπιστήμας] εὖ μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις, καὶ ταῖς βαναύσοις, οἶον τεκτονικῇ καὶ σκυτικῇ, διότι βέλτιον ἢ χεῖρον λέγεσθαι πάντα, τὰς δὲ μαθηματικὰς οὐθένα ποιεῖσθαι λόγον περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν. The same in *Alex.* on *Met.* xiii. 3. Compare the language of Aristippus in *Diog.* ii. 71, 79.

keep clear of theories, since the sole object of their theory was to establish ethics, and indeed their own exclusive view of ethics.<sup>1</sup> The end to be secured by philosophy is the happiness of mankind. On this point Aristippus and Antisthenes agreed. But Antisthenes knew of no happiness which did not immediately coincide with virtue, and thus made virtue the only object in life. Aristippus, on the other hand, considered enjoyment the only end in itself, and happiness the only unconditional good.<sup>2</sup> Everything else appeared to him good and desirable only in as far as it was a means to enjoyment.<sup>3</sup> Both Schools therefore, diverge from a common principle in oppo-

<sup>1</sup> According to the sense in which it is understood, it is equally true to say that they set logic aside and that they made use of it. Of what was afterwards called logic, they appropriated just as much as was necessary for their theory of knowledge, but they assigned no independent value to it, nor did they study it beyond what was wanted for their purposes.

<sup>2</sup> Aristippus in Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 9: ἐμavτὸν τοίνυν τάττω εἰς τοὺς βουλομένους ἢ ῥᾶσά τε καὶ ἡδίστα βιοτεύειν. Cic. Acad. iv. 42, 131: alii voluptatem summum bonum esse voluerunt: quorum princeps Aristippus. Ibid. Fin. ii. 6, 18, 13, 39; Diog. 87: ἡδονὴν . . . ἦν καὶ τέλος εἶναι, 88: ἡ ἡδονὴ δι' αὐτὴν αἰρετὴ καὶ ἀγαθόν. Athen. xii. 544: [Ἀριστιππος] ἀποδεξάμενος τὴν ἡδυπάθειαν ταύτην τέλος εἶναι ἔφη καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν βεβλήσθαι. Euseb. The same view is mentioned and attacked by Plato,

Gorg. 491, E.; Rep. vi. 505, B., and Philebus, 11, B., where it is thus described: Φίληβος μὲν τοίνυν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι φησι τὸ χαίρειν πᾶσι ζώοις καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τέρψιν καὶ ὅσα τοῦ γένους ἐστὶ τοῦτου σύμφωνα. Ibid. 66, D.: τὰγαθὸν ἐτίθετο ἡμῖν ἡδονὴν εἶναι πᾶσαν καὶ παντελῆ. That Plato had Aristippus in mind is clear, as will be shown in the sequel.

<sup>3</sup> Diog. 91: τὴν φρόνησιν ἀγαθὸν μὲν εἶναι λέγουσιν, οὐ δι' ἑαυτὴν δὲ αἰρετὴν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ ἐξ αὐτῆς περιγινόμενα . . . καὶ τὸν πλοῦτον δὲ ποιητικὸν ἡδονῆς εἶναι, οὐ δι' αὐτὸν αἰρετὸν ὄντα. Cic. Off. iii. 33, 116: Cyrenaiici atque Anniceri philosophi nominati omne bonum in voluptate posuerunt; virtutemque censuerunt ob eam rem esse laudandam, quod efficiens esset voluptatis. Wendt, Phil. Cyr. 28, and Ast refer the passage of the Phædo, 68, E., to this sentence of Aristippus, but without reason. It refers to common unphilosophical virtue.



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(b) *Feelings the only object of knowledge.*

site directions, but not without subsequently approaching one another even more nearly than seemed at first sight to be possible.

This leading thought was then further developed by Aristippus and his pupils as follows.<sup>1</sup> All our perceptions, they maintain, are nothing but feelings of a change within ourselves, but they do not supply us with the least information about things in themselves. We are indeed conscious of having a sensation of sweetness, whiteness, and so forth, but whether the object which causes the sensation is sweet, or white, is unknown to us. One and the same thing often produces an entirely different effect upon different persons. How then can we be sure, that in any given case, our impressions of things are not entirely different to what things are in themselves, either owing to the nature of our organs, or to the circumstances under which we receive the impressions? Our knowledge, therefore, can only refer to our own feelings, about which we are never deceived; but of things in themselves we know absolutely nothing.<sup>2</sup> Just as little do we know about the feel-

<sup>1</sup> The Cyrenaics divided their ethics into five parts. Sext. Math. vii. 11: *καίτοι περιτρέπεσθαι τούτους ἔνιοι νομομάκασιν ἐξ ὧν τὸ ἡθικὸν διαιροῦσιν εἰς τε τὸν περὶ τῶν αἰρετῶν καὶ φευκτῶν τόπον καὶ εἰς τὸν περὶ τῶν παθῶν καὶ ἔτι εἰς τὸν περὶ τῶν πράξεων καὶ ἤδη τὸν περὶ τῶν αἰτίων, καὶ τελευταῖον εἰς τὸν περὶ τῶν πίστεων· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ὁ περὶ αἰτίων τόπος, φασιν, ἐκ τοῦ φυσικοῦ μέρους ἐτύγχανεν, ὁ δὲ περὶ πίστεων ἐκ τοῦ λογικοῦ.* We cannot, how-

ever, follow this strictly in our account, since we do not know how the subject was divided among these several parts, nor how old and universal the division is. That it was unknown in the time of Aristippus may be gathered from the statement made about his writings. In the portion *περὶ πίστεων* probably the theory of knowledge was treated, and in the preceding one the theory of motion.

<sup>2</sup> Cic. Acad. iv. 46, 143: *aliud*



ings of other people. There may be common names, but there are no common feelings, and when two

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judicium Protagoræ est, qui putet id cuique rerum esse, quod cuique videatur : aliud Cyrenaicorum, qui præter permotiones intimas nihil putant esse judicii. Ibid. 7, 20 : de tactu, et eo quidem, quem philosophi interiorem vocant, aut doloris aut voluptatis, in quo Cyrenaici solo putant veri esse judicium. Plut. adv. Col. 24, 2 : [οἱ Κυρηναῖκοι] τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς διαποτασίας ἐν αὐτοῖς τίέντες οὐκ ᾤοντο τὴν ἀπὸ τούτων πίστιν εἶναι διαρκῆ πρὸς τὰς ὑπὲρ τῶν πραγμάτων καταβεβαιώσεις, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐν πολιορκίᾳ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀποστάντες εἰς τὰ πάθη κατέκλεισαν αὐτοὺς. τὸ φαίνεται τιθέμενοι, τὸ δ' ἐστὶ μὴ προσαποφαινόμενοι περὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς . . . γλυκαίνεσθαι γὰρ λέγουσι καὶ πικραίνεσθαι καὶ φωτίζεισθαι καὶ σκοτοῦσθαι τῶν παθῶν τούτων ἐκάστον τὴν ἐνέργειαν οἰκείαν ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ἀπερίσπαστον ἔχοντος· εἰ δὲ γλυκὺ τὸ μέλι καὶ πικρὸς ὁ θαλλὸς . . . ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἀντιμαρτυρεῖσθαι καὶ θηρίων καὶ πραγμάτων καὶ ἀνθρώπων, τῶν μὲν δυσχεραίνοντων, τῶν δὲ προσιεμένων τὴν θαλλίαν, καὶ ἀποκαομένων ὑπὸ τῆς χαλᾶς, καὶ καταψυχομένων ὑπὸ οἴνου, καὶ πρὸς ἥλιον ἀμβλυωττόντων καὶ νύκτωρ βλεπόντων. ὅθεν ἐμμένουσα τοῖς πάθεσιν ἡ δόξα διατηρεῖ τὸ ἀναμάρτητον· ἐκβαίνουσα δὲ καὶ πολυπραγμονοῦσα τῷ κρίνειν καὶ ἀποφαινέσθαι περὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς, αὐτὴν τε πολλὰκις ταράσσει καὶ μάχεται πρὸς ἐτέρους ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐναντία πάθη καὶ διαφόρους φαντασίας λαμβάνοντας. Sext. Math. vii. 191, which is the most accurate account, but probably to a great extent in his own termi-

nology : φασὶν οὖν οἱ Κυρηναῖκοι κριτήρια εἶναι τὰ πάθη καὶ μόνα καταλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ ἄψευστα τύγχανειν, τῶν δὲ πεποιηκότων τὰ πάθη μηδὲν εἶναι καταληπτὸν μηδὲ ἀδιάψευστον· ὅτι μὲν γὰρ λευκαινόμεθα, φασί, καὶ γλυκαζόμεθα, δυνατόν λέγειν ἀδιαψεύστως . . . ὅτι δὲ τὸ ἐμποιητικὸν τοῦ πάθους λευκὸν ἐστὶ ἢ γλυκὺ ἐστίν, οὐχ οἶόν τ' ἀποφαίνεσθαι. εἰκὸς γάρ ἐστι καὶ ὑπὸ μὴ λευκοῦ τινα λευκαντικῶς διατεθῆναι καὶ ὑπὸ μὴ γλυκέος γλυκανθῆναι, just as a diseased eye or a mad brain always sees things different to what they are. οὕτω καὶ ἡμᾶς εὐλογώτατον ἐστὶ πλεόν τῶν οἰκείων παθῶν μηδὲν λαμβάνειν δύνασθαι. If therefore we understand by φαινόμενα individual impressions, πάθη, it must be said πάντα τὰ φαινόμενα ἀληθῆ καὶ καταληπτά. If, on the contrary, every name means the thing by which the impression is produced, all φαινόμενα are false and cannot be known. Strictly speaking, μόνον τὸ πάθος ἡμῖν ἐστὶ φαινόμενον· τὸ δ' ἐκτὸς καὶ τοῦ πάθους ποιητικὸν τάχα μὲν ἐστὶν ὃν οὐ φαινόμενον δὲ ἡμῖν. καὶ ταύτῃ περὶ μὲν τὰ πάθη τὰ γε οἰκεία πάντες ἐσμὲν ἀπλανεῖς, περὶ δὲ τὸ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενον πάντες πλανώμεθα· κακείνα μὲν ἐστὶ καταληπτά, τοῦτο δὲ ἀκατάληπτον, τῆς ψυχῆς πάνυ ἀσθενοῦς καθεστῶσης πρὸς διάγνωσιν αὐτοῦ παρὰ τοὺς τόπους, παρὰ τὰ διαστήματα, παρὰ τὰς κινήσεις, παρὰ τὰς μεταβολάς, παρὰ ἄλλας παμπληθεῖς αἰτίας. See Pyrrh. i. 215 ; Diog. ii. 92 : τὰ τε πάθη καταληπτά, ἔλεγον οὖν αὐτὰ, οὐκ ἀφ' ὧν γίνεται.

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people say that they have the same feelings, neither of them can be certain that he has really felt what the other has, since he can only apprehend his own and not another's feelings.<sup>1</sup>

Thus, like Protagoras, the Cyrenaics regard all our notions as relative and individual; but they differ from Protagoras in referring them more directly to our own internal feelings, and in leaving out of sight<sup>2</sup>

Ibid. 93: τὰς αἰσθήσεις μὴ πάντοτε ἀληθεύειν. Ibid. 95 of the School of Hegesias, which does not in this respect differ from others: ἀνήρουν δὲ καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις οὐκ ἀκριβοῦσας τὴν ἐπίγνωσιν. Arist. in Eus. Præp. Ev. xiv. 19, 1: ἐξῆς δ' ἂν εἶεν οἱ λέγοντες μόνα τὰ πάθη καταληπτὰ. τοῦτο δ' εἶπον ἔνιοι τῶν ἐκ τῆς Κυρήνης (which in the face of the definite statements of Cicero, Plutarch and Sextus, does not prove that this doctrine did *not* belong to the whole School, nor can this be intended) . . . καίόμενοι γὰρ ἔλεγον καὶ τεμνόμενοι γνωρίζειν, ὅτι πασχοῖεν τι· πότερον δὲ τὸ καῖον εἶναι πῦρ ἢ τὸ τέμνον σίδηρος οὐκ ἔχειν εἰπεῖν. Sextus Math. vi. 53, says: μόνα φασὶν ὑπάρχειν τὰ πάθη, ἄλλο δὲ οὐθεν. ὅθεν καὶ τὴν φωνὴν, μὴ οὖσαν πάθος ἀλλὰ πάθους ποιητικὴν, μὴ γίνεσθαι τῶν ὑπαρκτῶν. But this is inaccurate. The Cyrenaics, we gather from the above, cannot have denied the existence of things, but only our knowledge of their existence. The whole of this theory probably belongs in the main to the elder Aristippus, as will be probable from a passage in Plato soon to be mentioned. Against Tenneman's notion (Gesch. d. Phil. ii.

106) that it first came from Theodore, see Wendt, Phil. Cyr. 45.

<sup>1</sup> Sext. Math. vii. 195: ἐνθεν οὐδὲ κριτήριόν φασι εἶναι κοινὸν ἀνθρώπων, ὀνόματα δὲ κοινὰ τίθεσθαι τοῖς κρίμασι. λευκὸν μὲν γὰρ τι καὶ γλυκὺ καλοῦσι κοινῶς πάντες, κοινὸν δέ τι λευκὸν ἢ γλυκὺ οὐκ ἔχουσιν· ἕκαστος γὰρ τοῦ ἰδίου πάθους ἀντιλαμβάνεται. τὸ δὲ εἶ τοῦτο τὸ πάθος ἀπὸ λευκοῦ ἐγγίνεται αὐτῷ καὶ τῷ πέλας, οὗτ' αὐτὸς δύναται λέγειν, μὴ ἀναδεχόμενος τὸ τοῦ πέλας πάθος, οὔτε ὁ πέλας, μὴ ἀναδεχόμενος τὸ ἐκείνου. . . . τάχα γὰρ ἐγὼ μὲν οὕτω συγκέκριμαι ὥς λευκαίνεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐξωθεν προσπίπτοντος, ἕτερος δὲ οὕτω κατεσκευασμένην ἔχει τὴν αἴσθησιν, ὥστε ἐτέρως διατεθῆναι, in support of which the example of a jaundiced or diseased eyesight is adduced. It follows then: κοινὰ μὲν ἡμῶς ὀνόματα τιθέναι τοῖς πράγμασι, πάθη δὲ γε ἔχειν ἴδια.

<sup>2</sup> The last point has been too much lost sight of by Schleiermacher (Plato's Werke, ii. 1, 183), when he considers the description of the Protagorean teaching in the Theætetus to be chiefly meant for Aristippus, whose view does not absolutely coincide with that of Protagoras. See Wendt, Phil.

as something not wanted for their purposes and transcending the limits of human knowledge,<sup>1</sup> the Heraclitean doctrine of the perpetual flux of things. If, however, knowledge is confined to a knowledge of feelings, it would be absurd for us to seek for a knowledge of things. Such a knowledge once for all is impossible. In this way the sceptical attitude in respect to knowledge, which the Cyrenaics assumed, was the ground of their conviction of the worthlessness of all physical enquiries.<sup>2</sup> But it also follows that the standard which directs the aim of actions

Cyr. 37. On the other hand, the difference between them is exaggerated by the Academician in Cic., who ascribes to Protagoras a view entirely different to that of the Cyrenaics, and by Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 19, 5, who after discussing the Cyrenaics introduces Protagoras with these words: *ἐπεταὶ τοῦτοις οὖν συνεξετάσαι καὶ τοὺς τὴν ἐναντίαν βαδίζοντας, καὶ πάντα χρῆναι πιστεύειν ταῖς τοῦ σώματος αἰσθήσεσιν ὁρισμένους*, for Protagoras only asserted the truth of all perceptions in the sense that they were all true for him who perceived them, that things were to each one what they appeared to him to be. In this sense the Cyrenaics, as Sextus has rightly shown, declared all to be true, but both they and Protagoras said nothing about their objective truth. Herrman's objection to this, Ges. Ab. 235, on the ground that Protagoras was far more subjective than Aristippus, since Aristippus presupposed an agreement amongst men in describing

their impressions, is in the first place still more at variance with the statements of Cicero and Eusebius, for they do not make Protagoras more subjective than Aristippus, but Aristippus more subjective than Protagoras. In the next place it is not correct. Of course Protagoras did not deny that certain names were used by all, but what is the use of agreeing in names, when the things differ? The Cyrenaics are only more accurate than Protagoras in asserting that perceptions which are called by the same name are not the same in different persons. But there is no disagreement in the teaching of the two.

<sup>1</sup> If they acted consistently, they must have regarded as such every attempt at a physical explanation of our perceptions. We must, therefore, not be misled by Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi sec. Epic. 4, 5, so as to attribute to them the view of Democritus about pictures and emanating forms.

<sup>2</sup> As Diog. ii. 92 remarks.

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and tests their value, is itself determined by feeling alone. For if all that is known to us about things consists in our own feelings, feelings are all that we can act upon: and the best course of action will therefore be to gratify our feelings as far as possible.<sup>1</sup> In this way the Cyrenaic theory of knowledge leads back to ethical principles, which it was the main object of their previous enquiries to establish.

(c) *Pleasure and its opposite.*

Following Protagoras, Aristippus assumes that all feeling consists in a kind of internal motion in him who has the feeling. If the motion is gentle, the feeling is one of pleasure; if violent and rough, of pain; if again we are in a state of repose, or the motion is so weak as to be imperceptible, there is no feeling either of pleasure or pain.<sup>2</sup> Of these three

<sup>1</sup> Sext. Math. vii. 199: ἀνάλογα δὲ εἶναι δοκεῖ τοῖς περὶ κριτηρίων λεγομένοις κατὰ τούτους τοὺς ἄνδρας καὶ τὰ περὶ τελῶν λεγόμενα· διήκει γὰρ τὰ πάθη καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ τέλη. Ibid. 200.

<sup>2</sup> Euseb. Pr. Ev. xiv. 18, 32, says of the younger Aristippus on the authority of Aristocles: τρεῖς γὰρ ἔφη καταστάσεις εἶναι περὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν σύγκρασιν· μίαν μὲν καθ' ἣν ἀλγοῦμεν, εἰκνύειν τῷ κατὰ θάλασσαν χειμῶνι· ἑτέρον δὲ καθ' ἣν ἡδόμεθα, τῷ λείῳ κύματι ἐφομοιούμενην· εἶναι γὰρ λείαν κίνησιν τὴν ἡδονὴν οὐρίῳ παραβαλλομένην ἀνέμῳ· τὴν δὲ τρίτην μέσσην εἶναι κατάστασιν, καθ' ἣν οὔτε ἀλγοῦμεν οὔτε ἡδόμεθα, γαληνῇ παραπλήσιον οὔσαν. Diog. ii. 86, says almost the same of older Cyrenaic school: δύο πάθη ὑφίσταντο, πόνον καὶ ἡδονήν, τὴν μὲν λείαν κίνησιν τὴν ἡδονήν, τὸν δὲ πόνον τρα-

χεῖαν κίνησιν. Ibid. 89, 90: μέσας τε καταστάσεις ὠνόμαζον ἀηδονίαν καὶ ἀπονίαν. Sext. Pyrrh. i. 215: [ἡ Κυρηναϊκὴ ἀγωγή] τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὴν λείαν τῆς σαρκὸς κίνησιν τέλος εἶναι λέγει. Math. vii. 199: τῶν γὰρ πάθων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν ἡδέα, τὰ δὲ ἀλγείνα, τὰ δὲ μεταξύ. That these statements referred on the whole to the elder Aristippus, appears to be established by several passages in the Philebus. After Socrates (p. 31, B.) has shown that pain consists in a violation, and pleasure in a restoration, of the natural connection between the parts of a living being, he connects with it (p. 42, D.) the question: What would happen if neither of these changes were to take place? When the representative of the theory of pleasure has answered in a way afterwards repeated by Plato,



states, that of pleasure is alone unconditionally desirable. This is proved by nature itself; for all follow pleasure as the highest end, and avoid nothing so much as pain,<sup>1</sup> unless the general opinion of mankind is perverted by unfounded fancies.<sup>2</sup> It would not be right to put absence from pain in the place of pleasure, for where there is no internal motion, pleasure and pain are equally impossible, and there can only be a state devoid of all feeling, as in sleep.<sup>3</sup> Thus the good comes to be identical with what is agreeable—with pleasure; the evil, with what is disagreeable,

Rep. ix. 583, C., that in this case there would be neither pleasure nor pain, he continues: κάλλιστ' εἶπες· ἀλλὰ γὰρ, οἶμαι, τόδε λέγεις, ὥς ἀέτι τοῦτων ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν συμβαίνειν, ὥς οἱ σοφοὶ φασιν· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἅπαντα ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω βρεῖ, upon which the answer is limited to mean, that great changes produce pleasure and pain, but small ones neither. On p. 53, C., he comes back to the same view with the words: ἄρα περὶ ἡδονῆς οὐκ ἀκηκοάμεν, ὥς ἀεὶ γένεσις ἐστίν, οὐσία δὲ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ παράπαν ἡδονῆς; κομψοὶ γὰρ δὴ τινες αὐ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἐπιχειροῦσι μνηνεῖν ἡμῖν, οἷς δεῖ χάριν ἔχειν. These latter words clearly prove that the assertion, all pleasure consists in motion, had been uttered by some one else, when Plato wrote the *Philebus*, and since with the exception of Aristippus no one is known to whom they could be referred, since moreover this assertion is universally attributed to the School of Aristippus, since too the epithet *κομψός* suits him best, it is most probable that both

this passage and the passage connected with it on the two kinds of motion and rest, come from him. The same applies to the remark, that small changes make no impression. Diog. ii. 85, records of Aristippus: τέλος δ' ἀπόφαινε τὴν λείαν κίνησιν εἰς αἴσθησιν ἀναδιδομένην, according to which a slight motion is not felt and does not produce pleasure.

<sup>1</sup> Diog. 88; 87; Plato, *Phil.* 11, B.

<sup>2</sup> Diog. 89: δύνασθαι δὲ φασὶ καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν τινὰς μὴ αἰρεῖσθαι κατὰ διαστροφὴν.

<sup>3</sup> Diog. 89: ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος ὑπεραίρεσις (ὥς εἴρηται παρ' Ἐπικούρῳ) δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς μὴ εἶναι ἡδονή, οὐδὲ ἡ ἀηδονία ἀλγηδών. ἐν κινήσει γὰρ εἶναι ἀμφοτέρω, μὴ οὐσίας τῆς ἀπονίας ἢ τῆς ἀηδονίας κινήσεως. ἐπεὶ ἡ ἀπονία οἷον καθεῦδοντός ἐστι κατὰστασις. Such explicit statements probably belong to a later time, and are due principally to the School of Anniceris in contrast to Epicure according to Clement, *Strom.* ii. 417, B.



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highest  
good.*

or pain ; and what affords neither pleasure nor pain can be neither good nor evil.<sup>1</sup>

It follows, as a matter of course, from the view taken by these philosophers, that individual feelings of pleasure must, as such, be the ends of all actions. Simple repose of mind, that freedom from pain, in which Epicurus at a later time placed the highest good, was not the highest good of the Cyrenaics, for the reason already mentioned.<sup>2</sup> Nor did it appear to them altogether satisfactory to make happiness, which should conduct us to the greatest amount of pleasure that can be enjoyed in a life time, the guiding star of a whole life ; for this would require the past and the future as well as the present to be included in our calculations, neither of which are in our power, or always certain to afford enjoyment. A future feeling of pleasure is a motion which is yet future, a past one is one which has already ceased.<sup>3</sup> The one

<sup>1</sup> Sext. Math. vii. 199 : τὰ μὲν ἀλγεῖνὰ κακὰ φασιν εἶναι, ὧν τέλος ἀλγηδών, τὰ δὲ ἡδία ἀγαθὰ, ὧν τέλος ἐστὶν ἀδιάψευστον ἡδονή, τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ οὔτε ἀγαθὰ οὔτε κακὰ, ὧν τέλος τὸ οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν, ὅπερ πάθος ἐστὶ μεταξὺ ἡδονῆς καὶ ἀλγηδόνος.

<sup>2</sup> Diog. ii. 87 : ἡδονὴν μέντοι τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἦν καὶ τέλος εἶναι, καθὰ φησι καὶ Παναίτιος ἐν τῷ περὶ τῶν αἰρέσεων, οὐ τὴν καταστηματικὴν ἡδονὴν τὴν ἐπ' ἀναιρέσει ἀλγηδόνων καὶ οἷον ἀνοχλησίαν, ἣν ὁ Ἐπικούρος ἀποδέχεται καὶ τέλος εἶναι φησι. Perhaps the words in Cic. Fin. ii. 6, 18, are taken from a similar passage : aut enim eam voluptatem tuetur, quam Aristippus, i. e. qua

sensus dulciter ac jucunde movetur . . . nec Aristippus, qui voluptatem summum bonum dicit, in voluptate ponit non dolere. 13, 39 : Aristippi Cyrenaicorumque omnium ; quos non est veritum in ea voluptate quæ maxime dulcedine sensum moveret, summum bonum ponere, contemnentes istam vacuitatem doloris.

<sup>3</sup> Diog. 87 : δοκεῖ δ' αὐτοῖς καὶ τέλος εὐδαιμονίας διαφέρειν. τέλος μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὴν κατὰ μέρος ἡδονήν, εὐδαιμονίαν δὲ τὸ ἐκ τῶν μερικῶν ἡδονῶν σύστημα, αἷς συναριθμοῦνται καὶ αἱ παρῃχηκταὶ καὶ αἱ μέλλουσαι. εἶναι τε τὴν μερικὴν ἡδονὴν δι' αὐτὴν αἰρετήν · τὴν δ' εὐδαιμονίαν οὐ δι' αὐτήν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰς κατὰ μέρος ἡδονάς. 89 :

thing to be learned in life is the art which teaches us to enjoy the present moment. The present is alone ours. Forbear then to be distressed by the remembrance of what is already past or by the thought of what has yet to come and may never be yours.<sup>1</sup>

The character of the things which afford us pleasure is in itself unimportant. Every pleasure as such is a good, and there is no difference between one kind of enjoyment and another. Pleasure may spring from various, even from opposite sources, but considered by itself as enjoyment, it is always the same—as good in one case as in another, a pleasurable internal emotion and always equally a natural object of desire.<sup>2</sup> The Cyrenaics do not therefore allow that

ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κατὰ μνήμην τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἢ προσδοκίαν ἡδονὴν φασιν ἀποτελεῖσθαι, ὅπερ ἤρεσκεν Ἐπικούρῳ. ἐκλύεσθαι γὰρ τῷ χρόνῳ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κίνημα. Ibid. 91: ἀρκεῖ δὲ καὶ κατὰ μίαν [ἡδονὴν] τις προσπίπτουσαν ἡδέως ἐπανάγη. Athen. xii. 544, a: [Ἀρίστιππος] ἀποδεξάμενος τὴν ἡδυνάθειαν ταύτην τέλος εἶναι ἔφη καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν βεβλήσθαι καὶ μονόχρονον αὐτὴν εἶναι· παραπλησίως τοῖς ἀσώτοις οὕτε τὴν μνήμην τῶν γεγονυῖων ἀπολαύσειν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἡγούμενος οὕτε τὴν ἐλπίδα τῶν ἀσομένων, ἀλλ' ἐνὶ μόνῳ τὸ ἀγαθὸν κρίνων τῷ παρόντι, τὸ δὲ ἀπολελυμένον καὶ ἀπολαύσειν οὐδὲν νομίζων πρὸς αὐτόν, τὸ μὲν ὡς οὐκ ἔτ' ὄν, τὸ δὲ οὕτω καὶ ἀδηλον. Ælian V. H. xiv. 6: πάνυ σφόδρα ἐρῶμενός ἐσθαι λέγειν ὁ Ἀρίστιππος, παρεγγυῶν, μήτε τοῖς παρελθούσιν ἐπικάμνειν, μήτε τῶν ἐπιόντων προκάμνειν· εὐθυμίας γὰρ δεῖγμα τὸ τοιοῦτο, καὶ ἴλεω διανοίας ἀπυδεΐξις· προσέταττε δὲ ἐφ'

ἡμέρᾳ τὴν γνώμην ἔχειν καὶ αὐτὸ πάλιν τῆς ἡμέρας ἐπ' ἐκείνῳ τῷ μέρει καθ' ὃ ἕκαστος ἢ πράττει τι ἢ ἐννοεῖ· μόνον γὰρ ἔφασκεν ἡμέτερον εἶναι τὸ παρόν, μήτε δὲ τὸ φθάνον μήτε τὸ προσδοκώμενον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπολωλέναι, τὸ δὲ ἀδηλον εἶναι εἴπερ ἴσται. That Aristippus had already propounded these views, is all the less doubtful, since his whole life presupposes them, and his other views immediately lead to them. The precise formularising of them may very possibly belong to the period of Epicurus.

<sup>1</sup> Diog. 66: ἀπέλαυε μὲν γὰρ [Ἀρίστιππος] ἡδονῆς τῶν παρόντων, οὐκ ἐθήρα δι' πόνου τὴν ἀπολαυσιν τῶν οὐ παρόντων· ὅθεν καὶ Διογένης βασιλικὸν κύνα ἔλεγε αὐτόν.

<sup>2</sup> Diog. 87: μὴ διαφέρειν τε ἡδονὴν ἡδονῆς, μηδὲ ἡδίων τι εἶναι. Plato, Phileb. 12, D., where the supporter of pleasure answers the objection of Socrates that

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there are any pleasures not only declared by law and custom to be bad, but bad by their very nature. Pleasure in their view may be occasioned by a disreputable action, but in as far as it is enjoyment, it is nevertheless good and desirable.<sup>1</sup>

(e) *Modified form  
of this extreme view.*

At the same time several additional considerations were introduced, by which the severity of this theory was considerably modified, and its applications limited. In the first place, the Cyrenaics could not deny that notwithstanding their essential similarity there were yet differences of degree in feelings of pleasure: for granting that every pleasure is good, it does not follow that the same amount of good belongs to all, on the contrary one pleasure deserves to be preferred to another, in proportion to the amount of enjoyment it affords.<sup>2</sup> Just as little did it escape their notice,

good and bad pleasures ought to be distinguished: εἰσι μὲν γὰρ ἀπ' ἐναντίων. . . . αὐταὶ πραγμάτων, οὐ μὴν αὐταὶ γε ἀλλήλαις ἐναντία. πῶς γὰρ ἡδονὴ γε ἡδονῇ μὴ οὐχ ὁμοιότατον ἂν εἴη, τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἐαντῶ, πάντων, χρημάτων; Ibid. 13, A.: λέγεις γὰρ ἀγαθὰ πάντα εἶναι τὰ ἡδεα, for this may be possible in the case of the worst pleasures? to which Protagoras replies: πῶς λέγεις ὦ Σώκρατες; οἷοί γάρ τινα συγχωρήσεσθαι, θέμενον ἡδονὴν εἶναι τὰγαθόν, εἴτα ἀνέξεσθαι σου λέγοντος τὰς μὲν εἶναι τινὰς ἀγαθὰς ἡδονάς, τὰς δὲ τινὰς ἐτέρας αὐτῶν κακὰς. Just as little will Protagoras (36, C.) allow that there is imaginary pleasure and pain.

<sup>1</sup> Diog. 88: εἶναι δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀσχημοτάτων

γένηται, καθά φησιν Ἰππόβοτος ἐν τῷ περὶ αἰρέσεων. εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἡ πράξις ἄτοπος εἴη, ἀλλ' οὖν ἡ ἡδονὴ δι' αὐτὴν αἰρετὴ καὶ ἀγαθόν.

<sup>2</sup> Diog. 87 says that the Cyrenaics denied a difference in degrees of pleasures, but this is undoubtedly a mistake. Diog. ii. 90, says that they taught that bodily feelings of pleasure and pain were stronger than mental ones. Plato too, Phil. 45, A.; 65, E., in the spirit of this School, talks of μέγιστα τῶν ἡδονῶν, and there is nothing in their system to require absolute equality in all enjoyments. They could not allow that there was an absolute difference of value between them, that some were good and others were bad, but they had no occasion to deny a relative difference

that many enjoyments are only purchased at the cost of still greater pain, on which account they considered it to be difficult to secure unbroken happiness.<sup>1</sup> They therefore required the consequences of an action to be considered, and in this way endeavoured to revive the distinction between good and evil attaching to actions—a distinction which they had originally refused to allow. An action should be avoided when more pain follows from it than pleasure, and on this account a man of sense will abstain from things which are condemned by the laws of the state and public opinion.<sup>2</sup> They also directed their attention to the difference between the body and the mind.<sup>3</sup> The pains and pleasures of the body, they held, were more pungent than those of the mind;<sup>4</sup> and they

of more or less good, and they might even allow of different kinds of pleasures, those of the body and mind for instance. Ritter's remarks on Diog. ii. 103, do not appear conclusive. Those of Wendt's Phil. Cyr. 34, on the other hand, may well be entertained. He says that the Cyrenaics only denied that one object taken by itself and independently of our feelings was more pleasant than another.

<sup>1</sup> Diog. 90: διδὲ καὶ καθ' αὐτὴν αἰρετῆς οὐσης τῆς ἡδονῆς τὰ ποιητικά ἐνίων ἡδονῶν ὀχληρὰ πολλάκις ἐναντιοῦσθαι· ὥς δυσκολώτατον αὐτοῖς φαίνεσθαι τὸν ἀθροισμὸν τῶν ἡδονῶν εὐδαιμονίαν ποιοῦντων.

<sup>2</sup> Diog. 93: μηδέν τι εἶναι φύσει δίκαιον ἢ καλὸν ἢ αἰσχροὺν, since the value of every action depends on the pleasure which

follows it, ἀλλὰ νόμῳ καὶ ἔθει, ὁ μὲντοι σπουδαῖος οὐδὲν ἄτοπον πράξει διὰ τὰς ἐπικειμένους ζημίας καὶ δόξας. Wendt (Phil. Cyr. 25) calls the accuracy of this statement in question without reason, but he is right in rejecting Schleiermacher's hypothesis (Pl. W. ii. 1, 183; ii. 2, 18), that in the Gorgias Aristippus is being refuted under the name of Callicles, and in the Cratylus 384, D., under that of Hermogenes.

<sup>3</sup> Which, strictly speaking, they could only have done by saying that one portion of our impressions *appears* to us to come from the body, another not: for they had long since given up all real knowledge of things. But their consistency hardly went so far as this.

<sup>4</sup> Diog. ii. 90: πολὺ μὲντοι τῶν ψυχικῶν τὰς σωματικὰς ἀμεί-



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endeavoured to show that bodily sensibility is the condition of all pleasure and pain;<sup>1</sup> but at the same time they maintained that some addition to sensuous feelings must come from elsewhere, or it would be impossible to explain how unequal impressions are produced by perceptions altogether alike—for instance, by the sight of real suffering and by the sight of suffering merely on the stage.<sup>2</sup> They even went so far as to allow that there are pleasures and pains of the mind which have no reference to any states of the body. The prosperity, for instance, of our country fills us with as much pleasure as does our own.<sup>3</sup>

ρους εἶναι καὶ τὰς ὀχλήσεις χείρους τὰς σωματικὰς· ὅθεν καὶ ταύταις κολάζεσθαι μᾶλλον τοὺς ἀμαρτάνοντας. (The same, Ibid. x. 137.) χαλεπώτερον γὰρ τὸ πονεῖν, οἰκειότερον δὲ τὸ ἡδεσθαι ὑπελάμβανον· ὅθεν καὶ πλείονα οἰκονομίαν περὶ θάτερον ἐποιοῦντο.

<sup>1</sup> This is indicated by the expression *οἰκειότερον* in the passage above. The assertion that not all pleasure and pain is connected with bodily states, may be brought into harmony with this statement by taking it to mean that every such feeling is not *immediately* connected with the body, without, however, denying a more remote connection between such feelings and the body. Joy for one's country's prosperity might in their minds be connected with the thought that our own happiness depends on that of our country. It can only be considered an opponent's exaggeration, when Panætius and Cicero assert that the Cyrenaics made

bodily pleasure the end of life. Cic. Acad. iv. 45, 139: Aristippus, quasi *animum nullum habeamus, corpus solum tuetur*. The highest good Aristippus declared consists not in bodily pleasure, but in pleasure generally; and if he regarded bodily pleasure as the strongest, and in this sense as the best, it by no means follows that he excluded mental pleasures from the idea of good. And his remarks about the value of intelligence make this probable.

<sup>2</sup> Diog. 90: λέγουσι δὲ μηδὲ κατὰ ψιλὴν τὴν ὕπρασιν ἢ τὴν ἀκοὴν γίνεσθαι ἡδονὰς, τῶν γοῦν μιμουμένων θρήνους ἡδέως ἀκούομεν, τῶν δὲ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἀηδῶς. The same is found in Plut. Qu. Conv. v. 1, 2, 7. Here belongs Cic. Tusc. ii, 13, 28.

<sup>3</sup> Diog. 89: οὐ πάσας μέντοι τὰς ψυχικὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ ἀλγῆδονας ἐπὶ σωματικαῖς ἡδοναῖς καὶ ἀλγηδόσι γίνεσθαι· καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ ψιλῇ τῇ τῆς πατρίδος εὐημερίᾳ ὥσπερ τῇ ἰδίᾳ χαρὰν ἐγγίγνεσθαι.



Although pleasure is in general made to coincide with the good, and pain with the evil, the Cyrenaics are far from expecting happiness to result from the mere satisfaction of animal instincts. To enjoy life truly, we need not only to take into account the value and the consequences of every enjoyment, but we need also to acquire the proper disposition of mind. The help most essential to leading a pleasant life is intelligence—not alone because it supplies that presence of mind which is never at a loss for means,<sup>1</sup> but, above all, because it teaches us how to make a proper use of the good things of life;<sup>2</sup> because it frees us from the prejudices and fancies which stand in the way of happiness, such as envy, passionate love, superstition;<sup>3</sup> because it guards us from regretting the past, from desiring the future, from being dependent on the pleasure of the moment; and because it guarantees to us that freedom of soul, of which we may at any moment stand in need to give us contentment with our present lot.

The cultivation of the mind was earnestly recommended by these philosophers,<sup>4</sup> and philosophy was pointed to as the one way to true virtue in life.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See the anecdotes and proverbs in Diog. 68; 73; 79; 82, and what Galen. Exhort. c. 5, and Vitruv. vi., Præf. i., say of his shipwreck. Conf. Stob. Ekl. ed. Gais. App. ii. 13, 138.

<sup>2</sup> Demetr. (Elocut. 96) mentions as an *εἶδος τοῦ λόγου* Ἀριστιππεῖον· ὅτι οἱ ἄνθρωποι χρήματα μὲν ἀπολείπουσι τοῖς παῖσιν, ἐπιστήμην δὲ οὐ συναπολείπουσι τὴν χρησόμενην

αὐτοῖς. The thought is Socratic.

<sup>3</sup> Diog. 91: τὸν σοφὸν μήτε φθονήσῃν μήτε ἐρασθήσεσθαι ἢ δεισιδαιμονήσῃν, whereas he is not preserved from the natural consequences of fear and sorrow.

<sup>4</sup> Many expressions to this effect are on record, particularly those of Aristippus, Diog. ii. 69, 70, 72, 80.

<sup>5</sup> See the saying of Aristippus

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It was even declared to be the essential condition of happiness; for although mankind is too far dependent on external circumstances for the wise man to be invariably happy, and the foolish man invariably miserable, wisdom and happiness, folly and misery, generally go together.<sup>1</sup> Although happiness as the main object in life was not renounced by this School, it was made to be something different from what at first it appeared to be.

C. *The  
actual  
practice  
of the  
Cyrenaics.*

All that is further known about the views and conduct of Aristippus is in harmony with this thought. His leading thought is comprised in the adage, that life offers most to one who, though he never denies himself a pleasure, at every moment continues master of himself and of circumstances. Of the Cynic freedom from wants Aristippus knew nothing. Prudent enjoyment is a greater art, he maintained,<sup>2</sup> than abstemiousness. And his own life was not only comfortable, it was in fact luxurious.<sup>3</sup> He enjoyed good

in Diog. ii. 72; Plut. Ed. Pu. 7. He is also mentioned as the originator of the saying, which Cic. Rep. i. 2; Plut. adv. Col. 30, 2, attribute to Xenocrates, that the conduct of the philosopher would remain the same, supposing all laws were abolished, Diog. ii. 68.

<sup>1</sup> Diog. 91: ἀρέσκει δ' αὐτοῖς μήτε τὸν σοφὸν πάντα ἡδέως ζῆν, μήτε πάντα φαῦλον ἐπιπόνως, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ πλεῖστον. In the same way the Cyrenaics would not deny that the ἄφρονες were capable of certain virtues, which, however, was only expressly stated by later members

of the School against the Cynics and Stoics.

<sup>2</sup> Stob. Floril. 17, 18: κρατεῖ ἡδονῆς οὐχ ὁ ἀπεχόμενος, ἀλλ' ὁ χρώμενος μὲν μὴ παρεκφερόμενος δέ. Diog. 75: τὸ κρατεῖν καὶ μὴ ἡττᾶσθαι ἡδονῶν κράτιστον, οὐ τὸ μὴ χρῆσθαι.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 1, already calls him ἀκολαστοτέρως ἔχοντα πρὸς τὰ τοιαῦτα [πρὸς ἐπιθυμίαν βρωτοῦ καὶ ποτοῦ καὶ λαγνείας], etc. He says himself that his object is ᾧ βᾶστά τι καὶ ἥδιστα βιοτεύειν. and Socrates asks whether he chose to have no home, because he felt sure that no one could like to have him even as

living,<sup>1</sup> wore costly clothing,<sup>2</sup> scented himself with perfumes,<sup>3</sup> and caroused with mistresses.<sup>4</sup> Nor were the means neglected by which this mode of life was rendered possible. On the contrary, he argued that the more means any one possessed, the more fully was the enjoyment of life placed in his power. Riches, he said, were not like shoes, which when too large could not be used.<sup>5</sup> Hence he not only demanded payment for his instruction, but, in order to enrich himself, he did not hesitate, as we have seen, to bear what any other philosopher would have considered below his dignity.<sup>6</sup> The fear of death too, which his

a slave? *τίς γὰρ ἂν ἐθέλοι ἄνθρωπον ἐν οἰκίᾳ ἔχειν πονεῖν μὲν μηδὲν ἐθέλοντα, τῇ δὲ πολυτελεστάτῃ διαίτῃ χαίροντα*; this picture was afterwards more deeply coloured by later writers, and certainly not without exaggeration. See Athen. xii. 544; Timon in Diog. ii. 66; Ibid. ii. 69, iv. 40; Lucian V. Auct. 12; Clement Pædag. ii. 176, D.; Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 18, 31; Epiph. Exp. Fid. 1089 A.

<sup>1</sup> See the anecdotes in Diog. ii. 66, 68, 69, 75, 76.

<sup>2</sup> Max. Tyr. Diss. vii. 9; Lucian. Tatian adv. Grac. c. 2; Tert. Apol. 46.

<sup>3</sup> That he made use of fragrant perfumes, and defended this practice, is told by Seneca, Benef. vii. 25, 1; Clem. Pæd. ii. 176, D., 179, B., Diog. 76, all apparently taken from the same source.

<sup>4</sup> His relations to Lais are well known. Athen. xiii. 599, 588; xii. 544; Cic. ad Div. ix. 26; Plut. Erot. 4, 5; Diog. 74, 85; Clement, Strom. ii. 411, C.; Lact. Inst. iii. 15. A few other

stories of the same kind may be found, Diog. 67; 69; 81; iv. 40.

<sup>5</sup> Stob. Floril. 94, 32.

<sup>6</sup> Here belong many of the anecdotes which relate to Aristippus' stay at the court of Dionysius. According to Diog. 77, Aristippus is said to have announced to Dionysius, on his arrival, that he came to impart what he had, and to receive what he had not; or, according to another account, he said that when he wanted instruction he went to Socrates to obtain it, now that he wanted money, he had come to Dionysius. Diog. 69, makes him tell Dionysius that the reason why philosophers appeared before the doors of the rich, and not the opposite, was because philosophers knew what they wanted, whilst the rich did not. The same is found in Stob. Floril. 3, 46. See also Diog. 70 and 81. Of the liberal offers made by Dionysius to Plato, he remarks in Plut. Dio. 19: ἀσφαλῶς μεγαλόψυχον εἶναι Διονύσιον· αὐτοῖς

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teaching professed to drive away,<sup>1</sup> was not so fully overcome by him that he could face danger with the composure of a Socrates.<sup>2</sup>

It would, however, be doing Aristippus a great injustice to consider him a mere lover of enjoyment, or at best as a pleasure-seeker endowed with a brilliant wit. Enjoyment he loved, but, at the same time, he loved to be above enjoyment. He possessed not only the flexibility which could adapt itself to any cir-

μὲν γὰρ μικρὰ δίδοναι πλείονων  
διομένοις, Πλάτωνι δὲ πολλὰ μηδὲν  
λαμβάνοντι. When Dionysius  
once refused to give him any  
money because the wise man, on  
his own showing, was never in  
difficulties, he replied, Give me  
the money this once, and I will  
explain to you how it is; but no  
sooner had he got it, than he  
exclaimed, Ah! was I not right?  
Diog. 82; Diog. 67, 73, and Athen.  
xii. 544, tell further, that when  
he had once been placed at the  
end of the table by Dionysius  
because of some free expression  
of his, he contented himself with  
remarking, To-day it is my lot  
to be honoured by him with  
this place. . . Another time, when  
Dionysius spat in his face, he is  
said to have borne it complacently,  
adding: A fisherman must put  
up with more moisture, to catch  
even a smaller fish. Once, when  
begging a favour for a friend, he  
fell at the feet of Dionysius, Diog.  
79, and when reproached for so  
doing, Why, he asked, has Diony-  
sius ears on his legs? It is a  
common story that Dionysius  
once asked him and Plato to

appear dressed in purple: Plato  
refused to do so, but Aristippus  
acceded with a smile. Sext.  
Pyrrh. iii. 204, i. 155; Diog. 78;  
Suid. Ἀρίστ.; Stob. Floril. 5, 46;  
Greg. Naz. Carm. ii. 10, 324: the  
latter unfortunately thinks that  
it happened at the court of  
Archelaus. He also observes in  
reference to Plato, Diog. 81, that  
*he* allowed himself to be abused  
by Dionysius for the same reasons  
that others abused him: a preacher  
of morals after all has an eye to  
his own interests. He is re-  
presented as a flatterer and  
parasite of Dionysius, by Lucian  
V. Aut. 12; Parasit. 33, Bis Accus.  
23; Mem. 13.

<sup>1</sup> See Diog. 76: at the same  
time the Cyrenaics consider fear  
to be something natural and un-  
avoidable

<sup>2</sup> On the occasion of a storm at  
sea he was charged with displaying  
more fear than others, notwith-  
standing his philosophy, to which  
he adroitly replied: οὐ γὰρ περὶ  
ὁμοίας ψυχῆς ἀγωνιῶμεν ἀμφοτέρωι,  
Diog. 71; Gell. xix. 1, 10; Ælian  
V. H. ix. 20.



cumstances and make use of persons and things,<sup>1</sup> not only the wit which was never at a loss for a ready answer,<sup>2</sup> but he possessed a calmness and independence of mind, which was able to forego pleasure without a pang, to bear loss with composure, to be

<sup>1</sup> Diog. 66: ἦν δὲ ἱκανὸς ἀρμόσασθαι καὶ τόπῳ καὶ χρόνῳ καὶ προσώπῳ, καὶ πᾶσαν περίστασιν ἀρμοδίως ὑποκρίνασθαι· διὸ καὶ παρὶ Διονυσίου τῶν ἄλλων εὐδοκίμει μᾶλλον, ἀεὶ τὸ προσπεσὸν εὖ διατιθέμενος. A few instances of this skill have been already seen. Here, too, belongs what is told by Galen. d. Vitruv., that after having suffered shipwreck and lost everything, he immediately contrived to procure an ample supply of necessities. Further, it is stated in Plutarch's Dio. 19, that he was the first to notice the growing estrangement between Dionysius and Plato. In Diog. 68, he answers the question, What good he has got from philosophy, by saying: τὸ δύνασθαι πᾶσι θαρρύνοντας ὁμιλεῖν—and Diog. 79, relates that when he was brought as a captive before Artaphernes, and some one asked him, how he liked his situation, he replied, that now he was perfectly at rest. The answer which he is reported to have given to Diogenes (which, however, is told of others), is well-known (Diog. vi. 58, ii. 102): εἶπερ ᾗδεις ἀνθρώποις ὁμιλεῖν, οὐκ ἂν λάχανα ἐπλυνες. Diog. 68; Hor. Ep. i. 17, 13; Valer. Max. iv. 3.

<sup>2</sup> In a similar way he could defend his luxuriousness. When some one blamed him for giving fifty drachmæ for a partridge, Aristippus asked, if he would

have given a farthing for it; and when the reply was in the affirmative, I, said Aristippus, do not care more for fifty drachmæ than you do for a farthing. Diog. 66, 75; Athen. viii. 343. Another time he argues that if good living were wrong, it would not be employed to honour the festivals of the gods. Ibid. 68. Another time, when some one took him to task for his good living, he asked him to dinner; and when the invitation was accepted, he at once drew the conclusion that he must be too stingy to live well himself. Ibid. 76. When he received from Dionysius the offer of a choice of three mistresses, he chose them all, with the gallant observation, that it had been a bad thing for Paris to prefer one of three goddesses. Ibid. 67. When attacked for his relations to Lais, he answered with the well-known, ἔχω καὶ οὐκ ἔχομαι. The same relation is said to have given rise to other light jokes, such as that it was all the same to him whether the house in which he lived had been occupied by others before; or that he did not care whether a fish liked him, if he liked the fish; and the same Cynicism is betrayed by the anecdotes in Diog. 81, although they are not otherwise at variance with Grecian morals.



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satisfied with what it possessed, and to feel happy in any position. His maxim was to enjoy the present and not to concern himself either about the future or the past, and always to be cheerful. Come what may, there is a bright side to things,<sup>1</sup> and he knows how to wear the beggar's rags and the noble's robe with equal grace.<sup>2</sup> Pleasure he loves, but he can also dispense with pleasure.<sup>3</sup> He will be master of himself.<sup>4</sup> His temper shall not be ruffled by any risings of passion.<sup>5</sup> Some importance is attached to riches, but hardly any independent value, and therefore the want of them is never felt. He is lavish of them because he does not slavishly cling to money.<sup>6</sup> He can do without riches, if necessary,<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Hor. Ep. i. 17, 23: *omnis Aristippum decuit color et status et res, tentantem majora fere, presentibus æquum*. Plut. de Vit. Hom. B., 150: Ἀρίστιππος καὶ πενία καὶ πόνοις συνηνέχθη ἐρῶ μένως καὶ ἡδονῇ ἀφειδῶς ἐχρήσατο. Diog. 66.

<sup>2</sup> According to Diog. 67, Plato is said to have remarked to him: σοὶ μόνῃ δέδοται καὶ χλανίδα φέρειν καὶ ῥάκος. The same remark is referred to by Plut. Vit. Alex. 8: Ἀρίστιππον θαυμάζονοι τὸν Σωκρατικὸν ὅτι καὶ τρίβωνι λιτῷ καὶ Μιλησίᾳ χλαμύδι χρώμενος δι' ἀμφοτέρων ἐτήρει τὸ εὖσχημον, and Hor. Ep. i. 17, 27, on which passage the Scholiast tells the story how Aristippus carried off the surcoat of Diogenes from the bath, leaving his purple cloak instead, which Diogenes refused to wear at any price.

<sup>3</sup> Diog. 67.

<sup>4</sup> ἔχω οὐκ ἔχομαι. Diog. 69, tells a saying of the same kind

which Aristippus uttered on paying a visit to his mistress, to the effect that there was no need to be ashamed of going there, but there was of not being able to get away.

<sup>5</sup> Plut. N. P. Suav. v. sec. Epic. 4, 5: οἱ Κυρηναῖοι . . . οὐδὲ ὀμιλεῖν ἀφροδισίοις οἰόνται δεῖν μετὰ φωτός, ἀλλὰ σκότος προθεμένους, ὅπως μὴ τὰ εἰδῶλα τῆς πράξεως ἀναλαμβάνουσα διὰ τῆς ὕψεως εὐεργῶς ἐν αὐτῇ ἢ διάνοια πολλάκις ἀνακαίῃ τὴν ὄρεξιν. The same way of thinking is expressed by his defining pleasure to be a gentle motion of the mind. The storms of passion would change this gentle motion into a violent one, and turn pleasure into pain.

<sup>6</sup> See the story that he bade his servant who was carrying a heavy burden of gold cast away what was too much for him. Hor. Serm. ii. 3, 99; Diog. 77.

<sup>7</sup> When he got on to a pirate vessel, he threw his money into

and is readily consoled for the loss of them.<sup>1</sup> To him no possession appears more valuable than contentment,<sup>2</sup> no disease worse than avarice.<sup>3</sup> He lives an easy life, but he is not on that account afraid of exertion, and approves of bodily exercise.<sup>4</sup> His life is that of the flatterer, but he often expresses himself with unexpected freedom.<sup>5</sup> Freedom he esteems above all things,<sup>6</sup> and on that account he will not belong to any community, either as ruler or as ruled, because he will not forfeit freedom at any price.<sup>7</sup>

the sea with the words: *ἄμεινον ταῦτα δι' Ἀρίστιππον ἢ διὰ ταῦτα Ἀρίστιππον ἀπολέσθαι*. Diog. 77; Cic. Invent. ii. 58, 176; Auson. Idyl. iii. 13; Stob. Floril. 57, 13.

<sup>1</sup> In Plut. Tranq. An. 8, Aristippus has lost an estate, and one of his friends expresses sympathy with him, upon which Aristippus replies: Have I not now three estates, whilst you have only one? Ought I not rather to sympathise with you?

<sup>2</sup> Hor. Diog. ii. 72: *τὰ ἄριστα ὑπετίθετο τῇ θυγατρὶ Ἀρήτῃ, συνασκῶν αὐτὴν ὑπεροπτικὴν τοῦ πλείονος εἶναι*.

<sup>3</sup> See further details in Plut. Cupid. Div. 3.

<sup>4</sup> Dio. 91: *τὴν σωματικὴν ἀσκήσιν συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς ἀρετῆς ἀνάληψιν*.

<sup>5</sup> Several free expressions towards Dionysius are told by Diog. 73, 77; Stob. Floril. 49, 22; Greg. Naz. Carm. ii. 10, 419, not to mention the anecdotes in Diog. 75.

<sup>6</sup> On the principle mentioned by Hor. Ep. i. 1, 18: *nunc in Aristippi furtim praecepta relabor, et mihi res, non me rebus*

subjungere conor. Here too the saying belongs Plut. in Hes. 9: *συμβούλον δεῖσθαι χεῖρον εἶναι τοῦ προσαιτεῖν*.

<sup>7</sup> Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 8. In reply to Socrates, who asked whether he considered himself among the number of those who rule, or those who are ruled, Aristippus said: *ἐγὼ γ' οὐδ' ὅλως γε τάττω ἑμαυτὸν εἰς τὴν τῶν ἀρχεῖν βουλομένων τάξιν*. For there is no man who is more troubled than a statesman: *ἑμαυτὸν τοῖνον τάττω ἐς τοὺς βουλομένους ἢ ῥᾶστά τε καὶ ἥδιστα βιοτεύειν*. When Socrates met this by observing that those who rule are better off than those who are ruled, he rejoined: *ἀλλ' ἐγὼ τοι οὐδὲ εἰς τὴν δουλείαν αὐτὸν ἑμαυτὸν τάττω· ἀλλ' εἶναι τίς μοι δοκεῖ μέση τούτων ὁδός, ἣν πειρῶμαι βαδίζειν, οὔτε δι' ἀρχῆς οὔτε διὰ δουλείας, ἀλλὰ δι' ἐλευθερίας, ἥπερ μάλιστα πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἄγει*. And after further objections: *ἀλλ' ἐγὼ τοι, ἵνα μὴ πάσχω ταῦτα, οὐδ' εἰς πολιτείαν ἑμαυτὸν κατακλείω, ἀλλὰ ξένος πανταχοῦ εἰμι*. This agrees with what Dionysius says in Stob. Floril. 49, 22: If you had learned

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Still less did he allow himself to be held in check by religious considerations or traditions; as there seems every reason for asserting both of Aristippus personally, and of his School in general.<sup>1</sup> The first, however, who gained notoriety by a wanton attack on the popular faith was Theodorus. Whether the insipid naturalism of Euemerus was connected with the Cyrenaic philosophy or not is somewhat problematical. Nor ought it to be forgotten, that the endeavours of Aristippus to make life easy were not alone of a selfish character, but that they were also extended to others. Possessed of pleasing and attractive manners,<sup>2</sup> an enemy of vanity and boasting,<sup>3</sup> he could comfort with sympathy<sup>4</sup> his friends in sorrow, and bear with calmness<sup>5</sup> the injuries of enemies. He could avoid

anything from me, you would shrink from tyranny as from disease; but it hardly agrees with his remark (Ibid. 18) on the difference between a monarchy and a tyranny. But it is probable that at a later time Aristippus to a certain extent relaxed his objections to public life, since he connected himself with a family with which he would previously have had nothing to do.

<sup>1</sup> It must have been an effect of their scepticism, that they followed Protagoras in his attitude towards religion, and their practical turn led to that freedom from religious prejudices, which they especially required in the wise man. Clement. Strom. vii. 722, D., says that they rejected prayer.

<sup>2</sup> ἡδιστος is the name which Greg. Naz. 307, gives him, and

he commends him for τὸ εὐχάριστον τοῦ τρόπου καὶ στρωμύλον.

<sup>3</sup> See Arist. Rhet. ii. 23; Diog. 71, 73.

<sup>4</sup> Ælian V. H. vii. 3, mentions a letter of sympathy addressed to some friends, who had met with a severe misfortune. He quotes the words from the introduction: ἀλλ' ἔγωγε ἤκω πρὸς ὑμᾶς οὐχ ὡς συλλυπούμενος ὑμῖν, ἀλλ' ἵνα παύσω ὑμᾶς λυπούμενους. In theory Aristippus could only uphold friendship because of its utility, as Epicurus did at a later time. Diog. 91: τὸν φίλον τῆς χρείας ἔνεκα, καὶ γὰρ μέρος σώματος, μέχρις ἂν παρῇ, ἀσπάζεσθαι. Something similar is also found in Socrates, and he employs the same argument Xen. Mem. i. 2, 54.

<sup>5</sup> Plut. Prof. in Virt. 9.

strife,<sup>1</sup> mitigate anger,<sup>2</sup> and conciliate an offended friend.<sup>3</sup> A virtuous man steadily pursuing his course in the midst of vice<sup>4</sup> appeared to him the most admirable object ; and that this was really his opinion is shown by his reverence for Socrates ; nor is it at all improbable<sup>5</sup> that he expressed his appreciation for his master by saying, that to Socrates he was indebted for being a man, capable of being praised in good faith. In a word, with all his love of enjoyment, Aristippus appears to have been possessed of high feelings and a cultivated mind, to have known how to preserve calmness and composure in the midst of the perpetual change of human affairs, how to govern his passions and inclinations, and how to make the best of all the events of life. He may have been wanting in the strength of will which can beard destiny, in the grave earnestness of a mind intent upon high ends, and in strictness of principles ; but he was a proficient in the rare art of contentment and moderation, while his pleasing manners and the cheerful brightness of his disposition attract far more than the superficial and effeminate character of his moral views repel.<sup>6</sup> Nor do these traits simply belong to his per-

<sup>1</sup> Diog. 70 ; Stob. Floril. 19, 6. *στραπται.*

<sup>2</sup> Stob. Floril. 20, 63.

<sup>3</sup> See the adventure with Æschines in Plut. Coh. Ira 14, Diog. 82, which Stob. Flor. 84, 19, probably by mistake, refers to the brother of Aristippus.

<sup>4</sup> Stob. Floril. 37, 25 : 'Αρίστιππος ἐρωτηθεὶς τί ἀξιοθαύμαστόν ἐστιν ἐν τῷ βίῳ ; ἄνθρωπος ἐπιεικὴς, εἶπε, καὶ μέτριος, ὅτι ἐν πολλοῖς ὑπάρχων μοχθηροῖς οὐ δέ-

<sup>5</sup> Which is told by Diog. 71. Few of the anecdotes about Aristippus rest on good authority, but as they all agree in portraying a certain character, they have been used as the material for history. They may be spurious in parts, but on the whole they give a faithful representation of the man.

<sup>6</sup> Even Cicero, who is not ge-



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sonal character; they are closely connected with the very nature of his system, which requires life to be directed by intelligence. Theory and practice mutually overlap with him, as they did with Diogenes, and in the case of both each may be explained by means of the other.

D. *Position of their system. Its relation to that of Socrates.*  
(1) *General relation of their philosophy.*

Both theory and practice with Aristippus are, however, far removed from their pattern, Socrates. The theory of Socrates insisted on a knowledge of conceptions; that of the Cyrenaics on the plainest sensuality. His was an insatiable thirsting for knowledge, an unwearied exercise in analysis; theirs a total renunciation of knowledge, an indifference to all theoretical enquiries. His was a scrupulous conscientiousness, an unconditional submission to moral requirements, an unceasing labour with himself and others; theirs was a comfortable theory of life, never going beyond enjoyment, and treating even the means to it with indifference. His were self-denial, abstemiousness, moral strictness, patriotism, piety; theirs were luxurious indulgence, flexibility, a citizenship of the world which could do without a country, and an intellectual religion in which the Gods find no place. And yet it cannot be

nerally his friend, says (Off. i. 41, 148), that if Socrates and Aristippus placed themselves in antagonism with tradition, they ought not to be imitated: *magnis illi et divinis bonis hanc licentiam assequebantur*; and he also gives (N. D. iii. 31, 77) a saying of the Stoic Aristo: *nocere audientibus philosophos iis, qui bene*

*dicta male interpretarentur: posse enim asotos ex Aristippi, acerbos e Zenonis schola exire.* The same is attributed to Zeno by Ath. xiii. 566, on the authority of Antigonus Carystius: those who misunderstood him, might become vulgar and depraved, *καθάπερ οἱ τῆς Ἀριστίππου παρεχθέντες αἰσχροῦς ἄσωτοι καὶ θρασεῖς.*



allowed that Aristippus was only a degenerate pupil of Socrates, not that his teaching had only been touched surface-deep by that of his master. Not only was he classed with Socrates by the unanimous voice of antiquity, which, no doubt, referred more immediately to his external connection with him; not only did he always call himself a pupil of Socrates and regard him with unchanging devotion—a proof which is stronger than the former, and shows that he was able to appreciate the greatness of his friend; but his philosophy leaves no doubt that the spirit of his teacher had been mightily at work in him. The intellectual convictions and the intellectual aims of Socrates he did not share.<sup>1</sup> On the one hand, Socrates

<sup>1</sup> Hermann's remarks (On Ritter's *Dar. d. Socr. Sys.* 26; *Gesch. d. Plat. Phil.* 263), intended to bring out the connection between the teaching of Aristippus and that of Socrates, do not appear satisfactory, even when supported by the additional arguments in his *Ges. Abh.* 233. Hermann maintains that Aristippus only lacked the religious and moral feelings of Socrates, but that he steadily adhered to his logical principles. Socrates declared all judgments to be relative, and conceptions alone to be universally valid; and in the same way he argues, the Cyrenaics denied only the universal validity of judgments, but not that of conceptions, for they allowed that all men receive from the same things the same impressions, and agreed in their names. But these names were identical with the conceptions of

Socrates, which by the Cynics and Megarians had been reduced to empty names and deprived of all real substance. There is indeed a noticeable advance in entirely separating conceptions from appearances, and in more precisely defining the highest good as the first judgment universally valid. But in the first place it never occurred to Socrates to deny the universal validity of judgments; and it is as certain that he allowed universally valid judgments as that he allowed universally valid conceptions—such, for instance, as 'All virtue is knowledge,' 'every one pursues the good;' and if he called some judgments relative—such as, 'This is good'—it is no less certain that he declared the corresponding conceptions—for instance, that of the good—to be relative. In the next place it is equally untrue to say that the

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strained every nerve to attain to knowledge; on the other hand, Aristippus denied that knowledge was possible. Socrates originated a new mode of attacking the problem of knowledge, and a new kind of knowledge; Aristippus allowed of no knowledge which did not serve a practical end.<sup>1</sup> But he was indebted to his teacher in a great measure for that critical skill for which he deserves credit,<sup>2</sup> and for that unprejudiced simplicity which throws a light over his whole conduct.

(2) *Relation of their moral teaching.*

The same may be said of his moral teaching and conduct. How far in this respect he was below Socrates is obvious. But he was nearer to him in reality than will be readily believed. Socrates, as we have seen, made utility the ground of moral duties.

Cyrenaics only denied the universal validity of judgments but not that of conceptions, for they declared most emphatically that all our notions only express our personal feelings. They did not even allow that all feel the same impressions in the same way: if we must understand feelings by impressions, this language would be as unquestionable as it would be unmeaning; but they maintained that we cannot know whether others have the same feelings as ourselves. It is altogether untenable that they practically admitted the common meaning of names the use of which they could not of course deny; for they left it an open question, whether common impressions and notions corresponded to these names. It will be seen at once what has become of the advance which Hermann finds in Aristippus. A

decided distinction between conceptions and appearances can least of all be attributed to the Cyrenaics, seeing that they know of nothing but appearances; and it will appear, after what has been said, to be equally a mistake to say that 'Pleasure is the highest good' is the first judgment universally valid.

<sup>1</sup> We cannot accordingly agree with Brandis, who says: Aristippus appears to have held that the impulses to action must be found within the sphere of knowledge, and, in investigating what can be known, to have arrived at a conclusion opposite to that of Socrates. See Brandis, *Gr. röm. Phil.* ii. a. 94.

<sup>2</sup> See Xen. *Mem.* ii. 1; iii. 8, and the stories told by Diog. ii. 83, *Athen.* xi. 508, on the form of dialogue observed in his writings.

And might not Aristippus be convinced that he was not deviating from Socrates, as to the final end in view, even if he held a different opinion about the subordinate means? Were there not traits in Aristippus which are truly Socratic?—that composure with which he rises above circumstances, that independence with which he is master of himself and of all that happens, that unbroken cheerfulness which engenders a friendliness to others, that quiet security which arises from trusting to the strength of his mind? Knowledge is with him the most powerful element in morals. By culture and intelligence he would make men as independent of external circumstances as their nature allows of; and he advanced so far in this direction that he not unfrequently trenches on the ground of the Cynics.<sup>1</sup> His School was also internally connected with theirs. Both Schools take the same view of the problem proposed to philosophy, making it consist in practical culture,<sup>2</sup> not in theoretical knowledge. Both neglect logical and physical enquiries, and justify their procedure by theories, based it is true on different principles, but leading to the same sceptical results in the end. Both aim in their ethics at the same end—the emancipation of man by means of intelligence, and by elevating him above the outer world. The only reason for their difference, is that they use the most opposite means

<sup>1</sup> This relationship appears in the tradition which attributes the same utterances at one time to Aristippus, at another to Diogenes.

<sup>2</sup> The standing expression is *παιδεία*, and what they say in favour of it is much to the same effect.

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to bring about this result. The Cynic school follows the path of self-denial, the Cyrenaic that of self-indulgence; the Cynic dispenses with the outer world, the Cyrenaic employs it as a means to virtue.<sup>1</sup> But as the object of both Schools is one and the same, their principles ultimately conduct to the same point. The Cynics derive the highest pleasure from their self-denial; Aristippus dispenses with property and enjoyment, in order the more thoroughly to enjoy them.<sup>2</sup>

(3) *Relation of their political and religious views.*

For the same reason the Cyrenaics hold an analogous position towards political life and religious traditions. The individual, conscious of his mental superiority, withdraws himself from the external world. He needs no state, nor does he feel himself fettered by the beliefs of his countrymen; while he troubles himself far too little about others to make any attempt at construction either within the sphere of politics or within that of religion. Thus, together with sharp differences, there is a family likeness between these Schools which betrays their common descent from Socrates.

(4) *Aristippus further removed from Socrates than Antisthenes.*

There can be no doubt that Aristippus deviated far more from the original ground of the Socratic teaching than did Antisthenes. The utilitarian view of life, which with Socrates was only an auxiliary notion in

<sup>1</sup> To make this difference clearer, Wendt (Phil. Cyr. 29) quotes the opposite statements of Antisthenes and Aristippus in Diog. ii. 68, vi. 6. Antisthenes says that to philosophy he owes

τὸ δύνασθαι ἑαυτῷ ὁμιλεῖν, Aristippus, τὸ δύνασθαι πᾶσι θαρρόντως ὁμιλεῖν.

<sup>2</sup> Hegel. Gesch. d. Phil. ii. 127.



order to justify the practice of morality to the reflecting mind, was by Aristippus raised to be the leading thought. The knowledge of Socrates was pressed into its service, and philosophy became with Aristippus, as with the Sophists, a means for furthering the private objects of individuals. Instead of scientific knowledge, personal culture was alone aimed at, and was made to consist in a knowledge of life and in the art of enjoyment. The scanty remarks of Aristippus on the origin and truth of our impressions, borrowed for the most part from Protagoras and leading to a result destructive of all knowledge, were only intended as helps to moral doctrines. The deeper meaning of the Socratic philosophy, if not altogether annihilated, was at least subordinated to what with Socrates was a bare outwork, and formed in fact almost an obstruction to his leading thought. Granting that Aristippus was not a false follower of Socrates,<sup>1</sup> he was certainly a very one-sided follower, or rather he, among all the followers of Socrates, was the one who least entered into his master's real teaching.

Side by side with this foreign element, the genuine Socratic teaching cannot be ignored in the Cyrenaic school—uniting as it does both elements in itself, and their very union constituting its peculiarity. One of these elements was their peculiar doctrine of pleasure, the other was a limitation of that doctrine by following the Socratic line of argument and making thought and intelligence the only means by

(5) *The genuine Socratic teaching in the Cyrenaic school.*



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which to arrive at true pleasure. The former, taken by itself, would lead to the supposition that the pleasure of sense is the only object in life; the latter, to the strict Socratic doctrine of morals. By uniting both elements Aristippus arrived at the conviction—displayed in his whole bearing, and on which his personal character is a standing comment—that the surest way to happiness is to be found in the art of enjoying the pleasures of the moment without interrupting the free play of the inner life. Whether this is indeed possible, whether the two prominent thoughts in his system can be harmonised at all, is a question which it would appear never occurred to Aristippus. We can only answer it in the negative. That free play of the inner life, that philosophic independence at which Aristippus aimed, is only possible when the impressions of the senses and the individual circumstances of life are to such an extent overcome that happiness is not made to depend on changing events and impressions. On the other hand, when the pleasure of the moment is the highest object, it is only possible for happiness to exist in proportion to the circumstances which produce pleasant impressions; and all unpleasant feelings of necessity mar happiness. It is impossible freely to abandon the feelings to the enjoyment of what is present, without at the same time experiencing disagreeable impressions from the other attendant circumstances. Generalisation, which alone would render such a course possible, is distinctly forbidden by Aristippus, who requires the past and the future to be ignored

and the present alone to be considered. Thus, apart from other defects, his system suffers from an inconsistency in its fundamental principles, the injurious effects of which could not fail to follow very quickly. As a matter of fact these effects soon appeared in the teaching of Theodorus, Hegesias, and Anniceris, and hence the interest which the history of the later Cyrenaics possesses.

About the same time that Epicurus was giving a new form to the philosophy of pleasure, Theodorus, Hegesias, and Anniceris were advocating views within the Cyrenaic School, which agreed in part with those of Epicurus, but were in advance of his doctrine of pleasure. Theodorus, on the whole, adhered to the principles of Aristippus, and unscrupulously pushed them to their most extreme consequences.<sup>1</sup> Since the value of an action depends upon its results to the doer, he concluded that any and every action might under certain circumstances be allowed. Certain things were declared to be immoral only as a device in order to keep the masses within bounds; but the wise man who has risen superior to this device need not, under appropriate circumstances, be afraid of committing adultery, theft, and sacrilege. If things are intended for use, beautiful women and boys are not intended only for ornament.<sup>2</sup> Friendship, it

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E. *The  
later Cy-  
renaics.*  
(a) *Theo-  
dorus.*

<sup>1</sup> *θρασύτατος* is the term used of him by Diog. ii. 116; and this epithet is fully justified by a passage like that, vi. 97.

<sup>2</sup> Diog. ii. 99. That Theodorus uttered this and other similar things, cannot be doubted after

the definite and explicit testimony of Diogenes. It is true that, in Plut. Tranq. Anim. 5, Theodorus complains that his pupils misunderstood him; a statement which, if it be true, probably refers to the practical

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seemed to him, might be dispensed with; for the wise man is self-sufficing and needs no friends, and the fool can make no use of friends.<sup>1</sup> Devotion to one's country he considered ridiculous; for the wise man is a citizen of the world, and will not sacrifice himself and his wisdom to benefit fools.<sup>2</sup> The views of his School with regard to the Gods and religion were also frankly avowed;<sup>3</sup> a point in which he was followed by

application of his principles. He may have led a more moral life than Bio (Diog. iv. 53; Clement, Pædag. 15, A.), and yet have expressed the logical consequences of the Cyrenaic teaching. But it is undoubtedly incorrect to charge him, as Epiphanius (Expos. Fid. 1089, A.) does, with prompting to theft, perjury, and robbery.

<sup>1</sup> Diog. 98, and Epiphanius in still stronger terms: ἀγαθὸν μόνον ἔλεγε τὸν εὐδαιμονοῦντα, φεύγειν δὲ τὸν δυστυχοῦντα, κὰν ᾧ σοφός· καὶ αἰρετὸν εἶναι τὸν ἄφρονα πλούσιον οὐτα καὶ ἀπειθῇ. This too seems to be rather in the nature of a hasty conclusion, for Theodorus makes happiness depend on intelligence, and not on things without.

<sup>2</sup> Diog. 98, Epiph.

<sup>3</sup> The atheism of Theodorus, which, besides bringing down on him an indictment at Athens, gained for him the standing epithet ἄθεος (he was called θεὸς according to Diog. ii. 86, 100, in allusion to a joke of Stilpo's, but probably κατ' ἀντίφασιν for ἄθεος), will be frequently mentioned. In Diog. 97 he says: ἦν . . . παντάπασιν ἀναιρῶν τὰς περὶ θεῶν δόξας· καὶ αὐτοῦ περιετύχομεν

βιβλίῳ ἐπιγεγραμμένῳ περὶ θεῶν οὐκ εὐκαταφρονήτω. ἔξ οὗ φασιν Ἐπίκουρον λάβοντα τὰ πλείστα εἰπεῖν. The last statement can only apply to the general criticism of the gods, for Epicurus' peculiar views about them were certainly not shared by Theodorus. Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 218; Math. ix. 51, 55, mentions him among those who deny the existence of the gods, with the addition: διὰ τοῦ περὶ θεῶν συντάγματος τὰ παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησι θεολογούμενα ποικίλως ἀνασκεύσας. Cic. (N. D. i. 1, 2) says: nullos [Deos] esse omnino Diagoras Melius et Theodorus Cyrenaicus putaverunt. Ibid. 23, 63: Nonne aperte Deorum naturam sustulerunt? Ibid. 42, 117: Omnino Deos esse negabant, a statement which Minuc. Fel. Oct. 8, 2, and Lact. Ira Dei, 9, probably repeat after him. Also Plut. Comm. Not. 31, 4, says: Even Theodore and those who shared his views did not declare God to be corruptible, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐπίστευσαν ὡς ἔστι τι ἀφθαρτον. Epiph. (Expos. Fid. 1089) also asserts that he denied the existence of a God. In the face of these agreeing testimonies, the

Bio,<sup>1</sup> and Euemerus.<sup>2</sup> But the theory of Aristippus did not altogether satisfy Theodorus. He owned that pleasure and pain do not merely depend on ourselves and our inner state, but also in a great measure on external circumstances; and he sought such a definition of the highest good as should secure happiness to the wise man, and make that happiness exclusively dependent on intelligence.<sup>3</sup> This result, he thought, would be reached if happiness were made to consist, not in individual pleasures, but in a happy state of mind—unhappiness, not in individual feelings of annoyance, but in an unhappy state of mind; for feelings are the effects of impressions from without, but inward states of mind are in our own power.<sup>4</sup> Theodorus went on to assert, that

assertion of Clement (Pædag. 15, A.), that Theodorus and others had wrongly been called atheists, and that they only denied the popular Gods, their lives being otherwise good, can be of little weight. Theodorus no doubt denied the gods of the people in the first place, but it was not his intention to distinguish between them and the true God. The anecdotes in Diog. ii. 101, 116, gave the impression of insincerity.

<sup>1</sup> Diog. iv. 54: πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἀθεώτερον προσέφερετο τοῖς ὁμιλοῦσι τούτο Θεοδώρειον ἀπολαύσας· but in his last illness he was overcome with remorse, and had recourse to enchantments.

<sup>2</sup> The view of Euemerus about the Gods is briefly as follows: There are two kinds of Gods—heavenly and incorruptible beings, who are honoured by men as

Gods, such as the sun, the stars, the winds; and dead men, who were raised to the rank of Gods for their benefits to mankind. Diodore in Eus. Pr. Ev. ii. 2, 52. To the latter class of beings Euemerus referred the whole of Mythology, and supposed it to be a history of princes and princesses, Uranus, Cronus, Zeus, Rhea, &c. For further particulars consult Steinhart Allg. Encyclo. Art. Euhemerus.

<sup>3</sup> These reasons are not mentioned in so many words, but they follow from Theodorus' positions about the highest good, and also from the stress which, according to Diog. 98, he laid on the *αὐτάρκεια* of the wise man, and the difference he made between wisdom and folly.

<sup>4</sup> Probably what Cic. (Tusc. iii. 13, 28; 14, 31) quotes as Cyrenaic

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in themselves pleasure and pain were neither good nor bad, for goodness consists in cheerfulness and evil in unhappiness—the former proceeds from intelligence, the latter from folly; and this is the reason why intelligence and justice are to be recommended, whilst ignorance and wrong-doing are to be rejected.<sup>1</sup> He also occasionally displayed a disregard for life<sup>2</sup> which would have done a Cynic credit. He did not therefore altogether renounce the theory of pleasure, but changed its import by giving to it a new explanation. In the place of individual pleasures, a state of mind has been substituted which needs to be independent of the mere feelings of enjoyment and pleasure. The highest good is made to consist in being superior to circumstances, instead of a cheerful resignation to the impressions of the moment.

(b) *Hegesias.*

A step in advance was taken by Hegesias, who also adhered to the general maxims of Aristippus. With him good is identical with pleasure, evil with pain. All

doctrine belongs to Theodorus. It is to the effect that every evil does not engender sorrow, but that only which is unforeseen, and that precautions can be taken to prevent sorrow by familiarising ourselves with the thought of future evils.

<sup>1</sup> Diog. 98: τέλος δ' υπελάμβανε χαράν καὶ λυπὴν· τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ φρονήσῃ, τὴν δ' ἐπὶ ἀφροσύνῃ· ἀγαθὰ δὲ φρόνησιν καὶ δικαιοσύνην, κακὰ δὲ τὰς ἐναντίας ἔχεις, μέσα δὲ ἡδονὴν καὶ πόνον. That justice is reckoned among things which are good, is not opposed to this. It is to be recommended, because it protects us from the unpleasant consequences of forbidden actions,

and from the disquiet which the view of these consequences produces, although such actions are in themselves admissible.

<sup>2</sup> When he was at the court of Lysimachus, he so annoyed him by his frankness (Diog. 102; Plut. Exil. 16; Philo, Qu. Omn. pr. lib. 884, C.) that Lysimachus threatened to crucify him, upon which Theodorus uttered the celebrated saying, that it was indifferent to him whether he went to corruption in the earth or in the air. Cic. Tusc. i. 43, 102; Valer. Max. vi. 2, 3; Plut. An. Vitios. 3; Stob. Floril. 2, 23, attribute another saying to him on the same occasion.



that we do, we do for ourselves alone. If services are rendered to others, it is only because advantages are expected in return.<sup>1</sup> But when Hegesias endeavoured to discover wherein true pleasure was to be found, he met with no very consoling answer. Our life, he says, is full of trouble: the numerous sufferings of the body afflict the soul also, and disturb its peace; fortune in numberless ways crosses our wishes: man cannot reckon upon a satisfactory state of mind, in a word, upon happiness.<sup>2</sup> Even the practical wisdom, upon which Aristippus relied, afforded him no security; for if our perceptions, according to the old Cyrenaic maxim, do not show us things as they are in themselves, and if we are therefore always obliged to act according to probabilities, who can be sure that our calculations are always true?<sup>3</sup> And if it is impossible to attain happiness, it is surely foolish to strive after it. We must be content if we succeed in fortifying ourselves against the sufferings of life. Freedom from pain, not pleasure, is our goal.<sup>4</sup> But

<sup>1</sup> Diog. ii. 93: οἱ δὲ Ἡγησιακὸς λεγόμενος σκοποὺς μὲν εἶχον τοὺς αὐτοὺς, ἡδονὴν καὶ πόνον, μήτε δὲ χάριν τι εἶναι μήτε φιλίαν μήτε εὐεργεσίαν, διὰ τὸ μὴ δι' αὐτὰ ταῦτα αἰρεῖσθαι ἡμᾶς αὐτὰ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰς χρείας αὐτὰς, ὧν ἀπόντων μηδ' ἐκεῖνα ὑπάρχειν. Ibid. 95: τὸν τι σοφὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἕνεκα πάντα πράξειν· οὐδένα γὰρ ἡγεῖσθαι τῶν ἄλλων ἐπίσης ἕξιον αὐτῷ· καὶ γὰρ τὰ μέγιστα δοκῇ παρά του καρποῦσθαι, μὴ εἶναι αὐτάξια ὧν αὐτὸς παρὰσχῃ. The same, but less accurately, in Epiph. Exp. Fid. 1089, B.

<sup>2</sup> Diog. 94: τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὅλως ἀδύνατον εἶναι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ σῶμα πολλῶν ἀναπεπλησθαι παθημάτων, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν συμπαθεῖν τῷ σώματι καὶ ταραττεσθαι, τὴν δὲ τύχην πολλὰ τῶν κατ' ἐλπίδα κωλύειν· ὥστε διὰ ταῦτα ἀνὺπαρκτον τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι.

<sup>3</sup> Diog. 95: ἀνῆρουν δὲ καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις οὐκ ἀκριβοῦσας τὴν ἐπίγνωσιν, τῶν τ' εὐλόγως φαινομένων πάντα πράττειν.

<sup>4</sup> Diog. 95: τὸν τι σοφὸν οὐχ οὕτω πλεονάσειν ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν αἰρέσει, ὥς ἐν τῇ τῶν κακῶν φυγῇ, τέλος τιθέμενον τὸ μὴ ἐπιπόνως ζῆν

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how is this goal to be attained in a world so full of trouble and pain? Certainly it can never be attained as long as our peace of mind depends upon external things and circumstances. Contentment can really only be secured when everything which produces pleasure or pain is an object of indifference. Both pleasure and pain, as Hegesias observes, depend ultimately, not upon things, but upon our attitude towards things. Nothing in itself is pleasant or unpleasant, and the impression which things make upon us varies according to our wants or condition.<sup>1</sup> Neither riches nor poverty affect the happiness of life: the rich have no more enjoyment than the poor. Freedom or slavery, high or low rank, honour or dishonour, are not conditions of the amount of pleasure we may receive. Indeed, life is considered a good by the fool alone, but by the wise man as indifferent.<sup>2</sup> No Stoic or Cynic could more emphatically deprecate the value of external things than the pupil of Aristippus here does. But with these principles the noble and thoroughly Socratic maxim is connected, that faults ought not to arouse anger; nor ought any human beings to be assailed with hatred, but only with instruction, for no one does what is bad intentionally.<sup>3</sup> Since every one desires what is pleasant,

μηδὲ λυπηρῶς· ὃ δὴ περιγένεσθαι  
τοῖς ἀδιαφορήσασι, περὶ τὰ ποιητικὰ  
τῆς ἡδονῆς.

<sup>1</sup> Diog. 94: φύσει τ' οὐδὲν ἡδὺν  
ἢ ἀηδὲς ὑπελάμβανον· διὰ δὲ  
σπάνιεν ἢ ξενισμὸν ἢ κόριν τοὺς  
μὲν ἡδεσθαι τοὺς δ' ἀηδῶς ἔχειν.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. 95: καὶ τῷ μὲν ἄφρονι

τὸ ζῆν λυσιτελὲς, εἶναι, τῷ δὲ  
φρονίμῳ ἀδιάφορον.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.: ἔλεγον τὰ ἁμαρτήματα  
συγγνώμης τυγχάνειν· οὐ γὰρ  
ἐκόντα ἁμαρτάνειν, ἀλλὰ τινι  
πάθει κατηναγκασμένον· καὶ μὴ  
μισήσειν, μᾶλλον δὲ μεταδιδάσκειν.

every one desires what is good ; and as the wise man does not allow his peace of mind to depend on things external, neither does he allow it to be ruffled by the faults of others.

In this theory we find it expressed, more plainly than in that of Theodorus, that the doctrine of pleasure is unsatisfactory. It is even expressly allowed that there is more sorrow than joy in human life, and accordingly absolute indifference to outward impressions is insisted upon. But what right have we to identify pleasure and the good, or pain and evil ? The good is, after all, that which is the condition of our well-being ; and if indifference rather than pleasure satisfies the condition, indifference and not pleasure is the good. The doctrine of pleasure is thus transformed into its opposite—a Cynical independence of everything external. It is true the Cyrenaic school could not avow this as its leading thought without surrendering its own position, yet at the same time it is distinctly avowed within that school that pleasure is not in all cases the highest motive. Anniceris, however, maintained that the aim of every action is the pleasure resulting from it ; and, like the older Cyrenaics, he would not hear of a general aim of life, nor substitute freedom from pain in the place of pleasure.<sup>1</sup> He observed too that by pleasure our

(c) *Anni-  
ceris.*

<sup>1</sup> Clement. Strom. ii. 417, B.: οἱ δὲ Ἀννικέριοι καλούμενοι . . . τοῦ μὲν βίου τέλος οὐδὲν ὠρισμένον ἔταξαν, ἐκάστης δὲ πράξεως ἴδιον ὑπάρχειν τέλος, τὴν ἐκ τῆς πράξεως περιγινόμενὴν ἡδονήν, οὗτοι οἱ Κυρηναῖκοι τὸν ὅρον τῆς ἡδονῆς Ἐπικούρου, τοῦτο ἐστὶ τὴν τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος ὑπεξαίρεσιν, ἀθετοῦσι νεκροῦ κατάστασιν ἀποκαλοῦντες. This would justify the inaccurate statement in Diog. ii. 96: οἱ δ' Ἀννικέριοι τὰ μὲν ἄλλα κατὰ ταῦτα τοῦτοι—the

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own pleasure could only be understood; for of the feelings of others, according to the old hypothesis of his School, we can know nothing.<sup>1</sup> But pleasure is not only caused by enjoyments of the senses, but by intercourse with other men and by honourable pursuits.<sup>2</sup> Hence, apart from the benefit resulting from these relations, Anniceris upheld friendship, gratitude, family affection, and patriotism on independent grounds. He even went so far as to say that the wise man would make sacrifices to secure them, and that he would not impair his happiness by so doing, even if there remained to him but little actual enjoyment.<sup>3</sup> With this he came back to the ordinary view of life, to which he approximated still further by attaching less value to intelligence—the second element in the Cyrenaic doctrine of pleasure. In fact, he denied that intelligence alone was sufficient to make us safe and to raise us above the pre-

School of Hegesias—and also the assertion that Anniceris was an Epicurean. Cicero and Diogenes likewise affirm that his School declared pleasure to be the good.

<sup>1</sup> Diog. 96: τήν τι τοῦ φίλου εὐδαιμονίαν δι' αὐτὴν μὴ εἶναι ἀρετὴν, μηδὲ γὰρ αἰσθητὴν τῷ πέλας ὑπάρχειν.

<sup>2</sup> Clement continues: χαίρειν γὰρ ἡμᾶς μὴ μόνον ἐπὶ ἡδοναῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ ὁμιλίαις καὶ ἐπὶ φιλοτιμίαις. Comp. Cic. Off. iii. 33, 116. The expression in Clement, τὴν ἐκ τῆς πράξεως περιγινόμενῃν ἡδονήν, probably means not only to the pleasure resulting from an action, but the

pleasure immediately bound up with it.

<sup>3</sup> Diog. 96: ἀπέλιπον δὲ καὶ φιλίαν ἐν βίῳ καὶ χάριν καὶ πρὸς γονέας τιμὴν καὶ ὑπὲρ πατρίδος τι πράξειν. ὅθεν, διὰ ταῦτα καὶ ὀχλήσεις ἀναδέσχηται ὁ σοφὸς, οὐδὲν ἦττον εὐδαιμονήσει, καὶ ὀλίγα ἡδέα περιγένηται αὐτῷ. Ibid. 97: τὸν τι φίλον μὴ διὰ τὰς χρείας μόνον ἀποδέχεσθαι, ὣν ὑπολειπουσῶν μὴ ἐπιστρέφεσθαι· ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ τὴν γεγυῖαν εὐνοίαν· ἥς ἕνεκα καὶ πόνους ὑπομενεῖν, καὶ τοι τιθέμενον ἡδονὴν τέλος καὶ ἀχθόμενον ἐπὶ τῷ στέρεσθαι αὐτῆς ὅμως ἐκουσίως ὑπομενεῖν διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν φίλον στοργήν.

judices of the masses. Intelligence needs rather to be strengthened by custom, before it can successfully lay siege to a perverse use.<sup>1</sup>

Thus the Cyrenaic doctrine is seen gradually to vanish away. Aristippus declared that pleasure was the only good, understanding by pleasure actual enjoyment, and not mere freedom from pain; and, moreover, he made the pleasure of the moment, and not the state of man as a whole, to be the aim of all action. One after another these limitations were abandoned. Theodorus denied the last one, Hegesias the second, and even the first was assailed by Anniceris. It thus appears how impossible it is to combine the theory of Socrates, which demands intelligence and independence of the external world, with the leading thought of the systems of pleasure. The Socratic element disintegrates these systems and resolves them into their antagonistic parts. But as this process took place without the mind becoming conscious of it, it did not lead to the establishment of a new system. With strange inconsistency, the very men who had been active in bringing about this work of disintegration, continued to repeat the old doctrines of Aristippus, as if his system had never been modified.

<sup>1</sup> Ibid. 96: *μη εἶναι τε αὐτάρκη γενέσθαι· δεῖν δ' ἀνεθίξεσθαι διὰ τὸν λόγον πρὸς τὸ θαρρῆσαι καὶ τὴν ἐκ πολλοῦ συντραφείσαν ἡμῖν τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης ὑπεράνω φαύλην διάθεσιν.*



## CHAPTER XV.

## RETROSPECT.

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XV.*A. Inconsistencies  
of the im-  
perfect  
Socratic  
schools.*

INCONSISTENCIES were not confined to any one of the Socratic Schools in particular, but appear to have been common to them all. It was, without doubt, an inconsistency on the part of the Megarians to confine knowledge to conceptions, and at the same time to do away with all possibility of development, and with anything like difference or definiteness in conceptions; to declare that being is the good, and, at the same time, by denying variety and motion to being, to deprive it of that creative power which alone can justify such a position; to begin with the Socratic wisdom, and to end in unmeaning hair-splitting. It was an inconsistency for Antisthenes to endeavour to build all human life on a foundation of knowledge, but at the same time to destroy all knowledge by his theories of the meaning and connection of conceptions. It was no small inconsistency both in himself and his followers to aim at a perfect independence of the outer world, and yet to attribute an exaggerated value to the externals of the Cynical mode of life; to declare war against pleasure and selfishness, and at the same time to pronounce the wise man free from the most sacred moral duties; to renounce all enjoy-

ments, and to revel in the enjoyment of a moral self-exaltation. The unsatisfactory nature of the leading thoughts with which these Schools started appears in all these inconsistencies, no less than in their mutual contradictions. We see how far these thinkers were removed from the perfect moderation, from the ready susceptibility of mind, from the living flexibility of Socrates, and how they all clung to particular sides of his personal character, but were unable to comprehend it as a whole.

The same fact will also, no doubt, explain that tendency to Sophistry which is discernible in these philosophers. The captious subtleties of the Megarians, the indifference of the Cynics to all speculative knowledge, and their contempt for the whole theory of conceptions, no less than the doctrines of Aristippus relative to knowledge and pleasure, savour more of the Sophists than of Socrates. But yet all these schools professed to follow Socrates, and there was not one of them which did not place some element of the Socratic philosophy at the head of its system. It is hardly correct then for modern writers to find nothing but sophistical views, supplemented and corrected by what is Socratic, in the teaching of the Socratic Schools, and, instead of deducing their differences from the many-sidedness of Socrates, to refer them to the diversities of the Sophists converging from various sides towards the Socratic philosophy as a centre.<sup>1</sup> With decided admirers of Socrates, such

*B. These schools are more followers of Socrates than of the Sophists. (1) Megarians and Cynics.*

<sup>1</sup> See Hermann, *Ges. Abh.* 228.

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as Antisthenes and Euclid, there can be not even a shadow of support for this view. Such men would never have professed to aim at a faithful reproduction of the life and teaching of their master, unless they had been conscious that to Socrates they were indebted for first supplying them with an intellectual groundwork, and for first giving them the living germ of a true philosophy;—facts which may also be clearly observed in their philosophy. In their case it is wrong to speak of the ennobling influence of Socrates on sophistical principles; we ought rather to speak of a sophistic influence, and a sophistical treatment of the teaching of Socrates. Socrates, as it were, gave the substance of the teaching, sophistry being only a narrower limitation of it; and on this account a School like that of the Stoics was able in the end to connect itself with that of the Cynics.

(2) *Aristippus.*

The case is somewhat different with Aristippus. But we have already established, not only that he professed to be a follower of Socrates, but that he really was one, although he penetrated less than any one else into the deeper meaning of the founder's teaching, and showed the influence of sophistical views to an appreciable extent. Previous sophistical culture may then be a cause, in addition to their lower powers of mind, which prevented the founders of the imperfect Schools from entering so deeply or so completely into the spirit of their master as Plato did; but it should also be remembered that Socrates gave occasion to this variety in those Schools which were connected with him. On the one hand, his

personal character afforded a rich store of thought, calling for investigation in the most opposite directions; on the other hand, the scientific form of his philosophy was imperfect and unsystematic, and hence admitted of many diverging modes of treatment.<sup>1</sup>

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The separation of the Socratic Schools was not without importance for the further advancement of philosophy. Bringing out the separate elements which were united in Socrates, and connecting them with the corresponding elements in the pre-Socratic philosophy, the various Schools brought their several points into greater prominence. The problems were set for all subsequent thinkers to discuss. The logical and ethical consequences of the Socratic maxims were brought to light. It was seen what the separation of the various sides in the teaching of Socrates, or their combination with other assumptions, would lead to, unless these assumptions were first brought into harmony with the mind of Socrates. In this way the smaller Socratic schools were instrumental in enforcing the demand for a comprehensive treatment of the Socratic philosophy, a treatment taking all its aspects into consideration both in their relations to each other and to earlier systems, and

*C. Importance of these schools.  
(1) They settled the problems for subsequent philosophy.*

<sup>1</sup> Cic. de Orat. iii. 16, 61, observes with some justice, but somewhat superficially: Cum essent plures orti fere a Socrate, quod ex illius variis et diversis et in omnem partem diffusis disputationibus alius aliud apprehenderat, proseminatæ sunt quasi

familiæ dissidentes inter se, &c. For instance, Plato and Antisthenes, qui patientiam et duritiam in Socratico sermone maxime adamarat, and also Aristippus, quem illac magis voluptariæ disputationes delectarant.

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deciding the importance of each one relatively to the rest. Thus these Schools paved the way for Plato and Aristotle, Euclid supplying to Plato his theory of ideas, Antisthenes and Aristippus his theory of the highest good.

(2) *They prepared the way for the post-Aristotelian system.*

Of greater importance is the fact that these followers of Socrates prepared the way for the course taken by philosophy after the time of Aristotle. It is true that the post-Aristotelian systems are not immediately connected with the imperfect Socratic Schools; and it is no less true that those systems would have been impossible without Plato and Aristotle, but it must not be forgotten that they are also greatly indebted to the Socratic Schools. The predominance of practical over intellectual interests which the post-Aristotelian philosophy displays, the moral contentment with which the wise man withdraws from everything external, and falls back upon the freedom and virtue of his inner life, the citizenship of the world which can dispense with a country and political interest—all these peculiarities of later times are foreshadowed in the lesser Socratic Schools. The Stoa took to itself all the moral principles of the Cynics, softening down their austerity and expanding their application. The same School, besides following Aristotle, connects its logic chiefly with the Megarians. The scepticism of Pyrrho and the Academy was another product of the Megarian logic, although it followed a somewhat different direction. The doctrine of Aristippus reappears in Epicurus, but altered in details. In short, tendencies, which at



an earlier period were only able to secure a qualified recognition, became dominant when they had been strengthened, altered, and supplemented by other elements.

But this was not possible until the intellectual strength of Greece had abated, and her political condition had become hopeless, by which currency was given to the view that indifference to everything external could alone lead to peace of mind. At first the intellectual interest was too vivid, and the Greek spirit was too keen, to suffer in this way from the results brought about by the Socratic philosophy; but, owing to its deeper foundations, that philosophy could not fail to lead to a science of conceptions such as was put forth by Plato and Aristotle.

(3) *They were themselves in harmony with the spirit of the age.*

Metaphysics so abstract, and subtleties so empty as the Megarian, could only then be possible; morals so unintellectual and absolutely negative as those of the Cynics could only then be tolerated; a doctrine like that of Aristippus could only then claim to be Socratic, when the various but inwardly connected elements of the Socratic teaching were taken separately, and when, owing to a formal imperfection in expressing his thoughts, the defects of the method of Socrates were mistaken for defects in the matter of his teaching. Undoubtedly the imperfect Socratic Schools are not without importance for the history of Greek philosophy, but the value of their intellectual productions cannot be rated very highly.

To take a deeper insight into the Socratic philosophy, and to discuss that philosophy in a more comprehensive manner, was a task reserved for Plato.



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